Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

59. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, July 15, 1985

SUBJECT

• Soviet Probes for Private Channel

Two developments last week—the first almost certainly and the second potentially—indicate that Gorbachev or members of his office are attempting to establish a personal channel to prepare for the Geneva meeting.

The first of these involves Bill McSweeney of Occidental Petroleum and the second Larry Horowitz of Teddy Kennedy’s staff. I will describe each in turn:

McSweeney:

Mark Palmer has reported to me a call by Bill McSweeney last Thursday.² He asked me to pass this information on to you with the proviso that he would like to have the opportunity to report it directly to Secretary Shultz when he returns and therefore would appreciate your not mentioning it to the Secretary until Palmer has had a chance to put him in the loop. In the meantime Palmer is not informing anyone else at State regarding the matter.

McSweeney told Palmer the following: During his last trip to Moscow (early July), Occidental’s Soviet employee in Moscow, one Mike Bruk (aka Brook) insisted on taking him from a performance at the Bolshoi for “an important message.” (Bruk is a well-known KGB official who has been working for the Hammer organization for some time—obviously to keep an eye on their operations and to act as an official go-between.³ He is bright, capable and speaks perfect, unaccented English. The Occidental people know of his affiliation, but Hammer took him on and keeps him on because he considers it useful to have the contacts Bruk provides.)

Bruk’s message purported to be from Alexandrov-Agentov, Gorbachev’s principal foreign affairs adviser in his immediate office. (Alexandrov held the same job with Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko. Many of us marvel at his staying power, but he does seem to be in solidly with Gorbachev. He, not a Foreign Ministry official, attended Gorbachev’s meetings with Baldrige and with Andreas.⁴ Bruk and Alexandrov are known to be close personal friends, often—for example—spending their vacations together.)

The message was that Gorbachev very much wanted a private channel to the President in order to make appropriate preparations for their meeting. McSweeney was told, however, that under no circumstances should Armand Hammer be involved in any effort to set one up. Bruk said the Soviets consider him unreliable because he is “garrulous” and indiscreet. McSweeney agreed not to inform Hammer, and Bruk then asked whom McSweeney would recommend as a point of contact in the Administration. McSweeney said that the person he knew best was Mark Palmer and that he had found Mark both reliable and discreet. Bruk then agreed that the message should be passed to Mark.

As an example of the sort of thing Gorbachev wanted to discuss, Bruk cited his desire to arrange for regular, annual meetings, which could be announced at the Geneva meeting. Otherwise he mentioned no substance but laid out a “communications plan” with code names for the various people who might be mentioned in messages. The code names included ones for the President, Shultz, yourself, Charlie Wick (!?) and Palmer. On the Soviet side, Gorbachev, Alexandrov and Gromyko were covered. According to this system, Palmer—if so authorized—could pass messages to McSweeney, who would then communicate with Bruk by the Occidental telex, using the code names provided.

That was the extent of the message itself, but McSweeney mentioned to Palmer two other matters which tend to substantiate the hypothesis that this is a real probe. First, McSweeney said that when he was in Moscow in mid-June (an earlier trip than the one when he was given the “message”) Bruk had asked him one evening to tell Art Hartman that Romanov would soon be removed and that Gromyko would be “kicked upstairs.” McSweeney said he was unable to do so since he had to leave Moscow early the next morning and did not want to do it by telephone. He therefore told Bruk he would have to find another channel. This occurred nearly two weeks before the Romanov/Gromyko change was made, and suggests two things: (1) That Gorbachev (or, at a minimum, Alexandrov) wanted to get word to us in advance, probably anticipating that we would consider it welcome news; and (2) It was at attempt to validate Bruk as a channel to the top.

The second matter has a bearing on McSweeney’s relationships with Bruk and Alexandrov. McSweeney told Palmer that he, Bruk and Alexandrov had been involved (to the distaste of all three, he claimed) as middlemen in getting expensive gifts from Hammer to Brezhnev, and possibly Brezhnev’s successors. When Brezhnev or members of his family wanted an expensive bauble, the word came by this channel and Hammer always was obliging. McSweeney did not say specifically whether Andropov and Chernenko also made use of this arrangement, but did say that on his most recent visit Alexandrov had asked for the “Heritage Edition” of the Encyclopedia Britannica for Gorbachev and the regular edition for himself—both of which have already been dispatched through the McSweeney-Bruk channel. (I find this both fascinating and curious. I can understand why Alexandrov, who speaks good English, might like a copy of the Encyclopedia Britannica, but Gorbachev? Is his English better than we have assumed? Does he just want it because the leather-bound volumes look good on the shelf? Or is Alexandrov indulging in a little free lancing? And whatever the answers to these questions may be, the incident seems to indicate that these fellows are not so devoted to their “anti-corruption” campaign that they let it interfere with their own ability to solicit some largesse from a soft touch.)

Horowitz:

Larry called me Friday to say that he had been invited to make a sudden visit to Moscow and that he would be seeing, at a minimum, Alexandrov and Zagladin. He said he just wanted us to know and that he would come over and brief John Poindexter and me when he gets back next week.

Given the fact that we responded to a message Zagladin sent through Horowitz last year—and that the whole matter was handled discreetly on all sides—the purpose of calling Horowitz over at this time could be to activate another probe for a channel.⁵

Comment:

1. Regarding McSweeney: There are many unsavory aspects of this connection, and it is obviously unsuitable for passing any substantive messages. It does seem to be a genuine effort on the Soviet side, however, and we might consider sending just one message back to the effect that if there is interest in private communications they should have an appropriate member of their party in Helsinki contact Palmer or me to discuss.

2. Regarding Horowitz, there is nothing to do until we find out what he comes back with. However, the invitation to him, coming on top of the various probes made to Agency sources, indicates to me that Gorbachev is indeed trying to make a connection and that we should find some way to accommodate him.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss the general question once again with Secretary Shultz and decide what our stance should be if we are approached in Helsinki, and also whether we should find some way through the various channels which seem to be available to let the Soviets know in advance that we will respond cooperatively if they wish to make a concrete suggestion. (Please protect Palmer regarding McSweeney’s approach to him until Mark has a chance to brief the Secretary directly.)⁶

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (3/8). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for action. Sent through Poindexter.
2. July 11.
3. Armand Hammer was Chairman of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation.
4. See Documents 32 and 38 and footnote 4, Document 36.
5. During a previous trip to the Soviet Union in January 1984, Horowitz met with Zagladin and passed information to Matlock. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 163 and 180.
6. McFarlane initialed his approval of the recommendation.