Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

304. Editorial Note

At 8 p.m. on the evening of October 11, 1986, working groups from the U.S. and Soviet delegations at the Reykjavik Summit in Iceland met to discuss the various arms control issues raised by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during their meetings earlier in the day; see Documents 301 and 302. Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, who headed the U.S. group, recalled in his memoir: “The working groups began their work at eight o’clock that evening. I chaired the American team on arms control and Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the chief of staff of the Soviet armed forces, chaired the Soviet team.” Nitze continued: “We spent a large part of the first six hours of the meeting trying to pin down what ‘fifty percent reduction’ would entail. Akhromeyev explained that the Soviets proposed halving the strategic arsenals of each side ‘category by category.’ I was quick to object to that formula. That would mean unequal end points in those categories where one side or the other had the current advantage. For example, the Soviet Union’s large relative advantage in ICBM warheads with a hard-target kill capability would remain. I thought the sides must strive for equal end results; this would require unequal reductions where the current levels favored one side.

“I suggested that we begin by agreeing on a final numerical ceiling of 6,000 on ballistic missile warheads, including both ICBM and SLBM warheads, plus long-range air-launched cruise missiles, and a 1,600 ceiling on ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers and then deal with sublimits within those equal end-point aggregates. After much discussion and no agreement, we moved on to INF, then defense and space, and then nuclear testing. We eventually came back to START, but we were still hung up on the issue of equal reductions versus unequal reductions to equal end-points.

“At two in the morning, Marshal Akhromeyev rose and said he was leaving the meeting—he then added that he would be back at three. Bob Linhard [Senior Director for Defense Programs and Arms Control in the National Security Council] and I hopped into a car and drove through the frigid Icelandic night to our hotel and woke up Secretary Shultz. He received us in his suite in robe and pajamas, surprisingly alert for that hour.” (Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pages 429–430)

In his memoir, Secretary of State George Shultz recalled: “At 2:00 A.M., sound asleep at my hotel, I was awakened by Paul Nitze. He, along with Kampelman, Perle, Linhard, Hill, and Timbie, crammed themselves into my small sitting room. The Icelandic chill pervaded the room. I put a sweater on over my pajamas and over that a bathrobe. Nitze was agitated. He saw a chance to make real progress, but Rowny in particular in our delegation objected to any show of flexibility on our part: the Soviets would have to meet our positions entirely. Nitze went on, ‘On START, they would reduce by 50 percent in every category, but we could not agree to the unequal outcome that such a process would yield.’ Nitze had insisted on equal numerical end-levels on warheads and delivery vehicles. We proposed a limit of 6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles. ‘On INF, Asia is still a problem.’ Paul paused. ‘Akhromeyev is a first-class negotiator. Communism is a flawed system and it will fail, but Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev is a man of great courage and character. If anyone can help the USSR toward its best aspirations, he can. But he is a good man in a bad system.’

“‘Akhromeyev was agreeable,’ Richard Perle said. ‘Then they caucused, and Karpov, we judged, argued with Akhromeyev for departing from Gorbachev’s proposal: 50 percent reductions, category by category, resulting in unequal outcomes.’

“‘So the military man is reasonable, and the Foreign Ministry man blocked him,’ I said with a laugh. That was just the opposite of the message provided in the CIA’s ‘intelligence’ report of twenty-four hours ago.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pages 763–764)

Shultz’s recollections mirror and may in fact be based in part on the handwritten notes of his Executive Assistant, Charles Hill. In his notes, dated October 12 at 2 a.m., Hill wrote that Nitze gave Shultz the “papers we submitted” to the Soviets on the proposals. Shultz reacted: “But these don’t capture G proposal! These are our original positions!” Nitze explained to Shultz that he was “opposed by our own” delegation. (Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for October 12, 1986) Hill’s notes from October 12 are in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume XI, START I, Documents 160, 161, and 165.

Shultz continued describing this conversation in his memoir: “‘We’re supposed to reconvene at 3:00 A.M.,’ Richard Perle noted. ‘The problem is that 50 percent cuts across the board will leave the Soviets with more than we would have in every category where they now have more on their side.’

“‘We must stand our ground on equal outcomes,’ I told them. Everyone agreed. ‘They have put something new on the table. We shouldn’t be bound by the detail of our old position,’ I said. ‘Sunday’s discussion will be less precise, but potentially bolder, because Reagan and Gorbachev will be bargaining with each other, not with their hard-line advisers. What the president will need from us in the morning is boundaries of positions and words he should stick to.’

“On INF, I told the group, ‘try to get to the point where we agree in a precise way on everything but Asia.’ On START, ‘your job is to make use of—not just reject—their offer of a 50 percent cut in heavy ballistic missiles. Apply the 50 percent cut, then say that equality is their longstanding position. But we can’t seek strict equality, as there are asymmetries in the two force structures. You guys have got to get loose from just restating our old position. Get SDI deployment worked into the equation so that continuing reductions in offensive weapons are clearly the result of a continuing SDI program.’”

“To Nitze I said, ‘This is your working group, and you’re the boss. It’s not a meeting in which everybody has a veto. There’s no rule or requirement for unanimity on our side.’ So, shortly before 3:00 A.M., Nitze led the group back to Hofdi House.

“‘I’m really sorry to have disturbed your sleep, Mr. Secretary,’ Nitze said. ‘Who do you think Akhromeyev woke up?’ I laughed. Nitze went back to work. I went back to bed. But I tossed and turned, mulling over how to handle the coming day’s inevitable pressure—and potential.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, page 764)

Nitze continued describing the U.S.-Soviet meeting in his memoir: “When we reassembled at Hofdi House at three, it became evident that Akhromeyev had awakened his boss too and had received authorization to agree to equal numerical end-levels on warheads and delivery vehicles. It then seemed to me that this opened up a significant prospect for real progress toward a comprehensive agreement.” (Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, page 431) Detailed discussion on START and INF numbers followed. The memorandum of conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume XI, START I, Document 159. Nitze explained that “the two sides found themselves far apart on space and defense issues. The Soviet team continued to insist that research and testing on SDI be confined to the laboratory. I suggested language for our memorandum to our superiors that would state the three issues on which we were disagreed: one, the length of the nonwithdrawal period, two, what happened after that period, and three, what happened during that period. Akhromeyev was reluctant to agree with that. I couldn’t even get an agreement on how we disagreed.

“We worked steadily until 6:30 A.M. drafting our memorandum for inclusion in a final joint communique.” Nitze continued: “As the meeting ended after more than ten hours of intense negotiations, I realized that large doses of mentally induced adrenaline had kept me alert all night. I found Marshal Akhromeyev a challenging negotiator with a clear, well-informed mind. I believe the dark, early morning hours found a mutual respect and admiration in our relationship that are rare in the annals of American-Soviet negotiations. He was tough, determined, but he was trying to get an agreement.”(Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, page 432) Several draft papers, possibly versions of the communiqué, are in the Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, President-Gorbachev Meeting, Reykjavik, October 1986 (5/5).

Nitze and his team went back to brief Shultz before the next morning’s meeting. According to Hill’s notes, at 7:10 a.m. Shultz said: “Damn good! (shake hands) what we came for.” Nitze then went into details, and Shultz requested “give me all the points as you came close so I can prepare the President.” (Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for October 12, 1986)

Shultz recalled in his memoir: “At 7:10 A.M. Nitze reported in. The working parties had agreed on START: big reductions in heavy ballistic missiles and equal outcomes of 6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles on each side. And Nitze had achieved a critical breakthrough with Akhromeyev on bomber counting rules: a strategic bomber would count as one, no matter how many gravity bombs or short-range attack missiles were on board.

“‘Damn good! It’s what we came for!’ I said, and pumped Nitze’s hand.

“‘The last sentence on sea-launched cruise missiles took an hour and a half,’ Paul said. And they had come close to agreement on INF except for the Asian question.

“‘A terrific night’s work, Paul,’ I told him.

“‘I haven’t had so much fun in years.’ He beamed. ‘Akhromeyev is very sound,’ Nitze said. ‘Great guy. We had a good exchange. Karpov was fuming. Arbatov was terrible. On our side, Rowny was negative.’

“The long night’s work was coming our way. We had won a 50 percent cut in strategic weapons to equal numerical outcomes, and, on INF, the Soviets had held to their new position that British and French systems need not be included. ‘The president’s call for the total elimination of all ballistic missiles is the crucial point of our position,’ I told Nitze, ‘because the more they cut, the less need there is for a full SDI; and if they cut entirely, there is no need for argument about SDI. Gorbachev is making these proposals and will expect credit for them. Fine, let him keep making them. His proposals are the result of five years of pressure from us.’” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pages 764–765)