Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

303. Draft Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 11–12, 1986, 8 p.m.–4 a.m.

PARTICIPANT

• U.S.

  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • Ambassador Hartman
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • Presidential Advisor Rodman
  • DAS Simons
  • Sov Director Parris
  • Mr. Hopkins (translator)

• Soviet

  • Bessmertnykh
  • Dubinin
  • Mikol’chak
  • Shishlin
  • Primakov

Assistant Secretary Ridgway began the meeting by proposing that the sides agree on an agenda for the discussion to follow. She suggested that several outstanding issues in the areas of regional problems, human rights, and bilateral affairs be considered and that the group work to create an informal list of promising areas for future work.² Bessmertnykh responded that such a list would indeed prove helpful and the Soviet side had come prepared with some suggestions of their own. He began to read from a prepared text which listed several topics for further consideration. Ridgway remarked that the language from the Soviet text was surprisingly formal and “political” in tone. She observed that it appeared to be more appropriate for use as a public statement or joint communique and not for use as an internal working document which she envisioned would result from this meeting. Ridgway then produced a text prepared by the U.S. team and read a few examples as alternatives to the Soviet document.³ After Ambassador Dubinin jokingly remarked that he had attempted to acquire a copy of the U.S. text from Mr. Parris prior to the meeting, Ridgway agreed to exchange copies with Bessmertnykh.

The sides then adjourned briefly to examine the two texts. Upon reconvening it was agreed that SOV Director Parris and MFA Minister Mikol’chak would work together privately in the next room to produce a mutually satisfactory text which incorporated both U.S. and Soviet language.⁴

After Parris and Mikol’chak departed, Presidential Advisor Peter Rodman began the discussion on regional issues by stressing their importance in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. He recalled the experience of the 1970’s when these issues exploded in our faces and derailed other important things going on. He continued that today, when we seemed to be making progress in other areas, this was all the more reason to be alert so that these issues didn’t explode in our faces again. This was why it was important to maintain this regular dialogue on regional issues even though it had been unproductive so far. Someday, when some of these issues were more ripe for solution, this channel might prove to be very useful.

Soviet representative Primakov responded that there was a misunderstanding which he always heard when he dealt with the U.S., namely, its attitude concerning the Soviet Union’s posture on regional issues. He argued that the USSR is wrongly accused by the U.S. of relegating this question to a back burner. Such is not the case. Rather, the USSR is interested in maintaining contact with the U.S. about regional conflicts in some areas, and it would like to bring the Soviet and American positions closer together in certain other areas. He said the Soviet Union is aware that the two countries may play differing roles in various solutions to regional issues.

However, Primakov added the sides could agree on measures to help bring about agreements. Although at the present time arrangements are not being worked out to achieve practical steps leading to agreements, it would be possible in the future to achieve agreements which could help confine regional conflicts. He stressed that the Soviet Union is prepared to conduct consultations with the U.S. on acute regional conflicts, adding that it would be possible to have special contacts between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Department.

Primakov then turned to a specific discussion of the Middle East. He noted that the U.S. and USSR had good exchanges last summer and had agreed on many questions.⁵

He attempted to describe the Soviet Union’s general approach to Middle East conflicts by stating that the USSR does not believe that separate deals have “justified” themselves. However, he pointed out that conducting bilateral discussions and making contributions to solutions to problems represent something different; they are not separate deals when such discussions and solutions constitute part of a more general solution. Further he stated that if political questions are not solved, it hinders reaching a total settlement.

Primakov asserted that the U.S. side was already aware of the Soviet proposal for an international conference on the Middle East. He acknowledged that such a proposal presented difficulties in terms of participants and issues to be addressed. However, these problems could be handled by a preparatory committee consisting of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Primakov stated that the USSR has had consultations on this question with many countries, and the majority favor the creation of such a preparatory committee.

He noted that the USSR has not considered a mid-East settlement excluding the U.S. and wondered why the U.S. would be willing to exclude the USSR from such a settlement. He acknowledged that there is a big emotional question involved in all of this, namely, Soviet-Israeli relations. However, he said he thought in the framework of a peaceful settlement, all such issues could be resolved.

Peter Rodman responded that the Middle East was a classic case for the proposition that the key to a solution was a negotiation between the parties concerned. If the parties were very close together, an international conference might not be necessary; if they were far apart (as they were now), it was hard to see how an international conference would do any good. The U.S. was prepared to consider how an international framework of some kind could help promote negotiations in the right circumstances. However, this seemed premature at this point.

Rodman continued that the U.S. had other concerns about an international conference, some having to do with our analysis of the negotiating process and some having to do with our assessment of Soviet policy. Our analysis of the negotiating process told us that, while the final outcome had to be comprehensive—in the sense of covering all points—this did not necessarily mean it was productive to tackle all the problems at once. The Israeli political structure could not handle making major concessions on all fronts simultaneously. Progress could best be made one step at a time—and we had achieved several successful negotiations in the last 13 years. To attempt a “comprehensive negotiation” could mean delaying the attainable while waiting for the unattainable. Moreover, Rodman added that the U.S. had serious concerns about Soviet policy in the region. We saw no sign that the Soviet Union was prepared to put pressure on its friends for flexibility the way we are always expected to put pressure on our friends for flexibility. On the contrary, the Soviet Union seemed to align itself with the most rejectionist elements like Syria and Libya, and seemed always to oppose positive developments like the February 11 accord and the Hassan-Peres meeting.

Rodman continued that the U.S. had yet another problem with an international conference, i.e., the suspicion that one motive for some countries’ interest in a conference was to put pressure on the U.S. These countries may believe that within the context of a conference, the U.S. could be pressed to do things it might not do in other contexts. Rodman cautioned that this was a mistaken notion. However, he added that the U.S. is not against some kind of international framework under the right conditions.

Primakov responded by again citing the inadequacy of separate deals. The U.S. could conclude ten agreements in the Middle East, and enjoy them, but unless we solved the Palestinian problem and the problem of territory we wouldn’t solve the problem at all. He cited the May 17 accord on Lebanon. There was no way to assure Israel’s security except on the basis of a solution to the Palestinian and territorial problems, including a Palestinian entity. Primakov denied that the Soviet Union was interested in destabilizing the Middle East—there was no benefit to the Soviet Union from a prolongation of the conflict. He again urged a preparatory conference, feeling that it held great promise and had the support of the countries of the region.

At this point, Rodman turned the discussion to the Iran-Iraq war, identifying this as an area of possibly converging interests. He stated that the U.S. had noted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s remarks at the UNGA calling for an end to the war and indicated that the U.S. would seek appropriate occasions to make the same point.⁶

Primakov replied that both the U.S. and the USSR are interested in bringing the war to an end. In general, neither side wants winners or a continuation of the war. He suggested that the Security Council’s activity should be stepped up on this issue and added that the USSR is ready to coordinate steps with the U.S. on this issue. Currently, each side is operating parallel to the other, but there are no joint or coordinated activities. He noted that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had discussed this question and had agreed that such steps must be taken with great care.

Rodman then began the discussion of Afghanistan by pointing out the importance of the issue. He emphasized that the U.S. was not impressed by the token withdrawal just announced, instead a complete withdrawal was necessary. Rodman continued that a military solution could not be achieved, nor could any solution be achieved, without the support and consent of the Afghan people. A solution was only possible on the basis of a rapid Soviet withdrawal and self-determination for the Afghan people.

Rodman pointed out that the U.S. had no desire to keep the Soviets in Afghanistan in order to “bleed” them. On the contrary, the U.S. was interested in a political solution and would be delighted to get the Soviets out rapidly. The U.S. has no strategic designs on Afghanistan and has no desire for bases there. The U.S. objective is to see Afghanistan a neutral, nonaligned country.

Primakov responded that the USSR would like to find a solution to this problem. He asked whether the U.S. Administration was ready to examine the situation soberly and realistically. He said the USSR is deeply determined to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, but first, indispensable prerequisites must be established. In this respect, there are two possibilities: international guarantees within a short time frame; or, if that is not possible, then the need to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan—something that is currently going on. He said the problem of Afghanistan can be resolved quickly if there is a desire to do so. Soviet goals are clear: Afghanistan should be an independent, sovereign, non-aligned state.

The Soviet representative (Primakov ?) then turned the discussion to Central America, stating that the USSR is against involvement in the crisis. He stressed that the Soviet Union has no expansionist ambitions in the region and added that U.S. claim of “vital interest” in the region are unacceptable to the USSR. He argued that, by extension, any area could be declared of “vital interest” to a country and thus justify involvement. He concluded by stating that the Soviet Union totally supports the Contadora and believes that a solution can be worked out to accommodate all parties.

In reference to Southern Africa, he (Primakov ?) noted that a group of African states are attempting to solve their problems independently. He said that given the joint moral support of the USSR, the U.S., and the West in general, they could find mutually acceptable solutions to their problems.

Primakov next gave a brief survey of Soviet ideas about how to treat regional issues. He stated that the USSR believes that exchanges of views with the U.S. are quite constructive and useful and should be continued. Referring to the document which the delegations were preparing, he said that despite his desire to do so, he did not think it would be possible to agree on acceptable language in the area of regional issues. However, he repeated Soviet interest in a continuing dialogue and offered some operating “principles” for such dialogue. Specifically, he explained that dialogue should be conducted on the basis of respect for sovereignty and the right of those countries involved to choose freely their own social structure, paths of development, and independent policies for choosing their friends and allies. He said this would be a good approach for both the USSR and the U.S. to countries where regional conflicts exist.

Primakov explained that this approach would answer U.S. concerns regarding Soviet involvement in regional conflicts. He added that it is necessary for both sides to manifest restraint, to carry on an exchange of views, to have constructive consultations, and to take well thought out measures. He added that, where possible, the USSR and the U.S. should attempt to act in a parallel manner. Finally, he suggested that if regional conflicts become acute or suddenly flare up, there should be immediate communications between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Department.

In response to the U.S. side’s presentation on humanitarian and human rights issues (U.S. presentation not available for memcon transcript),⁷ the Soviet representatives responded that during the first discussion held between Gorbachev and President Reagan, Gorbachev had noted specifically where the President had raised the issue of human rights, i.e., at what particular moments the issue had been raised.⁸ First, the President had said that he was not anticipating a joint public resolution of this issue. Further, the President had said that the U.S. was not interested in interfering in the internal affairs of the USSR or changing its laws in some way. The President also pointed out that the U.S. is a nation of immigrants and therefore quite sensitive to this problem.

The Soviet speaker (?) countered that the U.S. side would have to understand that the Soviet Union also has its own attitudes about human rights in the U.S. Moreover, he said, the USSR does not think that the resolution of this question lies in immigration or immigration laws.

However, he suggested that the group not go further into details on this particular subject. He thought it would be more productive, if necessary, to think about some short formulation on humanitarian and human rights issues to the effect that the positions of the sides had been set forth and discussed.

After some further U.S. remarks (?), Bessmertnykh said that the USSR does understand this U.S. concern. He noted that laws and regulations are improving, pointing to the results of the Berne conference and the Helsinki Accords. He expressed the hope that the U.S. would deal with its own human rights problems.

However, he said that the USSR did not think that Soviet-U.S. relations should depend on how the two countries view each other’s respective behavior in this area. He continued that if there is a desire to put Soviet-American relations on a solid track, this question should not be over-emphasized during the preparations for the General Secretary’s U.S. visit. In reference to this he noted that at a recent press conference U.S. journalists had asked Soviet representatives about the Bernard Kalb case and also about “disinformation,” which had been conveyed to the USSR and Libya. He noted that the Soviet representatives had evaded answering those questions.⁹

He went on to say that thanks to the fact that the U.S. side had agreed to discuss all questions at the Reykjavik meeting, including arms control, Gorbachev had said the USSR is prepared to talk about humanitarian issues. However, he repeated that Soviet-American relations should not be dependent on those issues.

Ridgway asked DAS Simons to describe this set of U.S. concerns, but not in terms in linkages. Simons used the metaphor that a rising tide lifts all boats. Ridgway then acknowledged that any language on the issue of human rights would have to be bracketed on the document being produced that evening.¹⁰

At this point there was a break for coffee.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Reykjavik Conversation October 1986. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place at Hofdi House. An unknown hand wrote “DRAFT” at the top of the page. Rodman also drafted a memorandum of this conversation on February 11, 1987. (Department of State, EUR/RUS Files, Political Subject and Chronological Files, Lot 00D471, Reykjavik Summit 10/11–12/86) In a covering note to Ridgway on his draft, Rodman explained: “I have put this together from my notes and from Hopkins’ notes. I have heard you had some problems with my additions. Please let me know, so I can put this in final for the files.” In a handwritten note, presumably in July 1988 when Alexander Vershbow became the EUR/SOV Office Director, Ridgway wrote: “Sandy—As you can tell by the date, this is OBE & should stay that way. We never had note-takers in the working group & then suddenly Peter R. turned up w/ this. It’s all skewed, short on things Peter wasn’t interested in etc. I never replied because I never wanted this to be official. I’m suggesting reading & tossing, or tossing & not reading, but it is not an accurate picture. Roz.” A note in an unknown hand at the top of the covering note reads: “SP—for deep file.” (Department of State, EUR/RUS Files, Political Subject and Chronological Files, Lot 00D471, Reykjavik Summit 10/11–12/86)
2. In his book, Matlock wrote: “Both working groups convened at eight that evening, one in the ground-floor conference room in Hofdi House, and the other in the upstairs common room. Discussion in the Ridgway-Bessmertnykh group, in which I participated, went little beyond summaries of what had been discussed earlier. The discussion of human rights was devoid of acrimony but resulted in no concrete commitments by the Soviet representatives.” (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, p. 222)
3. No text was attached. However, a draft text was attached to Peter Rodman’s February 1987 copy. See footnote 1, above.
4. According to Peter Rodman, Ridgway and Bessmertnykh discussed “bilateral issues” at this point, reaching an “agreement on a set of joint instructions which the two leaders would issue to their subordinates for future work.” See footnote 1, above.
5. In his book, Matlock recalled: “Americans were somewhat surprised that Yevgeny Primakov, then head of the IMEMO think tank, was tapped to lead the discussion of the Soviet position on the Middle East. Up to then, all such discussions had been only with foreign ministry officials; it was most unusual that a quasi-academic would be authorized to present the Soviet position on a subject as important as Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbors. Incidentally, Primakov explicitly denied, for the first time that I could recall, that the Soviet government was following a ‘no war, no peace’ policy in the Middle East as American officials suspected.” (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, p. 222–223)
6. See footnote 5, Document 289.
7. According to Rodman, the discussion of human rights here was more extended, including the following exchange between Ridgway and Shishlin.“The common wisdom was that improved relations and increased emigration had a relationship—the Soviets’ own people have said this. Movement on this would enable us to have forward momentum in the relationship,” Ridgway stated. Shishlin responded that “Gorbachev had taken note of the points the President had made during the first discussion of human rights.” He continued: “the U.S. side would have to understand that the Soviet Union also had its own perceptions of human rights in the United States” and that “this issue would be present in our relations.” (See footnote 1, above)
8. See Document 302.
9. On October 8, Bernard Kalb resigned as Spokesman of the Department of State over an alleged disinformation campaign related to Libya and Qaddafi. (David K. Shipler, “Spokesman Quits State Dept. Post on Deception Issue,” and Bernard Weinraub, “The Ex-Spokesman: Bernard Kalb,” New York Times, October 9, 1986 pp. A1 and A16, respectively) Kalb addressed reporters regarding his resignation during the Department briefing on October 8 at 1:18 p.m. (Telegram 317383 to all Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic posts, October 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860768–0219)
10. In his book, Matlock wrote: “Although the group made little progress in solving the problems discussed, it did agree on a list of cooperative projects that might be undertaken. Also, for the first time at a summit-level meeting, the Soviet delegation had explicitly accepted a framework for discussion based on the American four-part agenda.” (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, p. 222)