160. Notes of a Conversation1
Sunday 0200
PN [Nitze] S [Shultz] JT [Timbie] Max [Kampelman], Perle, Gaffney, Linhard
PN—They look at this as generating papers for press
S—produce the paper + then see what to do w it.
PN—I divided into the parts. Akro [Akhromeyev] wanted to change order. I agreed good disc on START. on #s. Akro didn’t really understand sub-limits.
S—50% w/o the proportion was G’s [Gorbachev’s] proposal
L—he talked gravity + shrams [SRAMSRAMS] w/o b/ms [ballistic missiles] + RVs at 6000
PN—I.e. we got it all done—then it stopped when we caucused + it came to putting it on paper. Rowny won’t agree w anything.
JT—R wdnt agree
PN—Then Adelman wdnt agree too + Karpov at same time was wkg ag [working against] Akromeyev Then long delay + when Akro went thru it + thru Inf + we resumed. Akro sd how does this differ from yr Sept 18 prop? It wasn’t different at all At that pt, Akro sd it differed from G proposal today They wd reduce by 50% in every cat—but we wdn’t. They wanted 50% of our SNDVs. I sd it was equal ceilings in all cats. And we cdnt go to unequal in cats when they had more—(bombers)
S—Karpov can’t nego G sd.
PN—Akro is 1st class person to nego w. Head of Gen’l staff.
L—In 5 areas we went thru.—Asia still issue on Inf—Def + Space: no closure. After 10 yrs we cd deploy? NO they sd—then we nego.
[Page 705]Max—That’s also a Karpov interjection tonight.
PN—here are papers we submitted2
S—But these don’t capture G proposal! These are our original positions!
PN—I was opposed by our own deleg.
S—P [Reagan] didn’t tell our deleg not to change our START position—he sd [illegible] this 50% idea + what do we do w it.—You’re saying they didn’t agree, so you didn’t get anywhere tonight.
RP—we go back at 3 a.m.
S—P doesn’t want to stand on just what we proposed before. He wants to know what 50% means.
RP—Problem is that w 50% cuts across boards Sovs entitled to more than we are. When we start w more on their side.
S—They have put something new on table We shdnt just be bound by our old position
RP—Akro was agreeable. They have caucused + Karpov all over Akro for how he departed from G proposal. (50% wd not apply to < equal outcome
S—So mil. reasonable + For Min blocked him.—This paper is our current position.
PN—Areas of disagreement are:—under what conds. cd adv. defenses be deployed—what restrictions during that period.
S—but G sd (1) let us have 10 years in which we both agree not to w/d from ty [treaty], (2) let us reduce b/m to 50% Nobody said over what period of time (5 yrs mentioned orally) DR [Don Regan] sd don’t get decision pt located in a US election yr. So 4 or 6.
RP—JCS thinks 5 yrs too short—need it for [illegible] for residual force.
S—So 10 yrs. was G. idea. He rejected sharing. He sd we want to bring about zero. By 2000. Less than 15 yrs. So P see 2 yrs of negos—then we start eliminating b/ms. That’s where closure exists.
L—Thats where PN was going.
S—Why make a pt that we will deploy? Stress the 10 yrs
RP—Its a diff betw SDI disintegrating or not. If we say at end we have rt to deploy. Congr cant oppose.
S—G. said we looking for 10 yrs during which we agree not to w/draw from ABM—testing + Risk red [reduction] in hand? (yes)
[Page 706]L—This looks like our old proposal because we ended by talking about a public paper.
—Akro was asked twice, wd we have rt to deploy at end pd + he sd yes.
RP—we cd characterize differences + agree to discuss them later—+ meet what P wants. Forces Sovs to decide if they want to go that far. Wd then be center of Wash. S [Summit] II
L.—we cant close here on Inf. We can pocket 6000 #. We have made pt we can’t accept uneq. Limits At end tomorrow we can get P’s instructions done.
S—Sum. disc will be less precise, but potentially bolder because P not bargaining w Rowny nor G w Karpov. But P needs boundaries + words to stick to.
L—If we can get text tonight—try to capture lang before you see it at 0900. Then P + G can agree to the document
S—On Inf, can get to pt where we agree on all but Asia? (yes)=
RP—They wd freeze at our level + their’s—ours is zero.
L—we at risk politically in START bec they made prop today + we just reiterated ours.
JT—We cd agree on 50% but they talk about how to do deal w asymmetries.
S—your task is to make use of 50% on heavy b/ms.
RP—That’s whay they offered, but w that comes 50 in other categories.
JT—There are ways of symetrying
S—You apply the 50% rule Then say that equality is their long stdg position You have to get loose from just restating our old position + cut loose the guys who don’t want that (Rowny)
L—Akro concerned about 6000 level—as he won’t deploy X ALCMs. So we have that spin.
S—You cant have strict equality as there are asymmetries in force structure. G. wants zero w/o changing force structure.
RP—He sd a few hundred wpns dont make a diff. If we eq. of principle, then arithmetic can be worked.
S—I thot we were on WH as unit of acct? (yes)—Use warheads in [illegible] table.
PN—They will come back tomorrow + say no deal
S—A shame to lose that.
PN—They are prepared to do it. Propg people there to see how to exploit it. A serious chance it will blow up.3
[Page 707]S—We need to get a structure from you.
PN—I dont know how to do that in space.
S—You need to id whats involved in way P can work w. Our prop is no w/d in 7 yrs.
Max—And they want 10. Issue of what ABM ty has to be done in Geneva. Its 2 day to them.
L—We cd id the critical (the PN Q’s above) Q’s and hand off to negors.
S—P all cranked up on S II. Maybe need lang for him that says 2 sides no longer int. in reciprocal summts. 2 sides will meet at Geneva + to hell w summts. If G doesn’t want a summt until everything is settled, fine . . . he won’t ha ha go for that.
RP—They see it as public doc. How it will play.
S—So we agreed on 50% principle. They have changed w G. proposal—we trying to see how to use it in caty [category] we care about.
L—we need to show wee off just restating our position.
RP—we cd say lets see if we can agree on 6000 [illegible]
S—apply principle of 50% and of equality + get Inf structured on Asia Q. We want in NST to nail down that they agreed not to w/d for 10 yrs is the key. We got to get deployment somehow worked in but also get in idea that reds in off wpns are result of SDI continuing.
PN—That means agrmt on what ABM prohibits (Max: and we’ll do that at Geneva)—Theyll never agree to rt to deploy.
L—do it via lang on restrictions that apply during the pd.
PN—we can do that
RP—It will be in public doc. If we end up stating diffs, our philos must be shown.
S—We don’t want to tell the world we came here to agree on difference.
RP—only in NST is that
L—Lay our the positions
S (to PN)—you meet + yr the boss. Not a mtg where anybody can veto. You 4 are in control. There’s no rule of unanimity on your side.
- Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, entry for October 12, 1986. No classification marking. Drafted by Hill. The meeting began at 2 a.m. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix E.↩
- Not found.↩
- Hill wrote in the left-hand margin beside this portion of his notes: “Note © Doby to Kaul of India (above)”↩