Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

206. Note From the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Palmer and Thomas) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway)¹

Washington, March 20, 1986

Roz:

The attached is a non-paper Craig has prepared for your reading and consideration during the trip, which we believe you may wish to share with the Secretary as well.² It sets down in somewhat greater detail how our idea of a closehold exploratory effort with Gorbachev might work. We believe it tracks with the results of the Secretary’s conversation with the President on Wednesday.³ We are obviously keeping this restricted to the minimum of people necessary within EUR and the building.

The paper reflects the views of Jim Timbie, who thinks it is a good piece.We are sharing it with Hawes and Clyne (in Paul’s absence), but do not yet have their comments.⁴

In brief, the paper notes:

—the case for making a quiet, exploratory effort with the Soviets now, rather than holding off until 1987.

—the basic substance of such a probe, in which we would indicate for the first time our willingness to consider a move on the defensive side (reaffirmation of the ABM treaty for the next decade) if matched by Soviet acceptance of our basic terms for offensive nuclear reductions.

—the especially closehold manner in which such an exchange would have to be handled, suggesting the President propose to Dobrynin that Paul and he set up special communications arrangements for a “very private, very informal dialogue.”

Next steps: Bruce has prepared for your consideration and that of the Secretary a first cut at the President’s talking points with Dobrynin at the latter’s April 7th farewell call (also attached).⁵ Over the next few days, we will prepare an initial draft of a “non-paper,” which could form the basis of Paul’s first presentation to Dobrynin.

• Mark Palmer
• Charles Thomas⁶

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs⁷

Washington, undated

Geneva Arms Control and the Next Summit

With some eighteen months left before the 1988 election campaign gets underway, we need to ask more precisely what we want to accomplish in East-West arms control and how we can get there in the time remaining. The Administration’s basic goal in this regard should be the achievement of a U.S.-Soviet agreement that starts the process of substantial reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms; reduces the Soviet LRINF threat in a way that meets our Allies’ security and political concerns; and protects both our current SDI research and future options for strategic defense.

After a year of negotiation, however, we have reached a point in the Geneva NST talks where the positions of the two sides are divided by well-defined and entrenched differences over questions of equality, stability and relative advantage. Adjustments at the margin of either the U.S. or Soviet positions may help, but are unlikely by themselves to generate meaningful progress. Although we may be able to deflect any pressure on us for unwarranted concessions in any continuation of the current situation, we will almost certainly be unable to achieve the President’s central objectives in the negotiations.

In order to advance the Geneva talks in any significant sense, we would have to bring the Soviets to preliminary agreement on the basic elements necessary for any eventual NST treaty, and in doing so, provide guidelines for the Geneva negotiators which begin to address the longer-term issue of the offense-defense relationship. This can only be accomplished by directly engaging the President and General Secretary; the Washington Summit is the logical mechanism for achieving this objective.

Although we are in a sound tactical position at the moment, there are several factors arguing for making an exploratory effort to resolve the basic issues of contention at Geneva during this year’s summit, rather than holding off until 1987. Not the least is the possibility that it could provide the President with an opportunity to reach a personal and substantive agreement with Gorbachev, that gives tangible evidence of the wisdom of his overall policy towards the Soviet Union and constitutes meaningful progress toward his arms control goals.

A further consideration is that of time. Negotiation of a full and detailed NST agreement would require considerable time (bumping up against the opening of the 1988 primary season), even if the Soviets prove to be more forthcoming after the President’s next meeting with Gorbachev. In the absence of major negotiating movement during this same period, the combination of Congressional pressures, budgetary constraints and Allied anxieties could work to undercut both our strategic programs and our negotiating leverage with the Soviets.

In sum, it is in our interest to test the Soviets on what might be possible on Geneva at a 1986 summit, specifically, whether they would be prepared to work together to solve the key issues of the definition of strategic forces, the exclusion of third countries, and relaxation of their position on “space strike arms.” At this point, we do not know whether or not Gorbachev would respond positively to our invitation for a closehold exploratory exchange to see if an agreement on these points might be possible. It may be worth the effort simply to determine if he is. For their own reasons, the Soviets have taken care to indicate—as Ryzhkov did to you in Stockholm—that “content” in any 1986 Summit is important for them as well.⁸ They have talked tough, but taken special care not to close any doors.

Basic Elements of an Agreement

Our objective in a summit agreement would be to set out the central points that would be necessary for any acceptable final treaty to emerge out of the Geneva NST. We would want an NST treaty to enable substantial offensive nuclear reductions to take place over a measured period against the background of predictable future defenses. To that end, we would seek to build the basis for agreement between the President and Gorbachev on two elements covering the near-term developments (i.e., through the mid-90’s) in the offensive and defensive fields:

—an agreement on the basics of staged and continuing reductions in US and Soviet START and INF offensive nuclear forces over the next decade; with

—an explicit commitment to maintain current ABM Treaty constraints on strategic defense developments and deployments during the period of offensive reductions, while continuing the SDI research program as presently structured.

Under a summit agreement with such an approach, the President would gain Soviet acceptance of the general scope and nature of deep offensive reductions that we are seeking in START and INF. This would essentially involve Soviet agreement to our definition of strategic forces and our position on the exclusion of third country forces. Specifically, this could take the form of language elaborating our earlier joint endorsement of 50% cuts “appropriately applied,” by specifying the types of strategic and LRINF systems to be included, the numerical levels to which they would be reduced, and the time frame (e.g., ten years) for such reductions.

In such an agreement, the President would also gain Soviet acquiescence to our continued SDI research (which we have already structured to meet restrictive ABM Treaty restraints and on which it would not be feasible to take decisions on deployment steps beyond treaty limits until at least the early 1990’s). In defending our program, we would indicate our readiness to enter into discussions with the Soviets of the treaty dividing line between such permissible and prohibited activities. We would retain the right to pursue deployments at a single, fixed land-based site as permitted by the ABM treaty if we so wished.

For the Soviets, this sort of framework agreement would allow Gorbachev to return from Washington with a concrete reassurance from the President against a unilateral and abrupt near-term U.S. expansion of strategic defenses beyond the ABM Treaty, particularly regarding space-based systems.

Negotiating in a Special Channel

Given the current state of interagency stalemate and inertia, a successful agreement on basic negotiating elements for the Summit can only be presented as a Presidential fait accompli. To reach that point, however, any exploratory effort with the Soviets concerning such an agreement would have to be conducted through a special channel on an extremely closehold and deniable basis. Knowledge of its existence and substantive content would have to be tightly restricted even at the White House; such a channel would have to operate on a Presidential mandate without the sort of interagency clearance that even current NODIS traffic often receives.

Therefore, we would want to structure any special channel discussion with the Soviets in such manner as to be:

—almost totally invisible not only to the public but within the USG as well, requiring the use of specially-chosen interlocutors in each capital and the absolute minimum use of “official” communications.

—authoritative yet highly informal in nature, maintaining an ad ref (and disownable) character to any substantive proposals and agreement until the very final stages.

—paced in such a way as to allow us to maximize our leverage while minimizing the opportunities for the Soviets to pocket any U.S. move without comparable reciprocal movement.

—staged to provide for the personal involvement of the President in bringing an agreement to conclusion with Gorbachev, once its feasibility and acceptable outlines have been worked out in the special channel.

We believe that as a start, we should seek to use Paul Nitze and Dobrynin as our basic interlocutors, drawing on the special strengths and positions of each. In particular, it is worth exploring whether Dobrynin’s new duties within the Central Committee and close to Gorbachev, when combined with his extensive Washington experience, offer us any special opportunities.⁹ As their discussions progress, we would want to give thought to your own possible involvement and that of Shevardnadze as appropriate. If successful in our initial exchanges, we would seek to reach agreement on as much as possible in this special channel, while recognizing that final agreement on the central points will doubtless have to be directly settled by the President in his personal exchanges with Gorbachev.

One possible scenario for setting up this special channel could run as follows: When Dobrynin returns to Washington in the first week of April for his farewell calls, the President could take him aside at their White House meeting to express his personal interest in a successful, substantive exchange with Gorbachev at the summit. The President would indicate that he would be interested in seeing whether a very private, very informal exploration of the arms control content of the next summit, including how we might address concrete stumbling blocks at Geneva as well the overall question of offense/defense relationship, could yield mutually acceptable results. The President would propose that Paul Nitze conduct such an exploration with Dobrynin (or any other special Gorbachev designee as necessary), setting up whatever special communications arrangements might be necessary.

This exploratory effort could initially take the form of exchanges of “non-papers” with Dobrynin, though we would make clear that, if it appeared useful, we could also envisage one or several quiet visits by Paul to Moscow. As the first substantive move in this process, we would put forward our initial ideas on a possible agreement on basic elements. In doing so, we would indicate for the first time our willingness to consider a move on the defensive side (reaffirmation of the ABM treaty for the next decade) if matched by significant Soviet movement on the terms of offensive nuclear reductions.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Arms V Arms Control Jan–Mar. Secret; Sensitive; Summit II. A typed note on a covering memorandum reads: “Paper given to Secretary on board aircraft 3/30.” In the right-hand margin of the note, Ridgway wrote: “Mr. Secretary: If the SALT & ABM decisions go the wrong way, this scenario may be dead. But the issue is so important that we may then want to restructure it to take advantage of any Soviet fears of our moving faster than they can keep up with. It isn’t much to hope for, but I don’t see how we can let a bad decision be the last word from the US until 1989. Roz.”
2. Craig Dunkerley, EUR/RPM. Shultz traveled to Paris on March 21, to Turkey from March 22 to 25, to Athens from March 25 to 28, and to Rome and Vatican City from March 28 to 30.
3. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz on March 19 from 1:25 to 2:10 pm and then spoke with him on the phone from 6:16 to 6:18 pm. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary on March 19: “A meeting with George Shultz and upstairs for the rest of the day.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 583) On March 21, from 10:03 to 10:33 a.m. Reagan met with Hartman and others in the Oval Office to discuss recent developments in U.S.-Soviet relations. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) In his diary on March 21, Reagan wrote: “Brief meeting with Ambas. Hartman (Russia). He says Gorbachev hasn’t tied everything down his own way—according to recent Soviet Party Congress.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 583)
4. John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, and Norman Clyne, Executive Assistant to Paul Nitze for Arms Control. A note in the margin reads: “NB: Clyne has now cleared.”
5. Bruce Burton, EUR/SOV. The draft is attached but not printed.
6. Palmer signed “Mark” and Thomas signed “T” above their typed signatures.
7. Secret; Sensitive; Summit II. Prepared by Dunkerley.
8. See Document 204.
9. During the 27th Congress of the CPSU, Gorbachev appointed Dobrynin to head the International Department in the Central Committee in Moscow, ending his term as Soviet Ambassador to the United States. In his memoir, Dobrynin wrote: “It came as a complete surprise. Frankly speaking, the flattering offer did not appeal to me at all, I would rather have remained abroad because I simply liked working as an ambassador. I liked the United States and still do. I liked the comparative independence and autonomy of my job and the distance from the Moscow bureaucracy. I had a rare opportunity to express my opinion and views directly to the general secretary (five of them in succession) and to the Politburo, and thus to some extent influence events and decisions in our relations with the United States from the Soviet Union’s most important diplomatic post. Worst of all, the International Department of the Central Committee, to the best of my knowledge, had in reality little to do with foreign policy and diplomacy but mostly occupied itself with promoting cooperation and ties with Communist parties and left-wing organizations in other countries. I had neither the experience nor the taste for that, and I told that to Gorbachev in just those words. Gorbachev dismissed my argument. By electing an experienced ambassador to run the International Department of the Central Committee, he said, the party leadership specifically meant to boost its prestige. Right now it was doing practically nothing in foreign policy, although that was what it was supposed to do.” (Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 601)