Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

204. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Stockholm, March 15, 1986, 4:45–6:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US Side

  • Secretary Shultz
  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • DAS Mark Palmer
  • Mark Parris, Notetaker
  • D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

• Soviet Side

  • Premier Ryzhkov
  • First Deputy FM Maltsev
  • Ambassador to Sweden Pankin
  • CDE Ambassador Grinevskiy
  • Premier’s Chef de Cabinet Batsanov
  • Mr. Obukhov, Interpreter

Ryzhkov opened the meeting, which immediately followed the Palme funeral service, with the observation, “Life goes on.” The Secretary agreed, “In a very profound way.” The Palme funeral had been oriented to the future, and the ideas and visions celebrated there were lasting ones. The Secretary and Ryzhkov agreed that it was their task now to think about life.

Ryzhkov moved into the substance of the meeting by noting that, when informed of the U.S. desire to meet in Stockholm, Moscow had agreed it would be useful to take advantage of the opportunity. The press was already speculating on what he and the Secretary would talk about and agree upon. But it was important to talk.

The Geneva meeting had been a good start. It provided an opportunity to begin a constructive dialogue to have a good discussion. Since then several months had passed. During that period, some things had unfortunately happened which the Soviet side did not understand. To be frank, there were doubts in Moscow as to where the process was leading. The world was talking of the next summit. Some had even tried to determine its dates. But the events of the months since Geneva had brought much which the Soviets did not understand. Some of these events had put their stamp on the forthcoming meeting. Therefore the Soviet side saw the present meeting as an opportunity to clarify views. Ryzhkov believed the U.S. might be as concerned about the situation as the Soviets were. This was the first meeting at this level to take place since the Geneva summit. Ryzhkov would therefore like to hear the Secretary’s views on the issues he had raised. As the guest, he invited the Secretary to speak first.

After thanking Ryzhkov for the opportunity, the Secretary recalled a Japanese saying: “The reverse side has its own reverse side.” Ryzhkov had described a situation from one side. The Secretary could agree with everything the Premier had said. But, just as the Soviets were puzzled by us, we were puzzled by the Soviets.

The Secretary agreed, and, he noted President Reagan agreed that a very good start had been made in Geneva. We wanted to continue the process now. To make the most of that start, the Secretary felt the way to do that was to focus on the context of issues and to identify areas where we needed to—and might be able to—move ahead. In that spirit he proposed to touch illustratively on a number of specific issues to show the direction in which we would like to go. Ryzhkov agreed.

Starting with bilateral issues, the Secretary noted that there had been progress since Geneva in a number of areas, citing exchanges and civil aviation in particular. On the whole our interaction had been constructive. We had gone forward very much in the spirit of Geneva, even as each side had looked to its own interests. Direct air service between the two countries, for example, would resume in late April. That was good—a clear, objective fact. We needed to continue to work in that spirit.

On the “tremendously important” area of arms control, we had seen little movement, although there had been a number of promising straws in the wind. It was in this area that we had the greatest sense of disappointment that our leaders’ objectives had not been fulfilled.

Starting with issues not covered in the Geneva nuclear and space talks (NST), the Secretary noted that we had recently had a relatively good meeting on chemical weapons (CW) proliferation.² It was not clear where that dialogue would go, but we had made a start and there was substance.

On the more general question of a CW Treaty, there had been less motion. The problem there was verification. In this regard we had noted and been gladdened by some of General Secretary Gorbachev’s recent statements on verification, especially his more positive treatment of the possibilities for on-site inspection. This was a “definite plus” from our standpoint. But we failed so far to see the operational context of such statements with regard to CW.

Similarly in MBFR, there had been initiatives from both sides since Geneva, but the most recent Soviet counterproposals did not go far enough to meet our verification concerns.

On CDE, everyone seemed to believe it could be done. The Secretary and Shevardnadze, and before Shevardnadze the Secretary and Gromyko, had said so to each other; the President and Gorbachev had said so to each other. We saw some progress, but we were afraid the process would stall out. Noting that Ambassador Grinevskiy had agreed to Ambassador Barry’s invitation to visit Washington in April, the Secretary expressed hope for a fruitful discussion.³ Each side needed to tell its representative to push a little.

On another issue, we had agreed in principle to discuss risk reduction centers, but had not been able to agree on where to talk. The Secretary told Ryzhkov that he was prepared at this meeting to tell the Soviets to name their site. He personally believed it would be better for the two superpowers to use their own capitals for such discussions than third capitals, but it was the Soviets’ call. You name it and we will be there.

The Secretary spent considerable time elaborating the U.S. position on nuclear testing. We agreed with Moscow that testing was an important issue. The U.S. did not agree that all testing should be banned as long as both sides had large numbers of nuclear weapons and the process of working on them had not been brought under an agreement to radically reduce them (which both sides favored), and until we had an operational ability of getting nuclear weapons totally under control.

The U.S. was nonetheless prepared to discuss nuclear testing seriously. We were, in fact, prepared to take deliberate, concrete steps in the field. The step we had in mind took into account General Secretary Gorbachev’s recent comments on verification, as well as the potential benefit of ratification of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) and Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). We did not require amendment of those treaties. What we had in mind was an effort on verification which could be coupled with an understanding on their ratification. The Secretary handed Ryzhkov the signed original of President Reagan’s proposal to this effect to Gorbachev, the text of which had been conveyed to the General Secretary March 14 in Moscow.⁴

The Secretary emphasized that the U.S. proposal opened up the prospect of a concrete step on arms control in a time frame we could calculate. It built on Gorbachev’s recent remarks on verification and on-site inspection. It addressed the dilemma posed by the fact that both sides had charged the other with violating megatonnage thresholds, while stating with certainty that such charges were unfounded as far as its own program was concerned. This situation showed that we could not be confident of our ability to verify nuclear yields. Our proposal was simple, non-intrusive and could substantially improve confidence in our ability to verify the two treaties in question. What the President was saying was that, if the Soviets accepted our proposal, we could move to ratify these treaties.

Thus, in the non-NST complex of arms control issues, including nuclear non-proliferation, there had been some progress. With the necessary push from each side, more might be accomplished.

We had seen less movement in the NST area—the most important one of all—despite our leaders agreement in Geneva that there were possibilities there. The President had found Gorbachev’s January 15 proposals “stimulating,” but ultimately inadequate in certain respects. On START and space/defense, they did not address our previous proposals.

There seemed to be a bit more progress on INF. The Soviets had made a proposal, and we had made a counterproposal. But our negotiators in this forum had not been able to get down to real bargaining. While there were possibilities, we continued to see the problem of missiles as one which had to be resolved on a global basis because of their mobility. This was an issue which had to be addressed. Still, there were possibilities in INF and in the other fora. Both sides had made clear their discomfort with the mountains of weapons which had accumulated. We needed to roll up our sleeves in Geneva and get to it.

Briefly turning to other issues, The Secretary noted that it had been possible in most cases to set dates and places for the next round of regional experts talks. We owed the Soviets an answer on one area, there was some uncertainty on another. Thus, the regional dialogue was proceeding. We regretted, however, that in the March 6 discussions on Southern Africa, the Soviet representatives had not seemed prepared to engage.⁵ This was a volatile, dangerous area.

We would like, the Secretary continued, to see the regional talks get somewhere. That was why he and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had agreed on the margins of the Geneva meeting to take up such issues at their level in future meetings. It had not yet proved possible to schedule such a meeting. But the U.S. continued to believe, as Gorbachev himself had noted in Geneva, that regional conflicts were one of the main sources of international tension. Such tensions lead to armaments, not the reverse. Problems like Southern Africa were problems we could only solve together. The Soviets were not responsible for what was happening there. Neither were we. But we should be able to work together to get at the real issues.

Switching the focus to human rights, the Secretary reaffirmed the importance of the issue to the American people. There had been progress since the Geneva meeting and we welcomed it. But as a general proposition there were still great problems. We had noted the General Secretary’s unequivocal condemnation of terrorism at the CPSU Party Congress,⁶ and had cooperated with the Soviets on this problem at the U.N. We felt there was more room for cooperation in this important area.

Concluding, the Secretary stated that the President had asked him to convey that our commitment and dedication to making progress on the various issues of the relationship was as strong as on the day we left Geneva. The Secretary had tried to review these issues from the standpoint of their content. In summary, we saw movement in some, not in others. We saw a need for energetic movement in the NST talks. And we felt progress was possible on nuclear testing. The Secretary thanked Ryzhkov for hearing him out.

Ryzhkov prefaced his own remarks by noting that the Secretary had accurately characterized the period since the Geneva summit as one of “disappointment.” The Soviets agreed. Nonetheless, the Geneva meeting had established some prerequisites for further work. It had elaborated certain common principles on issues of concern to the entire world as well as to the two leaders. People on both sides had expected an active and constructive dialogue after Geneva on the most vital issues of modern times.

The Soviet political leadership thus took a most serious approach to the results of the Geneva meeting. The first meeting of the leaders of the two superpowers in seven years could not be considered merely a protocol meeting. The Secretary strongly agreed, noting that it was a real meeting between two strong people.

The proof of the seriousness of the Soviet leadership’s approach, Ryzhkov continued, was the comprehensive arms control proposals made by the General Secretary on January 15. The Soviet leadership expected that this major initiative would be seriously considered and would lead to constructive discussions and constructive results. They had no illusions that it would be possible to solve all outstanding issues “at a single stroke.” But they did hope that a step-by-step process would be set in motion which would lead to concrete results.

The U.S. response had arrived on the eve of the opening of the CPSU Congress. Gorbachev had summarized the Soviet reaction in his report. Ryzhkov wanted to take the opportunity of his face-to-face meeting with the Secretary to say that Moscow was frankly disappointed with the U.S. reply. On the one hand, it appeared to support the notion that outstanding problems should be resolved. But it was so encumbered with conditions and linkages as to suggest that there was no real will to find solutions.

Similarly, the Soviets had hoped that the fourth round of the NST talks would clarify issues in such a way as to make possible constructive discussions and ultimately, solutions. Ryzhkov felt the Secretary would agree that the round had produced no forward movement. Against this backdrop, Ryzhkov observed, what he called a “global question” arose: Where are events leading? Months were passing. There was no forward movement. The Soviet leadership ever more frequently found itself asking: “What is to be done? Why is this happening?” They hear the U.S. claim it wants to solve problems. But when it comes to practical steps to answer the “global question,” there is no constructive movement. The Soviets were thus asking themselves why this was happening. Noting that there was a similar saying in Russian, Ryzhkov concluded his general remarks by admitting that the Secretary could apply his Japanese “reverse” argument to what he had just said.

Returning to the Secretary’s remarks on nuclear testing, Ryzhkov had some specific comments. Ryzhkov recalled that the Geneva Joint Statement had called unequivocally for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The first and necessary step toward this goal, he argued, was to ban nuclear testing. He therefore found it puzzling that the U.S. position should be that such tests should continue. The sole purpose of such tests was to perfect nuclear weapons. Where was the logic in this? How could one eliminate nuclear weapons while at the same time perfecting new ones?

Ryzhkov said he had not seen the contents of the President’s letter to Gorbachev on testing. He could not give an authoritative response to the letter to Secretary Shultz. But he and his colleagues around the table had been puzzled by Western media accounts of the letter’s contents. The testing issue could only be resolved by banning testing. Verification made sense only in the context of such a ban. Yet the U.S. seemed to be proposing to perfect the verification not of a ban, but of testing. The American approach focused too much on technicalities while ignoring the central issue of banning testing.

Ryzhkov claimed that both sides had more than adequate means of determining whether nuclear tests had occurred. Rather than seek to verify the caliber of a test, efforts should be directed to banning all tests. While press accounts of the U.S. position might be distorted, the U.S. appeared to be proposing that Soviet technicians come to the U.S. in April to monitor a nuclear explosion. From this, it appeared the U.S. leadership was determined to continue testing.

As for the TTBT and PNET Treaties, it was Ryzhkov’s understanding that they dealt not with banning testing, but with thresholds. These were two different things. It appeared the two sides were speaking in different languages. The Soviet position had been made clear in Gorbachev’s letter to the Delhi Six.⁷ The Soviet Union was prepared to cooperate fully in verifying a ban on nuclear testing.

Ryzhkov indicated he would not address all the issues raised by the Secretary, as Soviet views had been clearly expressed in the recent CPSU Congress. He did wish to call attention to General Secretary Gorbachev’s remarks on future meetings with President Reagan. However, while it might not be possible to reach agreement on all issues in advance of such a meeting, it was the Soviet view that for such a meeting to be fruitful it would be necessary to “resolve” two sets of issues: nuclear testing and INF.

Without getting into details, Ryzhkov noted that the Soviet position on INF had been made clear in the January 15 proposal. He underscored the Soviets’ willingness to include Soviet territory up to 80 degrees longitude, which goes to the Novosibirsk area in its definition of the “European” U.S.S.R. for purposes of an INF agreement. Within this zone, the Soviets would be prepared to destroy, not merely move, LRINF missiles. It was unfortunate that there had been no forward movement from the U.S. in response.

Ryzhkov noted that the Secretary had not touched on the next summit, about what should be addressed there. Both sides seemed to recognize that this meeting could not be just a protocol affair. Too many people would be disappointed by such a meeting. Rather, it would have to be a fruitful meeting.

The Secretary agreed that the next summit should be fruitful. He had tried to show in his review of the issues the varying degrees of progress achieved to date. We agreed that progress in NST was desirable and that INF was a likely candidate. But it would be a mistake to rule out other areas. There were important things on the table. Progress could be made.

Maltsev interrupted to ask if the Secretary included nuclear testing in that category. The Secretary noted that nuclear testing was not covered in the NST talks, but it appeared we could have a useful exchange on testing. He could not predict that we would agree. But when one had a goal, the way to get there was to take a step. When that had been done, there would be a basis for further progress. That was why it was important to cap megatonnage and improve verification. As for a testing ban, the Secretary wondered if the Russians had an equivalent of the expression: “putting the cart before the horse.” In response to Ryzhkov’s confirmation that they did, the Secretary observed that the problem was one of deciding what was the cart and what the horse. We believed the first task was to achieve radical reductions in nuclear weapons, and only then consider a ban on testing. But even within those parameters, we could have a useful discussion of testing issues.

Ryzhkov quipped that he thought the “cart horse” saying worked against the U.S. position. The U.S. proposal did not represent a real “step.” The Soviets, on the other hand, had made three steps: with their August 1985 moratorium, with their extension of the moratorium, and with their response to the Delhi Six to continue the moratorium so long as the U.S. conducted no nuclear tests. The U.S.S.R. had gone eight months without a test. Ryzhkov had a frank question for the Secretary: Had the U.S. decided to conduct a new test?

The Secretary replied that the U.S. would continue testing. In reviewing his earlier argumentation on the rationale for the U.S. testing proposal, he emphasized the prospects it opened for early concrete progress on testing. Capping megatonnage and improving verification means would make it possible to go on from there.

Ryzhkov indicated he would report the Secretary’s answer to Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership. Both sides had to work, he added. They had to work, moreover, in ways other than they had in the months since Geneva.

The Secretary agreed. But he also felt, on a personal basis, that it was important to establish a time for the next summit meeting, as well as for his next meeting with Shevardnadze. Experience had proven that the existence of dates tended to put drive into the process on both sides. The Secretary had found this to be the case when he was in a business organization. He knew that the Premier had extensive management experience of his own, and suspected he had had similar experiences. It was important to pin the matter down. The Soviets had the U.S. proposal for dates. We would wait for a response.

Ryzhkov asked what the next meeting should address. The Secretary asked in response if he could pose a frank question of his own: “What should he report to the President. . . ?” Before he could finish the question, Ryzhkov interrupted to note that that was precisely what he, Ryzhkov, wanted to know. What could he tell the Soviet leadership when he returned to Moscow? The only firm thing he could say was that he had asked a frank question and received a frank response about testing. The Secretary observed that those of Ryzhkov’s colleagues who had worked with the Secretary in the past would tell him that his answers were always frank and reliable, even if his listeners did not always like them. Ryzhkov allowed that he had heard a lot about the Secretary from his “comrades” who had dealt with him. But frankness was one thing. Substance was another.

Maltsev interrupted to say “two words.” As former Ambassador to Sweden, he claimed to know the Swedes well. The U.S. could ask the Swedes, who were very good in such matters, whether or not calibration tests were necessary to detect nuclear explosions. They would tell us that they were not. The Soviets did not have to ask the Swedes. Their own capabilities were sufficient to detect even unannounced U.S. explosions. Ryzhkov stepped in to comment ruefully that his and the Secretary’s task till they reported to their leaders was to figure out what to tell them.

Returning to his original question as to what he should tell the President, the Secretary asked if he should say that there should be no more discussion of summit dates until there were mutually satisfactory agreements on INF and nuclear testing. The Secretary stressed that he asked the question because what Ryzhkov had said left him uncertain.

Ryzhkov responded that he had simply repeated what Gorbachev had said at the CPSU Congress. The Secretary said he had not understood Gorbachev to be so categorical as Ryzhkov had sounded. Maltsev produced a copy of Gorbachev’s report and read the text in question. The Secretary indicated that he had posed the question not because he was angry, but because he wanted to be clear about what he should tell the President. Ryzhkov said he would not go beyond what Gorbachev had said.

The Secretary asked if he should tell the President that until he agreed to cease nuclear testing and to accept a non-global INF agreement, the Soviet leadership did not want to discuss a next meeting. Again, the Secretary stressed he was simply seeking information. It would obviously save everyone a lot of trouble if we didn’t need to worry about the next summit.⁸

Amid whispered prompting on the Soviet side, Ryzhkov replied that the issue the General Secretary had sought to address in his report was an important one. The Soviets recognized that everything could not be solved in a single day. What was needed was constructive proposals, a demonstration of readiness to address the issues constructively, calling for frankness. Ryzhkov observed that the U.S. wanted a date. On the other hand, it would continue testing. This was a bad combination. [The last two sentences were not translated into English by the Soviet interpreter because of the Secretary’s following interjection:]

The Secretary replied that he was not asking for a date. He only wished to clarify the Soviet position. Ryzhkov repeated that this was something to consider carefully once he and the Secretary had returned to their capitals.

Noting that the press would be interested in their discussion, the Secretary asked for Ryzhkov’s reactions to some themes the Secretary proposed to use in describing the meeting. Ryzhkov concurred with one exception: in place of the Secretary’s suggestion that they indicate it had not been possible to resolve the question of summit dates, Ryzhkov proposed that he say only that the issue would be discussed further. The Secretary agreed.

Prior to departing, the Secretary expressed regret that he and Ryzhkov had not had an opportunity for an in-depth discussion of economic issues as the Secretary had once had with Ryzhkov’s predecessor, Kosygin. Ryzhkov replied that he was sure the two would meet again and that he would look forward to such a discussion.

As the meeting was breaking up, Ryzhkov stressed with some feeling the need for continued work on the full range of issues, including the question of a future meeting. The Soviet position, he said, was that no doors should be closed with respect to such a meeting.

The two superpowers had a responsibility for the future of the entire world. He hoped the meeting could conclude on that note. The Secretary agreed.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1986 (7/8). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place at the Soviet Ambassador’s residence in Stockholm. Shultz was in Stockholm from March 14 to 16 to attend Palme’s funeral. In an undated briefing memorandum to Shultz, Ridgway wrote: “Your meeting with Ryzhkov will be an opportunity to take the pulse in the Kremlin in the wake of the CPSU Party Congress and of some rough sledding in the bilateral relationship. It will also enable us to give the Soviets an authoritative U.S. view of what must be done to move the agenda forward, and of how Soviet game-playing on the scheduling of a second summit has affected the process. Finally, it can help allay any concerns among the allies and the U.S. public that the U.S.-Soviet dialogue is breaking down.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, 1983–1986, Meetings: Shultz/Ryzhkov Stockholm, March 15, 1986)
2. While this precise reference is unclear, the United States and Soviet Union had ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons under the umbrella of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
3. Ambassador Robert L. Barry, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm. Ambassador Oleg A. Grinevskiy headed the Soviet Delegation.
4. See Document 203.
5. In telegram 2278 from Geneva, March 6, Crocker, who was heading the U.S. delegation to talks on Southern Africa, wrote to Shultz: “I met for more than five hours on March 6 with a Soviet delegation which had instructions to assert Soviet interest in ‘activating’ joint work on regional problems, but which had no mandate on how to put any flesh on the bones of those good intentions. This produced some visible discomfort, with my counterpart several times citing the ongoing CPSU Party Congress to explain his inability to be more concrete.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])
6. See footnote 3, Document 200.
7. In a letter of March 13, Gorbachev responded to a February 28 joint message from the Delhi Six, Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania, Greece, Sweden, and India. The texts of the joint message, which was also addressed to Reagan, and Gorbachev’s response are printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1986, pp. 93–94 and 115–117. See also footnote 3, Document 166.
8. In telegram Secto 4013 from the Secretary’s aircraft, March 16, Shultz sent Reagan a summary of the meeting stressing these points related to the summit. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, 1983–1986, Meetings: Shultz/Ryzhkov Stockholm, March 15, 1986)