Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

205. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, March 17, 1986

SUBJECT

• Summitry and the Shultz-Ryzhkov Meeting

The following are my impressions and conclusions from Secretary Shultz’s meeting with Ryzhkov Saturday.²

Summit Date

Ryzhkov made clear that he could not go beyond Gorbachev’s comments to the Party congress, i.e., that the next Summit is important, that it could not be merely “protocollary,” and that some “real achievements” would be necessary to justify it.³ INF and nuclear testing are clearly the Soviet targets for such “achievements,” but when Shultz asked Ryzhkov if the President should be told that Gorbachev would not set a date until we reach satisfactory understandings on INF and testing, Ryzhkov refused to confirm. He said that Gorbachev’s words at the Party Congress speak for themselves, and that they were still waiting for U.S. suggestions regarding the “content” of the Summit.⁴ (Shultz pointed out that we have many proposals on the table.) Just as we were leaving, Ryzhkov said—as if to give the meeting a more upbeat conclusion—that we should not “close any doors” to future meetings, and that the question of the date should be discussed further.

I infer from this that the Soviets understand that their interests would not be served if the meeting this year collapses. However, by taking the public stance they have, they seem to have painted themselves into a corner publicly. How they will wiggle out of it remains to be seen, but we doubtless face some continued pressure to define the principal “results” in advance. I suspect that the Soviets feel that we bested them at Geneva, and this feeling lies behind their recent maneuvers. They don’t want Gorbachev to come home again with empty hands in terms of Soviet positions.

Issues

Shultz went through the talking points which you saw, though in a different order. Ryzhkov picked up on only two issues: INF and nuclear testing.

Regarding INF, he directed his criticism at our position on systems in Asia, saying that they had made a major concession in extending the “notion of the European zone” to Novosibirsk, and agreeing to destroy, not transfer, the missiles, yet they “see no movement.” Since he did not single out our position on British and French systems for criticism, one might conclude that the treatment of the missiles in Asia is considered a more serious problem than the rejection of any linkage with the British and French.

He spent more time, however, on the nuclear testing issue, using the familiar Soviet arguments: that continued testing is inconsistent with a commitment to abolish nuclear weapons. As for the President’s latest proposal, he claimed to have seen only press reports (probably true, since the text was not delivered in Moscow until noon that day), but was basically negative on the idea of improving verification of threshhold testing limits.⁵ He asked Shultz directly whether we intend to continue testing, and Shultz confirmed that we do.

General Tone

Ryzhkov’s approach, while implicitly accusatory, was more in sorrow than in anger. He repeated several times that developments since Geneva have produced “incomprehension” in Moscow. (Shultz made clear that we also are concerned about the lack of progress since Geneva and cited Soviet stonewalling in several areas.)

Ryzhkov the Man

Self assured and superficially very “Western” in his style, Ryzhkov projects the image of a corporate executive. He looks younger than his 55 years and would blend in well in an IBM Board meeting. His style was less argumentative than Gorbachev’s, but this may only reflect the fact that he does not have primary responsibility for foreign affairs. As they parted, Shultz observed that it was a pity they had not had time to discuss economic questions since they share an interest in them. Ryzhkov responded that they would doubtless have opportunities on other occasions to do this—which seemed to be a clear signal that, whatever their rhetoric at the moment, they are not thinking of ending the dialogue.

COMMENT:

We will probably have to wait until Dobrynin’s return for another authoritative exchange regarding the Summit date. In the meantime, I would suggest that we say as little as possible about the date. Otherwise, we risk encouraging the Soviets to believe that we are so eager to nail it down we might yet pay a price—which would simply add to their incentive to continue their current tactics. When asked, we should simply say that there is an agreement for a meeting this year which we assume the Soviets will honor, and so far as the date is concerned, the ball is in their court. I think we should avoid being drawn out on what dates are acceptable and which ones not acceptable.

If Dobrynin does not bring with him a suggested date, the President might make the following points to him:

1. Our invitation was in good faith, as was our suggestion for a date.⁶

2. We do not understand why the Soviets seem to think that we are not as interested in results as they are.

3. We have made a number of proposals, and are perplexed at the lack of Soviet response to some and their failure to negotiate actively on others.

4. Nevertheless, we do not call the meeting into question, since we feel that it can play a major role in solving some of the current impasses.

5. A firm date could also serve to focus the attention of bureaucracies on both sides on possible achievements.

6. However, we have no greater interest in a meeting than do the Soviets. Preconditions from either side are clearly unacceptable.

7. Practically speaking, we need a few months to prepare a proper visit.

8. For this reason, we would hope that the General Secretary will see fit to indicate his preference regarding timing as soon as possible.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you indicate your reaction to the approach outlined above.⁷ If you concur, I will incorporate it in the Briefing Memorandum for the Dobrynin meeting.

2. That you discuss our public stance with the President, Don Regan and Secretary Shultz, and encourage them to minimize comments on the Summit timing and avoid public discussion of the pros and cons of various dates.⁸

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron 1986 (6/8). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “Natl Sec Advisor has seen.”
2. March 15; see Document 204.
3. See footnote 3, Document 200.
4. In telegram 3528 from Moscow, March 3, the Embassy reported that “four key Soviet foreign policy advisors answered questions on U.S.-Soviet relations and security and regional issues at a Moscow press conference March 3 tied to the 27th CPSU Congress.” In a section entitled “U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Summit,” the Embassy reported: “Although generally critical of the President’s defense speech, Arbatov noted that the President, like Gorbachev at the CPSU Congress, had called for concrete results at the next summit. There was, however, no sign of a U.S. desire for progress; when such a sign came, Arbatov said, one would be able to speak with more optimism.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860162–0157) Reagan’s February 26 address to the nation on national security is printed in Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, Book I, pp. 272–276, and excerpts are in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 263.
5. See Document 203.
6. Poindexter highlighted the eight points and wrote “Good. JP” in the margin.
7. Poindexter approved the recommendation.
8. Poindexter approved the recommendation and wrote “Done” below the recommendation.