Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

207. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Rome¹

Washington, March 29, 1986, 2204Z

Tosec 50410/98353. Subject: Gorbachev Proposal for Summit on Nuclear Testing.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Here follows an Information Memorandum for the Secretary on Gorbachev’s March 29 address. Embassy Moscow will be sending an additional analysis by septel.² NSC-approved press guidance also being transmitted separately.³

3. Begin Info Memorandum:⁴

To: The Secretary

From: EUR—William Woessner, Acting

PM—H. Allen Holmes

Subject: Gorbachev Proposal for Summit on Nuclear Testing

In a 20-minute television address March 29, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would resume nuclear testing if the U.S. continues to test, but also proposed that he and President Reagan meet in Europe to discuss the issue and “issue instructions to draft an appropriate agreement.”

In the address, Gorbachev reiterated familiar themes and recounted the various Soviet proposals on a testing halt. He again said the Soviet Union would not test after the March 31 deadline, provided the U.S. did not test after that date.

The new twist in the Soviet position was an offer to meet with the President in London, Rome, or other European capital to reach an agreement on testing.

Gorbachev said he hoped the proposal would be “correctly understood” by the President, and by other governments. Gorbachev did not rpt not call into question his commitment to come to the United States in 1986 to meet with the President, and indeed made no reference to that meeting.

Analysis

Gorbachev’s speech is an attempt to lay the groundwork for a resumption of the Soviets’ own testing program. The fact that the Soviets did not communicate the proposal to us privately beforehand,⁵ but began alerting the Western press yesterday that the speech was on the way, indicates they, too, see it as basically a propaganda exercise.

We do not interpret Gorbachev’s call for a meeting with the President in Europe as an attempt to back out of the 1986 summit in the United States. Clarification of Gorbachev’s intentions on that score can be expected when Dobrynin meets with the President April 8.

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860243–0399. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Moscow. Drafted by Burton; cleared by Holmes, Bova, and Talcott; approved by Parris. Shultz was in Rome and Vatican City from March 28 to 30 to meet with Prime Minister Craxi, the Pope, and other officials.
2. In telegram 5421 from Moscow, March 31, the Embassy reported: “Gorbachev’s televised speech was presumably intended both to increase international pressure on the U.S. and to explain the failed risk of the nuclear testing moratorium to the Soviet public. The speech revealed a bitter attitude toward the Reagan administration, which Gorbachev accused of hypocrisy. Gorbachev thus sought to place the onus on the Reagan administration for the imminent resumption of Soviet nuclear testing.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860244–0470) For the full text of Gorbachev’s speech, see Documents on Disarmament, 1986, pp. 164–168.
3. Press guidance not found. For the text of the March 29 White House statement, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, Book I, pp. 415–416.
4. The information memorandum was drafted by Burton and cleared by Parris and Holmes.
5. According to telegram 99669 to Moscow, April 1, Sokolov called on Ridgway on March 31 to deliver the text of Gorbachev’s speech, stating that “he hoped the Soviet proposals would be considered seriously.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860865–0836)