Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

135. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, November 4, 1985, 3:30–6:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • Mr. McFarlane
  • Ambassador Hartman
  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • Ambassador Nitze
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • Mr. Palmer (EUR)
  • Mr. Parris (EUR/SOV) (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • G.M. Korniyenko, First Deputy FM
  • A.F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
  • V.G. Komplektov, Deputy FM
  • A.A. Bessmertnykh, Chief, USA Dept
  • A.C. Chernyshev, Principal Aide to Shevardnadze
  • Yu. A. Kvitsinskiy, Soviet Rep to NST INF sub-group
  • I.A. Khripunov (Notetaker)
  • N.N. Uspenskiy (Interpreter)²

The Secretary suggested he continue his presentation of the rationale behind the language of the U.S. draft communique.³ He started with the Soviet suggestion in New York that a joint communique include references to the inadmissibility of nuclear war. Our alternative language was based on the consideration that the Soviet concept was not broad enough. Non-nuclear wars could lead to nuclear war. It was also important to make clear the steps our two sides were willing to take in order to lessen the risk of war. Our language was preferable because it described how arms control could contribute to strengthening strategic stability and reducing the risk of war.

The Secretary noted that we had also raised the idea of centers which could explore ideas for reducing the risk of military confrontation. Senators Nunn and Warner had mentioned their ideas along this line to General Secretary Gorbachev and we had noted with interest his response that such ideas could be considered.⁴ The Secretary suggested that U.S. and Soviet experts meet to explore this and other ideas which could reduce the risk of military confrontation.

The Secretary noted that he had already outlined the new U.S. NST proposal and observed that he would not comment further on it, other than to refer the Soviet side to the appropriate paragraphs in our draft communique.

Following up on the Soviet suggestion in New York for language on SALT II interim restraints, the Secretary indicated that we had carefully studied the Soviet proposal. There was agreement that mutual restraint in the area of strategic weaponry could add stability and improve the atmosphere for the Geneva negotiations. The Secretary pointed out that President Reagan had clearly expressed this view in his June 1985 announcement that the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting the Treaty to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint, and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reduction agreements in the NST talks.⁵

The United States, he observed, had scrupulously observed its arms control commitments. We expected no less of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union knew, we had recently dismantled a Poseidon submarine in accordance with our policy. We continued to insist that the USSR take the necessary steps to correct actions not in compliance with existing agreements. In this regard when the President announced the USG’s policy, he indicated his willingness to go the extra mile and invited the Soviet Union to join in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The Secretary had to say we were disappointed with the Soviet response. He called attention once more to the need for resolving U.S. concerns over telemetry encryption, the Krasnoyarsk radar and the SS–25 new type. To demonstrate our commitment to make progress in the Geneva negotiations while we worked to resolve our differences, however, we were willing to note our policy in a joint communique.

Turning to non-proliferation, the Secretary noted that our respective ambassadors had developed language on which we could both agree. There were some minor discrepancies in the language included in the two sides’ drafts on NPT, but these probably reflected technical errors and could be worked out. Ambassador Dobrynin interjected that he had called Ambassador Petrovskiy to be certain the Soviet version was correct. The Secretary repeated that this problem should be resolved at the working level.

On chemical weapons, the Secretary stated that two things needed to happen. The first was a global treaty on the possession and use of chemical weapons. There was a U.S. proposal on the table in Geneva and we hoped it would be possible to realize progress. At the same time, a bilateral dialogue could be desirable with respect to proliferation and [omission is in the original]. As an example, in the Iran-Iraq war there had been a clear case of CW use and there was a danger of further use. In his September 27 meeting with Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister had indicated the Soviet side had no information on the use of CW in the Iran-Iraq war.⁶ The Secretary handed Shevardnadze a 1984 UN report on the subject which left no doubt whatever of the facts. The Secretary restated our earlier proposal for experts discussions on CW use in the Iran-Iraq context. Such talks could be useful in their own right, and, if successful, could lead to a broader discussion on CW non-proliferation.

While on the subject of the Iran-Iraq war, the Secretary recalled that we had in the past agreed that the war served neither U.S. nor Soviet interests. The U.S. continued to believe that the President and General Secretary Gorbachev should discuss the issue in Geneva. The two sides had also previously shared the view that Iran was the intransigent party. That being the case, we again urged the Soviet Union to take steps to restrict arms flows from Soviet friends to Iran, so as to deny Iran the means to continue the war.

On the Stockholm CDE talks, the Secretary noted Shevardnadze’s remark in New York that the U.S. appeared to be dragging its feet. We had carefully examined our feet and they seemed to be moving. The President’s Dublin offer on non-use of force (NUF) stood.⁷ The other side of the coin must be concrete CSBM’s. We hoped that the informal exploratory phase which the conference began just before the end of the last round would be fruitful in narrowing differences on the specific content of the concrete CSBM’s we have proposed. In frankness, a more constructive Soviet approach would be needed. There was nothing to be gained by reopening previously settled issues or by trying to change the Madrid mandate. If we could agree on the general outline of an agreement consisting of genuine CSBM’s falling within the mandate, excluding independent naval and air activities, combined with a reaffirmation of our non-use of force commitment, we could agree to give our ambassadors parallel instructions to commence drafting. This would be a signal we were beginning to make headway. We had agreed this was an area where a push could be helpful; the U.S. was ready to push if we could agree where the push should come.

On MBFR we continued to regard the Vienna talks as an important part of our work on arms control. We continued to study the Soviet February 1985 proposal.⁸ While it had inadequacies, we were closely consulting with our allies on ways to move forward. The Secretary had nothing to say of a specific nature today, but he indicated that there could be a positive Western initiative at some point in the future which he felt the Soviets would find forthcoming. He asked Shevardnadze not to ask what he meant by “near future”. Shevardnadze quipped that perhaps he meant the year 2000.

The Secretary then raised a number of issues relating to Berlin, pointing out that the city had in the past been a source of U.S.-Soviet tension. He first touched on the problem of Berlin air corridors: an issue, he noted, he had discussed earlier with both Gromyko and Dobrynin. The Secretary noted that the problem was one of safety. There was currently a 10.5 mile reservation-free area; we wanted 17 miles. We knew the issue was being discussed at a technical level in Berlin. But the Soviets’ technicians needed to have a signal that their mileage was too small and that they should give greater consideration to our proposal.

Also with respect to Berlin, the Secretary raised Soviet conduct toward U.S. military liaison missions (MLM’s). The killing of Major Nicholson remained a sore point. A positive Soviet gesture to the family would be very much appreciated. It was well that U.S. and Soviet military staffs were working to prevent further incidents. But we would welcome learning what steps the Soviet military was taking to prevent use of force against MLM personnel.

The Secretary expressed the USG’s view of the desirability of enhanced military contacts, observing that U.S. proposals remained on the table both in the context of expanded exchange activities and on their merits. In this connection he welcomed the rescheduling of the Incidents-at-Sea annual review for the following week in Washington. In last year’s session the Soviets had raised the idea of reciprocal ship visits. We considered this an excellent idea that should be pursued in this year’s review.

Turning to regional issues the Secretary indicated he would be brief in view of his extensive treatment of the subject in New York. He first recalled the U.S. proposal for regularization of regional experts talks. These exchanges had been frank and useful. But we had yet to hear a Soviet response to our regularization proposal. Reviewing the history of the talks, the Secretary observed that the original idea had come in the President’s 1984 UNGA address. Subsequently, Ambassador Dobrynin had proposed a cycle of discussions of regional issues, which we had now completed. The world had not changed as a result, but the talks had been useful and might achieve more if continued.

We had in mind a schedule of meetings on all of the areas we had discussed this year, at the same level and in roughly the same sequence as in the past. The Secretary suggested that we might start in March 1986 with the Middle East. Southern Africa, Afghanistan, East Asia, and Central America and the Caribbean could also be discussed. The details could be worked out in diplomatic channels. The exact sequence would, of course, be a function of the availability of personnel on both sides, as well as the course of events in the regions themselves.

Komplektov intervened to clarify the meaning of the Secretary’s reference to “East Asia”. The Secretary indicated that the term referred to all of East Asia, including Southeast Asia.

Beyond our regional experts talks, the President had put forth in New York an initiative on resolving problems in certain areas. The Secretary noted that he had discussed these proposals with Shevardnadze at some length in their last meeting. We had noted the Foreign Minister’s response that the U.S. and Soviet Union could not become international judges and that not everything depended on the two countries. We agreed with that assessment. The President’s proposal was meant to build on existing mechanisms, not supplant them. The Secretary solicited Shevardnadze’s thoughts on the President’s regional conflicts proposal.

Noting that they had discussed the topic at lunch, the Secretary raised terrorism, noting that the phenomenon affected both countries. He welcomed the good news that Soviet citizens had been freed in Beirut, noting, however, that one diplomat had been lost.⁹ The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. still had six hostages in Lebanon and that British and French has also been seized. We all had interests in combatting terrorism. We thought consideration should be given to discussing the problem at the Geneva meeting. An additional possibility would be a jointly sponsored resolution in the U.N. General Walters had been discussing this option in New York.

Concluding his presentation on the U.S. draft communique, the Secretary noted that we had agreed that attention should be given in Geneva to an agenda for the future. Agreement on the things we had discussed would have great importance for the future. So would the tone of the Geneva meeting. We also felt it important that the leaders state their readiness to meet again. Whether their statement would be limited to that or should be more specific was up to them. We had provided some language in our draft and would be interested in the Soviet reaction.

Noting that the next page of his briefing book was blank, the Secretary indicated that he had concluded his presentation and invited comments from Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary for his thorough remarks on all matters on which both Governments were focusing as subjects for discussion in Geneva. The Secretary had commented at length on the new U.S. Geneva arms control proposals. Shevardnadze had had a chance to review those proposals and had two questions on which he would like the Secretary’s response. After that, he would ask Ambassador Kvitsinskiy to comment very briefly on the U.S. proposals. Shevardnadze recalled that Ambassador Nitze had during a previous meeting given an extensive lecture on the Soviet position.¹⁰ Shevardnadze would permit no such lectures from the Soviet side this time.

Shevardnadze’s first question was: How does the U.S. proposal address the problem of the interrelationship of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth?

His second question: How do the U.S. proposals take into account the double threat posed by nuclear weapons located both on the territory of the U.S., and outside the U.S. but capable of reaching the Soviet Union?

The Secretary indicated that he would offer a preliminary response and then allow Mr. McFarlane and Ambassador Nitze to comment. The Secretary said that to understand the interrelationship one had first to take each of the negotiating groups by itself and then reunite them. The U.S. had proposed radical reductions in the START and INF areas. The Soviet proposal also called for reductions, so we were going in the right direction. In the space and defense field the fundamental objective of strategic defense was to eliminate the first-strike threat, and, perhaps ultimately, the utility, of nuclear missiles. It might be possible to get them to zero—something both sides have stated is a long-run objective.

What the U.S. was doing in its research program reflected a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We would like to hear from the Soviets that their extensive work was similarly restricted. Of course the key question was: what if research is successful? What about deployment? Once again, we proceed in accordance with the Treaty, but we believe the subject should be addressed now—in its interrelationship—both philosophically and operationally so that we have some idea before it becomes truly operational how we handle it.

Korniyenko interrupted to ask a clarifying question “to facilitate” the Secretary’s reply. What the Secretary had said, Korniyenko stated, was not a reply to the question that had been posed. The Secretary was talking about numbers, but there had been no reply on stopping the arms race in space. Korniyenko recalled that the January 1985 agreement had two parts: to prevent an arms race in space; and to terminate it on earth. The Soviet question had addressed the first part of the agreement. Perhaps Mr. McFarlane could as well in his comments.

The Secretary indicated that he thought his comments on the interrelationship between these two areas were clear, but asked McFarlane to make his comments. Regarding the interrelationship, McFarlane acknowledged that there ought to be one. One had to recognize, however, that certain systems—offensive systems—exist today while defensive systems do not (Korniyenko interjected: “and should not”) except on the Soviet side. McFarlane indicated he would like to comment on how to reduce offense while maintaining the capability to exploit defensive systems.

Regarding our offensive forces, it was possible until now to bound the problem by counting the number of forces the other side possessed and building a corresponding force of one’s own for deterrence. But new Soviet systems could no longer be counted. The U.S. was thus driven to defensive systems because there was no adequate counter. Further, non-nuclear systems held the promise of a safer means of deterrence.

Regarding Shevardnadze’s second question, with respect to strategic and INF systems, McFarlane pointed out that the issue had been debated for ten years, and resolved at least twice. There was no reason to reopen it again. A final historical point: the Soviet deployment of SS–20’s, while primarily a threat to our allies, caused them to ask us to deploy LRINF to counter the Soviet actions. It was still possible, however, to limit, and ultimately eliminate, all these systems through negotiations.

Ambassador Nitze asked to say a few words with respect to Korniyenko’s question. The negotiators of the ABM treaty had sought carefully to define their terms and definitions so as to be able to determine whether components, as we then knew them, were being tested in an ABM mode. Nitze cited the rigorous definition on radar power-aperture to illustrate his point that, while it had been possible to define adequately components based on existing technology, the same was not true for unknown technology. The Soviet side had at the time argued in principle against limiting things which could not be defined. When pressed as to how to cover such situations, the Soviets had suggested consultations. When asked what recourse there would be should consultations not resolve possible disagreements, the Soviet answer was that the disagreeing side could withdraw from the treaty.

The U.S. felt that this was an extreme remedy and that measures short of this were needed. The result was Agreed Statement D which calls for consultation pursuant to Article XIII and agreement pursuant to Article XIV in the event such a situation arose. To date, systems of the type he had described had not been created. We have proposed not only to comply with the provisions of Agreed Statement D with respect to consultations, but to begin discussions now to determine what should be done if such systems were to be developed.

Nitze noted that, at Soviet insistence, an article had been included in the treaty which allowed for modernization. Agreed Statement D made clear that only deployment was limited by the treaty. It makes no sense to speak of an arms race in research.

Korniyenko cut in to state that Article V forbids not only deployment but development and testing as well. He stressed, however, that his question had to do with not the ABM treaty but the January 1985 statement. The Geneva Talks dealt with preventing an arms race in space; SDI was a clear contradiction of the 1985 statement.

Nitze protested that his remarks addressed that question. The ABM treaty involved not research but deployment. Research was permited. Korniyenko was confusing the intent of research with the outcome of research. One of the best ways to reduce the need for defense in space, he added, was to radically reduce offensive systems.

The Secretary commented that Ambassador Kvitzinskiy was shifting in his chair and appeared anxious to make his comments. We wanted to hear him out, but the Secretary had one additional comment.

The U.S. was a part of the NATO Alliance. We were legally and morally bound to help defend the Alliance against attack. In addition the U.S. had a physical presence on the ground in Europe. When the USSR aimed its SS–20’s at European targets, it aimed at us. In that sense there was a double threat to the U.S.: a threat to the U.S. itself; and a threat to our role vis-a-vis our European allies. It should not be surprising, therefore, that our allies asked for U.S. deployments in response to Soviet deployments aimed at Europe. Thus, if the USSR was exposed to a double threat, so were we. In any case, we have separate negotiations on INF. We think this is appropriate. We think there should be an interim agreement as we have proposed. But we also think that this class of weapons should be eliminated entirely.

After being motioned to do so by Shevardnadze, Kvitsinskiy began his presentation. Kvitsinskiy observed that detailed comments on the new U.S. proposals would be premature since they were still being presented in Geneva, and required careful study. He allowed that there were some similarities between the recent Soviet counter-proposal and newly presented U.S. ideas. There were also some very big differences which made the U.S. proposal, unlike the Soviet, “unbalanced and unfair.” He had three main points in this regard.

First, the U.S. proposal did nothing to limit the strategic arms race. The limits it envisaged omitted SLCM’s and its bomber limits left a large “hole.” The 1,500 ALCM’s provided for could be carried on 75 aircraft; that left 285 bombers. What would they carry? SRAM’s? Bombs? This was not included in the 6,000 limit; it was something totally different.

Second, the U.S. proposal ignored the FBS threat to the Soviet Union. In addition to its strategic delivery vehicles (SDV’s), the U.S. has more than 800 forward based systems (FBS). After deep cuts, using the 1250 to 1450 figures, the U.S. would increase SDV’s by 1,000: a two-fold increase in the significance of such systems. Kvitsinskiy asked how this tallied with the U.S. intention to eliminate Soviet heavy ICBM’s and to cut throwweight by more than half. This cut is a “bargain” in the wrong direction.

On a more general plane, radical reductions in missiles would increase the significance of FBS and aircraft—a major advantage to the U.S. Nor was there any mention of British and French systems. This was a further attempt to obtain one-sided advantages for NATO. The U.S. proposal for dealing with INF, moreover, did not provide for the suspension of missile deployments. The U.S. now had 209 warheads. Under its proposal that figure would climb to 420. The Soviet Union would meanwhile have to reduce. Kvitsinskiy also protested the U.S.’s call for reductions in Soviet Asian LRINF, noting that this issue had not arisen in some time.

As for space, the U.S. proposal did nothing to block the arms race. The U.S. draft communique referred only to programs which are permitted by and in compliance with the ABM Treaty. It did not ban space strike weapons. This implied an arms race in space and a violation of the ABM Treaty. Article I, paragraph 2, of the Treaty prohibited the establishment of a territorial defense; the U.S. sought to protect its territory and that of its allies. Article V clearly prohibits development of the kinds of systems the U.S. plans to create. Kvitsinskiy could not agree with the U.S. interpretation of Agreed Statement D, since no Agreed Statement can take precedence over the basic articles of the Treaty. Therefore, Agreed Statement D must be read in the context of Article III of the Treaty, referring to permitted types of equipment within permitted areas. If not, the ABM treaty would “collapse”.

The Geneva negotiations had two goals: to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth. The two were interrelated. To try to focus only on the problem of nuclear arms would be to solve only half of the problem. Thus, the U.S. proposal was unbalanced and unconstructive. If there were no decision on space, there would be no decision on nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Soviet Union very much wished to hear the constructive part of the U.S. proposals on space—if it existed.

The Secretary noted that we had had a fascinating re-run of arguments we had heard for some time. SLCM’s were a good example. They had been discussed a lot but no one had answered the question of how they could be verified. We had invited the Soviet Union to address this question and had received no reply. It did not seem sensible to agree to limit something if one could not verify it. As for Kvitsinskiy’s point on aircraft, if it were true that aircraft become more important as missiles were reduced, so did the role of air defenses—an area in which the USSR had an advantage. Kvitsinskiy questioned whether Europe did not have air defenses. The Secretary replied that the Soviets’ were more extensive. They should not be complacent, said the Secretary, he meant it as a compliment. His point was that if bombers face defenses, those defenses needed to be taken into account.

Korniyenko countered that, applying the SDI analogy, air defenses should make aviation unnecessary. The Secretary replied that both conventional and nuclear forces had to be considered. But that did not reduce the importance of the nuclear threat.

The Secretary noted that Kvitsinskiy had referred to 140 in his comments on the U.S. proposals. That figure, the Secretary clarified, referred to the number of U.S. LRINF launchers to be deployed by December 31, 1985. The U.S. had to that degree adopted the Soviet freeze idea.

Korniyenko noted that Kvitsinskiy had been speaking about warheads. How did the U.S. get 420 warheads? The U.S. had 209 warheads now; would it reach 420 by January 1? McFarlane noted that the confusion was a function of the U.S. proposal’s provision that the mix of Pershing II and GLCM warheads would be a subject of negotiation. Kvitsinskiy alleged that that was not what the U.S. delegation was saying in Geneva.

Nitze indicated that by December 31 there would be 108 P–II and 32 GLCM launchers in Europe. We would, under our proposal, discuss the mix between these two systems with the Soviet Union. We wanted an equal outcome of from 420 to 450 on each side, i.e. about 90 GLCM and 50 P–II’s. The mix could be changed as needed after such a discussion. The right to alter the mix would be retained. Kvitsinskiy replied that the mechanics of the U.S. proposal were clear to him. It was equally clear that when the U.S. indicated it would suspend deployments of missiles in Europe, it would continue to deploy warheads.

Nitze asked Kvitsinskiy if he would prefer 236 warheads and a corresponding number of warheads on the Soviet side. Were they prepared to reduce their SS–20 launchers to a third of that number? The Secretary interjected that we would be prepared to go down to zero.

Komplektov asked to inject a historical note with respect to long-range cruise missiles. He recalled that in SALT II GLCM’s and SLCM’s had been limited. That Treaty did not fail to come into force through the fault of the Soviet Union. The weapons which its provisions had limited started to appear first on the U.S. side. Now the U.S. complained that it was impossible to verify SLCM limitations. The same was true for mobile missiles. Nitze pointed out that Komplektov was referring only to the SALT II protocol—a document of short term because of uncertainties as to the systems it covered. Komplektov acknowledged this, but stressed that it was aimed at a solution to the cruise missile problem.

McFarlane remarked that the conversation had begun by addressing the January 1985 statement’s linkage of offensive and defensive systems. He noted that offensive systems had been a threat for years and that there was, therefore, considerable experience in reducing them in a stable fashion. We should continue to do so. As for defense, there was no experience except on the Soviet side. But two factors gave cause for confidence, or at least hope: defensive systems could be non-nuclear, and therefore preferred; and we had the time to talk about the role they may or may not play before they become a reality. Since some defensive systems already existed on the Soviet side, we had a double interest in discussing them. But it was hard to limit something that didn’t exist.

Komplektov suggested in English that the same point could be made with respect to SLCM’s. We didn’t know what to do with them before they existed; now they exist.

The Secretary threatened jocularly that, if the other participants didn’t stop to allow for a translation on behalf of Mr. Shevardnadze and himself, the two would throw the others out and talk among themselves.

Continuing, the Secretary noted that British and French systems seemed to be brought up every hour and a half. He described his view of the problem. The five permanent members of the Security Council were the countries with nuclear weapons. The scale of these countries’ nuclear arsenals varied, but all regarded themselves as sovereign in having weapons. What other nuclear powers might do in the future with their weapons was their decision, but the U.S. had to compare itself to the USSR, not to the others.

At the same time, the U.S. and USSR had in January agreed that their objective was to eliminate all nuclear weapons. If the two countries were to reduce to 4500 reentry vehicles on each side, then the ratio of our forces to those of other nuclear powers would be reduced, especially as third country forces were being built up. Thus, if we were developing a schedule for reducing to zero, it would be important at some point to bring in other countries, so as not to leave them with nuclear weapons. We should call that card. They have said they would join. We have said we want radical reductions. We have said we want zero. We should handle this by doing the reductions and then involving not only the British and French but the PRC as well.

The Secretary then offered a procedural suggestion. We were prepared to stay and talk as long as the Soviets wished or thought it worthwhile. But we needed to keep in mind that the meeting between our leaders would occur in mid-November. It was our job to get the discussion focused. It was useful to have the preliminary Soviet reaction to our Geneva proposal, and to have that reaction described as “preliminary”. We would relay the gist of Soviet remarks to our negotiators in Geneva.

In the meantime we needed to figure out how to give focus to our work; how to accomplish as much as possible so that our leaders can have useful discussions. In that connection, we should try to make as much progress as possible on a communique. The leaders should not have to waste their time arguing in Geneva. We should settle what we can. If there are some arguments which haven’t been decided before the leaders meet, they can write that down. But there should be a structure. We need to answer the question: are we to have a lengthy communique like the one the U.S. tabled, or not? The answer will depend on whether we can get the necessary substance. We need to pin this down a bit.

In addition, the Secretary indicated, it would be important to have a clear idea for our leaders of the flow of subjects in Geneva—how they should allocate their time. This could, of course, change if they chose to do so. But we could provide a loose structure. It is also true that there are a number of unanswered questions beyond the communique. We need to get them to gell. We had tried to set out our views on these items in our own presentation. As Shevardnadze had pointed out, we had not seen the Soviet draft communique, and vice versa.

Shevardnadze agreed on the need to find formulas for procedure for organizing further discussions. Why had this situation arisen? The Soviets had not planned a detailed discussion of the U.S. proposal. But since the Secretary had provided the gist of the U.S. approach and criticized that of the USSR, the Soviet delegation had felt obliged to respond in equal detail.

Shevardnadze did not wish to suggest that the Soviets saw only negatives in the U.S. proposal. The very fact that the proposal had been made was positive. However, having come on the eve of the summit, it left little time for detailed study. He did not, he stressed again, exclude that the U.S. position had positive elements—a “grain of rationality”. But with each successive explanation from the U.S. side, the grains became fewer and fewer. At the end of the day, there might be no grains left at all.

Returning to procedure, Shevardnadze pointed out that the Secretary had done all the talking, and suggested it was now his turn. He indicated he would need an hour and a half to two hours to make his remarks adequately. If the U.S. side was prepared to continue this evening, there could be a break and then the discussion could proceed. Alternatively, the delegations could meet again the following day at 2:00 p.m. The Soviets would frankly prefer the second option, as it would allow for both sides to read the other’s draft. The only negative was that the Secretary would meet the General Secretary without hearing the Soviet side’s views. But the Soviets were not in a hurry. They were at home. They could work tonight, tomorrow, or even over the coming holiday.

The Secretary noted that in the Minister’s line of work there were no holidays. While he feared there might be frowning faces, he suggested the sides meet the following afternoon. There were some substantive items and some communique-related items to discuss.

The Secretary offered a suggestion. The delegations could allow a couple of hours to read the communique, and then ask a sub-group to meet and compare notes in a preliminary way. The Secretary personally wanted to focus his thinking on his meeting the following morning with Gorbachev. He would ask Matlock, Palmer and Linhard to meet with the Soviet group. They would make no decisions, but could compare notes with the Soviet team and scout the ground.

Shevardnadze agreed to the Secretary’s suggestion and nominated Komplektov to lead the Soviet sub-group. He suggested the groups meet at 8:30 p.m. The next morning they could inform the Secretary and Shevardnadze of their impressions.

The Secretary agreed to Shevardnadze’s scenario. He indicated he had a few additional thoughts to transmit to Shevardnadze that evening, indicating that McFarlane and Ambassador Hartman should stay behind. Shevardnadze agreed to continue the discussion, designating Dobrynin and Korniyenko to remain with him. A one and a half hour private meeting followed (separate memcon).¹¹

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Shevardnadze/Gorbachev in Moscow November 4 and 5, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry.
2. Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.
3. See footnote 4, Document 134.
4. Senators Nunn and Warner were a part of the Byrd/Thurmond congressional delegation that visited the Soviet Union August 27–September 4; see footnote 3, Document 80. They discussed the proposal for Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers with Gorbachev during a September 3 meeting. (Telegram 12144 from Moscow, September 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850623–0169)
5. See footnote 2, Document 41.
6. See Document 108.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 224, footnote 3.
8. The Soviet proposal was submitted on February 14 in Vienna. For the statement by the Soviet Delegation spokesman describing the proposal; see Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 81–82.
9. See footnote 8, Document 114.
10. See Document 99.
11. See Document 136.