Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

134. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, November 4, 1985

SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
AT THE MFA GUEST HOUSE
W/SOVIET INTERPRETER DZARECHNAK

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze began by sincerely welcoming Secretary Shultz and the U.S. delegation on Moscow soil and he expressed the wish that their stay in the Soviet capital be pleasant and useful. He said that they had tried to the extent possible and in so far as their capabilities allowed, to influence the weather, and that it was relatively normal. He observed that this was the first visit of a U.S. Secretary of State to Moscow in seven years, and the fact of the visit was a positive factor in U.S. Soviet relations.² The fact that there had been no visit for so long is typical of recent Soviet/American relations which, to be honest, have been characterized by conflicts and tension more than by understanding. But 1985 has been characterized by the fact that there have been contacts at high levels and on a systematic basis. This is the fifth meeting that has taken place this year. Shevardnadze said he has met the President twice, and there had been other meetings and political consultations, as well as the negotiations in Geneva.³ So in terms of contacts, political and other contacts, this year has been positive.

However, in terms of the results of the work of the Geneva negotiations, as well as negotiations in other places, so far, there are no grounds to express satisfaction; in some areas, the positions of the sides have become more rigid on regional and bilateral issues.

He continued by noting that Secretary Shultz’ visit completes preparations for the Geneva Summit meeting; therefore, this visit has great significance. He said there was more need to talk about the importance of the agenda of the summit meeting itself, since the two Foreign Ministers have already exchanged their respective views on that. He said that he wanted to emphasize, though it was hardly necessary, that this meeting highlights the importance of the Foreign Ministers’ responsibility at such an important stage of preparation for the summit meeting.

He said that at their last meeting, they had laid down certain aspects of the forthcoming meeting and proposed formulas for a final document to come out of the Geneva Summit, observing that doubtless, there would be such a document. He noted that the U.S. had transmitted to the Soviet side the contents of its proposed draft.⁴ The Soviet side had likewise prepared a draft which reflected Soviet proposals on the prevention of an arms race in space and for terminating the arms race on earth, as well as formulas proposed in general on security issues and regional and bilateral questions.

He said he had been informed that the U.S. had submitted an additional draft. He said he thought that the two sides should be very energetic in correlating and agreeing on the drafts in order to come to the summit meeting with a draft document in more or less agreed form.

He said they would like the Secretary of State to give consideration to a whole range of questions proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan as well as to what was expressed to the U.S. side in talks in New York and Washington.

He said that the Soviet side was counting on the fact that these meetings would be constructive and bring about results.

Secretary Shultz responded that as he had said at the airport, he appreciated the graciousness of the reception in the Soviet Union, and the fact that he and his wife and party had been met by the Foreign Minister and Mrs. Sh— at the airport. He said he had been to Moscow many times in the 1970’s as well as more recently. The last two times were somber occasions. He noted that on this trip, there was an opportunity to see how it is possible to contribute to the future and in that sense, it is a more welcome and auspicious trip.

He said he concurred with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that there is much important work to do today and tomorrow. He said the U.S. side had prepared itself and the fact that the U.S. side had sent another draft of the communique is a suggestion of the effort that has been made. The U.S. has accepted, at least procedurally, the Soviet thought about seeing what kind of communique can be put together, but whether or not it is a lengthy one or is a good idea depends on the content of the communique. He said that if it is possible to find substantive content, then there can be a lengthy communique; if not perhaps it might be better to have a shorter communique and have separate views expressed by individuals representing the respective sides.

However, he said, the idea of getting a draft is one way to focus on the issues. He said it would be possible to go through the drafts and in such a fashion test them out in a sense to see how we can report on the November meeting, and whether we can find understanding on the substantive issues. So, he said, in that sense he agreed that going through the drafts is a good way to proceed, for it would touch on the unresolved questions.

He noted that while on his way to this meeting he had thought that one way to proceed might be to start with the general area of arms control.

He said he would like to set forth briefly the U.S. counterproposal, describing the proposal as the U.S. sees it. He continued that after the Soviet response, it would then be possible to go through the draft communique item by item. He said he had not seen the Soviet communique, but the two drafts could be lined up and compared, and in such fashion it would be possible to go through them, if the Soviet side found that a good way to proceed.

Shevardnadze responded by saying they could try to do so, but he did not know what practical outcome would result. He suggested that before discussing the drafts, perhaps the Secretary of State should first read the Soviet draft. He noted that the principle the Secretary proposed was correct, but in practical terms he did not know what the result would be. He added that perhaps it would be possible to lay out the sides’ points in principle and then representatives could go through the drafts. However, he noted that if Secretary Shultz wished, they could proceed in a way he had suggested and see what happened.

Shultz responded that in the U.S. draft, all subjects were included in some way or other. In many cases, the U.S. side simply assumed the Soviet response to various questions, though the U.S. side could not know for sure what the Soviet response would be. This, however, is one way to see where there are still outstanding issues to be resolved. He said that he agreed that sitting here and arguing about the draft communiques was not the best way for them to use their time; however, the drafts could be a guide to areas needing resolution.

Shevardnadze said perhaps it would be possible to lay out the substance of the sides’ proposals on the issues and the language could be agreed later. This, however, would help pinpoint outstanding issues. He said the U.S. could lay out its principal approach to issues, and the Soviet side could too, and afterwards, representatives of the respective sides could take what had been said into account in correlating the specific language of the draft document. He said that if each side read out its draft, however, he did not know what results that would give. He thought that the U.S. side should first study the Soviet draft.

Ambassador Dobrynin added that the U.S. side had to know what was in the Soviet draft.

Shultz said the U.S. side could take the Soviet draft, read it, and then the meeting could be reconvened. He said perhaps just reading the two drafts would be enough to show that there is no way to put together a joint statement between now and November. He said that was one approach, but he noted there was a second approach as well. He said obviously the U.S. side would read the Soviet draft later in the day. The U.S. side could take the draft and tell the Soviet side what it thought about each topic. There could be such a conversation and then representatives of the sides could spend time on that conversation to see if it would be possible to get results. He said he would be glad to use the time either way. It was up to the Soviet side: either stop now and read the documents or do so in the evening.

Shultz said he wanted to offer some advice on the basis of his three-and-one-half-year diplomatic experience. He had observed that communiques are the enemies of substance and common sense, since all the available time is spent on words and not enough is spent on issues. He said that in this respect the Soviets might be better than the French. He noted that the U.S. draft lists topics as does the Soviet draft. He said it would be preferable to talk more about those topics themselves and not so much about the communique. Shevardnadze said that the Soviets are not as complicated as the French, but neither are they simple.

The gentleman on Shevardnadze’s right observed that the Soviet side had not yet seen the revised and completed U.S. draft; nor had the U.S. side seen the Soviet draft. He said it would be counter-productive to read the drafts out point by point. He said the Soviets were prepared to discuss substantive matters and to start as the U.S. had proposed by talking about the Geneva negotiations. Each side could outline its considerations. There would be an opportunity perhaps at a second meeting today or even tomorrow. In sum he suggested not to read the texts, noting that from the start the Soviet side had thought to approach things in this way.

Shultz observed that this was their first agreement. He said perhaps it would be possible to present briefly U.S. thoughts on the Geneva negotiations. U.S. negotiators had presented proposals there, and the U.S. believes they offer a real opportunity to make progress. U.S. negotiators in Geneva have presented a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build upon positive elements in the Soviet Union’s recent counter-proposal, to bridge the positions of the two sides. That, he observed, was how the U.S. had worked. Shultz pointed out that at the same time, he wanted to emphasize that previous U.S. negotiating positions remain on the table for Soviet consideration as well. He said that as had been noted, the U.S. proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva talks, because the U.S. believes a relationship exists between the areas. The U.S. proposal has been shaped to achieve deep reductions. The U.S. agreed and agrees to focus on areas and weapons which are more de-stabilizing. In the area of strategic offensive arms, the U.S. focused on the 50 percent reduction principle contained in the counterproposal of the Soviet side. The U.S. proposal also incorporates reductions which would result in a total of 6,000 ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. The U.S., too, attempted to use that number, and like the Soviet side, to address itself as well to re-entry vehicles on land-based ballistic missiles.

Shultz said he had been speaking about what the U.S. agreed with. Now, he would address things the U.S. did not agree with. He said the U.S. must insist that numbers and percentages to which reductions would apply be used for the correct categories. The U.S. side could not agree with a definition of “strategic delivery systems” that includes a category of delivery system on the U.S. side while it excludes that system on the Soviet side.

Further, the U.S. cannot agree to limits on the number of gravity bombs and SRAMs on heavy bombers in light of the sizeable and unconstrained Soviet air defenses which the U.S. retaliatory bomber force must face.

Moreover, the U.S. cannot agree to aggregate under a common ceiling such dissimilar items as ballistic missile warheads, which arrive at their targets in minutes and which are at present, at least, unhampered by defensive systems, with cruise missiles, which take hours to arrive at their targets and face sizeable defenses on their way.

Moreover, the U.S. cannot agree to make limits on offensive systems contingent on restrictions on the U.S. SDI program beyond the limits imposed by the ABM treaty. He noted that the President has said that the U.S. SDI program will proceed on the basis of a relatively narrow definition of the ABM treaty, despite the fact that the U.S. believes that a broader definition of that treaty is justified given the history and wording of the treaty.

Shultz said that the U.S. has proposed to apply the 50 percent reduction to the strategic weapons of the two sides in the following way: Each side would reduce the number of re-entry vehicles carried on its ICBMs and SLBMs to a level of 4,500, i.e., a reduction of roughly 50 percent by each side in this category of weapons. Each side would reduce the number of RVs on its ICBMs to 3,000, i.e., about a 50 percent reduction from the current Soviet level and this more or less splits the difference between the limit of 2,500 previously proposed by the U.S. side and the limit of 3,600 previously proposed by the Soviet side.

This would also include a 50 percent reduction in the maximum throwweight of strategic ballistic missiles of ICBMs of either side, i.e., 50 percent of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM throwweight.

Then, if this were agreed, the U.S. would be prepared to agree to an equal limit of 1,500 on long-range ALCMs on the heavy bombers of each side. This would represent about a 50 percent reduction of the ALCMs currently planned by the U.S.

On the basis of arithmetic, it is possible to come to the conclusion that the sum of the numbers of ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs on each side would be the 6,000 figure proposed by the Soviet Union.

Concerning strategic nuclear delivery vehicle reductions, they are somewhat less than the reductions proposed for weapons in order to encourage both sides to rely more on single-RV systems which are more stabilizing.

The U.S. proposes that each side reduce its number of ICBMs and SLBMs to a level between 1,250 and 1,450, which would be a reduction of about 40–45 percent from the current Soviet level.

In the context of agreement on ballistic missile reductions, the U.S. could agree to reduce the heavy bombers of each side to equal levels of 350. That would represent about a 40 percent reduction from the current level of U.S. SALT-accountable heavy bombers.

The U.S. cannot agree to aggregate under one common limit heavy bombers and ballistic missiles. However, it is possible to mention that arithmetic shows a sum of between 1,600 to 1,800 ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, if agreement were reached on the delivery vehicle reductions that the U.S. proposes.

Concerning constraints on modernization, the U.S. has two other points to propose: First, since heavy ICBMs are especially destabilizing because of the threat they pose to the retaliatory capabilities of the other side, the U.S. proposes to ban all new missiles of this category. This would include a ban on modernization of existing SS–18 ICBM forces. Second, to reflect the difficulty of verifying the number and status of mobile ICBMs, the U.S. proposes a ban on all land-mobile ICBMs.

Shultz noted that the President had been struck by Shevardnadze’s emphasis on verification, and Shultz noted the problem of verification is a particularly difficult one.

He said the U.S. believes there should be an agreed build-down schedule which shows how to achieve the reductions.

The U.S. believes that the aggregate result of its proposed reductions and limitations would be a more stable world, where the number of arms would be radically reduced to comparable levels on both sides, and the threat to the retaliatory capabilities of each side would be significantly diminished; there would also be better opportunities and prospects for verification.

Turning to the area of intermediate range nuclear arms, Shultz said the U.S. proposed an interim step toward the goal of complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. Here, U.S. proposal develops further certain ideas advanced by the Soviet side.

The U.S. is prepared to cap U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe at 140, i.e., the number employed as of December 31, 1985, in return for Soviet agreement to reduce Soviet LRINF missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same number. Under this approach, there would be freedom to mix systems of the types deployed on December 31, 1985. The exact mix of these systems would be subject to discussion.

The U.S. would also need Soviet agreement to reduce the number of SS–20s launchers located in Asia in the same proportion as the reductions of SS–20 launchers within range of NATO Europe.

The end result would be that both sides would agree to equal numbers of LRINF missiles on a global basis.

It would also be necessary to agree on constraints on INF missiles with shorter range. After achieving agreement on such an interim stage, the U.S. envisages follow-on negotiations leading toward the complete elimination of this type of missile worldwide.

In the area of defense and space, the U.S. is committed to conduct its strategic defense programs as permitted by and in full compliance with the ABM treaty.

As is known to the Soviet side, the U.S. is fully aware of extensive research programs and of massive efforts conducted by the Soviet Union in the area of strategic defense.

So, the U.S. would expect a reciprocal commitment from the USSR regarding its strategic defense programs. Furthermore, the U.S. would also expect the USSR to take action to correct those instances where the Soviet SDI program is not in compliance with the ABM treaty.

Regarding the area of compliance with the ABM treaty, the U.S. urges the Soviet Union to join it in an “open laboratory” initiative. The two sides would provide each other briefings similar to the one the U.S. gave the Soviet side in Geneva in the summer of 1985. In addition, each side would also give the other an opportunity to visit laboratories and research facilities connected with strategic defense research, so each side would know what the other was doing in that area.

The U.S. furthermore proposes that the two sides begin exploring new means for a cooperative transition to greater reliance on defensive systems. If the research of either side should indicate that defensive systems are feasible, the sides should begin to plan now for a cooperative transition to more reliance on defensive systems.

These are the elements of the U.S. approach to bridging the past positions of the two sides.

Critical considerations here are the issues of verification and compliance, which will require particular attention and effort in the future.

Shultz again noted that the President had been impressed during Shevardnadze’s visit by the Soviet Foreign Minister’s emphasis on questions of verification.

Shultz continued that activities which corrode the confidence necessary for the arms control process must stop if existing accords are to be preserved, and if new arms control agreements are to be created between the U.S. and the USSR. Verification and compliance are today pacing elements if the sides are to achieve progress. The U.S. believes that more effective and meaningful approaches to verification are necessary. This may mean putting up technical devices and on-site inspection on Soviet and U.S. territory.

The U.S. is prepared to work diligently with the Soviet Union to develop such approaches as are necessary.

Regarding compliance, the U.S. must continue to insist that the Soviet Union take the necessary steps to correct those of its actions which do not correspond to existing agreements. The U.S. has identified those actions for the Soviet Union in the SCC and in demarches in diplomatic channels.

For example, the Soviet Union should alter its current practice with regard to telemetry encryption and revert to practices that it followed at the time of signing the SALT II Treaty.

In sum, the U.S. has designed an approach which could provide for a mutually acceptable resolution of a range of nuclear and space-arms issues, taking into account the relationship between offense and defense, and while also addressing those areas which the Soviet side has described as having great significance for it.

If acceptable to the Soviet Union, this approach could provide the basis for an understanding between the sides that could provide direction to the future efforts of the two delegations in Geneva to work out effective and durable agreements on all these issues.

Shultz said that in the new draft communique, the Soviet side would find language implementing all this, and he added jocularly that if the Soviet representatives would initial the document immediately, it would then be possible to go on to other business.

There was considerable joking at the table from the Soviet side to the effect that they would initial the U.S. draft if the U.S. would initial the Soviet draft.

Shultz continued that there were many other issues concerning security and bilateral and regional issues, but he said he believed both sides agreed that the Geneva negotiations are of central importance to this cause.

He noted that the U.S. would be willing to discuss whatever subject the Soviet side should desire. He noted that the U.S. regarded as constructive the fact that the Soviet side had agreed to prolong the third round of the Geneva talks so there could be consideration in Geneva of the U.S. proposal by those Soviet representatives who work directly with these issues.

Shevardnadze suggested that perhaps Shultz would continue and present U.S. views on all the relevant questions so as to know how much time would be necessary for discussions.

Shultz poured himself more water so as to continue, and Shevardnadze observed that the situation in the USSR was fine with mineral water, but otherwise with wine.

Shultz remarked that in the draft communique there were some points that he would not comment on here as well as others that he would address. He said that some items of a more sensitive nature he might discuss individually with Shevardnadze. Regarding some points concerning bilateral relations, specifically exhibits and T.V. appearances, he said there are still some difficulties.

Concerning exhibits, the U.S. side prefers one or two exhibits in nine cities for up to 28 days each. The Soviet side would prefer fewer cities and to have the six to nine city option clearly stated in the agreement.

At the same time, the U.S. is insisting on language which would give each side the right to have its representatives appear on the other country’s television. He said if the Soviet Union would agree on the television appearances, the U.S. would be willing to agree to language which would make it clear that within the number of 6–9 cities, the sending side could determine the number of cities and the length of stay of its exhibits in the various locations.

Concerning “new initiatives,” the U.S. side had given the Soviet side a list of such suggestions. The Soviet side said they would be studied, but so far there has been no response. The U.S. is interested in the Soviet reaction to the proposals. The Soviet side knows, for example, that the President talked about the possibility of military-to-military contact as well as cancer research, which could be part of this or a separate agreement. The U.S. is interested in the Soviet response to these proposals.

The U.S. has investigated the Soviet proposal for cooperation in the area of fusion research and believes this is a good idea.⁵ The U.S. is ready to work with the Soviet Union to develop this area in the next two weeks so that the leaders of the two countries can make an announcement about such a joint project in Geneva. In this connection, the U.S. thinks that before the Geneva meeting, the following steps should be taken. As noted by the Soviet side, there are other countries which have experts and resources, and they should also be involved. They should be discreetly contacted before the joint announcement in order to maximize their receptiveness. In this context, probably some agreed talking points and parallel efforts would be helpful.

This is a very ambitious undertaking, and goals should be set. The U.S. sees two such goals: designing, building and starting up a prototype reactor in ten years; also, realizing the practical application of energy produced from fusion by a definite date. U.S. specialists have suggested the year 2020. This seems like a long time off. Perhaps in the Soviet Union there are experts who think less time would be required. In any case, it is necessary to set goals for these ambitious but realizable plans.

Shevardnadze remarked that he and Shultz should open the reactor and cut the ribbon together, so he suggested leaving that date.

Shultz continued that another area that should be discussed before getting other parties involved is where to locate the prototype reactor. He suggested Geneva, where there has already been successful international scientific work. He noted that it would be necessary to consult with the Swiss Government, which may or may not favor having the reactor there.

He said it would also be wise to begin thinking about how this project would be organized and managed. In the U.S. view, the managerial structure would have two components. There would be the political aspect, involving control of it, and then the technical component, involving scientists, engineers, technical people, etc. It is necessary to get some feel for these two aspects and to define the Soviet role and the U.S. role in the project, then if the leaders announce it in Geneva, it will be possible to work together and invite other countries to join the U.S. and the USSR and get the project rolling.

Shultz said if the Soviet side could agree, the U.S. was prepared to consult Japan, some Western European countries and the Chinese, as well as another country the U.S. had in mind, in order to get ourselves in a position for the leaders to make an announcement about this in Geneva. These approaches to other countries should be made quietly, so as not to detract from the Geneva announcement. Shultz said the U.S. also wanted to add Canada. He also noted that in general, in involving others in such projects, they should have something to bring to the project if they desire to participate.

Shultz further discussed the question of consulates in Kiev and New York. He noted that the U.S. has a group prepared to go to Kiev November 12–16, and that there is time for this prior to the Geneva meeting. However, he pointed out that adequate sites for inspection by the team are essential to make their trip worthwhile. He said if there are no such adequate sites, then the delegation would not go to Kiev. He said it is critical to identify acceptable buildings or sites, and that the U.S. side expected to see buildings and sites other than the ones that had been presented before. He further pointed out that simultaneous occupancy of the respective buildings was essential. He noted that the U.S. had advised the Soviet Embassy in Washington that the staff members of the New York Consulate would not count in the country-wide Soviet personnel ceiling. He said the U.S. side would like Soviet assurances before his delegation leaves Moscow that the Kiev inspection team would be able to see such new sites.

Concerning North Pacific Air Safety and Civil Aviation, the Secretary noted that the U.S. had given the Soviet side information about this while the Soviet delegation was in the U.S., and that negotiations on this topic are resuming today (11/4/85) in Washington. However, the Soviet Union has reopened some issues that the U.S. believed to have been resolved. The U.S. has procedures that it desires to have written down. This is no more than what other ICAO countries do, and without such written procedures, any signed agreement has little effect. The U.S. side repeats that the question of North Pacific Air Safety has to be resolved before the U.S. can consider signing any new civil aviation agreement. Moreover, the U.S. has no interest in signing a civil aviation agreement unless it assures an equitable share of air traffic for U.S. companies. There is a gap here as the U.S. sees it, and these matters should be settled.

In the draft communique, the U.S. also refers to other bilateral areas that are not controversial. Shultz said he was referring to measures worked out by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade. He said he would just mention those briefly.

Shevardnadze interrupted at this point to ask whether Shultz would soon be concluding his presentation. Shultz responded that he was going through all the points as he understood the Minister had suggested. Shevardnadze said that he simply was wondering what to do in terms of a lunch break.

In response, Shultz asked whether Shevardnadze had ever heard of John L. Lewis.⁶ He said he was a colorful bargaining figure who liked the good life. He conducted negotiations in the following fashion. He would go to a resort where a number of mine operators had been invited for a meeting, and the first meeting would go on until one of the operators moved to adjourn for lunch. Then, there would be no further meetings until after Lewis had worked on an agreement privately with the mine operators.

In those days, the mines and mining towns were scattered and isolated. Mining companies owned stores in the towns. There would always be arguments about prices in the company stores. Lewis would come to the negotiations with a number of notebooks. He would pick one up and read complaints from it about the high prices in those stores of pork, beans and so on. He would read page after page of outrageous prices and then take another book and do the same. Time would pass—1:30, 2:00, 2:30—he would go on reading. Finally, one of the mine operators would ask to be recognized and observe that all of this was “fascinating,” but that everyone was hungry and he would suggest adjourning for lunch. Lewis, an impressive man, would stand up and point to the books and say “sit and listen and know the gnawing hunger of the miners who have to pay those outrageous prices.”

Shevardnadze remarked that it is difficult for hungry people to agree on anything.

The lunch break began at 1405.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Files, Memoranda of Conversations (09/1985–11/1985); NLR–775–23–5–1–0. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. A typed notation in the upper right-hand corner reads: “Day 1, Part 1.” Another draft copy of this memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Shevardnadze/Gorbachev in Moscow November 4 and 5, 1985. Minor editorial corrections that have been incorporated in the text printed here suggest that this is a draft. No final text was found.
2. Secretary of State Vance visited Moscow March 27–30, 1977, and April 19–23, 1978. For documentation on his meetings with Brezhnev and Gromyko, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 17–23 and 99–103.
3. See Documents 71, 105–108, and 121–122.
4. Shultz provided a draft communiqué to Shevardnadze during their October 25 meeting in New York; see Document 122. Telegram Secto 25015 from Shultz in Helsinki to Moscow, November 3, transmitted a revised draft. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850787–0198) According to telegram 15790 from Moscow, November 4, the “PolCouns delivered the text of revised draft communique early a.m. November 4 to MFA’s Deputy Director of USA Division Chetverikov.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, no [film number])
5. Negroponte sent Shultz an undated memorandum on fusion research cooperation, which concluded: “a political commitment to proceed with a worldwide cooperative effort to design and build a prototype fusion reactor could advance the introduction of fusion energy into commercial use by forcing the acceleration of the R&D process. At first consideration the Russian proposal appears to be an attractive possibility which is difficult but probably can be accomplished.” The memorandum was drafted on October 27 in OES/NTC. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Papers Ambassador Matlock took to Moscow: Letter-Eyes Only Jack F. Matlock; NLR–351–62–2–1–0)
6. John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers of America, 1920–1960, and founder of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.