Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

105. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 27, 1985, 10 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

• The President’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union (S/S)

PARTICIPANTS

• Vice President Bush
• Secretary Shultz
• Donald T. Regan
• Robert C. McFarlane
• Ambassador Arthur Hartman
• Jack F. Matlock
• Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter
• Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
• Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko
• Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
• Ambassador and Asst. to the FM Chernyshov
• Minister Counselor Oleg Sokolov
• Counselor to the FM Sergei P. Tarasenko
• Mr. Pavel R. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

The President greeted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and led him into the Oval Office for a photo opportunity which ended at 10:10, at which time the other participants entered the room and the President opened the meeting. (U)

The President began by observing that in preparing for this meeting he had had a chance to look at how the United States is portrayed in the Soviet press. He observed that the picture is less than flattering. He said that he raised this not to make Mr. Shevardnadze uncomfortable but to make a point. This meeting and the meeting that he would have with Mr. Gorbachev in November would provide an opportunity for each of them to get a more accurate view of the other. He wanted the Soviet leadership to begin to get a true picture of who he, Ronald Reagan, is, what he stands for and what he wants to accomplish. He would like to get the same picture of Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues. (S/S)

The President continued by pointing out that we need to get beyond stereotypes and talk frankly about our differences, to explore constructively what we can achieve together between now and November 19, and after that meeting as well. (S/S)

The President noted that when he met with Foreign Minister Gromyko last year he discussed his view of the world and our two countries’ place in it.² Since Mr. Shevardnadze was familiar with what he said then he would not repeat himself but he did want to emphasize two things that he said at that time. The first is that our philosophies and political systems are very different and will remain so, but we live in one world and must handle our competition in peace. The second is that neither of us will ever allow the other a military edge, but if we are ever going to clear the air, reduce suspicions, and reduce nuclear arms, there will never be a better time. (S/S)

The President then noted some of the things which he wished to cover in his November meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. He said he wanted to discuss several points—why the Soviet Union should feel threatened by the United States when the United States has never started a war and never will. He wanted to explain why we see the Soviet military build-up and Soviet attempts to expand its influence in the world as threatening to us, and to explain that this is why the United States is rebuilding its strength. We are doing so to defend ourselves and make sure a war is never conceivable. But he also wanted to go beyond a discussion of rivalry—he would like to share with General Secretary Gorbachev our hopes and plans for our people since we both have much to do at home. It might make it easier to reduce suspicion if the two of them could understand each other’s priorities better. (S/S)

The President then turned to international issues, saying that disputes in third countries have frequently been the cause of the most serious strains between us. He pointed out that efforts during the seventies to develop understandings came apart in our view because of the Soviet Union’s failure to act with restraint. When our friends are militarily threatened by the Soviets and their Allies, they ask us to help and we must respond. We will continue to do so, but we would like to end this cycle. (S/S)

The President noted that we had started discussions on several areas in the world and that he was glad we had done so. We find these exchanges useful and we will have a formal proposal to regularize these discussions. (S/S)

We must go further, however, in dealing with the problems caused by outside military involvement in regional disputes. We need to give greater thought, creative thought, to how we can remove the military element from our rivalry and he would welcome Mr. Gorbachev’s thoughts on this. He then noted that there is a lot that could be said about particular issues but he would defer that until later in order to present some thoughts on arms control. (S/S)

Regarding arms control the President made the following points:

— Arms control is one of the most difficult of the issues before us. Frankly, we do not know if your government is serious about making progress in arms control. We are prepared to make progress; we are prepared to keep our objectives high. (S/S)

— Our two governments have underway a number of formal negotiations. In addition, the U.S. has proposed that our representatives get together soon on a number of other specific issues. I believe that what is actually achieved at these negotiations and discussions should be the basis for what General Secretary Gorbachev and I can accomplish in this area in November. (S/S)

— As a first priority, the United States seeks stabilizing and radical reductions in the levels and power of offensive nuclear arms. These are the weapons that most threaten mankind. This goal should be paramount to both of us. (S/S)

— We must also consider the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. Your country has long had a massive strategic defense program, including major improvements in your existing ABM system deployed around Moscow and your new radar at Krasnoyarsk which is in violation of the ABM Treaty. We are also seeing the upgrading of your strategic air defenses. (S/S)

— We are now conducting a research effort in the area of strategic defense technologies, as you have for years. We are morally bound to seeing whether or not strategic defenses can offer a better, safer way of maintaining the peace than is possible by the accumulation of offensive nuclear arms. (S/S)

— I have directed that our strategic defense research be conducted within the bounds of the ABM Treaty. (S/S)

— Now is the time to take a bold step by agreeing to deep cuts in nuclear forces in a manner which enhances stability. Now is the time to establish stability and begin a serious dialogue on the offense/defense relationship. (S/S)

— If we are successful then we can look forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war, perhaps based on an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against nuclear offensive arms. (S/S)

— This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we believe the U.S., the Soviet Union and all other nations can agree. (S/S)

— I would like to underscore, in strongest personal terms, my commitment to the pursuit of arms reduction. (S/S)

— We also ought to look at other ways our senior defense and military officers can have more regular contact. We should ask our experts to explore such approaches. (S/S)

— However, we still seem to have a problem with incidents involving our military officers in Germany.³ We must insist that you take effective steps to enforce discipline on your troops so that our people are treated with the respect we show yours in Germany and lives are not threatened and no one is abused. The incident which affected our people most was the murder of Major Nicholson. This matter is not closed. (S/S)

The President then turned to bilateral issues noting that these are very important. He then made the following specific points:

— If we are to make real progress in solving the critical problems, we are going to have to take major steps to improve the climate. (S/S)

— We must find a way to live on this planet in peace. Doing that will be much harder if our people don’t have more contact and don’t have better means to communicate. (S/S)

— For this reason, those issues we have under negotiation are very important. We have to make sure our negotiators get on with the talks and start producing some results. There has been too much haggling over minor points, and we have to break that pattern. (S/S)

— But, you know, even though it is important to conclude these efforts, they are not nearly enough. The fact is that our societies are dangerously cut off from each other, and we need truly major steps to improve that situation. (S/S)

— Frankly, I think our bureaucracies have not been imaginative enough in preparing for our meeting in Geneva. I have instructed our people to go back to the drawing boards and to come up with some ideas which are commensurate to the need for better communication and more cooperation. (S/S)

— I have in mind things like:

—Giving our students and young people more opportunities to meet and study together;

—Working together in an area like computer education;

—More contact between our military people;

—Joining efforts to find cures for cancer and other diseases;

—Getting some help from you in improving Russian-language instruction here. (S/S)

— I have instructed our people to develop some ideas along these lines, and will be passing them along in diplomatic channels. (S/S)

— I hope you will also be thinking of more ambitious ways to expand communication and cooperation between our societies. Tell Mr. Gorbachev that I don’t think we should be limited by our cautious bureaucrats. The two of us can lead our countries to some real breakthroughs if we set that as our goal. (S/S)

The President concluded his initial presentation by saying that this is how he sees the overall picture. He regretted that he took so long, but thought it important to give Shevardnadze his thoughts on the October meeting. He then solicited Shevardnadze’s views. (S/S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze thanked the President for receiving him, and for the attention given to his visit and his delegation. He regarded the reception as an expression of the President’s attitude toward his country and its leadership. Shevardnadze noted that he had seen Gorbachev before leaving Moscow and that Gorbachev sent greetings and best wishes to the President and said that he was looking forward to their meeting in November with interest and hope. (S/S)

Shevardnadze stated that he had arrived with instructions from the Soviet leadership and that he wanted to deliver to the President a letter which is quite substantial and of major importance. He did not expect an immediate reply because of the letter’s length, but would make some comment on it. He then handed the letter to the President.⁴ (S/S)

Shevardnadze then noted that there had been a recent tradition of communication between our leaders and these messages had been a positive element in our relations. He also pointed out that Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership are engaged just as the President is in serious preparation for their meeting. This meeting will be of importance to more than our two countries. In New York he had had the opportunity to meet with many Foreign Ministers, and he found that they were less interested in discussing bilateral questions than in discussing the prospects for the forthcoming meeting between the President and Gorbachev. This demonstrates that nations and governments of the world have great hope for that meeting. (S/S)

As far as the Soviets are concerned they hope that crucial questions, global questions, will be resolved at that meeting. The people of the world live in fear. They know our two countries have tremendous devastating potential and not only for each other, since we can destroy the earth and even affect the entire solar system. Shevardnadze reiterated that Gorbachev had worked hard on his message and had sought and taken the advice of his colleagues. He regards the message as a concept for the summit meeting in November. (S/S)

Shevardnadze said that Gorbachev agrees with the idea which appeared repeatedly in the correspondence that there are substantial differences between our countries, and also that many of these problems will continue to exist. There are obvious political, economic and social differences between our countries. Nevertheless he believes, like the President, that we must co-exist on this planet and learn to cooperate, and indeed mankind looks to us for such a decision. When American visitors have seen Gorbachev he has said to them, “Either we live together or die together,” and he has expressed this thought in the letter. (S/S)

Shevardnadze pointed out that the prevention of nuclear war is the principal task today, and that Comrade Gorbachev believes that at the Geneva meeting the two sides could come to a mutual understanding regarding the prevention of nuclear war. Such an understanding must be based on the essential principles of the inadmissibility of military superiority on either side and the inadmissibility of encroaching on the security of either side. This was the first thought. The second was that both sides need to confirm their recognition of the need to limit and reduce nuclear arms. This can be done by terminating the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. That would make a radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations possible. Gorbachev thinks that we need to work for this, both before and after the summit meeting. (S/S)

What the Soviets have in mind is working on the various problems in a comprehensive way. Indeed questions of space and nuclear arms must be approached in a comprehensive way. The Soviets look at the situation as follows:

1) The prevention of the militarization of space is the road to the reduction of nuclear arms.

2) We must look for solutions in a dynamic and active way for the summit, if it is to have tangible and positive results. Stopping the arms race in its main area, the nuclear area, is essential. Shevardnadze asserted that the Soviets have stopped nuclear tests but that their moratorium is not an unlimited one. It would be good if the United States would give thought to meeting the Soviets on this issue. If we have an agreement to end nuclear tests, it would not be the final step, but a step along the way to solve the problem of preventing nuclear war. (S/S)

There has not been much progress in the Geneva negotiations. Each side says it is the fault of the other. The Soviets will be proposing a formula and a concept which could be the basis of that formula; it is in the General Secretary’s letter. It involves (1) a complete ban on space strike weapons and (2) a 50% reduction of appropriate nuclear arms on both sides. (S/S)

The picture would be as follows if there could be such an agreement: Nuclear arms capable of reaching the territories of each other would be reduced. He noted that the United States has more delivery vehicles than the Soviet Union, but the Soviets are prepared to take the step because it would preserve strategic equivalence between the two countries. Equality would be assured at equal but lower numbers of nuclear weapons. [Note: The proper translation of the Russian word “zaryad” is “weapon”, not “charge”, as the Soviet interpreter was saying.] Both sides would have 6,000 nuclear weapons, if one assumes a base of about 12,000. This would be a practical solution to the task set for the negotiators in Geneva. (S/S)

If we could reach such an agreement, Shevardnadze continued, strategic equilibrium and stability would be assured and trust between our two countries would be established. He added that Gorbachev said in his letter that an agreement on our part would be a good stimulus for the other nuclear powers. There is a need for political will on both sides to bring this about. In connection with the agreement the following would be resolved: (1) stopping work to develop space strike systems, (2) freezing nuclear arsenals at current levels, (3) banning new types of nuclear weapons. The purpose would be to take out of operation and dismantle an agreed number of strategic arms on both sides plus a mutual obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in countries where there are none now deployed. In other words an agreement not to build up stockpiles and not to put new ones in where weapons are now deployed. (S/S)

Shevardnadze indicated that Gorbachev’s letter also contained a few ideas regarding medium-range missiles in Europe, stating that the Soviet Union is prepared for the most radical reduction in their numbers and that the Soviet Union would agree not to have these weapons in a greater number than the weapons in UK and French hands, on the basis of warhead numbers. These are simply fundamental considerations on the broad questions; they obviously need to be considered by our specialists. (S/S)

Shevardnadze then referred to the President’s remarks on confidence-building measures and stated that the subject matter of the Stockholm CDE Conference can become a part of the meeting. In outline, the picture there is that there seems to be a general understanding in three or four of the confidence-building areas. It would seem, based upon conversations with the US representative in Moscow recently, that there are no great differences in these four areas. (S/S)

Regarding the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, the Soviets believe that a positive solution could be found. The United States has raised verification questions and we agree that this is an important issue—we are no less interested in verification than you are. He quoted Gorbachev as saying “We are in favor of real and effective verification.” He is willing to consider any comments made by the US on this matter. (S/S)

Regarding bilateral and regional problems, he proposed that we prepare a list of issues so that there can be a basis for agreement at the summit meeting in November. If the process continues in a normal manner and it is mutually desired, a concluding document for that meeting could be prepared. He added that he had presented to Secretary Shultz a general outline and that we will continue to have contact in diplomatic channels to work this out. (S/S)

Shevardnadze then turned to the President’s remarks, stating that he had said much regarding the strategic defense initiative. The Soviets understand that the programs in the United States have defensive elements to them, but they believe that the militarization of space should be banned and that space strike weapons should be banned. Those arms under development have not only defensive but offensive potential. Therefore, the Soviet position is to ban all stages except for laboratory research. He thought this position had not been well understood by the Administration. In fact both sides have basic research and this will continue and the Soviets are not trying to ban that. He then quoted from Article V of the ABM Treaty which states that “Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM Systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.” The provisions not to develop, test or deploy are extremely important in the Soviet view. (S/S)

The Soviets believe, he continued, that there is today a strategic equilibrium and that its basis is the SALT I and II Treaties and particularly the ABM Treaty. Other undertakings and treaties are relevant but those are the basis of our relations which must not be destroyed. Any other approach would mean a spiralling arms race, both quantitative and particularly qualitative. (S/S)

Shevardnadze then observed that they read our press just as we read their press and in the American press he had seen the idea—perhaps it was not the official US government-view, that the Soviet Union can be exhausted by competition in the arms area. Those who assert this, even hope this, are mistaken. Such people are not aware of the Soviet potential, both economic and scientific. We are against war, he added, but we are not weak. The Soviet Union can withstand competition but does not want it to happen. It is sometimes said that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian regime, he observed. We have a different view—we have in addition to economic strength a moral and political unity and this is a force no less important than that of nuclear weapons. We take pride in it. (S/S)

Regarding nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union has declared a moratorium. We expected a positive response. Instead we had a proposal to invite our representatives to observe a nuclear explosion in the United States. We did not come and this was not a capricious decision. We have sufficient scientific potential that we do not need to observe the tests to know what is going on. (S/S)

For example, since the Soviet moratorium proposal, the United States has conducted one announced nuclear test but also there was one unannounced test—it occurred on August 15th at 1700 hours GMT in Nevada. It had a power of less than two kilotons. The Soviet specialists detected this test and they have no need to come to Nevada to know what happened. You have a beautiful country, of course, which it would be nice to visit, but one can record nuclear explosions in Moscow just as well as on the spot. Instruments exist which can differentiate between earthquakes and nuclear explosions. (S/S)

In this respect he found the President’s news conference after Gorbachev’s proposal was received of considerable interest.⁵ He was interested in a sentence which the President uttered at that time which he did not believe was accidental. It was to the effect that the United States has a projected program and after this program is completed, can revisit the problem. He thought that a date, perhaps January, had been mentioned by the President. Subsequent to this, others have tried to re-interpret the President’s remarks but he, Shevardnadze, found the words of interest. (S/S)

Shevardnadze continued by saying that he had spoken with Secretary Shultz in Helsinki about creating a good atmosphere for the meeting.⁶ This is as important as anything else. In the Soviet Union we criticize each other in a sharp manner. Therefore, it is not that we are sensitive to criticism; we are accustomed to it. But some statements made in the United States, and not only by correspondents but even by responsible American officials, seem like they are designed to be like an artillery barrage before a battle. Sometimes the arguments are not at all convincing. For example, the talk about the Soviet Union being ahead of the United States in its weaponry. At the same time American officials are saying that the Soviet Union is engaged in stealing technology from the West. There is no logic in this. Now I don’t want to sound offensive but our people are offended by statements like “evil empire”. When I heard that I thought the President had the old empire in mind, not the Soviet Union of today. (S/S)

Every country has its pride and identity and those things which are sacred to it. We for example would be pleased to pay tribute to George Washington—even our first-graders know about George Washington and the role he played in American history—but you know we are very much offended by some of the things that have been said about Lenin. We haven’t done that sort of thing to you. Explaining historical processes that are going on in Africa, Latin America and Asia by incitement by Lenin is quite unjustified. Lenin signed the first Decree on Peace and he formulated this idea even before the Revolution. He called upon the Soviet Union to cooperate with the United States even when the United States did not recognize the Soviet Union. Many of you are religious believers—I am not—but what sort of offense to believers would it be if we denounced God. For us Lenin is sacred. In addition some of the quotations used and attributed to him are not accurate—he never said anything like that. Now, of course, any personality can be criticized, but one should take into account the opinion of people and the effect upon them. (S/S)

Now when we mention certain elements in the relationship we are not trying just to win arguments. Gorbachev’s letter and his concept shows that we do not want rhetorical arguments. Such arguments would not be at all dangerous if neither of us had nuclear missiles pointed at each other, but under the circumstances it is not a desirable thing. (S/S)

In the Soviet Union everyone welcomes the statement that you want to go down in history as a peacemaking President. We sincerely believe that our own proposals are consistent with this. (S/S)

Shevardnadze then concluded by thanking the President for his hospitality. He mentioned that it was his first visit here, although he had read much about the United States and knew that the American people are a great people. He felt the people of the Soviet Union have their own qualities and would like to use these riches for the benefit of mankind as a whole. (S/S)

The President said that Mr. Shevardnadze had raised many points of interest and he would like to comment on a few of them. (S/S)

He welcomed his comments on verification matters observing that this was the first time in his view that such an offer had been made by the Soviet Union. He was very pleased to hear it and hoped that this would indicate a willingness of the Soviet Union to give greater attention to this area. (S/S)

As for the proposal regarding 6,000 nuclear weapons, the President noted that the U.S. proposal was for a level of 5000 missile warheads. He asked if the Soviet proposal would be presented at Geneva, observing that up to now their proposal had not been concrete enough for negotiation. Since this is the first time that they will have made a concrete proposal as opposed to general statements, he was most gratified. (S/S)

Regarding the assertions that the United States is behind the Soviet Union in areas of military strength, the President noted that in 1972 the United States had a slight edge regarding warheads on ICBM’s. Since then the Soviet Union has gone ahead, far ahead. In fact they have a three to one advantage now in land-based missile warheads. It is true that the United States has a better balance in its triad of forces. The United States has no intention of forcing the Soviet Union to a different structure it does not desire. Counting all nuclear warheads the Soviet Union also has an advantage—about 9,000–7,000. (S/S)

In conventional forces the Soviet Union is far ahead of the United States. Furthermore, we feel that the Soviet Union is building a potentially offensive force. (S/S)

Regarding the SALT agreements which the Minister had referred to it has been precisely since those agreements were signed that the Soviet Union has gone ahead so decisively in the area of ICBM warheads. (S/S)

As for space systems we must remember that everyone knows how to make nuclear weapons today. Suppose we and the Soviet Union reduce our arsenals to zero. No one could be sure that there are no nuclear weapons in the world. For example, in 1925 when countries agreed to ban chemical weapons, they did not give up the gas mask, they kept it, and we have had experience with madmen in international relations. Nevertheless, gas was not used in World War II. It was not used because all knew the others had it and could use it against them, and because we all had gas masks. Now our Strategic Defense Initiative is a research program. It is being carried out within the framework of the ABM Treaty. If a weapon could be developed to intercept nuclear missiles, defensive systems would be like the gas mask. One would not have to worry about others having the weapon, because there would be a defense against it. If our research is successful we would not view it as necessary to deploy the system. We would sit down with you and others to discuss how it might be used. (S/S)

As far as the militarization of space is concerned, nuclear missiles fly through space, and this is militarization. There was once the idea of orbiting nuclear weapons, and we have agreed to ban that. But regarding defensive weapons, both countries should go ahead with research and see what is possible. Today, it is simply uncivilized to say that we can only maintain the peace by threatening innocent people. We need to find a better way and that is why we believe we need to go forward with research in this area. (S/S)

So far as his earlier reference to an “evil empire,” perhaps he was responding to charges he had heard repeatedly from the other side that we are blood-thirsty imperialists. However, the point about atmosphere is a correct one. We should do more talking to each other rather than about each other. So far as the quotations of Lenin are concerned, the point is that the idea of our ultimate destruction is inherent in his thought. We have people from every strain on earth in our population. But there is a difference: here our people can dictate to their government what it does, while in your country the people don’t have much to say about policy. But you have chosen the system you have and we have chosen another. We must live in peace and we must cooperate more. We could get together to put an end to some of the conflict in other regions. We would hope that you could find a way, for example, to withdraw from Afghanistan. This would have a very good effect on our mutual relationship. (S/S)

Shevardnadze responded that the President had mentioned certain details regarding who has more weapons and such. This is something our specialists should discuss. He had also mentioned some types of Soviet missiles but he had not mentioned cruise missiles and U.S. missiles in Europe which are strategic for the Soviet Union. But this is not the basic question. The basic question is: will the United States abide by the ABM Treaty? If the United States wants to revise or withdraw from that Treaty it should say so forthrightly, because its announced program is incompatible with it. So far as the Kransnoyarsk radar is concerned, we (the Soviets) can also name things such as U.S. radars in the U.K. and Greenland. But this is something our specialists should discuss. The radar near Kransnoyarsk has not been turned on yet. When it is, you can come and see it, and see that it is in compliance with the ABM Treaty. (S/S)

The President returned to the matter of nuclear testing, pointing out that our instruments show that there have been Soviet tests above the 150 kiloton limit. The Soviets say that they have not tested above that limit, and have charged us with violating that limit. This was the reason for the invitation, not just to come and witness a test, but to bring instruments and to calibrate them. (S/S)

Shevardnadze said that what Gorbachev is proposing leads to a final goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We must think of that as the final goal. Our negotiators can discuss numbers, whether it is 5,000 or 6,000, and weigh the impact of the various elements and the details. So long as there is stability one can be flexible about these things. (S/S)

The President noted we had been the only ones to put a concrete figure down. He is delighted that the Soviets intend to table some figures for our people to deal with, and he agreed that any agreement must be only a step along the way to total elimination. (S/S)

Shevardnadze agreed that any reduction should be progressive and should lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz described the problem with the radar near Krasnoyarsk. He noted that the Soviets had said it is under construction and when completed could be looked at. However, the theory of the ABM Treaty is that certain things would not be undertaken. Large phased array radars are big, they take a lot of time to build, and they are necessary for a defense of the national territory. One must complain when one sees construction which is in violation of the Treaty. It needs to be stopped, not completed. This radar is not on the periphery of the Soviet Union and pointing outward. But this all suggests that if the Soviets think this is compatible with the ABM Treaty, then we should review what we both think the Treaty means. This is what he suggested to Minister Shevardnadze in New York,⁷ and this is different from talking about what is in violation or not. (S/S)

Shevardnadze referred to his statement in New York and mentioned that he had discussed this with their experts in preparation for the meetings. We have discussed radars at Krasnoyarsk and in Greenland. The United States has not convinced us that Krasnoyarsk is a violation of the Treaty: it has a space tracking function. If you think otherwise, if you think this is not the fact, then the doubt must be removed, but then we must also apply this procedure to your radar in Greenland. Regarding the ABM defense in Moscow, this is legitimate in terms of the ABM Treaty. We cannot accept criticism for that. You could have a defense in Washington or New York if you wish, and that would be allright, but the points of real concern should be discussed. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz pointed out that we are not charging a violation of the ABM Treaty because of the ABM system around Moscow. But we do need a discussion of what the Treaty means and how we obtain a mix of offense and defense in our deterrent strategy. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane referred to the ABM system around Moscow and pointed out that there are restrictions in the Treaty regarding what that system can contain. Limitations regarding such matters as rapid reload capacity, mobility of its components and so on, are a part of the Treaty. Certain activities can be called into question if it seems that the Treaty is not observed. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane continued that it is right to answer these questions in Geneva, but it is also fair to ask about fundamental principles. For example, regarding the Soviet reference to a ban on all new types, it seems that this would ban U.S. new types such as midgetman and the new submarine-launched missile, but would not apply to the new Soviet systems such as the SSX–24 and SSX–25 since the Soviets do not concede that these are new systems. He also noted that the Soviet proposal refers to nuclear weapons (or “charges”), because it seems they want to count U.S. weapons which are directed against the Soviet air defense system, while the U.S. has no air defense system. If these are included, it is not a reasonable basis for a balanced agreement. Therefore, we must conclude that some elements in the Soviet proposal are an apparent attempt to achieve an imbalance in the Soviet Union’s favor. (S/S)

The President pointed out that we are acting fully in compliance with the ABM Treaty. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane called attention to Agreed Statement D in the ABM Treaty. It places no prohibition on research, testing or development, only on deployment. (S/S)

Korniyenko argued that the first sentence of Agreed Statement D, “In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty,” makes these agreements subordinate to Article III where there is a commitment not to deploy a nationwide system. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane pointed out that the commitment is not to deploy. (S/S)

Korniyenko then referred to Article V of the Treaty which states that “each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.” (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane pointed out that the terms of the Treaty do not preclude the development and testing of systems based on new physical principles. This illustrates the need to talk about our interpretation of the Treaty. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz mentioned that those in the space and defense group at the Geneva negotiations have a lot to talk about. (S/S)

Korniyenko said that the Soviet negotiators will have instructions to discuss the prevention of an arms race in space. (S/S)

Shevardnadze remarked that they seem to be stealing the work of our negotiators. The Soviets have brought in a proposal which seems quite clear. It is important to establish a basic approach to these questions. The Soviets have often been reproached for having no proposals and although they have mentioned percentages for reductions they had not received a reply. Their proposal is not a demand. It is up to the United States to respond as it wishes. (S/S)

The President asked if they would be putting the proposal on the table in Geneva. (S/S)

Shevardnadze responded that, yes, they would table the proposal on Monday.⁸ He added that as he had said in New York, we could go back all the way to 1946 in assessing the situation—the whole tragedy with nuclear weapons began then. (S/S)

The President remarked that that was the period when the truth was made evident that this country has no aggressive intent toward anyone. We had an economy untouched by war damage, we had nuclear weapons—the only country in the world to have them—and we did not threaten anyone. In fact, we helped others with postwar reconstruction and did not expand our territory. Why should one think now, when we face so many weapons on the other side, we would suddenly become aggressive? (S/S)

Shevardnadze said that he mentioned 1946 not in order to criticize our cooperation in World War II, but only in regard to the postwar development of nuclear weapons. The United States used the weapon against Japan when it was clearly defeated. [At this point both Secretary Shultz and Chief of Staff Regan objected]. The USSR developed the weapon only after the United States did. (S/S)

The President mentioned the offer that had been made in the Baruch Plan. (S/S)

Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union had proposed that all nuclear weapons be eliminated. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz observed that the problem is not getting people to make declarations, but to get people to agree to make concrete arrangements to carry out these declarations. He added that the President had reacted positively to Shevardnadze’s comments on verification, because this is indeed the root of many of the problems. (S/S)

Korniyenko said that it is not correct to say that the Soviets have not made proposals on verification. He recalled the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban where an offer of on site verification was made by the Soviet negotiators. The United States broke off these negotiations. They should be resumed, in the Soviet view. (S/S)

Shevardnadze remarked that these were historic negotiations and they need to be continued. (S/S)

At this point the President noted that the time for the meeting had ended and suggested that the participants proceed to the Residence for lunch and asked that Minister Shevardnadze stay behind for a few minutes for a private meeting.⁹ (U)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (6/6). Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original. Matlock sent the memorandum of conversation to McFarlane under a September 28 cover memorandum, requesting that McFarlane approve it. There is no indication McFarlane approved or disapproved the recommendation. On September 27, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: “into a jam session on the upcoming Shevardnadze meeting. He arrived at 10 A.M.—a 2 hr. meeting, then I had 10 min’s. alone with him & then lunch (St. Dining Room) until 1:30. He’s a personable fellow but we had our differences. My goal was to send him back to Gorbachev with a message that I really meant ‘arms reductions’ & I wasn’t interested in any détente nonsense. For the 1st time they talked of real verification procedures.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 500)
2. See footnote 2, Document 1.
3. See footnote 2, Document 83.
4. See Document 84.
5. On August 5, during a news conference, the President responded to a question about Gorbachev’s nuclear testing moratorium. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II, pp. 975–976. For Gorbachev’s letter to Reagan announcing the moratorium, see Document 68.
6. See Document 71.
7. See Document 99.
8. September 30.
9. No record of the private conversation between Reagan and Shevardnadze was found.