Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

122. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 25, 1985, 7:30–9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • Secretary Shultz
  • Assistant to the President McFarlane
  • Assistant Secretary Ridgway
  • Ambassador Nitze
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • DAS Palmer
  • Interpreter Zarechnak

• Soviets

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov
  • Assistant to the FM Chernishev
  • Assistant to the FM Tarasenko
  • Minister-Counselor Sokolov
  • Interpreter N. Uspenskiy²
  • Interpreter P. Palazhchenko

Secretary Shultz welcomed Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and noted that we have a tradition of working breakfasts and lunches. Shevardnadze said that he believed that this is a good tradition. Shevardnadze noted that the President had had a reception in the same room the day before. The Secretary said that the President had met with Thatcher, Craxi, Kohl, Mulroney, Nakasone—noting that we meet with the group of seven on economic issues each year. All of them had been present except France, which had other things to do. The Secretary noted that we had a well-known comic with a long nose named Jimmy Durante. He had a saying “everybody wants to get into the act”. It seems that everybody has advice for us with regard to President Reagan’s meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

Shevardnadze agreed that this was the case, and noted that at every meeting he had had when he was last in New York and again this time all of his interlocutors raised the meeting next month. This is the center of discussion. The Secretary said that this shows people attach great importance to the meeting and everything it covers. Shevardnadze said that now literally the whole world is living day to day with thoughts about this meeting. The Secretary noted that during the meeting he had held with Gromyko last January in Geneva there were around 1500 journalists. We imposed a rule that we would say nothing for two to three days, so they had zero to report. They were reduced to interviewing each other. Shevardnadze said that this time journalists in New York had more food for reporting as there are more heads of government here; although the majority of the heads seem to have already departed. The Secretary noted that the President still has bilaterals with Nakasone and Kohl, and he would then be seeing the family of Mr. Klinghoffer.³ He was the man murdered on the Italian ship under tragic circumstances. Indeed, one of the issues he wanted to raise this morning was this question of terrorism. He noted it now because the Klinghoffer family lives here in New York.

Shevardnadze noted that they did not have much time as far as he understood the situation. The Secretary said that they had until 9:30 a.m., they would have their eggs right now and then be ready to proceed. He understood from our Ambassador to the United Nations that the social schedule up here at the UN was such that you could eat 10 to 15 times a day. Shevardnadze responded that we need to take a closer look at what our people are doing there. He said that he had a warm recollection of the time he spent at the Secretary’s house in Washington.⁴ The Secretary said that he and his wife had enjoyed having them and that he had asked his wife about how her lunch with Mrs. Shevardnadze had been. She had noted that Mrs. Dobrynin had been a very able interpreter. Mrs. Shultz has decided that she would like to accompany him to Moscow. The Secretary asked whether Shevardnadze had thought further about how the trip would be announced. Shevardnadze said that they assumed Mrs. Shultz will be coming, and they are ready for an announcement to journalists today. He would say that the Soviet Union had invited the Secretary and that we have now agreed that such a trip would be useful and would take place.⁵ The Secretary noted that he would probably be asked whether he would see Gorbachev in Moscow. He would say that he looks forward with interest to meeting with Gorbachev. He would discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin the details of the trip and could do this on the next Tuesday as he would be away in Canada on Monday.⁶

Shevardnadze said that one thing is clear about the meetings in Moscow—this would be the closing stage of preparations for Geneva. We should have that in mind as we put together the program for Moscow. The Secretary said that we should try to get as much settled as possible in Moscow, though he would not preclude ambassadors continuing the work on some problems afterwards but we should do as much as we can in Moscow. Shevardnadze said that we can start here and finish in Moscow.

The Secretary noted that we have worked out an innovation with regard to interpretation. We will go with simultaneous interpreting. If at any moment either side wants it to be slower, the simultaneous will stop and we will pick up with consecutive. There are items when we will want to be sure of what is being said and we should take the time to be careful.

Shevardnadze said that he agreed and that as he understood it he should raise his hand if he wants clarification. This will not be a sign of protest. The Secretary noted that in the United States this was traditionally a sign that you wanted to go to the bathroom.

At this point the food was cleared away and the formal part of the meeting began. The Secretary welcomed Shevardnadze back to New York. We had looked forward to the discussion here. As Shevardnadze was the guest, the Secretary would invite him to go first. The Secretary noted that he had a lot to cover himself as well.

Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary. He said that on behalf of his delegation he wanted to give a cordial greeting and to thank the Secretary for the attention and hospitality which had been given to him personally, his family, and their delegation. Shevardnadze noted that this was his fourth meeting with the Secretary if Helsinki is included. The focus of recent contacts had been addressing the issues which needed preparations for the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. In this meeting, their purpose was to review what they had been able to do and how to go about making the Summit successful and meeting the hopes for the future. The day before he had mentioned to the President that the Soviets had taken certain steps. On the one hand, they had made some large-scale proposals with regard to security. For example, they had proposed a prohibition on space-strike weapons, deep cuts on strategic weapons, as well as addressing medium-ranged weapons in Europe. That is how they see the proposals which they are bringing to Geneva. They have adopted serious steps. Unfortunately, all of these steps are of a unilateral nature to date. They also have pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. They have placed limits on medium-range missiles in Europe. They have put into effect a unilateral cessation of nuclear tests. They have proposed a ban on ASAT tests to be followed by destruction of ASAT systems. This is a program of unilateral measures which the Soviet government has announced. Many of these unilateral measures are in effect. Gorbachev in Paris mentioned to the French Parliament that the number of medium-ranged nuclear weapons will be equal to the number in June 1984. He also said that they have begun dismantling of these missiles.

Shevardnadze continued that they are convinced that these acts are conducive to accomplishment of the main task. Unfortunately, he had to note that on the part of the US Administration these had not been met by understanding. It seems to the Soviets that one side has an interest in preparing for the Summit while the other side is not interested and is dragging its feet and delaying. They have this impression with regard to the Geneva negotiations. Gorbachev had sent a letter to President Reagan which laid out their concept with regard to these negotiations. Their delegation had then elaborated in Geneva. They are following the course of these negotiations with big interest. So far they have not seen any encouraging signs. He wanted to take an objective stand. He knew that within a week or a month it was hard to answer all questions. But now is the time for the other side to make a contribution. Given past experience, it is possible to bring positions together. With very few days to go, each side must take a responsible approach. They need to use every hour. The leadership in the Soviet Union and you in the United States have a responsibility to shoulder. This was mentioned by your President at the meeting the day before.

Shevardnadze continued that it cannot be said there is nothing positive in the relationship. He and the Secretary had had four meetings. Shevardnadze had met with the President. They had a variety of bilateral consultations. There were the meetings in Geneva. But this was not enough. What they had in mind today is to review what had been done and to formulate what they could bring to the Summit; what the results of that meeting could be. With the Secretary’s permission he would like to continue for some time and to discuss some practical problems.

Shevardnadze noted that during his last meeting they had proposed 50% reductions of appropriate weapons; of course with banning space-strike weapons. Since then the Soviet delegation had presented this in Geneva. On the basis of discussions among the two delegations, they need to think how best to prepare for serious discussions at the Summit of Soviet proposals. Detailed consideration requires time. Thus at this stage, it would be better not to focus on details, but search for a mutually acceptable approach. They would like to instruct the delegations to explore language that could be included in a final document. As he understood, there is agreement that there could be a concluding document. They are thinking not of a detailed paper but one which reflects similarity of viewpoints. In Gorbachev’s letter of September 12, they had put forward suggestion with regard to a concluding document. Regarding a document, there could be a joint statement on the inadmissibility of war. It was Shevardnadze’s impression that the President agrees about the inadmissibility of war. He would like to outline the content of such a pronouncement [Soviet Embassy will provide precise language—promised October 26th].⁷

Shevardnadze continued that they believed such a joint statement could be an important part of the Summit. It could be a separate statement or it could be part of a concluding document. Perhaps the Secretary would like to say something with regard to this issue or Shevardnadze could go on to medium-ranged missiles. The Secretary said that he would have comments but it was better for Shevardnadze to finish and then he would present his materials.

Shevardnadze stated that the Soviets assume the United States will have some remarks. This is draft language. It will require work to reach agreement.

Shevardnadze said he would now like to turn to medium-range missiles. The Soviet side was working to achieve a radical solution to medium-range systems in Europe. The US side has said it is ready to reach an agreement. But the two delegations have not been able to find convergence in order to reach a radical and final settlement. Considering all the circumstances, it is possible to accommodate the US proposal for an interim solution. The Soviet delegation has set forth a proposal. As of December 1, they would set aside deployment of medium-range systems. They would also discontinue implementation of other countermeasures in Europe and there would be a freeze in other areas with the understanding that there was no substantial change in the strategic setting in Asia. There could then be staged reductions in Europe. In eighteen months to two years you could end up with 120 US cruise missiles and have a Soviet number of medium-range warheads equivalent to the number of warheads on US missiles and the relevant arms of the UK and France. In the meantime, we could continue to work for a more radical solution including aircraft. So what the Soviet Union is proposing is a practical approach. If an accord could be reached, this also could be reflected in a concluding document. If, however, there is a need for additional work, then the Soviet side proposes that the delegations in Geneva explore what can be mutually agreed upon as soon as possible. This exploration could then continue in Moscow.

Shevardnadze stated that he also wanted to make some suggestion with regard to the SALT II Treaty. December 31, 1985 is the date when SALT II becomes ineffective or expires. What should we do beyond that. It seems to the Soviet side that at least we should extend it through 1986, that the US and the USSR should continue to adhere to the extent they’re now doing. They have language to suggest in this regard [Soviet Embassy to provide].⁸ Shevardnadze noted that they would be prepared to consider any formulation the United States wanted to put forward on this subject.

Shevardnadze said that we also would have to consider the question of the large American radars in Greenland and the UK. These have been raised in previous meetings. They are clearly in violation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union had expressed this concern in the SCC. Despite US assertions, this is not modernization of old stations. Instead of a non-phased array, the US is building phased array. He would like to say emphatically that depiction of Krasnoyarsk as incompatible with the Treaty is not true. This station is designed for tracking space objects. It has nothing to do with early warning. The Soviet Union is in favor of jointly looking for a settlement. This could be done by means of ceasing construction at Krasnoyarsk, in Greenland and in Britain. If this is acceptable, then a basic agreement could be reached at the summit and more detailed agreement at the SCC.

Shevardnadze continued that with regard to non-proliferation there are some positive things. The representatives of the two countries have prepared a draft text. This text could be adopted at the Summit as it has the necessary set of elements. If the Secretary has no objection, they can consider this agreed at their level and can submit it to their leaders for the Summit. There are no great differences on this question.

He then wanted to say a few words about their moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. They did not consider that this was off the agenda. For almost three months the moratorium had been in effect, and it would continue to January 1, 1986. It would continue beyond that if the United States decides to refrain from tests. Frankly, reluctance by the US to follow does not appear logical. The US has been saying that it is in favor basically of a full cessation of nuclear tests. If that is true, the time has come. References to verification are not appropriate. It would be readily verifiable. Nuclear explosions can’t be concealed. Soviet instruments and probably US instruments are capable of recording explosions on any scale. They had mentioned a specific test by the US. A positive attitude by the US side towards refraining from tests and resumption of CTB talks would open the way to solving verification and finding reasonable compromises there. The Soviet side was certain solutions could be found. He hoped there would be concrete discussions with the US side on this question.

Shevardnadze continued that at their previous meetings Stockholm had been discussed and they had seen some positive trends towards a resolution. They had agreed on drafting. This is, of course, good but agreements in principle need to be put in practice. The approach proposed by the neutral countries would make possible moving with a certain rhythm, including giving concerted attention to working out an agreement on non-use of force and a set of confidence-building measures. The Soviets had agreed on an annual exchange of information on military activities. They hoped that general agreement on this score would make difficult preparations for a secret war. But their recent information from Stockholm is that the US delegation is slowing things down. There is a toughening of the US position, it is more rigid with regard to non-use of force. The Soviet side had heard that nothing terrible would happen if there is no agreement until the fall of 1986 and the problem is just transferred to the Vienna conference. They hope that no factors will be allowed to impede progress. Most delegations are favorable to positive movement. The Soviet side believes it would be desirable to include Stockholm in the conclusions of the US-Soviet summit. They attached importance to Stockholm and with the other participating parties intend to work for an early successful conclusion.

With regard to the Vienna negotiations, Shevardnadze noted that in several days there would be the 12th anniversary of the talks. Unfortunately, there is a complete stalemate. In February, the Warsaw Treaty countries had put forward a proposal for initial reductions of US and Soviet forces followed by a freeze. What they have in mind is a partial agreement on what is possible now. He recalled comments by the US that it would soon determine its position. This is a problem ripe for solving.

Shevardnadze asked whether he was abusing the amount of time available. The Secretary said that he was watching Shevardnadze’s pile of briefing papers gradually decrease, but that he should continue. Looking toward the simultaneous interpreters, Shevardnadze said that this is a better way of using the time (as opposed to consecutive interpretation).

Shevardnadze continued that last time they had had a useful exchange on chemical weapons. They had looked at this again. Banning these weapons is quite possible. In the stream of efforts to ban chemical weapons, the Soviet Union now has said that it is ready to work out a non-proliferation regime. If we had been able to do this with regard to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, where our two countries had done a lot of the work, why couldn’t a similar approach work with regard to chemical weapons proliferation. The problem of chemical weapons will become more complicated if the US deploys binaries. The Soviet side hopes for a serious approach on chemical weapons to be included in the summit. It would be useful there to reaffirm that both sides are for banning these weapons and for an international convention. If we agree in principle, then we could agree on giving an impulse here.

Shevardnadze then stated that in quite a few areas of bilateral relations there has been positive movement. This has progressed quite a bit. On the North Pacific Air Safety Talks we have a memorandum of understanding in effect and we have begun negotiations on a technical agreement.⁹ Unfortunately, the first round did not bring about agreement. The US side is insisting on a number of provisions which go beyond the framework of the memorandum of understanding. The Soviet side fails to understand the decision of the US side to suspend the talks on air travel between the two countries. A question arises whether the US really wants an agreement on these matters. We need clarity on this issue. The exchanges negotiations are in their final stages. They are impeded only by a US demand that is not consistent with what they have in the Soviet Union and also the practice in the United States. So whether or not there will be an agreement is up to the United States. But these questions and the consulates are quite realistic.

Shevardnadze continued that the day before he had said to the President that they are making preparations with regard to the proposals of the President on such matters as computer education, exchange of students, study of Russian and others.¹⁰ They had instructed the Soviet ministries and departments to analyze these proposals of the President. They would be prepared in Moscow to give the Secretary a preliminary answer on these matters. Overall, both sides need to clear the roadblocks that block bilateral cooperation. They need to set aside what makes agreement more difficult and focus on where they have a sufficient degree of mutual understanding.

Shevardnadze said that he would now like to raise for discussion the question of creating a prototype thermonuclear fusion reactor with socialist countries, China, the United States, West European countries and Japan. This is a fundamentally new source of energy and is practically inexhaustible. Thermonuclear fusion has been confirmed by Soviet and US scientists who have been working together. Our cooperating on a project of such a reactor has been under development in the International Atomic Energy Agency since 1978. The Soviet side now thinks we should begin work on a prototype. This would not be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. We could get practice on this and then produce commercial reactors. This is a very large scale and promising area. Realization of it would demonstrate more broadly the possibility of peaceful cooperation among states. The Soviets understand that the U.S. will need to study this idea. We could then explore it further in Moscow.

Shevardnadze then said that with regard to regional problems, it is positive we have had bilateral discussions on different regions. They will continue towards the end of this month with talks on Central America.¹¹ On the basis of all these discussions, it seems difficult to the Soviet side for the leaders to adopt concrete proposals on separate regions. Therefore, the Soviet side proposes that at the meeting of the leaders that they note the common commitment of the two states to resolve urgent regional problems. They would name the regions in question, where urgent solutions are required and say they were in favor of solutions including of bilateral conflicts. It would be important to reaffirm the need for restraint and taking into account the legitimate interests of each other and of other nations involved.

Shevardnadze said that as he had noted to the President, it was now of basic importance to give additional impulses to all of our delegations—in Geneva, Vienna, Stockholm and elsewhere. On bilateral relations, we need to give additional instructions to our embassies. We need more intensive preparations for the main documents, we need to formulate the main things that would conclude the summit meeting, having in mind that during the visit to Moscow we will have more concrete discussions of all the problems. We need to agree there on language for a joint overall concluding document. This is the overall way the Soviets envisage the principal format that could become the basis for discussion at the summit meeting. Of course, the Soviets recognize that everything cannot be considered and resolved at one summit meeting. They intend meetings to continue to take place. They want to set an outline for the future, for prospects beyond the meeting next month.

The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his comprehensive presentation. There was much that was constructive. The U.S. will have to study what he had said. Some things we can agree on; some offer promise, but will need to be worked through; and there are some where we clearly disagree. The Secretary agreed that we need to continue to give impulses to those working in various areas before our leaders meet. He said that he wanted now to go through the areas which will be discussed in Geneva. He would start with bilateral matters. Rather than going through subject by subject, what our positions are and where there are problems, he would just like to give Shevardnadze a written statement (Secretary handed over three page, non-paper).¹² This paper is presented in the hope that we can bring focus on the problems and if possible prior to Moscow or during and after that, but prior to Geneva see what can be resolved.

The Secretary continued that he could not say he had foreseen the Soviet proposal for a prototype thermonuclear fusion reactor. His own company had worked in this field, he had thought it was far away from development, but let us look at this proposal.

The Secretary said he would now like to comment on regional issues. He noted Shevardnadze’s points in his speech the day before to the UNGA.¹³ Both sides recognized that these matters present in themselves problems and problems between the two of us. Getting at this is the intention of the President’s proposals. As he noted, the regional experts’ talks have been useful. We have proposed regularizing them, perhaps putting this in the joint document. We have no answer from the Soviet side, although perhaps what Shevardnadze had said about regional consultations implied that they accepted this proposal. But we need to solve, not just discuss these problems. Shevardnadze had said that there was no fated clash between us. He also had said that these regional crises obstruct economic development and had talked about the tragedies of small wars—although some are not so small anymore. So the US hopes that this means that the Soviets are ready to help solve some of these problems.

The Secretary continued that what the President proposed is a framework for US-Soviet efforts, principles and processes which we might both act upon, recognizing that each area has its own history and in some respects is unique. We need in the first instance to work on those conflicts—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia—which directly contributed to the deterioration of our relations. These issues are at the core of international tensions and were largely responsible for shattering efforts to improve US-Soviet relations in the 1970’s. So if we are to have the kind of sustained improvement in our relations that we both seek, it is important that we have movement on these issues. This is particularly true with regard to Afghanistan which more than any other example demonstrates for the American people the use of force by a great power against a small nation and which basically ended chances for ratification of SALT II. The Secretary mentioned this as with all due respect to arms control agreements, they can be readily derailed by an atmosphere created by regional conflicts. These troubles often arise from local situations but outside influences made them worse and gave them an East-West dimension.

The Secretary stated that we never made any secret that our sympathies are with those who fight for independence but we need negotiated solutions. He noted what Shevardnadze had said in this regard. So the US is prepared as the President said for military disengagement by both our countries.

What we have in mind is a peace process to address these conflicts at three levels. First there should be negotiations between the warring parties, designed to achieve an end to violence, national reconciliation and withdrawal of foreign troops. Second, once these negotiations make real progress, then appropriate, separate discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union would begin. These talks would not be formal negotiations but would support what the groups inside another country had been trying to arrive at. In some cases, this would mean guaranteeing arrangements reached in negotiations but in every case our role would be to help reduce outside military involvement and to limit the flow of outside arms. In the third stage, if there is more stability in a given country and we are able to help, then it would be possible to reintegrate these countries into the world economy. This would require a multilateral reconstruction effort. The US is prepared to play its part and we assume the Soviet Union would as well. So the process is one of reducing violence, then supporting it through bilateral efforts and third sponsoring economic reconstruction.

If Shevardnadze agreed, the Secretary would be prepared to develop language for our leaders to use in Geneva in a document. In any case, we would hope that the General Secretary would discuss these regional matters with President Reagan in Geneva. There are things he could say about each area but he would not take the time as they have limited time left. But the United States does not limit its interest to the five countries mentioned. They had discussed Iran and Iraq as part of their discussion of the Middle East, and he had some thoughts about Iran and Iraq. Both agree that the war is not in our interest. Iran is the intransigent party. They think they have a vertical hot line so there is no way to talk with them. Thus the way is to stop the flow of arms to Iran. The US has been trying this and with some success. According to US information, the major flow of arms is coming from North Korea, some countries in Europe and Libya.

The Secretary continued that with regard to Shevardnadze’s comments about banning chemical weapons, they were being used in this war; and there was a potential major outbreak of the use of these weapons. There is a common view that there is a stalemate; this was the Secretary’s view. But if Iran succeeds, this would give fresh impetus to spreading its backward doctrines in that region. So the US thinks there should be a stop to the flow of weapons.

In general there is a great deal to talk about in the regional field, where we could be a constructive force, help stabilize our bilateral relations, and more broadly East-West relations. Perhaps in Moscow they could return to regional issues; there was not time today to go through his considerable stack of materials. It was important to help bring about political settlements—this would help our relations and of course help the problems themselves. This is security in the most fundamental way. If we can stop arms from being used in these regions, then we can lay the basis for arms control.

The Secretary wanted to say a word about terrorism. They might talk about this further themselves and address it to our leaders. Each of us has been the victim of terrorism in recent weeks. At least one American has died; a Soviet diplomat also has died. Each of us has hostages who are being held by terrorists in Lebanon. The U.S. made a strong statement about your hostages and the dead Soviet, and he wanted again to express our sympathies.¹⁴ The US knows the Soviets are making a major effort to get their people released just as the U.S. is doing. The U.S. believes the Soviet hostages are being held by a small Sunni group very close to the group holding our people. Both groups are heavily influenced by Iran which has not been trying to obtain their release. Syria is constrained by relations with Iran and by the confused situation in Lebanon. In the case of the TWA hostages Iran’s last-minute endorsement, at Syria’s urging, appeared to be a key factor in their release. This is one area where we can and should stand together. We should let the world know. The U.S. noted some greater understanding initially on your part with regard to the Achille Lauro incident, although subsequent Soviet press treatment was opportunistic.

The Secretary continued that we have some joint experience with regard to discussing certain issues such as nuclear terrorism and hostage taking. Here US-Soviet cooperation would be quite dramatic. If nothing else it would show the terrorists that they are isolated, that they have no sanctuary. This could have an impact.

Next, the Secretary wished to turn to arms control. The US continues to study the Soviets’ ideas thoroughly. As the President and he had said, the US sees seeds which could be nurtured in the Soviet proposal. We will be responding. The Secretary noted that the US had had proposals on the table since last spring and had had a long wait to hear concrete Soviet proposals. Nevertheless, these are issues that had been studied by both sides for years, they are not new subjects. He would therefore give some reactions. First the fact that the Soviets had put forward a specific proposal which contemplates deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons was welcomed. We welcome also their indication that they are prepared to reach a separate agreement on intermediate range nuclear forces and their acceptance of the fact of NATO deployments in Europe. At the same time, the US is disappointed in many of the details of their proposal. They are one-sided in the Soviet favor. Of course we wouldn’t expect them to be one-sided in our favor.

But, the Secretary continued, the Soviet proposals would decrease rather than enhance stability. Neither we nor our allies, can accept a definition of “strategic” which includes systems that protect our allies—LRINF, aircraft in Europe and Asia, and on aircraft carriers at sea—when the Soviets place no constraints on the systems which threaten our allies. The US approach is that if you strike my friend, you strike me. The Soviet proposal unfairly imposes limits on the modernization of US strategic systems, while locking in the advantages the USSR has accrued through massive military buildup over the last decade—in particular, Soviet heavy ICBMs. The Soviet proposal would permit them to retain a significant number of prompt, hard target capable warheads on heavy missiles—the most destabilizing of all strategic systems—while imposing severe limitations on the US strategic deterrent force. Finally, the Soviet proposal would block the US strategic defense program while allowing the Soviet program to proceed. Obviously, the US cannot accept such unequal proposals. Once the US finishes its analysis we will be trying to find ways to bridge the gaps between the US proposal and the Soviet proposal.

Turning to nuclear testing, the Secretary noted that they had discussed this issue before and US views had not changed. The Secretary agreed about the importance of chemical weapons and maybe they could get at it, but verification was the heart of the problem. On non-proliferation the Secretary had met with the Soviet delegation and had received a lecture on testing and had given a lecture back.

On CDE, it may be that something can be worked out. A year and a half ago in Dublin the President had proposed the same framework we are now discussing—non-use of force and concrete confidence measures which go beyond those in the final document.¹⁵ So we wish to move these things along but we need a more constructive attitude on the Soviet side. If the two sides are to move to drafting from the informal stage which they entered on October 14, we need a more positive approach by the Soviet side to resolve outstanding differences. We believe our efforts should be focussed on finding areas for common agreement on genuine confidence and security-building measures that fall within the Madrid mandate. Talking about areas outside the mandate, such as independent air and naval maneuvers, only diverts attention from the task at hand. We need to see what we can work out in CDE.

On MBFR, the Secretary said he had nothing beyond what had been said before.

The Secretary then said that the US had given thought to the subject of a joint statement or communique, and in particular to the views Shevardnadze had expressed to him and that the General Secretary had raised in his letter to the President. As we had said at the time, US willingness to have a formal communique or document very much depends upon its contents. We have no interest in tying up time or resources in a futile debate. The enemy of good discussions could be an argument over communique language. If we can get agreed language before Geneva, that would be different. The Soviets had suggested certain substantive areas. So the US has blocked out an approach. Shevardnadze had given some suggested language. So the Secretary would give him some of ours (Secretary hands over draft joint communique).¹⁶ It may be that in the end we may decide not to do this. So this is not given to the Soviet side as finally decided. With that in mind and noting that there are lots of brackets to be filled in, we think there are elements in our draft for the Soviets to consider.

Dobrynin, noting the length of the US document said that this was quite a draft. The Secretary noted that when he was a professor he used to get out a scale to weigh his students’ papers. The Secretary noted that they were running out of time. It was very important to have a good exchange on arms control but also a discussion of regional tensions was important as these issues have upset our relations in the past. He hoped we could reach agreement on the bilateral matters. It was not good for our leaders to spend much time on these bilateral issues. They give special content, but are not at the center of matters.

The Secretary stated that he knew the President had spoken to Shevardnadze separately the day before and would only underline the importance of the subject which the President raised. This was of extreme significance for the United States. The Secretary then asked whether McFarlane, Nitze, Ridgway, Matlock or Palmer had anything to add. The Secretary noted that McFarlane chairs the interagency group on arms control.

McFarlane noted that he finds the Soviet approach an innovative way to provide full employment for the US arms control community. There is a basis for serious negotiations at hand and there is a prospect that progress can be made. Discussions in Moscow can further address arms control.

Shevardnadze then thanked the Secretary for the detailed presentation. He noted that the US draft would be studied in depth. He hoped that everything which had been set forth by the Soviet delegation would be studied by the US side. He noted that in Moscow it would be possible to explore matters in greater detail. But he also noted that there is little time left before the meetings in Moscow. There are deep-seated differences. Realistically, therefore, some central problems will remain but we should work on them. He saw this as his central task.

Shevardnadze continued that without diminishing the importance of regional matters, terrorism and bilateral issues, they are still convinced that the principal area at the summit should be security and arms control, in particular avoiding an arms race in space and reducing nuclear arsenals. This is their conviction and it will continue despite all complications. This is the most promising area as here a lot hinges on the two powers with the greatest arsenals. As far as regional matters are concerned, not everything depends on our two countries. The US and the Soviet Union cannot become international judges. There is the Security Council and other mechanisms for that purpose.

Shevardnadze said that some of the problems raised by the President with him the day before will be studied in the most careful manner. He said that both sides need to intensify their efforts and in Moscow discuss everything in greater detail. It appeared to him that we should try to leave as little as possible for the leaders. It is necessary to prepare the groundwork for them; we need a productive approach to preparing the meeting. Many layers of distrust have accumulated. He was not issuing an appeal or making a banal statement but trying to reflect reality.

The Secretary said he agreed, so we should dedicate ourselves to this task. In terms of handling the press, he thought that they should say the meetings in New York and the upcoming meetings in Moscow should be seen as part of a continuing effort to prepare as carefully as possible for the President’s meeting with Gorbachev. He would note that they had ranged across the issues in the relationship, including, of course, our own special concern. With regard to the visit to Moscow, he would say that this was at the Soviet’s invitation and demonstrated the seriousness of both sides. He would say that he is looking forward to his meeting with the General Secretary. The dates of November 4th and 5th were agreed.

Shevardnadze said that there is very serious and difficult work to be done in Moscow. This would be the last time to prepare for the Summit. The rest of it would just be technology which can be dealt with by our ambassadors. The Secretary said that if this meant “logistics” that is fine. He expects to work hard in Moscow.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Shultz/Shevardnadze Meeting in New York, 10/25/1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
2. Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.
3. Leon Klinghoffer was murdered during the hijacking of the Italian cruise liner, Achille Lauro, in October 1985. See footnote 9, Document 114.
4. Shevardnadze and his wife, Nanuli, were dinner guests of Shultz and his wife, Obie, on the evening of September 27, during his trip to Washington. See Document 107.
5. According to an October 25 article in the Washington Post, “the announcement came as Shultz wound up a two-hour meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.” The article continued: “the invitation for Shultz to visit Moscow for summit planning came as a surprise and was known only shortly before Shevardnadze arrived in New York.” (Don Oberdorfer and David Hoffman, “Shultz to Meet Gorbachev on Summit Plans,” Washington Post, October 25, 1985, p. A1)
6. Shultz met with Canadian Secretary for External Affairs Clark in Calgary from October 27 to 28.
7. Not found.
8. Not found.
9. In telegram 231777 from State, July 29, the Department repeated the text of telegram 15384 from Tokyo, which reported on the signature by Japan, the Soviet Union, and United States of the Memorandum of Understanding on Pacific Air Safety. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850538–0304)
10. See Document 116.
11. In telegram 322243 to Guatemala, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and San Jose, October 19, the Department informed posts that “U.S. and Soviet delegations of experts will meet October 31–November 1 to discuss Central America and the Caribbean as part of a series of exchanges on regional issues. USDel will be headed by A/S Elliott Abrams. We intend to use the session essentially to warn the Soviet side of the costs and risks it runs by its machinations in this region vital to U.S. interests.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850011–0197)
12. Not found.
13. In his October 24 speech, Shevardnadze declared that the Soviet Union was proposing a “world without weapons in space,” the reduction and then elimination of nuclear arms, a U.S. and Soviet ban on nuclear explosions, and U.S. and Soviet renunciation of the development of new nuclear weapons and banning of anti-satellite systems. See footnote 3, Document 120.
14. One of the four Soviet hostages in Beirut was found dead on October 2. The reference to a U.S. statement is unclear. However, in telegram 323071 to Moscow, October 21, the Department reported that Shevardnadze sent a reply to Shultz’s October 2 “letter of sympathy concerning the Soviet hostages seized in Beirut.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850753–0113)
15. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 224, footnote 3.
16. Neither draft was found.