86. Editorial Note
On March 10, 1982, members of Congress submitted bipartisan resolutions calling for the United States and the Soviet Union to undertake a nuclear weapons freeze followed by arms reductions. In the Senate, Senator Edward Kennedy (D–Massachusetts) introduced Senate Joint Resolution 163 on behalf of himself and 26 others. For the text of Senate Joint Resolution 163, see Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, on S.J. Res 163, 171, 177, 191; S. Res. 242, 323, 343, 370, 391; S. Ex. Res. 5, 6; and S. Con. Res. 81, April 29, 30, May 11, 12, and 13, 1982, pages 4–5. See also Judith Miller, “139 in Congress Urge Nuclear Arms Freeze by U.S. and Moscow,” New York Times, pages A1 and A12, and Margot Hornblower, “Bipartisan Resolutions Urge U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Weapons Freeze,” Washington Post, page A3; both March 11, 1982.
During hearings held on March 10 by the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Related Programs to consider foreign assistance appropriations for fiscal year (FY) 1983, Subcommittee Chair Robert Kasten (R–Wisconsin) asked Secretary of State Alexander Haig if the freeze proposals introduced that day would advance U.S. security interests. Haig responded: “Well, I had a telephone call from Senator Kennedy last night informing me that this proposal would be put forward suggesting that he regretted that it hadn’t been discussed with us before then. I am aware of this freeze proposal, however, because it has a number of supporters, well-meaning supporters, and I would just make the following general comments.
[Page 317]“This freeze proposal is not only bad defense and security policy, it is bad arms control policy, as well. It is clear that the Soviet Union over the past 15 years has outspent the United States in the development of their strategic nuclear capability by substantial margins, each year and every year for the past 15. That has enabled them to develop a level of existing and future strategic superiority in especially the instantaneous hard target kill capability and large ballistic missile imbalances have developed.
“I would consider it to be very destabilizing were we today to freeze the contemporary balance into an imbalance. That will not contribute to progress in either arms control or meet the vital security interests of the American people.
“Now, I want to emphasize that President Reagan’s arms control policy is not to freeze at unacceptable levels that we have already reached, but rather to achieve substantial reductions in levels of nuclear armament and to do so in a way that we can verify such reductions have taken place.
“Unfortunately, this freeze proposal runs directly against both of those principles, and I am particularly concerned at this time that such a proposal would come forward in the midst of the INF discussions which are underway in Geneva in which we seek to eliminate in the land-based sector the threat entirely by the so-called zero action.
“Now the freeze as applied in Western Europe would be to freeze in place a minimum of 3 to 1 Soviet superiority and something more analytically in the neighborhood of 6 to 1 superiority of Soviet systems. The instability and the political disarray of such a proposal by the U.S. side could be devastating not only in terms of the future direction of Western European policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but more importantly to undercut the very initiative that we have just lost in these discussions.
“So while one cannot question the well-meaning motivations of this resolution and this proposal, one must analyze the practical consequences of it, and for that reason, I am very concerned about it.” (Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, Part 1, pages 64–65)
During a briefing held at the Department of State on March 11, Department spokesperson Dean Fischer read to news correspondents a prepared statement on behalf of Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Richard Burt regarding the resolutions: “I would like to make a brief statement with respect to the nuclear freeze resolution which was introduced in the Senate yesterday.
[Page 318]“The President and his entire Administration share the concern felt throughout the world over the danger that nuclear weapons pose for mankind. That is why, in his speech of November 18, the President proposed a far-reaching arms control program for seeking equitable and verifiable agreements, which will not just freeze current nuclear and conventional forces but actually significantly reduce them.
“In Geneva the United States is now negotiating with the Soviet Union on the basis of the President’s bold proposal of November 18, which calls for the elimination of the Soviet nuclear systems most threatening Europe in exchange for cancellation of scheduled NATO deployments of comparable intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles.
“While we understand the spirit that motivates the freeze efforts, the Administration cannot support the freeze itself. A number of compelling facts argue against a freeze.
“—It would freeze the United States into a position of military disadvantage and dangerous vulnerability. Soviet defense instruments have far outpaced ours over the last decade. While we exercised substantial restraint, the Soviets’ across-the-board modernization efforts have produced new weapons, including new generations of intercontinental ballistic missiles directly threatening our nuclear deterrent. In Europe, Soviet deployments of new intermediate-range missiles have given the Soviet Union an overwhelming advantage over the West in this category of weapons.
“—We want verifiable agreements that go beyond freezes to produce real reductions. The freeze proposal, which is neither verifiable nor reduces weapons, is not only bad defense but, as Secretary Haig said yesterday, is bad arms control as well.
“—The President needs the strategic modernization program if we are to have a credible chance to negotiate a good strategic arms reduction agreement with the Soviets. The freeze would, of course, kill the modernization program and with it our chances for achieving the reductions that we all seek.
“—We have embarked on very important negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces with the Soviet Union in Geneva—negotiations in which the United States is seeking far more than a freeze. Our goal in Geneva is the total elimination of land-based intermediate-range missiles. Thus the United States and the NATO alliance must have the flexibility to continue with the two-track approach that NATO agreed to in 1979. The freeze proposal would concede to the Soviet Union its present advantage in intermediate-range nuclear missiles and eliminate any Soviet incentive to reach a fair and balanced agreement that would reduce nuclear weapons in Europe.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 1982, page 42)