Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

84. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 8, 1982

SUBJECT

• Strategy for Building Democracy in Communist and Non-Communist Countries

Developments in Poland and El Salvador teach us three important lessons in politics: 1) there are growing pressures for political change in communist and authoritarian countries alike; 2) if we want democratic forces to win, they need practical training and financial assistance to become as effective as the communists in the struggle to take and maintain power; and 3) the United States is organized to give economic and military assistance, but we have no institutions devoted to political training and funding.

I propose that we establish an institute and program to support democratic change. This could be one of your Administration’s most important and enduring contributions to global freedom and security. Let us take the Soviets on in a field where we have the best inherent strengths, but today lack the tools which they have so massively and professionally developed over many years.

1. The Problem

The Soviets spend large sums on training and financing political forces for change in Europe and the Third World. Going back to Lenin and even earlier, communists have placed the highest of priorities on establishing political parties, underground communications, and motivation.

Even some of our European allies understand the importance of practical political support. For example, Western Europeans sent money and advisors to Portuguese democratic parties to prevent a communist takeover. The United States is simply out of the picture. Neither our parties nor the CIA have significant programs. And the AFL–CIO’s efforts are restricted to unions.

Furthermore, the Europeans are just as derelict as we in terms of efforts designed to help democratic forces in communist countries. There isn’t even much study being done of how communist regimes can be changed—even though it is clear that the potential exists (witness Solidarity, Yugoslavia, thousands fleeing Cuba, etc.).

Obviously there are constraints on what we can do towards both communist and non-communist countries in the immediate future. We would need to begin on a pragmatic and careful basis. A sudden, full-fledged effort would be counter-productive—destabilizing non-democratic friends in the Third World, driving the Soviets into perhaps dangerous counter-actions, and alarming our European allies with visions of an all-out effort to destabilize Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself.

But in sum, and taking into account the need for this gradual approach, there are four reasons to develop a program to support the growth of democratic forces:

1) Ultimately a truly stable, cooperative and open international system requires societies based on freedom of choice and legitimacy rather than force and oppression;

2) In non-communist countries, we need to help moderate democratic forces as the best long-term protection against communism;

3) We can help to keep the Soviets preoccupied with problems inside their existing empire (rather than expanding further) by giving practical assistance to democratic and nationalistic forces and thus going on our own political offensive. The use of this political tool is no less effective than military and economic leverage, and is much less costly and risky.

4) Launching a program to support democracy now can help provide a new focus for our idealism, give the Successor Generation here and in Europe something other than nuclear disarmament as a goal, gain bipartisan support, and give your Administration a positive, freedom-oriented face.

2. The Solution

Specifically, we propose that the United States establish an “Institute for Democracy.” The Institute’s objective would be three-fold:

1) to analyze and develop ways to help transform communist and other forms of dictatorship into democratic societies;

2) to train people in the practical mechanisms required for such peaceful transformation—overt/underground/exile political parties, labor unions, press, communications, etc.;

3) to help finance these efforts in the countries concerned.

The Institute should be non-governmental to be effective and to fend off charges of interference from other countries. The Europeans and the Soviets use such “private” institutions for political operations without serious problems. At the same time, the Institute would require Congressional as well as private funding to make the kind of major, sustained and professional effort required.

3. Next Steps

— The first step clearly is for you to decide whether you agree that this proposal should be implemented.

— Then an interagency group should draw up a gameplan for obtaining Congressional and public support, possibly including a speech by you or me on the theme “democracy not Marxism-Leninism is the future.”

We have uncovered substantial support for this idea from informal soundings around town. Right-wing critics of the Administration like Wattenberg and Podhoretz² are enthusiastic. Max Kampelman is prepared to contribute his time to help get it going. The AFL–CIO is positive. Liberals will strongly endorse the Third World dimension.

We should use the climate generated by Poland to set up a permanent program to tackle the larger, longer-term task of building democracy in communist and non-communist states. This could be one of your Administration’s most important and enduring contributions to global freedom and security. The moment for it may not come again for many years.

Recommendation

That you endorse the establishment of an Institute for Democracy.³

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Agency File, Department of State (02/13/1982–05/25/1982). Secret. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum.
2. Benjamin Wattenberg and Norman Podhoretz.
3. The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation.