Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

75. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to Secretary of State Haig¹

Washington, December 21, 1981

Diplomats, like generals, tend to prepare for the last war. For decades, we have dedicated our energies (successfully) to averting World War II—deterring an aggressive nation in the heart of Europe bent on conquest. A far more troubling model we think too little about is the slide into World War I, where countries failed to define, understand and communicate clearly their respective national interests until it was too late.

Today we are in that stage of crisis when the premium should be on a clear, precise and cold-eyed analysis of the U.S. interests and objectives in Poland. What exactly do we seek out of the crisis?² What are the indicators of an acceptable outcome (i.e., must Solidarity return as a significant political force or is it sufficient for U.S. objectives that it be a vigorous trade union? What role do we see for the Church? For the Army? For the Party?) We need to think and speak very clearly about these matters, for only when the government’s high councils have agreed on U.S. objectives is there any chance of agreeing on courses of action designed to forward our objectives.³

We should also demand of ourselves and our decision-makers the same degree of analysis about likely Soviet objectives. That Russia’s vital interests are at stake in Poland is incontestable.⁴ Whether for reasons of preserving the fiction of Party supremacy or as a recognition of the iron grip of geography, no one who rules in Moscow can be indifferent to what happens in Warsaw. Whatever the crisis is for us, therefore, we should be under no illusions: it is an issue of war or peace for the Kremlin.⁵ Empires don’t as a rule commit suicide. They fight.⁶

Secondly we are at the phase in this crisis where discipline of thought must be matched by discipline of action. We cannot afford to have different voices in the Administration signaling differently to the American people; the Poles, the Soviets and the Allies (unless we do so intentionally as part of our strategy).⁷ Crisis management in this administration particularly must have as one of its highest priorities reasserting the central control by the President over our public posture.

Finally, we need to remember the desirability of keeping the President’s options open. Incautious actions today—or even actions which today seem appropriate—may well tie his hands in two days or two weeks.⁸ As we move down the path, we need constantly to ask ourselves where each step will leave us, not just tomorrow, but the day after. The process is dynamic; so must our strategy be.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Alexander Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box CL 62, December 21, 1981. Secret; Eyes Only; Not for the System. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. Haig wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “Amen but alas—so sadly ignored. AMH.”
2. Haig highlighted this and the previous sentence.
3. In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Haig wrote: “Don’t worry too much!”
4. Haig highlighted this and the previous sentence.
5. Haig highlighted the portion of this sentence beginning with “it” and ending with “Kremlin.”
6. Haig underlined “Empires don’t as a rule commit suicide. They fight.”
7. Haig highlighted this and the previous sentence. He also underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with “differently” and ending with “strategy.”
8. Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.