Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

74. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• U.S. Foreign Policy for the Coming Year—Opportunities for Presidential Leadership

Winston Churchill once said that “the pessimist sees a danger in every opportunity and the optimist sees an opportunity in every danger.” This memorandum highlights dangers we face, identifies areas where we need your help, and notes opportunities for you to advance U.S. interests in the coming year.

The success of our policies depends primarily on your leadership and involvement. However, we will bear in mind the importance of your domestic program and will seek your aid only on vital matters.

I. Western Unity and Relations with the Soviet Union

The dramatic events still unfolding in Poland² are likely to have strong and unpredictable effects on our relations with our allies and the Soviets. Regardless of the outcome of the Polish crisis, three other issues will be of great importance to Western unity and East-West relations.

The peace issue must be ours and be met head on. Your Press Club speech³ has put the Russians on the defensive, but we must build on that foundation in the Geneva INF talks⁴ and with an early announcement of a new approach on START.⁵ We should also continue to focus European attention on Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Upcoming political hurdles include the German SPD Party Congress next April and the start of site construction for our new INF deployments.

Growing tensions arising from the economic problems faced by every industrialized country could become a serious threat to the unity of the Western alliance.

Finally, the United States itself does not yet have a policy that provides effective leverage over the Soviet Union through trade and technology transfer, much less a policy for the Western allies as a whole.

Where We Need Your Help

We will need decisions from you on a position for opening START negotiations early next year and on East-West trade policy.

Presidential leadership will be needed on Poland. The Soviets must not mistake our resolve, nor should the deeply anti-Soviet Polish experiment fail for want of American understanding of the significance of the new situation.

A trip by you to key Western European capitals next spring, built around the Paris Economic Summit⁶ or a special NATO summit, preferably both, would permit you to promote better understanding of our policies and ease political pressures on Allied leaders.

At Paris, you might also launch an “Industrial Democracies Economic Action Program” that would combine public and private efforts to solve reindustrialization, productivity, energy and development problems.

II. Financial Resources, Trade and Development

We cannot run a first-class foreign policy with second-class resources. A healthy U.S. economy is the best solution. However, we urgently need resources even before our economic problems are solved.

Our defense and foreign assistance programs must pass if we are to maintain our credibility in Soviet eyes, help our friends resist Soviet pressures, increase U.S. political influence in the developing world, and carry out both the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the development policy that you set forth at Cancun. In addition, the Department’s own resources have been seriously constrained for several years. We are in danger of losing the vital capacity to represent our nation’s interests effectively and report and analyze developments abroad.

The Administration’s defense and foreign assistance programs both face difficult Congressional opposition. Conservatives in general and Republicans in particular oppose foreign assistance almost as a reflex action. The Democrats will work to embarrass us, as they did with the attempted foreign assistance cut in the Continuing Resolution that you brilliantly vetoed.⁷ The preferable legislation subsequently passed confirms again that strong presidential leadership greatly increases our leverage.

We anticipate rising protectionist pressures that could threaten your Caribbean Basin Initiative and your program to promote development through freer trade, as well as our relations with our industrial allies.

Where We Need Your Help (continued)

Only you can persuade our political allies that a Reagan foreign policy requires Reagan budgets and Reagan legislation.

We will also be coming to you soon for decisions to flesh out the 4-point approach you presented at Cancun, in order to maintain the initiative and keep control of the world economic dialogue.

You could demonstrate your personal support for free and open international trade by publicly participating in preparations for next fall’s Ministerial Meeting of the GATT.⁸

III. Regional Trouble Spots

No region has so many obvious dangers, from Iran to Morocco, as the Middle East-Persian Gulf. The next six months will be crucial for our entire position in the Middle East as we pursue our interdependent goals of peace and security.

Your decision to commit U.S. forces to the Sinai Peace-keeping Force looks particularly farsighted today.⁹ It has become the key to assuring Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and Egyptian fidelity to the Camp David Accords thereafter.

We will also be working hard to reach an agreement on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza, before April if possible, but continuing beyond then if necessary. The difficulties posed by Begin’s recent annexation of the Golan Heights clearly indicate the problems we are going to face.¹⁰

Effective action against the destabilizing efforts of radical forces will be important to our credibility. Containing Qadhafi’s program of aggression and terrorism will be particularly important.

Southern Africa offers increasing hope for diplomatic success in 1982. By next spring or summer, we hope to have the elements of a Namibian settlement in place, but we could face a stalemate over the issue of Cuban withdrawals from Angola and the related question of Savimbi’s role.

China. Over the next few months, we need to make some decisions to meet our important commitments to Taiwan’s security while ensuring that our strategic association with China does not suffer an historic and politically costly reversal.

Central America/Caribbean. The picture in our own hemisphere is dark. El Salvador is threatened; Nicaragua is arming to the teeth and solidifying totalitarian rule; democratic governments in Costa Rica, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic face serious economic problems; and destabilization is beginning in Guatemala and Honduras. As you have already concluded we vitally need $250–300 million in supplemental assistance for the Caribbean Basin program and special additional efforts in El Salvador and Honduras to restrain these trends.

Where We Need Your Help (continued)

In the Middle East, your continuing personal involvement might be needed to complete the return of the Sinai to Egypt, which will be a major triumph for Reagan foreign policy. We will need your help in our continuing efforts to prevent war in Lebanon. You may want to be involved personally if the autonomy negotiations appear close to successful conclusion. Finally, once Americans have withdrawn from Libya, we will need some decision from you on a long-term policy for dealing with Qadhafi.

Securing peace in Southern Africa, including a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, would be a major achievement. Your help may be needed to maintain public and allied support for our policy or to clinch the deal with South Africa.

As to China, we must make clear to Peking that this Administration is committed to a one-China policy and supports a process of gradual peaceful reconciliation, but that we also will fulfill our long-term defense commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act in a prudent fashion, particularly on the difficult issue of aircraft replacement.¹¹

We will need your personal intervention to persuade the Congress and the public of the vital importance of supplemental assistance for Central America and the Caribbean.

Conclusion

This is what I expect to be asking of you in the coming year. If we can plan on your support, we can make some major gains that will strengthen the country and your leadership and lay a strong basis for our diplomacy through the remainder of the first Reagan Administration.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 12/11–20/81. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Drafted by Kaplan and Libby on December 15 and cleared by Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz sent the memorandum to Haig under a December 15 covering note. (Ibid.) A November draft of the memorandum, with Haig’s handwritten comments, is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/11–20/81. Wolfowitz sent Haig a revised draft, incorporating Haig’s revisions, under a December 5 covering memorandum, indicating that Eagleburger, McFarlane, Veliotes, Hormats, Buckley, and Stoessel had approved in substance the earlier versions of the memorandum. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 12/1–10/81) Adams returned the attached version of the revised draft with Haig’s extensive handwritten revisions under a December 15 covering note in which he requested that Wolfowitz “redo the memo, adding the Secretary’s edits.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, Pres. Leadership Memo (drafts, etc.)
2. Reference is to the imposition of martial law in Poland on December 13, as well as the earlier action by the Government of Poland to disband Solidarity and the ongoing humanitarian crisis.
3. See Document 69.
4. See footnote 9, Document 56 and footnote 4, Document 69.
5. See footnote 4, Document 71.
6. Scheduled to take place at Versailles, June 5–6, 1982. In June 1982, the President traveled to Paris and Versailles, June 2–7 and June 5–6, respectively; Rome and Vatican City, June 7; London, June 7–9; Bonn, June 9–11; and West Berlin, June 11. For the President’s address before the British Parliament, see Document 104.
7. Presumable reference to the President’s veto of H.J. Res. 357, the continuing resolution providing appropriations for FY 1982, on November 23, which led to a temporary shutdown of the federal government. On November 24, Congress passed and Reagan signed a short-term spending bill, authorizing expenditures through December 15. (Lee Lescaze, “Federal Shutdown Ends as Reagan, Hill Agree,” Washington Post, November 24, 1981, pp. A1, A7) The House and Senate approved a revised version of the resolution— H.J. Res. 370—on December 10 and 11, respectively. The President signed P.L. 97–92 (95 Stat. 1183), which authorized additional continuing appropriations for FY 1982, into law on December 15. (Congress and the Nation, vol. VI, 1981–1984, p. 45) At the December 15 signing ceremony, Reagan indicated that the continuing resolution provided appropriations for “most of the government” through March 31, 1982. He noted his preference for separate appropriations bills, adding, “But the continuing resolution I’m signing today is far better than those of recent years and better than the one I vetoed 3 weeks ago.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, p. 1156)
8. See footnote 11, Document 63.
9. See footnote 4, Document 67.
10. Reference is to the Knesset’s December 14 vote to annex the Golan Heights and extend Israel’s “law, jurisdiction, and administration” to the area held under military occupation since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. (David K. Shipler, “The Golan Heights Annexed By Israel in an Abrupt Move: Begin Pushes the Legislation Through Parliament—U.S. Criticizes the Action,” New York Times, December 15, 1981, pp. A1, A12)
11. See footnote 5, Document 9.