Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

218. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 15, 1984

SUBJECT

• Backgrounding on Second Term Agenda

We have been thinking about ways to make backgrounding on the agenda progressively more expansive.

1) Increased Security Assistance. To succeed, this effort will need the tightest possible national-security rationale; otherwise it will be difficult to explain the defense/security assistance funding trade-off, which will trouble many conservatives. This means distinguishing our Third World economic development concept from an initiative to raise security assistance funding to more meaningful levels. While we can’t specify a source for funding the latter yet, we can prepare the ground by noting how much such increases will help our own defense, hinting illustratively that it can reduce the need for more costly forms of prepositioning and lower—though not eliminate—the need for direct American involvement in low intensity conflict.

2) Nonproliferation. The Washington Post has already applauded our interest in this issue, but continues to declare that it represents a policy reversal. (This despite the Post’s earlier positive editorials on our position with Zia and in praise of the Luxembourg initiative.)² You can observe that what we’re really doing is trying to build on a major first-term success—e.g., the first suppliers’ meeting since 1977.³ (I am doing a separate follow-on substantive paper on some interesting policy options.⁴ I didn’t want to overload the President’s initial package, however, beyond putting a marker down for the need for greater emphasis in this area.)

3) European Recovery. We will need to continue to treat this issue delicately. The President can make an important contribution to increasing the visibility of the issue. And we can, through the stimulation of inventive private exchanges, help to generate greater European realism about both the problem and the cure. We need to make it clear though that we are not talking about a bail-out; and we need to avoid creating the perception that we are being patronizing.

In private discussions with European leaders, we can be more candid. In fact, it is here that we can begin to be shrewd in connecting defense spending and meaningful economic change. The President can tell his counterparts that he raised the issue in part to shield the Europeans from Congressional pressure for unrealistic defense increases. Structured this way, meaningful economic reform can be played not only as the engine for sustained defense increases in the future, but also as a near-term offset for not meeting current defense targets. Progress in one area or another, however, has to occur; and what we can innocently play as a favor in effect becomes more pressure.

4) The Trickier “Competitive” Issues. The main risk in highlighting the above issues is that they may seem to signal a change of focus away from competition with the Soviets. Obviously this isn’t the time for belligerence, but we don’t want the impression to arise (either on the outside or on the inside) that our agenda is limp, and that other elements of the agenda will have lower priority.⁵

Unfortunately, it’s still hard to talk about some of the other elements in the package—exploitation of technological programs like Stealth, targeting Soviet clients, driving up Soviet defense spending in areas less menacing to the West—at least not publicly and at least not at this juncture. Even where we don’t want to reveal too much, however, we should begin to adumbrate themes like the following:⁶

— “The President wants arms control, but he will also have a sharp eye on our strategic position in the rest of the world.⁷

— “Protecting our friends and exploiting opportunities is important. We won’t repeat the mistakes of earlier years”

— “Look for a foreign policy that plays to America’s strengths—technology, economic power, flexibility,” etc.

— “Look for a leaner but also a tougher and more imaginative defense posture.”

Although we can’t be too specific on some of these points, we shouldn’t play down areas where we do have a position, and where signalling lack of interest could be dangerous. Central America is one of these. In fact it’s a very good example of the first two points. One key difference between the President’s strategy and detente is that we can now expect to do better in the Third World—but only if we avoid near-term reverses. For this reason, the contra aid issue will be enormously important: before the impression takes hold that the aid cutoff is permanent, we should probably begin to put more heat on our critics. Too much attention has focused on the purpose of contra funding and too little on the ever more relevant problem of the U.S. allowing the contras to be wiped out. If the Soviets and our friends in unstable regions see the Congress curtailing Presidential activism, we’ll have a lot of rebuilding to do.⁸

1. Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, Policy Planning (Second Term) I: [11/05/1984–11/15/1984]. Secret. Non-system. McFarlane wrote “Many thanks, M” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Below this, Poindexter initialed “JP.”
2. Presumable references to “Mr. Reagan’s Letter,” October 27, 1984, p. A18, and “When Trade Should Not Be Free,” July 18, 1984, p. A14; both Washington Post. The “Luxembourg initiative” is in reference to an early July meeting in Luxembourg of the nuclear supplier nations, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, the Democratic Republic of Germany, and Poland, all members of the original Nuclear Suppliers Group, were not invited to attend. At the meeting, the representatives agreed that all countries purchasing nuclear equipment should have safeguards on all nuclear facilities. (Joanne Omang, “Nuclear Suppliers Seek Tighter Export Controls,” Washington Post, July 17, 1984, p. A3)
3. Reference is to the September 1977 London meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), also known as the London Suppliers’ Group. At the meeting, participants established guidelines or codes for the export of nuclear technology. (David Binder, “Atom Sales Controls Are Set by 15 Nations: London Meeting Agrees on Rules for Transfers of Technology,” New York Times, pp. A1, A5, and Bernard D. Nossiter, “Nuclear Nations Set Rules for Technology Sales,” Washington Post, pp. A1, A7; both September 22, 1977)
4. Not found.
5. McFarlane placed two checkmarks in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
6. McFarlane wrote “agree” in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.
7. McFarlane placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this point.
8. McFarlane placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.