Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

203. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 2, 1984

SUBJECT

• Looking Ahead: NSC Papers

The NSC staff, as part of its own “Looking Ahead” exercise, has commissioned (in-house and around the government) a series of papers on key issues.² These papers will not be completed until mid-August, and I am assured we will get a chance to see them.

Attached are the terms of reference for four such papers. They are useful not only because they raise good questions but because they confirm that we and the NSC are thinking seriously about some of the same issues as part of this exercise. The four papers are on:

— Soviet-American relations: Strategic Overview: Soviet perceptions and actions, the role of negotiations, economic leverage, summitry, talks on regional issues, etc. (TAB 1)

— US, West Europe, and NATO: Outline of a broad inquiry into political, military, and economic dimensions of the Alliances. It touches on new conventional-force doctrines, ways of assisting Europe’s industrial/technological development, etc. (TAB 2)

— Strategic weapons and arms control: Evolution of the strategic balance, and arms control implications. (TAB 3)

— Central America: This paper asks such questions as: Are our means proportional to the ends we seek? What is a feasible diplomatic agenda for dealing with Nicaragua? (TAB 4)

Unfortunately, none of these papers tells us what the answers are. But the papers that are to come should be interesting.

Tab 1

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

SOVIET AMERICAN RELATIONS: STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

Key Questions:

1. What are Soviet perceptions of the current strategic situation (broad balance of power, US purposes, principal Soviet opportunities, risks of conflict, etc.)?

2. What impact will Soviet leadership politics have on foreign policy in next 2 years? (How weak and divided are they? Is a “stonewall-coalition” in place? Does internal stalemate make US probe pointless?)

3. How to conduct a probe of Soviet positions on most advantageous terms (without sacrificing bargaining leverage, without demobilizing public opinion on issues to be negotiated, without limiting freedom of action on other issues)?

4. Do we face great obstacles in being understood by Moscow, in proving “good faith”—or is this just a Soviet pose? If problem is real, how to overcome it? How to avoid being manipulated?

5. How can Moscow’s agenda be matched to ours—what are the issues of greatest Soviet interest? What are the points of greatest vulnerability? Which of these offer opportunities for the US to exploit? Where would it be counterproductive to apply pressure?

6. On which, if any, disputed issues is it possible to achieve results in the short term (first year of Administration)? On which only in the long term?

7. To what extent can Soviet conduct in the Third World be moderated through direct US-Soviet discussions (recognizing that the most effective restraints are created by independent US cooperation with friendly states)? On which issues? What is the role of “linkage” in these discussions? In the absence of any understandings with the US, is Soviet posture in Third World likely to become more or less dangerous? Where is the Soviet challenge to Western positions likely to remain strongest even if some agreements can be reached?

8. Is Western economic leverage of any importance in affecting Soviet foreign policy choices? If so, how to use it?

9. What can be the place of human-rights issues in US strategy? Can the US take a consistent approach to them, through the up’s and down’s of relations with Moscow? Do signs of internal tightening suggest that human rights practices will be a growing obstacle to improved relations?

10. What is the place of a summit in policy toward the Soviets over the next two years? Would the Soviets be interested, even in the absence of agreements? How acceptable is it to have an inconclusive summit—with a full airing of views, but still tense and without agreements (i.e., not so different from Mitterrand’s visit)?⁴ What would be the principal advantages and disadvantages?

11. How useful can “small steps” (agreements or contacts on peripheral issues—e.g. maritime boundary talks, fishing agreements, etc.) be in US strategy? Should they be saved to ratify progress on other issues, or used up to signal our interest in the course of a probe?

12. If no (or very low) results are most likely over next several years, what is implication for US policy? Is it necessary to push harder with extra initiatives and offers (because no other way to force Soviet leadership to make decisions)? Safe to do so (because little chance they’ll accept)? Or important to sit tight (because anything given away now will be wasted)?

Tab 2

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

U.S., West Europe, and NATO Terms of Reference

I. Trends

A. Economy of key West European countries

— GNP rate of growth?

— Sectors of high unemployment?

— Movement into high growth industrial, service sectors?

— International competitiveness?

— Energy dependence?

— Other

B. Political trends in West Europe

— Tendencies toward protection?

— Movement toward, away from, European economic, political integration?

— Arms control/anti-nuclear sentiment

— Perceptions of, attitudes toward, U.S.? Areas of friction with U.S.?

— Perceptions of, attitudes toward Soviets?

— Other

C. Military

— Non-nuclear force balances in Central Region? Trends in balance? Trends in operating concepts (nuclear/conventional operations, OMG “deep strikes” by NATO or Soviets)?

• Ground force balance and trends
• Air warfare balance and trends
• Special forces, unconventional warfare trends

— Force balance and trends in Northern Region

• Air balance?
• Maritime balance?
• Ground force balance?
• Implications for Soviet SSBN strategy?

— Force balances and trends on Southern Flank?

— Trends in theater nuclear forces

• Soviet TNF vs. likely Soviet target set?
• NATO TNF vs. likely NATO target set?
• Impact of Soviet defenses, hardening on TNF balance?
• Political implications?

— Trends in mobilization and reinforcement capabilities, NATO and Warsaw Pact?

— Sustainability?

— Non-nuclear strike systems?

II. NATO Strengths and weaknesses, Warsaw Pact strengths and weaknesses

A. NATO strengths?

B. NATO weaknesses?

— Disagreement between U.S. and West Europe on proper level of defense spending

— Low levels of U.S. defense spending for NATO 1970–1980

— Low levels of West European defense spending 1980–future

— Unintegrated R&D, logistics systems

— Absence of strategic reserves

— Key rear area targets are few in number, vulnerable

C. Warsaw Pact strengths

— Military superiority in many cases

— Integrated force structure

D. Warsaw Pact weaknesses

— Strong, latent anti-Soviet feeling in East Europe

— War plan may critically depend on execution of pre-planned timetable that could be disrupted

III. Goals?

A. Minimum—maintain status quo: avoid or reduce U.S.-West European frictions, keep military balance in Central region from declining further, muddle through

B. Revive NATO

— Measures to strengthen West European economies

— New doctrines for NATO to increase NATO confidence in ability to deter Soviet attack, increase Soviet worries about security of East Europe in wartime

C. Build alternatives to NATO

— Bilateral arrangements between U.S. and key West European governments may avoid problems of getting NATO-wide agreement, be more flexible

— Bilateral or other West European defense arrangements independent of U.S.

— Others?

IV. Strategies

A. Muddle through

— Identify low cost military measures where consensus has emerged, is emerging, and act on them, e.g., infra-structure, aid for Turkey

— Resolve NATO crises in Congress, with Europeans, as they arise

— Resolve economic disputes with Europe through established mechanisms

B. Strategy to revive NATO?

— Economic plan to help West European economies?

— Ways to move NATO to new doctrines? New weaponry?

C. Alternatives to NATO

— Reinforce strategy, positive tendencies toward cooperation in groups smaller than full NATO membership?

— Ways for U.S. to transfer to key West European countries technologies, capabilities that would be required for European defense of Europe

— Develop alliances with European countries that U.S. needs for strategic missions other than defense of Europe (e.g, Turkey for Southwest Asian contingencies, Norway for maritime missions)

V. Obstacles

A. To reviving NATO

— Transferring resources from U.S. to West Europe will be opposed. Counter arguments for use on Hill?

— Shift to new, non-nuclear defense doctrine will be opposed. Counter arguments for use in Europe?

B. To alternatives to NATO

— West Germany outside of NATO may appear dangerous to other Europeans, Soviets. Countermeasures?

— Shift to greater European self-reliance could cause shift to West European neutralism, anti-U.S. policies around the world. Countermeasures?

Tab 3

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

1. What is our understanding of how the Soviets evaluate the strategic nuclear balance? Is there evidence or analysis that suggests which U.S. strategic capabilities are most important in Soviet calculations and which, therefore, help most to deter attack? Possible categories for discussion:

— strategic defenses

— precision guided weapons

— Stealth technologies

— strategic ASW

2. What are the capabilities that are likely to emerge in Soviet strategic weapons systems over the next five years? What impact will they have on our strategic forces? Issues include:

— If the Soviets deploy mobile missiles, what effect does that have on our requirement for high accuracy weapons to attack fixed targets?

— If the Soviets deploy various forms of ABM, what effect will that have on U.S. penetration capabilities?

— If the Soviets develop under-ice operations for SSBNs, what effect does that have on our strategic ASW capabilities and programs?

3. Which U.S. strategic weapons technologies now appear to have technological and strategic promise?

— Near-real-time reconnaissance and targeting capabilities?

— Autonomously guided weapons?

— Stealth?

— BMD?

4. In view of Soviet perceptions of the balance and foreseeable Soviet and U.S. weapons programs, how should our strategic modernization program and our strategic defenses initiative be changed?

5. Similarly, are there changes that should be made in the operation of our strategic forces as a result of an evaluation of Soviet perceptions, and U.S. and Soviet capabilities?

6. What steps should be taken now to prepare the way for these program and operational changes? What are the best ways to utilize the opportunities for decision present at the start of a new term? What follow-up measures will be necessary to support and sustain these measures in the face of foreseeable opposition in the bureaucracy, the Hill, and the arms control community?

7. What are the conceivable arms control measures most compatible with the U.S. strategic programs and operations that you recommend? What should be the timing for these arms control measures?

Tab 4

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, July 1984

CENTRAL AMERICA

KEY PLANNING ISSUES

I. Strategic Overview

— Ends:

• What are the stakes in Central America? Are they as high as we have said? Are our objectives attainable given the threat? What is the range of acceptable outcomes? How are they related to the pursuit of other US policy objectives, elsewhere in the hemisphere and beyond?

— Means:

• Are our means proportional to the ends we seek? How different are the means needed to attain maximum (vs. satisfactory) goals?

II. Political-military problems, opportunities, and options:

— El Salvador:

• What can be achieved militarily with current level of aid? Vulnerability to sudden collapse increasing or decreasing? Any prospect of major military break-through by government forces, or of steadily growing control over insurgency?
• How to assure continuing human rights improvement? Is this the key merely to our problem (sustaining current policy) or also to their problem (stabilizing the situation)?
• How to increase international legitimacy of Duarte government (e.g. revocation of Ungo recognition by SI)?

— Nicaragua:

• What is a feasible diplomatic agenda—how much can we get/should we give? How strong our position if covert aid preserved? If not? Priority of internal and external goals (i.e. democratization, pluralism vs. limits on quantity and quality of outside arms supply, military advisers, etc.)
• What feasible diplomatic process—role of Contadora (especially Mexico), Cuba, Soviets?

— Elsewhere in the region:

• What greatest medium-term vulnerabilities (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras)?
• US measures to deal with worsening in one or more countries—in anticipation, in direct response. How sustainable a US strategy that has to deal with several of these wars at once?

III. Kissinger Commission Recommendations:

— Managing the follow-through

• Reformulations, refinements needed to make Commission package more effective?
• Is a scaled-back program of any value? Any real impact in region, or merely precondition to sustain military aid? To induce Nicaraguan restraint?

— Congressional prospects:

• How dependent on progress in El Salvador, or on diplomatic probe toward Nicaragua?

IV. Long-term military posture:

— New missions (e.g. narcotics interdiction)

— Infrastructure requirements

— Political implications (including compatibility with different negotiated outcomes)

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons Looking Ahead—Papers from S/P Chrons (11/2/84). Secret; Sensitive. Kauzlarich initialed the memorandum and wrote “8/2.”
2. See Document 197 and the attachment at Tab I.
3. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper.
4. Mitterrand visited the United States March 21–24.
5. Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper.
6. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper.
7. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper.