199. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- Weinberger Speech on Use of Force
Issue
Whether to authorize Cap’s American Legion speech, July 11.
Discussion
Cap has circulated another speech draft on the use of force.2 This is, of course, a critical policy issue, but I am concerned (and State agrees) that the speech will be misunderstood and weaken the domestic consensus behind your foreign policy.
The speech sets up two extreme positions on force: between advocates of “isolationism” and those who, as he puts it, “argue that military force can be brought to bear in almost every crisis, before or during attempts to solve problems by diplomatic means. . . .” Cap doesn’t say who favors using force so casually, but the description will surely be read as a reference to others in the Administration. At a time when critics want to charge us with recklessness, this suggestion will hardly help you.
The rest of the speech presents certain “tests” of when force should be used. Cap’s answer, in brief, is: only when “vital US interests” are at stake and we’re prepared to “win.” Even here, however, there are real problems. These terms are very difficult to define, and many will think Cap is saying that the Administration has used force for less than vital reasons; others will think his emphasis on “winning” means every use of force must be total. Either way we lose. Another of Cap’s “tests,” requiring Congressional approval to use force, will sound inconsistent with our posture on the War Powers Act. In the long run, moreover, such approval is rarely decisive: the near-unanimous Tonkin Gulf vote [Page 850] couldn’t guarantee support for Vietnam, and early Congressional criticism on Grenada turned to praise once we succeeded.
I’d like to tell Cap that you prefer he speak on a different subject. Your national security advisors need to debate this subject internally and present the issues to you for decision. Then armed with an approved administration position, we may start the debate in the public arena next year. Short of this, we (and State) can work with him to produce a draft that does not do significant damage.
Recommendation
| OK | No | |
| _____ | _____ | That you authorize me to postpone this speech.3 |
- Source: Reagan Library, WHORM: Subject File, Federal Government Organizations (FG), FG013, Department of Defense; NLR–654–FG013–14–1–2. Confidential. Prepared by Sestanovich. Poindexter initialed for McFarlane. A copy was sent to Bush. Sestanovich and Fortier sent the memorandum to McFarlane under a July 6 covering memorandum, recommending that he sign the memorandum to the President. Poindexter initialed his approval of the recommendation.↩
- Weinberger’s speech draft was not attached.↩
- The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation. According to an attached NSC Correspondence Sheet, the President approved the recommendation on July 9. In the top right-hand corner of McFarlane’s memorandum, McFarlane wrote: “Will Taft advised of RR decision 6/9 12:30 RCM.” Kimmit added an asterisk after the word “decision” and below this wrote: “*Not to give speech at this time. RMK 7/9.”↩