Mr. President:
While I share your superstition of planning for events (re election) that
may never happen, we do have a responsibility to be prepared both to
deal with existing problems next year and to lead in charting new
courses to assure more stable peace and prosperity.
We would very much welcome your participation in the planning effort.
Attached is a paper which describes it. We will keep you advised in the
coming weeks and would welcome your thoughts, ideas, priorities and
guidance at any time.
You need not read this entire paper. I have highlighted some of its more
salient and provocative factors.
Attachment
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane) to
President Reagan3
Washington, undated
SUBJECT
- Planning Second-Term Foreign Policy
We have begun to think about the foreign policy problems and
opportunities ahead in your second term.4 We need to review first-term accomplishments, assess
where we stand now, and have operational strategies ready for
January. This paper is by no means a finished plan. It is meant to
illustrate the kinds of choices you will face, and to help you think
about how you will want to spend your time and effort in the months
and years ahead.5
[Page 830]
Global Context
During your first term, we began regional and
global programs to arrest the decline of U.S. power and influence, and to lay the
groundwork for actions that stabilize and expand the area of liberty
and prosperity in the world. The trends are now more favorable than
they were in 1981:6
- —
- The willingness of the U.S. to raise defense spending, coupled with
prompt and effective use of force in Grenada, has already
done much to erase the image of American decline.
- —
- The Soviet tide of advance in the Third World is being met
and now half of the insurgencies in the world are directed
against Soviet clients.7
- —
- Moscow’s control of Eastern Europe requires increasing
attention and resources and the burden of sustaining Soviet
clients like Cuba and Vietnam is becoming more
onerous.
- —
- The dynamism of our leadership and economic growth stands
in vivid contrast to a succession-plagued Soviet leadership
and a stagnating Soviet economy.
- —
- The growth of Communist insurgency has been slowed in
Central America and a free election has taken place in El
Salvador.
- —
- Added to all this, the world economy has some major bright
spots. Energy prices seem to have begun a long-term decline.
The performance of the U.S.
and some East Asian economies is good, and could help spur
recovery elsewhere.
There are other elements in this picture, of course. Although the
Soviet leadership appears to be preoccupied with internal affairs,
they still have the ability to probe weak points on the periphery of
the Soviet Union that are of vital importance to the U.S.
The Soviets could confront us with simultaneous
crises in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, for example, and
reveal that there are still large parts of our global strategy
that we are not yet strong enough to execute.8 While our increased defense budgets and new
programs have improved our ability to deter Soviet moves, there
still remain large gaps between U.S.
defense commitments and capabilities in critical parts of the
world.9
[Page 831]
The vulnerability of one leg of our strategic triad has been kept
dangling. And although INF
deployment in Europe has shown the Soviet Union that missile
rattling and “peace offensives” cannot divide the West, the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance still
strongly favors the East and the solidity of the alliance has been strained.
The U.S. also suffered a clear but
limited defeat in Lebanon.10 Countries of the region now see the U.S. as less able to influence Mid East
politics than before. A sustained, successful defense of the Persian
Gulf should help to offset this to an important extent, as will
continued development of strategic cooperation with Israel.11
Basic strengths of the U.S. position
remain, but building on them will take time, particularly in light
of the unresolved debate here at home about the use of force.
More generally, as we look around the world, we are struck by the
enormous political, economic, and technological changes that have
occurred since the 1950s, and by the fact that many of the key ideas
and institutions of American foreign policy have not changed, and
may, in fact, have reached dead-ends.12
In planning an agenda for you to consider for the second term, we
intend to keep the following central ideas in mind.
- —
- We should capitalize on U.S. strengths
(technological innovation, organizational flexibility, etc.) and
Soviet weaknesses (inefficient economic structures, fear of
subject peoples, etc.)
- —
- Strategic planning must reflect the
importance of timing. We must be ready for
opportunities as they arise, and act to create opportunities for
ourselves down the road.
- —
- We should seek the maximum leverage for our
efforts. This means identifying areas where, having
laid the groundwork, we can reap the largest payoff for
investments of time and resources. Where the payoff will be
smaller, our effort should also be less.
Looking Ahead
No re-elected President since Eisenhower (and no new President since Kennedy) has
had the kind of freedom of action with which you will probably begin
your second term.13 Nevertheless early action on
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key
issues will be essential, to use the leverage created by
your first term, to exploit your post-election authority at its
peak, and where possible to control the agenda.14 The lessons of ’81 are
relevant here.
An early start was the key to obtaining larger defense budgets, one
of your prime national security successes. We must similarly begin
early in the areas that matter most to us, and not allow our time
and political capital to be used up in secondary or tactical
fights.
Your second-term agenda must obviously include issues that loomed
large in your first term—U.S.-Soviet
relations, Central America, the Middle East, China, the state of
NATO. All involve essential
U.S. interests. On most of them
there will also be considerable public and allied anticipation of
new initiatives, whether due to the intense controversy they have
already generated (e.g., Central America) or because (like U.S.-Soviet and Arab-Israeli talks)
they have been on hold for more than a year.
We want to approach all of these issues with care. Decisions on
timing and priorities will have effects throughout your term, and it
is critical that you not overcommit yourself at the outset to solve
problems where openings are extremely limited. One
of the main objectives of this planning exercise will therefore
be to assess where forward movement is truly possible.15
Where it seems remote, we will have to devise more incremental
policies, while continuing to search for ways to increase our
leverage and build future opportunities.
Our initial (and very tentative) judgment is that most of the big
issues identified above will be just as knotty and intractable next
year. For this reason, the following discussion begins instead by
identifying issues where we see special opportunities. If these are
successfully addressed, they will increase our leverage across the
board and help us to deal with other openings as they arise.16 At the same time, the legacy you could
leave to the world community in these large, knotty problem areas is
a vital consideration. Therefore, in certain areas, it may be
crucial to use the special period of a second term to at least begin
to define and tackle problems whose solution may not be quickly
achieved.
Decisions for 1985
1. Resources Issues
Our leverage in all of the international issues we face will depend
on how well we use the resources available to us for national
security action. In a painfully tight fiscal process our military
and security assistance budgets will be the target of budget
cutters. We are most likely to
[Page 833]
get support for adequate budgets if we can
show how they help us take the initiative and force the Soviets into
activities less threatening to peace. There are several ways to do
this. We will need to convince a skeptical Congress that we are not
simply throwing money at defense problems but we have a thoughtful
plan for handling the threats facing us, and that we are building
forces in accord with that plan.
In thinking about the structure of our defense
program in a resource-constrained second term, our effort should
be on forcing the Soviets to behave in ways that are less
threatening to peace. Our strategic cruise missiles, for
example, have already forced the Soviets to spend large sums of
money on air defenses, at relatively low cost to us. The money they
spend on air defenses is not available for other, more threatening
programs. Capitalizing more on existing Soviet vulnerabilities is
also important and a very good way to rectify the gap between U.S. defense commitments and
capabilities that we mentioned in the global context. However, some
of these weapons and strategies could be in tension with the desire
for arms control. Non-nuclear cruise missiles, for example, will be
critical in dealing with Southwest Asian contingencies, but they
will also make it more difficult to count and control nuclear cruise
missiles. We must be careful that we do not deny ourselves valuable
instruments that help us meet our commitments within our budget
limits. Our planning activities will examine ways
of reducing this tension.
The pressures on our defense budget will mount during the campaign,
as well as in 1985, and we will hear calls for more simple, cheap
weapons. We will examine this issue, though it is important to
understand that a production battle to see who can make the most
simple weapons would play to Soviet strengths in mass production. We
have discovered from recent and highly sensitive sources that Soviet
military calculations give great importance to our high-tech
weapons. While we understand the limitations of F–15s and other sophisticated systems,
the Soviets apparently give very great weight to weapons whose
high-tech features they cannot match.
Making effective use of our resources is most important in crises. In
particular, the effective use of power requires better crisis
management techniques and organization. We will devote particular
attention to this issue in the months ahead.
If cuts are made in the U.S. military
budget, we should work hard to obtain correspondingly large
increases in foreign and security assistance budgets. To do so, we
need to increase awareness of how much our ability to act abroad
depends on strengthening states that will act as partners. We have
made this point repeatedly but our ability to make
the foreign assistance budget a truly potent diplomatic
instrument probably depends on a first-year initiative tied to
some offsetting reductions in defense
[Page 834]
spending.17
This could be structured in a way that makes it appear a very
dramatic initiative—appealing to liberals and conservatives alike,
while keeping money that we would otherwise lose altogether in the
national security account.
Finally, we should focus on the ways in which Japanese economic
strength can be used to relieve some of the demands on U.S. resources. Japan should not be
used to finance U.S. security
projects, but we will be looking to identify areas where additional
Japanese activity would be in the interest of both countries.
Premier Nakasone has
discussed some innovative defense measures for Japan, and we should
pursue them with him more vigorously.
If our discussions with the Japanese go well, we might decide to
devote considerably more time and effort to this issue. It could, in
fact, develop into what we call special opportunities in the next
section. This illustrates that our categories are not rigid.
Depending on the decisions you make, the timing and priority of our
work on various issues will be adjusted.
2. Special Opportunities18
Our chances for success in the central areas of
U.S. national security
policy will improve if we can shape circumstances and create
opportunities for ourselves by winning some smaller victories
first.19 It now appears that in
1985 we may be able to reverse some of the gains made by the Soviet
Union in the Third World.20 The position of their clients in Angola and
Ethiopia is not firm.21 Libya has become more isolated
diplomatically.22 With increased U.S. assistance, the mujahadeen
in Afghanistan could impose serious costs on the Soviet Union;
without it, they may face defeat.
Defeating Soviet clients in some of these countries will provide
important benefits.23 First, it will help build the consensus in the
U.S. on the use of force.24 Successful use of limited force without
direct confrontation with the Soviet Union can only help rebuild the
consensus
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in favor of
U.S. action where it is needed
and can be effective.25 At the same time, it should reduce the
need for U.S. intervention by
showing the Soviets that they can spend a lot of money to prop up a
client and still lose. Second it will show countries around the
world that the U.S. is a good friend
to have, and can impose costs on those who attack us or our
friends.26 Finally, it will meet the issue of
state-sponsored terrorism and low-level conflict head-on by
combatting it in the Third World.27
We will also be looking at possibilities for drawing important
countries closer together. On the basis of our outstanding relations
with Pakistan, and now our substantive dialogue with India, measures
to promote Indo-Pakistani detente are a logical next step; George Bush’s recent trip
revealed major possibilities here.28 No progress is likely this year (they have
elections too) but we want to have a package of ideas ready by early
1985—including military confidence-building measures (border troop
withdrawals, military exchanges, a hot line, etc.) as well as
economic and cultural projects and cooperation on narcotics
problems. The Vice President is in an excellent position to
spearhead this after you launch the effort.29
Korea may offer another opening. For now, finding the right
modalities looks very hard (the number and identity of other
participants is a problem) but the Chinese are plainly interested in
lowering tensions on the peninsula (especially as the Soviets court
the North) and may be able to help us.
3. Key Choices
Arms control and our strategic nuclear weapons programs may be
approaching a turning point. If we can learn anything from the past,
it is that it is crucial to have a plan that relates our strategic
weapons programs and our arms control strategy early: perhaps as early as this summer.
The arms control theories and agreements of the past are, to a very
large extent, also based on the technologies of the past. Controls
on new
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weapons simply
cannot be verified with the same confidence as in the past.30 At
the same time, new technologies could help us reduce our dependence
on vulnerable traditional strategic weapons, or even allow us to
scrap them in the interest of arms control.
The new technologies that make a truly mobile ICBM possible will deal with the
problem of vulnerability even better than the M–X can. At the same
time, the current log-jam in the strategic arms control arena and
the charge that you are indifferent to arms control might be handled
by accelerating our efforts on MIDGETMAN and cancelling the
M–X—particularly if the Congress insists on transforming our
well-constructed M–X proposal into a tiny absurdity.31 If we were to do
this, it would have to be done early, before
our friends on the Hill go
to bat for you for the M–X, and before Congressional action makes it
look as if you were being forced to cancel.
Although still at the canter of our foreign policy, NATO now faces problems that may
further reduce that institution’s vitality. The Soviet nuclear and
non-nuclear build-up has increased the military and political
pressures on West Europe at a time when the economies of West Europe
are in bad shape, and likely to remain so. The potential for a
visible, debilitating clash between the U.S. and West Europe exists.
Solving this problem will require a major effort. We might need
programs to strengthen the economies of West Europe—perhaps a
technological “Marshall Plan.”32 In our planning activities, we will consider
the merits of painfully thrashing out new, more realistic doctrines
for the defense of West Europe, or new alliance arrangements. And we
will have to consider how to handle domestic critics who ask why we
should be doing all this with Europe when we have problems of our
own.
Treating NATO on a business as
usual basis would involve lower costs. The West Europeans are moving
slowly toward solutions for their economic problems, and are talking
about joint European defense projects. The Soviets are not likely to
invade or provoke a crisis. We could muddle through. But if the
Soviets do attack somewhere around the world, NATO could be shown up as an empty
shell.
Whichever course we end up following, we will investigate in the
coming months the potential value of new non-nuclear weapons for the
defense of Europe.33 Their military value appears to be real,
although
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their economic
costs, and the ability of the Soviets to devise ways of beating the
new technologies need to be evaluated. More importantly, better
non-nuclear weapons offer a way to reduce our reliance on nuclear
weapons that frighten Europeans, very reasonably.34 The desire to avoid nuclear war may allow us to
forge a consensus in favor of the new non-nuclear weapons, and in
favor of a strong NATO.
Like the new technologies, the flanks of NATO—Norway on the north, Turkey in the south—will
receive our close attention whatever our other decisions may be.
Those areas are so vital to U.S.
strategic concerns—control of the seas in the north, control of
Southwest Asia in the south—and their current defenses are so weak,
that we simply must devise ways to improve their position.
In the Middle East, a new Labor government in Israel could provide us
with some diplomatic opportunities.35 If the leaders of the Labor
party do what they now say they will do (a freeze on West Bank
settlements, confidence-building measures on the West Bank,
negotiate on the basis of the Reagan plan), King Hussein may find it more difficult
to explain why he cannot join the negotiations. While Hussein is not likely to find new
courage overnight, and run risks for peace, he knows that if the
Israelis are flexible, it will be more risky for him to refuse to
move forward. If he does not negotiate in those circumstances, his
relations with us would suffer, and some of his own people who are
linked by family to the West Bank would be angry. There is no
guarantee that there would be progress, but the potential is there.
Any effort to take advantage of that potential would require your
own involvement. If the Labor government were, with our help, to
successfully press such an initiative forward this summer, it would
have two important effects on our planning process: 1) partially
free up resources for initiatives outside the Middle East at the
beginning of the second term; and 2) create an environment of
success conducive to undertakings more ambitious than those now
imagined.
4. Unavoidable Decisions
On some issues, even if real openings seem slight, we will face
considerable pressure next year (whether from Congress, public
opinion, allies, or action-forcing events) to prepare new
initiatives. This will probably be true of U.S.-Soviet relations and Central America. Both will be
prominent campaign issues, and a November victory may put our
critics on the defensive, but not for long.
[Page 838]
The Soviets’ own focus will probably continue to be inward; if so, we
may see less activism and confrontation, but also little basis for
major agreement. Despite this, Congress will probably interfere more
in our policy, above all by holding nuclear-weapon systems hostage
to arms control initiatives; the odds are also increasing that in
1985 Moscow will do more to encourage such efforts here and in
Europe, by appearing more responsive (even if only as a
tactic).36
Considerable public and Allied anticipation is also likely on the
summit issue (particularly as more Allied leaders pick up the line
of circumventing Gromyko).37 As we plan a probe of Soviet positions on a
number of issues, such a meeting may offer certain advantages.38 Our
position on “results” as a precondition may therefore need review:
the start of a new term could allow a “clear-the-air” summit (no
major results) without loss of credibility—in fact, with extra
freedom to hang tough on issues of substance (such as
verification).39
Congressional interference will remain a continuing problem for
Central America policy as well. Yet if Duarte strengthens himself in El Salvador, and the
contras escalate in Nicaragua, our
position vs. Managua may seem as strong as it’s ever likely to be
(especially if we can fund the Jackson Plan40
next year and use it as a lure for Nicaraguan demobilization). As a
result, pressures for—and perhaps a true chance of—accommodation
will increase. We’ll need to balance two conflicting goals—showing
that we can decisively defeat threats in our own hemisphere, and
gaining flexibility on other issues by putting this “crisis” behind
us.
Steady-state Management
In many issues, where our policy is basically on track, an
end-of-term review will do little more than survey some marginal
changes of direction. This usually reflects progress already made.
Policy toward China is now clearly in this category, along with our
efforts in southern Africa and our management of the international
debt crisis.
On these and other issues, despite a basically favorable outlook, we
have to be alert to new problems and opportunities that may arise. A
marked worsening of Sino-Soviet relations may, for example, increase
Chinese interest in accelerated cooperation with us. Similarly,
[Page 839]
in managing debt issues we
should probably work harder to gain informal political payoffs from
the debt relief we provide.
Adjustments like these will be considered in this planning process,
but because they are highly tactical, we do not expect to do more
than establish general guidelines. Moreover, the possible benefits
of even small policy adjustments have to be carefully weighed
against likely costs.
