Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

195. Memorandum From Frederick Wettering of the National Security Council Staff to Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, June 5, 1984

SUBJECT

• Africa: Issues and Opportunities Post 1984

There are five major themes which dominate our policy towards Africa which need to be continued, refined and enhanced in post-1984.

— Continue the rollback of Soviet gains in Africa of earlier years: We have made some impressive gains in reducing Soviet influence in Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Cape Verde, Botswana, through an intentional and adroit combination of diplomacy, economic and security assistance, and working with friends and allies. A key factor has been our ability to use not only carrots but sticks in terms of withholding assistance until concessions are made. In addition, we have seen the terrorist/insurgency capabilities of the Soviet-controlled ANC movement targeted against South Africa and the Soviet-influenced SWAPO movement targeted against Namibia, as well as the Libyan surrogate movements in Chad and targeted against Somalia, all badly damaged. In each of these cases, we have made effective use of an intermediary as the action agent. Specifically, in the forthcoming period:

— Angola: Should no proposal on Cuban troop withdrawal be forthcoming from the MPLA regime, we can increase the pressure on them by inviting Jonas Savimbi to Washington for a visible series of meetings—possibly including a White House contact. We also should hold the line in denying ExIm Bank and other USG favors to the MPLA regime despite pressures to the contrary.

— Mozambique: We should continue to move with deliberate economic assistance in exchange for structural reforms away from Marxism-Leninism and put some resources behind our effort to engage the Portuguese in Mozambique on our behalf (this is in train but needs continuing White House support).

— Ethiopia: We should continue and increase the pressure on our allies to deny economic assistance to this troubled Leninist regime in order to increase domestic problems for Mengistu and put greater pressure on his Soviet backers.

— Continue to press South Africa into acceptable conduct to move South Africa into a status of acceptable member of the Western Alliance: South Africa is the most strategically important African state. We have made considerable strides in moderating and moving South African behavior to the point where it ceases to become a pariah state but becomes accepted in the Western community (as exemplified by Prime Minister Botha’s current official visit to Western Europe).² We need to continue to use all our resources to moderate South African international behavior into constructive channels and at the same time press for more domestic reforms to move away from apartheid. A possible visit by Prime Minister Botha with the President should be considered to further these points.

— Increase resistance to Libyan aggression and terrorism and increase the cost to Libya for such activities : We have some accomplishments here, but this activity needs constant White House backing to overcome bureaucratic timidity. There are some real possibilities in stinging Libya in its partial occupation of Chad. High level talks with the French government on this matter should be in order.

— Press on with assistance to African states which leads to real reform along free enterprise lines and also provides answers to the hunger problem: Two White House initiatives need Congressional funding and follow-up—the Economic Policy Initiative for Africa³ and the Keating Group’s recommendations on hunger in Africa.⁴ Both need White House backing in Congress and follow-up in implementation.

— Continue to prove a loyal ally and reliable partner to our friends in Africa: Continued White House input is needed to guarantee adequate help to our proven friends in Africa such as Liberia, Kenya, Zaire, Sudan, Somalia, Senegal, to overcome sniping and cheese-paring efforts by Congress and the bureaucracy. A fresh round of working visits to the White House from these friendly leaders would be in order.

1. Source: Reagan Library, African Affairs Directorate, NSC Records, Subject File, [Africa—General]. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for information.
2. From May 28 to June 14, Botha visited Switzerland, Belgium, France, Austria, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Vatican. In telegram 1392 from Cape Town, June 21, the consulate reported: “Prime Minister P.W. Botha’s European visit largely matched the aims which South Africa set itself. Botha’s foremost goal was to break out from decades-long diplomatic isolation by holding face-to-face meetings with European leaders. As a corollary, the SAG construes the trip as signifying de facto international acceptance of Pretoria’s regional diplomacy and constitutional reforms.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840399–0642) See also James M. Markham, “Europeans Give Botha A Frosty Reception,” New York Times, June 10, 1984, p. E5.
3. See footnote 13, Document 192.
4. NSSD 1–84, “U.S. Third World Hunger Relief,” issued on February 27, called for a study to review existing U.S. policies and programs regarding third world hunger relief and propose new initiatives. The Directive placed responsibility for the NSSD review with an interagency steering group chaired by the Department of State; Keating was assigned to chair the study. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II, Document 218.