Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

178. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, December 8, 1983

SUBJECT

• A Suggestion for Rebuilding Support for Foreign Assistance

Shortly before leaving State I recommended that a bipartisan commission be established to find ways to reconstitute public support for foreign assistance. I don’t know it if it was my idea that finally percolated to the top, or whether there were independent suggestions along the same line from multiple sources. In any event, it was only much later that I learned that such a commission had in fact been established. I was not asked by State to comment either on its work program or composition. Perhaps then it is only my personal annoyance that causes me to feel that the project has not been managed in a particularly inspirational fashion. But for whatever reason I do in fact believe this is the case.

One thing is certain. We desperately need to do something about the foreign assistance problem. You know better than anyone how important such assistance is: to affect expectations, to signal support, to minimize our direct involvement, to build cadres oriented toward the West, to reduce opportunities for Soviet exploitation, to show the reversibility of Soviet gains, etc. I acutely remember my own sense of demoralization upon visiting North Yemen in 1980. Even in so small a country the Soviets were self-consciously out-training us by a ratio of about twenty to one. In Turkey, the Soviets have invested more in support for terrorism than we have in recent years on foreign aid. New intelligence out of Somalia suggests that Siad Barre is becoming so frustrated by the limitations of our assistance program that he is reconsidering the value of the broader bilateral relationship. The Somali case may be exaggerated; though it is symptomatic of what we may see in even larger form in the years ahead.

As harried policy makers we agonize constantly over trade-offs at the margin, e.g., ten million dollars, more or less, grant or credit, Somalia or Sudan. The plain fact of the matter is, however, that the foreign assistance program has eroded steadily since the first crucial investments for peace and security were made in the wake of World War II. Those investments have paid handsome dividends over the last three decades, but new investments must be made for the years ahead. Just as a conservative Republican President was needed to reverse our relationship with China, the same may be true now with regard to the need to restructure American public opinion on the subject of foreign assistance.

Perhaps this is an issue for the first year of the second term rather than now. I believe, however, that there is no time like the present. I have recommended that the Speechwriters include a significant passage on foreign assistance in the State of the Union address. We would make the point that support for foreign assistance is perhaps the foremost remaining requirement for restoring the conditions for a successful U.S. foreign policy.

Words without examples will only carry us so far. Thus, I suggested some months ago that the President contemplate concrete action to drive home the rhetorical point we so frequently make—namely, that dollar for dollar, foreign assistance is as effective, and in many cases more so, than our own defense programs. The specific idea was to identify a weapons system (or some specific percentage of the current defense budget) which the President would agree to delete, reduce or defer, but only as part of a Congressional deal to dramatically reconstitute the foreign assistance account. My thought was that we would probably be obliged to take cuts in any event and that, possibly, by going a little further than was expected, we could get something truly significant for what we would be forced to give up. The gain would be a concrete one in terms of our security interests, and, yet because of the attachment many liberals have to the economic portion of our economic aid program, it would be easier to sustain a bipartisan consensus for the deal. Ikle, Wohlstetter and others were struck by the idea when I first discussed it with them, although Fred of course only unofficially. Implementing the idea would of course be complex.

Maybe this is just pie-in-the-sky, but I think something of this magnitude will be required if we are really serious about facing up to the foreign assistance problem. I think it is frequently safer to fight battles in the large, rather than on regional, specific programs.

I suggest that you attempt to see Carlucci privately to sound him out on this idea. He not only would have the experience of the Commission’s work² behind him, but would also have important insights about how to make the idea work given the defense budget progress and associated bureaucratic politics. Bob Lilac and I will also give some thought to how we make better use of the product we do have from the Commission itself.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, [Security Assistance] Foreign Aid (December 1983); NLR–753–94–6–20–0. Secret. Sent for information. Also scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance.
2. On February 22, Shultz announced that was “creating an advisory panel of private citizens and members of Congress to review the Government’s foreign aid and military assistance programs.” He indicated that Carlucci would head the Commission on Foreign Security and Economic Assistance. (“Panel to Advise on Aid,” New York Times, February 23, 1983, p. D13) The final report is The Commission on Security and Economic Assistance: A Report to the Secretary of State (Washington: The Commission on Security and Economic Assistance, 1983).