Tab I
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan4
Washington, undated
Subject
- U.S.-Soviet Relations in
1983
George Shultz forwarded you a
memorandum (Tab A) outlining how to handle U.S.-Soviet relations in 1983. His memorandum sets
forth a strategy for “countering new Soviet activism by using an
intensified dialogue with Moscow to test whether an improvement in
the U.S.-Soviet relationship is
possible.” George posits that a “process of dialogue” (Depts.
/Desks, Ambassadors, Ministries, Summitry) would help us gauge the
seriousness of Dobrynin’s
proclaimed intentions to improve U.S.-Soviet relations, and could permit us to seize the
high ground domestically and internationally, and foster Allied
unity.
Specifically, he argues that the Administration should continue its
present arms control policy, resume a dialogue with the Soviets on
regional issues (Afghanistan, Africa, Middle East), and continue to
seek improved Soviet human rights behavior. On economic and
bilateral issues, the Administration should pursue careful and
controlled forward steps—no dramatic expansion, only carefully paced
positive change. Lastly, he suggests that the whole dialogue process
would lead to a summit if relations warrant.
While there may be some initial public relations benefit to explore
the possibility of “across the board” improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, I believe that
we should have no illusions about the nature of the Andropov regime. Thus, I have
serious reservations about the proposed timing and method of
implementation in State’s memo. I am specifically concerned that the
U.S. would soon be forced to
dissipate its leverage by making piecemeal concessions in bilateral
negotiations which would not result in any meaningful Soviet
response, but which would further intensify rather than mollify
domestic and Allied pressures to do more. In sum, this course of
action would be sure to arouse even more public expectations and
would make it difficult for us to maintain a firm policy vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union; moreover, Soviet activism is largely in the field
of public propaganda. This is difficult to counter through dialogues
which normally remain private.
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Instead, I suggest that we use existing channels to smoke out real
Soviet intentions and their willingness to be flexible on critical
issues before embarking on a campaign to
improve our bilateral relations. The private Shultz-Gromyko exchanges, should continue
to concentrate on eliciting concrete Soviet views on how military,
political and economic aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations can be specifically improved.
Right now, I do not see any important areas for give in our basic
positions: in arms control, any signal of readiness for compromise
on INF would be interpreted by the
Soviets as a sign of weakness—a sign that we fear we will be unable
to deploy our missiles in Europe; on regional issues, we might be
willing to reach some small compromises on individual issues, but we
would not make major changes in our positions on Afghanistan,
Central America or the Middle East. Since there is no basis for
major reciprocal deals, I, therefore, do not see the justification
for undertaking a major effort to intensify the dialogue.
If it appears that there is real possibility for progress, then we
can respond accordingly. However, if, as is probable, the Soviet
positions still offer no room for genuine breakthroughs, it is
essential that we be able to maintain firm policy positions and
intensify our efforts to portray the USSR as an obstacle to peace. Creating false
expectations of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations might buy us some time and temper
domestic, and Allied pressure in the short term, but in the long
term, public expectations would pressure us for more and more
concessions making it exceedingly difficult to sustain a firm and
resolute course.
I have grave reservations not only about the overall thrust of the
proposed strategy for “improving U.S.-Soviet relations”, but I also disagree with some
of the specific policy initiatives set forth.
- 1.
- On regional issues, State sees the
possibility of new Soviet flexibility on Afghanistan and proposes tabling a bold framework for
a comprehensive settlement. There actually seems to be little
willingness to compromise in the Soviet position and a proposed
settlement by us could lead to negotiations which would take the
heat off the Soviets and erode U.S. credibility with Pakistan.
- 2.
- Bringing Moscow into renewed bilateral, discussions on Namibia/Angola as State proposes has
pitfalls which we should avoid. I suggest that we continue to
deal with the problems of Cuban presence in Angola through the
frontline African states.
- 3.
- State recommends the restoration of government to government
economic contacts through the Joint
Commercial Commission (JCC).
This proposal would send a dramatic signal of changed trade
policies and procedures to the business community and would
seriously hinder our efforts to forge Allied consensus on
East-West economic relations. Any unilateral actions at this
time would be counterproductive as the
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East-West Economic Study is not completed.
Instead, trade should continue to be conducted through private
channels. Restoration of the JCC can only be seriously contemplated if
meaningful improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations appear imminent.
- 4.
- In accordance with the terms set forth in NSDD 75 (U.S. Policy Toward the USSR),5 a U.S.
dialogue with the Soviets should address the full range of
U.S. concerns about Soviet
internal behavior and human rights violations and not just arms control. However, in addition to
what State mentions, arms control—without becoming the
centerpiece—should be addressed in these discussions with the
expressed purpose of gauging Soviet seriousness of purpose on
reductions, equality, verification and compliance. That is,
Soviet behavior in INF and
their willingness to fundamentally alter their present
negotiating stance offers an excellent litmus test of true
Soviet intentions vis-a-vis the U.S. If the Soviets are not prepared to relinquish
the current clearcut nuclear superiority they enjoy in the
European theater, no modicum of dialogue or even of piecemeal
agreements in the political/economic sphere would decrease the
Soviet threat to Western security.
- 5.
- A “process of dialogue” at all levels
(Departments/Desks, Ambassadors, Ministries, Summitry) would not
be fruitful but counterproductive, as it would serve primarily
Soviet interests. We should seek a better balance between
contacts through Dobrynin and our Ambassador in Moscow.
- 6.
- Finally, a summit meeting is envisioned
by State as the ultimate objective of the dialogue proposal. I
see little point in summitry until the Soviets have made a major
move which clearly demonstrates a willingness to reduce threats
to us and the rest of the free world.6
