Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

125. Editorial Note

On November 15, 1982, President Ronald Reagan met with the newly-elected Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Kohl. During his welcoming remarks, made at 11:06 a.m. on the South Lawn of the White House, the President stated: “The future of both our nations depends so much on friendship and the values we share. In these uncertain times, when a power to the East has built a massive war machine far in excess of any legitimate defensive needs, the Western democracies must stand firmly together if our freedom and peace of the world are to be preserved.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book II, page 1467)

Reagan and Kohl then met with U.S. and West German officials in the Oval Office from 11:44 a.m. until 12:25 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) At 12:25 p.m. the President escorted the Chancellor to the State Dining Room for a working luncheon, where they were joined by the attendees from the earlier meeting in addition to other U.S. and West German officials. During the luncheon, which lasted until 1:35 p.m., the President referenced the change in Soviet leadership following the death of Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on November 10 and the elevation of Yuri Andropov to the position of General Secretary: “The discussion turned to the new Soviet leadership. The President said that it was his evaluation that the new Soviet leader [Yuri Andropov] would be a very tough adversary. He did not see great changes in Soviet policy. The Soviet Union was faced with major economic problems. The change of leadership gave an opportunity to let the Soviet Union know publicly that they could easily have better relations with the West ‘if they changed their ways.’ The President said that the Soviets did not have to make any great public announcements about changed behavior, but only to take a specific action. If they would take an action to indicate a willingness to deal peacefully with the rest of the world, the United States would be prepared to take an immediate reciprocal action, to meet their quid with a quo.”

Following Kohl’s remarks about Soviet leaders, Communist economic development, and Reagan’s impact on European audiences, the President returned to the issue of Soviet leadership: “The President pointed out that there were two common explanations for Soviet behavior: One was that the Soviets were following the teaching of Marx and spreading the world revolution of the proletariat. The second explanation was they were paranoid and afraid and were expanding in order to protect themselves. The President pointed out that it was absurd for the Russians to believe that any country was out to conquer them. He asked the Chancellor’s opinion on this question.

“The Chancellor replied that both explanations were correct. Fundamentally, Soviet policy was Russian policy. Marxist-Leninist ideology was an addition, but underneath Soviet policy was imperial great Russian policy. Historically, the Soviet Union had no defensible frontiers. The approaches to the homeland had been wide plains, therefore traditionally the Soviets had attempted to build buffer zones. This explained much of the history of Poland. Twice invading armies from Western Europe had reached the Soviet capital—Napoleon and Hitler. Chancellor Kohl said the President was right. No country seriously threatened the Soviet Union, least of all the Federal Republic. From a rational point of view there was no threat, but there was an irrational but deep fear among the Russian people, which the government exploited to justify military expenditures. The Chancellor noted that he and the President as politicians knew the importance of irrational emotions held by people and how they must be taken into account. It was also important to look at history. In the 19th century, the Russians had had the same fears and Bismarck had recognized these and was therefore careful to maintain the balance which would keep the Russians satisfied. On the other hand, this fear also offered an opportunity that could be exploited. It was a key element of Russian policy never to take great risks, never to move when the risks were high. The only recent exception to this had been the move into Afghanistan.

“The President recalled the analysis done in two books by Laurence Beilenson, a lawyer who had become an historian after retirement. He had written three books about history, the first, called The Treaty Trap had shown that any country which had put its faith in treaties rather than building up its defenses had failed to protect its national interests. The second book, on the use of subversion, had shown that although many countries in history had used subversion against their adversaries to a certain extent, Lenin had uniquely based an entire approach to foreign policy on it. Beilenson had also found that the Soviets or the Russians would not make an aggressive move if it risked a threat to their homeland. They would never gamble if there were a threat to Russia itself. The President said he could not help but remember 1928 when the Soviets had made a proposal for worldwide disarmament. He wished that someone would remind them of that. The President said that he had been recently pursuing quiet diplomacy with the Soviets. As a politician he knew that if he made public demands on the Soviets they would find it impossible to give in, so he had privately asked for a gesture, a concrete action from the Soviets. The President cited as an example the Pentecostalists who were in the basement of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Their release was the sort of gesture he was looking for. If the Soviets took such an action, the U.S. would not publicize it, but would reciprocate with an appropriate response. The President said that President Nixon had been able to operate in this fashion. He had asked Brezhnev to take a number of actions privately and Brezhnev had taken some of them. President Nixon had responded immediately with reciprocal actions.

“Chancellor Kohl said that the most important issue of the day was peace, that is, peace and freedom. He recalled from his family history that his mother’s brother had been killed in World War I, that his parents had then given the same name to his older brother and that brother had been killed in World War II. Chancellor Kohl had given the same name to his son, although his mother had opposed it and that son was now serving in the army before going to university. The Chancellor said he told the story as he understood the President was a man with a heart, a man who could see the human aspects of the problems which confronted him. It was necessary to see the human side of great problems, while not neglecting the danger and the threat. The Chancellor continued to discuss the INF deployments. He said that if in the fall the negotiations had not achieved results in Geneva he expected all of the basing countries to go forward with their deployments, but even if they did not, the Federal Republic would. The Chancellor said that he had made this clear in his party platform.

“President Reagan said that he was willing to deal with the Soviet Union on a human basis. He recalled that when he was recovering in the hospital from being shot, he had written a letter by hand to Brezhnev asking him to sit down together to talk about the aspirations of their people and what their leaders could do for them. The President said he didn’t know if Brezhnev ever saw the letter, since the reply came through normal diplomatic channels and contained all the normal Soviet propaganda. That did not mean he would give up trying to establish contact with the Soviet leadership. He would try again, but as the Chancellor had said, never losing sight of the threat. It was important for the Soviets to understand that the United States would not buy peace at any price.” (Memorandum of Conversation, November 15; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Memorandums of Conversation—President Reagan (11/01/1982–12/06/1982)) The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume VII, Western Europe, 1981–1984.

Following the luncheon, Reagan and Kohl spoke at the Diplomatic Entrance on the South Lawn of the White House. For their remarks and a joint statement released following the discussions and dated November 15, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, Book II, pages 1469–1475. In his personal diary entry for November 15, the President noted: “Our meeting was good. He is entirely different than his predecessor—very warm & outgoing. Mrs. Kohl is the same & very charming.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 172) Secretary of State George Shultz provided a brief description of Kohl’s visit in his memoir, writing: “Helmut Kohl had come to Washington for meetings on November 15 as the new chancellor. Kohl and President Reagan and I had similar impressions of Andropov, the new Soviet leader: formidable, experienced, tough; we agreed we needed to know him better. Kohl emphasized the importance of a firm and cohesive NATO alliance as the only hope for success in the crucial INF negotiations with Moscow. But it must be ‘a real negotiation, not just a show,’ he said.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, page 149)