Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXX, Public Diplomacy

205. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the International Communication Agency (Bray) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 7, 1980

SUBJECT

• Initiatives with Respect to European Opinion

You will have received our memorandum of April 4 on European public opinion.² At David Aaron’s suggestion, we have considered what posture or initiatives might best respond to the post-Afghanistan climate of opinion.

With that in mind, we propose below a strategy that focuses on the Olympic boycott as the most urgent issue politically and diplomatically.³ We should concentrate on appealing to the Europeans on two issues of sensitivity to them—morality and Alliance unity. Simultaneously, we should highlight economic sanctions and security issues both to reinforce our position on the Olympic boycott and as critical themes themselves over the longer term. In discussing these issues we should emphasize that (1) the U.S. is making hard economic choices and our allies must do likewise; and (2) Soviet aggression in Afghanistan demonstrates the need for both Atlantic unity and improved NATO defense capabilities.

Olympic Boycott. Excepting only the Germans, Europeans are less supportive of an Olympic boycott than their governments. Arguments of national or international interest/security—“drawing the line” or “teaching the Russians a lesson”—appear unlikely to be effective; they may even be counterproductive given strong European public reluctance to derail detente.

The best approach appears to us to be the moral one: is it “right” to legitimate, even honor, Soviet aggression? What is “the right thing to do?” (Parenthetically, this approach may simultaneously also be more effective in the United States as well.)

We know that in mid-1977 European publics were much more supportive of the Administration’s address to human rights⁴ than their governments. We know there has been strongly negative reactions—particularly in France and the Low Countries—to the Sakharov exile and the impending pre-Olympic removal from Moscow of other dissidents. Both matters should be kept in the public mind by the President, Secretary of State, senior advisors and key members of Congress—particularly those well known in Europe.

We recommend:

—that details on dissident arrests and pre-Olympic round-ups be made public promptly as the facts are known, then periodically repeated;

—that the moral note, combined with references to Soviet offenses against Afghan human rights, be strongly stated in the President’s next press conference or ASNE appearance⁵ and become a staple of daily White House and State Department briefings;

—Western European governments (especially the West Germans) will be more susceptible, however, to the theme of Alliance unity. The President should use his next news conference, his appearance at the ASNE meeting this week, or a statement following this weekend’s USOC meeting⁶ to stress the importance of Alliance unity;

—that you make a mid-April appearance at our Foreign Press Center here before an invited list of (primarily European) journalists, and that the morality theme figure prominently;

—that American Ambassadors in Europe be urged to make repeated public speeches and TV appearances in the six weeks remaining before May 24,⁷ drawing on your Foreign Press Center transcript and other sources;

—that American Ambassadors in Europe (and elsewhere) engage in systematic media backgrounding on the same themes;

—selected American Olympic athletes who support the boycott should visit Europe during the next three weeks to discuss with athletes and sports organization officials their conviction that the U.S. and its allies should not participate in the Moscow Olympics;

—that private American and European human rights organizations collaborate in a series of conferences in European capitals in early May to examine Soviet behavior in Afghanistan. Nobel laureates, particularly from the scientific communities which have spoken out on the Sakharov case, should be featured speakers;

—that an effort be made, preferably through third parties, to convene the UN Human Rights Commission to address (a) Soviet treatment of dissidents and (b) human rights—including refugees—in and resulting from Afghanistan;

—that the United States explore with third parties the possibility of bringing charges against the Soviet Union in the UN under Articles II and III of the International Genocide Convention.⁸

Economic Sanctions. The British public supports sanctions; the German public can be led in that direction; other European publics appear more reserved.

We recommend:

—the morality theme (combined with non-aggressive accounts of USG actions and American business response) appears most likely to be effective. Again, American Ambassadors should support this effort in speeches and deliberate backgrounding of the financial-business media.

Constant supporting themes should include:

—the details of accelerating energy conservation in the U.S., declining imports, decontrol, etc.;

—the details of the increase in defense spending despite budgetary cutbacks in domestic programs as supported by both Administration and Congress.

[Both these points address the crucial question of American will (see next section) and should be designed to raise in comfortably affluent European minds the need for hard choices with respect to military security and East-West relations.]⁹

Security Issues. European publics strongly support NATO, are increasingly concerned by a perceived Soviet threat, regard the USSR/Warsaw Pact as stronger than the US/NATO, appear disposed to support higher defense budgets.

We recommend:

—that the theme of Atlantic unity—not unanimity, but unity in the face of threat (particularly to oil suppliers)—be raised directly, even bluntly. The Rusks, McCloys, Kissingers, Trilateralists in the U.S. and Europe, could assist substantially if enlisted by the White House and Secretary of State.

We recommend:

—that a chorus of European and American voices be raised—particularly from those held in high regard in the FRG, which is most sensitive to the unity issue;

—that a DOD/State/NSC/USICA group be formed this week to consider the most effective observance of the 35th anniversary of V–E Day on May 9. There are indications that the USSR already has plans to use the observance for political purposes;

—that the possibility of an early “Reforger” type exercise,¹⁰ or other real (and visibly symbolic) steps, be undertaken to reinforce the fact of American commitment, perhaps in connection with V–E Day;

—that key Europeans (particularly the Germans, British and Dutch) be encouraged to make some V–E Day-related gesture to the United States in the United States, e.g. major speeches on Atlantic unity, visits to the headquarters of famous military units like the 82nd Airborne. Such gestures/speeches would be much more widely reported in Europe than here, but that is the purpose.

Indeed, that is the general purpose of this memorandum: to affect the climate of opinion by acts tangible and symbolic, and in a tone that is in the highest sense moral.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800065–2473. Confidential. A copy was sent to Vance.
2. Not found.
3. The White House, on February 20, released the text of a statement indicating that the President had informed the United States Olympic Committee that the United States should not send an Olympic team to Moscow. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981, Book I, p. 356)
4. See footnote 2, Document 17.
5. The President offered remarks and participated in a Question and Answer session at the ASNE annual convention, held at the Washington Hilton Hotel, on April 10. For a transcript, see Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981, Book I, pp. 631–643.
6. The meeting took place at USOC headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colorado. On April 12, the United States Olympic Committee voted to support the President’s call for a boycott of the Moscow Games. (Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Olympic Group Votes to Boycott the Moscow Games,” The New York Times, April 13, 1980, p. 1)
7. Reference is presumably to the May 24 deadline for registration for the Moscow Games.
8. Reference is to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948 (A/RES/260 (III)A). Article II defines genocide, and Article III defines crimes punishable under the Convention.
9. Handwritten brackets are in the original.
10. Reference is to an annual exercise, conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to enable rapid deployment of troops to the Federal Republic of Germany in the event of a conflict with the Warsaw Pact.