149. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy and Disarmament (Bray) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

I. Background:

In your memorandum of June 8, 1978,2 you tasked this Committee with developing a public diplomacy initiative focused on arms control and disarmament issues.

Our Committee included representatives of the National Security Council, Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and International Communication Agency.

We agreed unanimously that a public diplomacy initiative could be extremely valuable at this time, and recommend that ICA be charged with coordinating appropriate activities along the lines outlined in the remainder of this paper.

II. Objectives:

We believe realistic objectives of the initiative are:

1. To lend clarity and precision to the foreign understanding of specific U.S. policies and broad purposes.

2. To increase the capacity of foreign individuals and institutions to engage in thoughtful, unemotional analysis of basic arms control issues.

3. To help create an international climate of opinion on these issues which is more congenial to the U.S. point of view.

The Committee considered a full range of arms control questions. However, to give greater focus to issues most important to U.S. interests and salient to publics abroad, and recognizing our resource limitations, we propose that preponderant attention be given to the following:

1. SALT and the East-West balance

2. Nonproliferation and the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)

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3. Conventional arms transfers (CAT) and regional arms control arrangements.

Specific programmatic goals will vary according to the immediacy and character of the issues involved in particular areas. The Committee devoted considerable time to discussing the relative attention that should be given to questions of obvious priority in the short run, such as SALT II and (to a somewhat lesser extent) CTB, as compared with longer term issues such as CAT and some aspects of nonproliferation.3 We agreed that considerable resources should be devoted during the next six to twelve months to making a strong presentation of U.S. policy on SALT, particularly to audiences in Western Europe and U.S.-based European correspondents. Simultaneously, we would expect to inaugurate various program activities supporting CAT, nonproliferation, and CTB, concentrating on areas other than Europe, but including that region as well.

Our goals will also be affected by the degree to which U.S. policies have been firmly settled or are still evolving. Where U.S. policies are well established, we must assure that they are understood abroad, if necessary through activities that are essentially consciousness raising exercises, and report back on areas of disagreement or misunderstanding. Where U.S. positions are in a formative stage (e.g., with respect to certain regional arms control proposals), this initiative can be useful for consensus building and providing early feedback on foreign opinions for the guidance of policy makers.

III. The Foreign Environment:

For this report ICA solicited Washington and field assessments of arms control-related attitudes of informed publics in 30 countries representing all major regions and various levels of development. Some of the more significant findings from this admittedly rough and second-hand survey are summarized below.

Within the larger publics concerned with foreign policy, national security, and energy, there exists in all the countries surveyed a much smaller group of knowledgeable individuals who influence government policy or public opinion on arms control and disarmament issues. Their numbers range from fewer than 100 in many of the developing [Page 423] countries to several hundred in India and some of the industrialized democracies.

In addition to these narrowly-defined groups of influentials, larger publics in many of the countries have an interest in one or more aspects of arms control, though they exercise relatively little influence over public policy. Of greatest concern to these publics are specific issues believed to affect directly the country’s security, such as SALT and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe.

Though interest in particular issues differs considerably by region, nearly everywhere it is thought to be high on nonproliferation and regional arms control arrangements, but low on radiological and chemical weapons, antisatellite systems, and the linkage between disarmament and development.

The concerned European publics generally oppose nuclear proliferation out of genuine fear that the spread of nuclear weapons will increase the danger of nuclear holocaust. Yet they want assured supplies of nuclear fuels without undue restrictions, as well as the right to export nuclear technology when it does not significantly increase the probability of proliferation. Although nominally committed to nuclear nonproliferation, many non-European publics wish to retain their countries’ option of joining the nuclear club, or at least of purchasing fissile materials for the production of energy without burdensome foreign controls.

Interest in regional arms control arrangements is generally limited to the country’s immediate region: to MBFR in Europe, to Ayacucho and Tlatelolco in Latin America, to the Indian Ocean in the littoral states.

SALT II and III are of great interest to most European countries, both East and West, but of medium interest in most other countries, with a few exceptions such as Japan. Interest in a comprehensive test ban treaty, on the other hand, is judged to be quite low in Europe, but high elsewhere (e.g., Japan, India).

Theater nuclear or “grey area” issues, which in major European countries are followed closely, are apparently of low salience in most non-European countries (Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Pakistan excepted). Among other issues of relatively high interest are the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW) and nuclear-free zones.

Finally, several countries—notably Egypt, Israel, South Korea, South Africa—are so preoccupied with their immediate problems that their publics show little interest in issues unrelated to these questions.

The concerned publics in most countries are judged to agree with the general proposition that the United States “is genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament,” though in some (e.g., India, South Africa, and Tanzania) there is more outspoken skepticism that America really means what it says about arms control.

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On two subjects of great interest to specialists in the 30 countries investigated—conventional arms transfers and nonproliferation—opinion about U.S. policies is divided, but tends to be critical. Probably reflecting either skepticism because of America’s role as the largest arms supplier, or dissatisfaction with U.S. decisions affecting them, concerned publics in most countries (ranging from NATO and East Asian allies such as France, Italy, Japan, and South Korea, to Warsaw Pact members, and including most of the non-aligned in between) are thought to disagree with American policies in these areas. The climate of opinion regarding nonproliferation is similarly inhospitable, with such countries as France, West Germany, India, Pakistan, Japan, South Korea, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, among others, disagreeing that U.S. policies on this subject are “well intentioned and constructive.” In fact, concerned publics in many countries representing all regions are believed to accept the view that U.S. policies on nuclear nonproliferation “stem primarily from its desire to retain its dominant position in the nuclear fuel market.”

In a majority of the surveyed countries, the concerned publics are believed to agree, but not without some reservations, that the United States is militarily superior to the Soviet Union. Even the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies, and Yugoslavia see the U.S. as the stronger country, although directly measured public opinion in Western Europe tends to view the U.S.S.R. as militarily equal to or ahead of the United States. In about half the countries the United States is viewed as having more armaments than necessary to meet its legitimate defense needs. At the same time, concerned publics in about a third of the non-Communist countries are thought to agree with the statement that the U.S. “is likely to sacrifice the interests of its friends and allies as it pushes for a SALT II agreement.”

Outside of the Soviet bloc, concerned publics in most countries do not perceive the Soviet Union as being genuinely interested in achieving meaningful arms control and disarmament. Further, except in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, these publics are thought to agree that the Soviet Union has more arms than it needs. However, several countries in addition to the U.S.S.R. and its satellites credit the Soviet Union (as well as the U.S.) with a constructive approach to the MBFR negotiations.

There is near-universal agreement—even in countries with low interest in these issues—that nuclear-weapons free zones can contribute importantly to world peace, that completion of the SALT II agreement and of the comprehensive test ban treaty are of great importance for all countries, and that the United States should continue to pursue an agreement with the Soviet Union on arms restraints in the Indian Ocean. There is also believed to be strong opposition to the ERW in many countries, both in and outside of Europe.

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Several Western and non-aligned nations, as well as the Soviet Union and the East European countries surveyed, believe that regional arrangements may be a practical, though as yet not fully exploited, way of limiting conventional arms transfers.

Finally, there is considerable divergence of opinion among concerned publics about linking arms exports to human rights violations. Despite strong approval of American human rights initiatives on the part of the general public in Western Europe, the specialized publics in France, Great Britain, and Italy are believed to agree with the Soviet Union, East European countries, and others that arms suppliers should not be constrained from making transfers to countries that are “guilty of gross and consistent violations of basic human rights.”

IV. Basic Approaches:

Relation to Soviet efforts: We regret that this Government has never before organized itself to conduct a “forward” public diplomacy strategy on these issues. The Soviet Union has—and with considerable effect, many believe (though some sources contacted by the Committee are skeptical about the degree of effectiveness).

In propagandizing extensively on disarmament, the U.S.S.R. has sought primarily to build support among certain less developed countries (LDCs) and to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its European allies. Without being defensive, our efforts must to a degree be directed toward setting the record straight on what we have already done in the arms control field and on the rationale for U.S. weapons modernization programs. At the same time, we will not assume that U.S. and Soviet broad security interests are universally incompatible.

Audiences: Our activities should be directed toward building constructive communication between Americans and influential publics abroad, in and outside of government, who significantly influence either the decision-making process or public opinion. While some of these may be “disarmament specialists,” others may approach arms control questions primarily from the perspective of national security policy.

We propose placing emphasis on countries for which the issues have high salience or which carry particular weight in international deliberations on these questions. The priorities listed in Section V reflect the Committee’s best judgment at this time, but are not meant to exclude other significant regional actors and will be reviewed in the light of increased information and experience.

The role of the People’s Republic of China is somewhat anomalous. While the PRC is clearly an extremely important part of the global arms control environment, it is nonetheless virtually inaccessible to this kind of USG-sponsored public diplomacy undertaking. We hope [Page 426] that through private efforts, such as those initiated in earlier decades with the Soviet Union, the Chinese can increasingly join in the international public consideration of arms control issues.

Timing: The proposed activities will span at least the coming year and continue longer as appropriate, recognizing the long-term character of the central security and arms control issues involved.

Wherever possible we should take advantage of predictable “motor events” which focus the attention of influential foreign publics on specific issues. Such events will include the completion of SALT II, agreement on CTB and its submission to an international body as well as to the Senate, completion in late 1979 of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the 1979 non-aligned summit in Havana,4 and the next United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) in the early 1980s.5

Activities: We propose that ICA commission public opinion research, intensify its media reaction reporting, sponsor press briefings and seminars, conduct exchanges, and otherwise bring the full panoply of its informational and cultural resources to bear on these issues. It will draw on both government and non-government sources, for both participants and documentation, configuring the specifics of each activity to the particular audiences and issues at hand. In so doing ICA will depend on the agencies represented on this Committee for ongoing assistance in the form of policy guidances, speakers, and suggestions on program participants and media materials. Section VI contains two models which illustrate some of the specific programmatic possibilities that might be considered.

Basic messages: To counteract the widespread tendency toward simplistic and unrealistic approaches to arms control (as evidenced most recently by foreign nongovernmental organizations at the SSOD), we propose to emphasize two broad points:

1. Arms control is a matter of the head as well as of the heart. It is not enough simply to feel strongly about the arms race, and to deplore the danger, expense, and other burdens brought about by modern weapons. Rather, rational defense policy and arms control are two sides of the same coin, because both aim at reducing the threat of war by maintaining the security balance. Arms control issues cannot be resolved without tremendous patience as well as careful study of the technological, security, and institutional problems involved. (Some of the more down-to-earth American NGOs can be helpful in making [Page 427] this point, and may provide a useful means by which to help upgrade the analytical capabilities of other nations.)

2. Lack of openness, or “transparency,” is a fundamental impediment to arms control. Without more widely shared, reliable information about other nations’ armaments, national leaders and private specialists on security questions quite naturally make conservative—perhaps unnecessarily conservative—assessments of their defense requirements and are forced to rely on national technical means for the verification of arms control agreements. Openness in defense planning is already a characteristic of Western nations, and it is in our interests, as well as in the interests of effective arms control, that the pressures of international opinion on this issue be brought to bear on more secretive nations such as the Soviet Union.

V. Specific Issues, Countries, and Approaches

(a) SALT and the East-West balance:

Country and regional priorities:

NATO members (with top priority to France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, United Kingdom)

Warsaw Pact members (with priority to the U.S.S.R.)

European neutrals (especially Sweden, Austria, Yugoslavia)

Major actors in Middle East and South Asia (e.g., Israel, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, India)

U.S. allies in East Asia (e.g., Japan, South Korea, Australia)

Major actors in Latin America and Africa (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria)

SALT and other questions directly affecting the East-West strategic balance will be of central concern to the United States for the indefinite future, and therefore should continue to receive heavy public affairs attention. Although our immediate efforts should focus on SALT II, we should also treat theater systems and MBFR, as well as CTB. SALT will naturally receive particular attention once a SALT II agreement is reached and the ratification debate intensifies. Theater systems will receive increasing interest over the next year or two. While Western positions on this issue and on MBFR are evolving, it will be particularly useful to engage in reasoned exploration of various options with interested publics.

With NATO country audiences it will be important to emphasize what SALT means for European security within the overall strategic balance, addressing concerns about limits on the transfer of cruise missile technology, about charges of U.S. “decoupling” of American and European security, and about allegations that the U.S. has given away too much by cancelling new weapons systems such as the B–1 [Page 428] bomber,6 and delaying decisions on ERW7 and the MX mobile missile.8 We should stress the importance of the SALT agreement and the CTB treaty to the long-term objectives of the Atlantic Alliance and its political significance to the detente process.

With our allies in Europe and Asia we should reiterate our view that strategic stability is the foundation stone of world peace. The U.S. has the strength and will to maintain the balance at whatever level necessary, but hopes that through arms control agreements, such as SALT, the balance can be held at lower, less costly, and less dangerous levels. Any agreement affecting the strategic balance must meet certain basic criteria: it must maintain, and if possible improve, the military security of the U.S. and its allies; it must be equitable, and readily perceived as such; and it must be adequately verifiable.

With audiences in the LDCs, our approach should be more general and more educative. We should emphasize that U.S. arms control efforts in SALT and other forums are achieving progress in the control of strategic armaments, and that these negotiations bring positive benefits to all nations without eroding the East-West balance upon which world peace depends. We should also stress that although the U.S. ultimately seeks substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals, the most immediate—and most difficult—goal is to stop or slow the increase in weapons. Once limits on expansion are reached, a foundation for significant mutual reductions will have been achieved. Success in SALT (and CTB) should be seen in part as responding to our obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)9 and thus linked to the issues raised in the following section.

(b) Nonproliferation and CTB:

Country and regional priorities:

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Euratom members (especially France, F.R.G., Italy, U.K.)

Non-parties to NPT (e.g., South Africa, P.R.C., India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, Israel, Egypt)

Other important suppliers or recipients (e.g., Canada, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Iran, Nigeria, Mexico, Venezuela)

Although CTB relates to the East-West strategic balance over the long run, in terms of public diplomacy in India and other nuclear-conscious LDCs, it can also usefully be approached within the context of its possible contributions to nonproliferation. Universal adherence to the NPT or equivalent internationally-binding agreements would also be a major step toward the same end.

Two dates of special interest are: (1) November 1979, the conclusion of INFCE; and (2) March 1980, the end of the renegotiation period called for by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. As the latter date approaches, there will be a growing interest in unresolved contentious questions, particularly in India, Western Europe, and other areas, if it is impossible to renegotiate all agreements for cooperation by then. CTB should receive ongoing treatment as the outline of a treaty becomes clear, with special attention when an agreement is reached between the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R., when it is sent to the Committee on Disarmament and the U.N. General Assembly, and when it is under consideration by the Senate. If it is signed before the 1979 non-aligned summit, CTB could be on the agenda there.

The major focus of activities on this subject should be to put across the point that nonproliferation is in the interest of all states, both nuclear and non-nuclear. Collectively we must focus on the long-term changes in the global ecosystem, and look seriously at where mankind is, or should be, heading in the coming decades.

In encouraging a more analytical approach to nonproliferation issues, we should stress (particularly to non-signatories of the NPT) the cost and danger of nuclear weapons, and the potential proliferation harm of premature movement to a plutonium-based fuel economy. Further nuclear proliferation could well upset existing regional stabilities, and would ultimately impair the national security of all nations both within the affected region and elsewhere in the world. We should articulate the U.S. view that in the coming few years priority should be given to developing proliferation-resistant and economically feasible fuel cycles. U.S. caution on this score is based on prudence and on the interests of the global community as reflected in the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency, not on a desire to maintain discriminatory hegemony or dominance of the nuclear fuel market.

Recognizing that U.S. policies in this area are frequently criticized as insensitive, hypocritical, and paternalistic, it is essential that we [Page 430] demonstrate an awareness of legitimate energy needs and commercial interests of other nations and that our efforts to encourage sales restraint by supplier countries not be seen as a cartel strategy. We anticipate that the most responsive audiences to this subject, especially in the developed countries, are likely to be non-governmental groups, including some in the environmental field.

The best approach to publics in the non-NPT countries may be through regional activities which bring to bear the concerns of other nations in the same region.

(c) Conventional Arms Transfers (CAT) and Regional Arms Control:


NATO members (especially Canada, France, F.R.G., Italy, U.K.)

Warsaw Pact members (especially the U.S.S.R.)

Neutrals (especially Sweden, Yugoslavia)


East Asia (especially Japan, South Korea, P.R.C.)

Middle East and South Asia (especially Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, India)

Latin America (especially Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela)

Africa (especially Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa)

Although CAT at present has appreciably less salience for other countries than for the U.S., the SSOD demonstrated a growing international concern with this issue. While some events in the U.S. (e.g., submission of particular arms transfers proposals to Congress) may arouse interest abroad, global consideration of this question is still so new that the contemplated public diplomacy activities should be primarily directed to consciousness raising. The major “motor event” that can be anticipated at present is the September 1979 nonaligned summit in Havana (or elsewhere), at which CAT could be an agenda item.

Public diplomacy treatment of this subject in supplier and recipient countries should stress the importance of supplier restraint in reducing flows of arms which exacerbate tensions in unstable regions and thus threaten the peace, and point out the heavy burdens which regional arms races and growing military expenditures may unnecessarily place on the LDCs as they go about providing for their legitimate defense needs.

Without overselling the Ayacucho agreement10 or suggesting that the U.S. is promoting particular and precise formulas, we should [Page 431] emphasize U.S. support for regional arms control arrangements arrived at by the parties most directly concerned. These agreements offer the best hope for building intra-regional confidence and thus reducing the tensions that lie at the root of pressures for arms influxes. Latin America and Africa may be among the promising areas for regional discussions on this issue.

VI. Illustrative Program Models:

(a) Program Model #1:

A typical country receiving priority might be, for example, an upper tier LDC that is: (1) hoping to significantly increase its purchases of conventional arms to offset weapons buildups in neighboring countries; (2) marginally interested in East-West negotiations, which it views as essentially aimed at preserving superpower hegemony over the Third World; and (3) anxious not to foreclose its nuclear options by adhering to the NPT or otherwise accepting fullscope safeguards. In this typical country arms control decisions are made by a coterie of government officials, linked to an equally small number of private specialists in the universities, the print media, and a few research institutions. Public opinion is generally uninformed on the details of the issues, while NGOs which concern themselves with these questions are either Soviet-influenced mass organizations on the fringes of the political systems or are comprised of “defense intellectuals” who view arms control through a narrowly defined national security prism.

Our primary objective in this situation might be to involve knowledgeable individuals in and out of the government and opposite numbers in the U.S. to (1) exchange ideas and information, (2) clear up misapprehensions among those close to the decision-making process about where the U.S. stands on the issues, and (3) improve that country’s analytical capabilities.

On issues of regional significance to the country and its neighbors, such as CAT and nonproliferation, the main approach might be to expose the specialists to the views of U.S. official and non-official experts as well as to the attitudes of others in the region (who perhaps see the country’s interest in increased arms and nuclear capabilities as not necessarily benign). Illustratively, the following techniques might be used to achieve this aim: (1) exchange grants for specialists from several countries in the region to visit the U.S. as a group for discussions with U.S. officials and American specialists, ending in a series of structured meetings held under the auspices of a foreign policy organization; (2) a regional conference, cosponsored by a prestigious foreign policy institution of the country, to informally discuss alternative approaches to limiting arms influxes; (3) a grant to an American NGO to work with specialists from the region to explore prospects for a regional [Page 432] clearing house to share information on arms control subjects; (4) speaking tours to the region for leading U.S. experts on these subjects; (5) fellowships for one or two nationals of the country to study arms control at a U.S. academic center for a year.

To allay misperceptions about the U.S. strategic military and arms control posture two main techniques could be used: (1) development of indigenous-language media materials which discuss the significance of SALT for East-West stability and its role in furthering global arms control objectives, and (2) exchange activities which bring defense specialists, journalists, and researchers to the U.S. to see at first hand how arms control and security interrelate in U.S. policy.

Instead of directly treating current policy disagreements over nonproliferation, a group of official and unofficial American specialists on this subject might meet with local counterparts in a three-day off-the-record session to discuss the implications of alternative proliferation scenarios over the coming decades.

For all of these activities ICA research and media reaction reporting would keep U.S. policy makers and program participants informed of local attitudes on the questions under discussion. At the same time ICA media (e.g., Voice of America programming, videotape recordings, magazines, presentation books, bibliographies) could be used effectively to supplement the interpersonal dialogue.

(b) Program Model #2:

In a typical developed country the issues might revolve around the U.S. reliability as an ally (in which SALT is feared by some as presaging a decoupling of American and regional defense), and a perception that the U.S. is attempting to retain its dominant position in both the conventional arms and nuclear markets. Governmental decisions and public pronouncements are affected by a sizable concerned public, affiliated with a wide variety of academic, research, and political institutions. Some anti-nuclear NGOs have political clout and support certain American arms control official positions, though they tend to oppose the U.S. military presence in the region. Writers on security questions are the most vocal and articulate opponents of the SALT II agreement, as well as other proposed regional arms control arrangements.

The major program strategy here might be to present the rationale for U.S. defense and arms control efforts through indigenous institutions which are already set up to explore these issues, and thus maximize the credibility of our presentations. Through participation in seminars and placement of articles in local publications we would seek an impact on both decision makers and public opinion. Although government officials would not be ignored, journalists, TV commentators, [Page 433] defense specialists in parliament, and faculty members of international relations institutes might receive primary attention.

To get at the question of U.S. reliability and SALT, we might use the following techniques: (1) information packets on the U.S. strategic posture and arms control, with special emphasis on SALT; (2) special briefings on SALT for foreign journalists resident in Washington and New York; (3) tours of NATO facilities for parliamentarians and journalists from the country; (4) a high-visibility joint seminar on SALT and regional security held in conjunction with a major strategic studies think tank; (5) speaking tours for authoritative U.S. experts on these subjects; and (6) a U.S. visitation program in which specialists meet with U.S. officials and private arms control/security experts, travel to appropriate installations around the country, and participate in a wrap-up conference in Washington which focuses on arms control in the context of East-West security issues.

Suspicions about U.S. positions on CAT and nonproliferation might suggest an approach wherein we both explain U.S. policies and also stress the importance of sharing ideas and information as we collectively attempt to develop appropriate policies for the coming decade. This low key approach might envisage such goals as: (1) to encourage systematic research by local institutions on public attitudes on these arms control questions, (2) to stage a series of small seminars off of USG premises at which U.S. views can be discussed, (3) to develop a computerized arms control information base for sharing with experts in the country, (4) to publish and distribute a quarterly arms control “portfolio” containing copies of major policy statements and journal articles, and (5) to subsidize travel and participation by specialists from the country in arms control related seminars conducted by private organizations in the United States.

VII. Research:

One element in this program should be systematic and periodic surveys by ICA of opinion in key foreign countries on central issues of arms control, disarmament, and national security. Although soundings of mass opinion may be useful on certain broad topics, such as MBFR or SALT in Western Europe, the primary focus of the research effort should be informed elite opinion, for which more detailed or nuanced questioning should be possible. Evidence from such surveys of mass and elite opinion could be integrated with media reporting to provide current profiles of national and regional opinion. Periodic surveys, beginning early in the program, reflecting changes in attitudes would be useful both to U.S. policy makers and to those charged with implementing and adapting the ongoing public diplomacy initiative.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 9, International Communication Agency: 9–12/78. Confidential. Aaron, signing for Brzezinski, sent the memorandum to Vance, Brown, McIntyre, Warnke, and Reinhardt under a September 15 covering memorandum, indicating that the report constituted the final report of the Interagency Committee. Aaron requested the addressees to submit comments and approval of the report to the NSC no later than September 25. (Ibid.)
  2. See Document 134.
  3. The JCS representative on the Committee advocated a cautious approach to initiatives regarding SALT and CTB due to the sensitivity and dynamics of the negotiations, and further recommended full interagency discussion of these issues prior to embarking on any related programmatic activity. Additionally, he considers other arms control and disarmament issues to be of no less importance than SALT and CTB, and as such they should receive equal priority for the short run as well as the longer term. [Footnote is in the original.]
  4. See footnote 4, Document 132.
  5. The second UN Special Session on Disarmament took place in 1982.
  6. During his June 30, 1977, news conference, the President announced that the United States “should not continue with deployment of the B–1, and I am directing that we discontinue plans for production of this weapons system.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 1197)
  7. See footnote 4, Document 143.
  8. On June 8, 1979, White House Deputy Press Secretary Rex Granum announced that Carter “had decided that we will pursue a full-scale M–X.” (American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977–1980, pp. 124–125)
  9. Reference is to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow in July 1968. On July 1, 1968, during a ceremony in the East Room of the White House, Johnson made a statement endorsing the treaty; Rusk and Foster signed the treaty on behalf of the United States. Johnson transmitted the treaty to the Senate on July 9, and the Senate gave its consent to the agreement on March 13, 1969. Following ratification by the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 40 other states, the treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970.
  10. See footnote 2, Document 138.