Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

366. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, February 2, 1980, 0011Z

1045. Subject: Andean Pact Military Assistance to El Salvador. Ref: (A) San Salvador 703² (B) State 028294.³

1. S–Entire Text

2. I called on Foreign Minister Zambrano this afternoon (February 1) to express our strong concern that in view of developments in El Salvador it was imperative that the GOV decide as soon as possible on its participation in the proposed multilateralization of military assistance to the junta. Zambrano responded that the situation was extremely worrisome, and that Ambassador Cardozo had reported on his recent visit there in very somber terms. The question was, how can the military aid be furnished? It was clear that it would require a Presidential decision as far as Venezuela was concerned, he said. When I emphasized that time was short to coordinate any possible multilateral efforts, and that we were on the eve of the two-week trip that the President and he are making to the Middle East, Zambrano said he was not sure the President would have time to focus on the proposal before departing this week-end. According to Zambrano, President Herrera has suspended all audiences and is concentrating exclusively on the preparations for the trip. Zambrano recommended that I follow-up with Cardozo who was back from his visit.

3. I was able to pursue the matter with Cardozo (who was in the Ministry working with the Ambassador of Colombia on how the proposal should be presented to the Governments of Colombia and Venezuela). Cardozo said that on the basis of his visit, he judged the political situation to be so grave that he would not give the present junta more than thirty days of life, unless it receives strong outside support. He said he expected to see President Herrera tonight to propose Venezuela’s participation in the military assistance effort. If the President agrees and if active military personnel are sent, it will require the approval of the Senate, or at least of the Interim Comision Delegada, which could be time-consuming. On the other hand, a possible alternative might be to locate suitable retired military personnel willing to accept the assignment plus a few selected security people and Copei Party activists. He said he would have to look further into the legal implications. He plans to talk tomorrow to ex-Presidents Betancourt and Caldera to assure Herrera bipartisan support. The Venezuelans would be political advisers and intelligence trainers and this latter skill is badly needed, according to Cardozo, who claimed that the GOS and the Salvadorean Armed Forces have no basic intelligence information about what is happening in the country. Cardozo said he had to go to Washington on Sunday, February 3 but would hope to get President Herrera’s approval to return by February 7 to take a small hand-picked group to Salvador. Colombia’s contribution (if the GOC agrees) would be five or six instructors in the area of counter-guerrilla training. The Ambassador said he plans to go to Bogota to present the proposal to President Turbay and the Foreign Minister on February 8. I urged him to go sooner.

4. I said we strongly supported the multilateral effort, and explained the importance of other groups going before our MTT.⁴ I said this seemed to me to be the time for the Andean countries, or at least Venezuela and Colombia, to stand up and be counted. The time to do something is now. Both of my interlocutors agreed on the urgency and the broader significance of the Salvadoren struggle. Cardozo said all of Central America will be put at risk if Salvador falls to the radicals. He did not think Honduras and Guatemala could long hold out under those circumstances, and the threat to Panama and even Costa Rica would be serious indeed. The Colombian Ambassador agreed.

5. Cardozo has promised to brief me tomorrow on the results of his meeting with the President. I detect an air of caution on the part of the Foreign Minister in discussing this matter. He is clearly leaving it to Cardozo and the President. Cardozo is seized of the issue and is not inclined to bury his head in the sand. But he has only one more day to persuade Herrera before the Middle East trip. I will work on this tomorrow full day.⁵

Luers

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/79-3/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. Dated January 31. The Embassy reported on the visit to El Salvador of the Andean Pact mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800055-0237)
3. Dated February 1. The Department repeated San Salvador 712, January 31, in which the Embassy reported that the Venezuelan delegation “had agreed in concept to provide military and anti-subversive training to Salvadoran armed forces.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800002-0575)
4. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XV, Central America, Document 406.
5. In telegram 1049 from Caracas, February 2, Luers reported that Cardozo had called “to say that he had gotten a green light for his plan from President Herrera,” and that they had “agreed on about 8 or 10 names of trusted active military officers (3 or 4) and civilians (4 to 6). The President has charged his special foreign policy adviser Margarita Palacios to work with Cardozo to have a team ready to go to Salvador probably a week from Monday.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/79-3/80)