Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

367. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, February 9, 1980, 1640Z

1350. Subject: Venezuelan Assistance to Salvador. Ref: Caracas 1317.²

1. Secret–Entire Text

2. Cardozo and I met for an hour this morning. He showed extreme frustration from the fact that apparently as I had suspected, Calvani has put a temporary roadblock in Cardozo’ plans. Since the plan was between Cardozo and the President and no one else except for Margarita Palacios knew about it, the Acting President, who is now out of Caracas, does not feel he can countermand Calvani’s more fuzzy and cautious approach.

3. Cardozo said that he had a long unpleasant conversation yesterday with Calvani in which Calvani said that Cardozo could not, as an Ambassador, represent COPEI to the PDC in Salvador and that the Congress would be outraged at the presence of a military mission in Salvador. Calvani was also worried about the US involvement and about the public image of Venezuela. Calvani, therefore, is planning to take to Salvador on Monday³ two retired generals (General Sucre Figuerela and General Araque). They will spend four or five days in Salvador giving some “courses” in political action and preparing another “report” for the President. Moreover, two other military officers have already gone to Salvador from the Ministry of Defense to prepare their own report. Cardozo, meanwhile, will not go as planned but has his team of three military officers and four civilians ready to depart whenever he can reconfirm the President’s instruction which may not be until Herrera returns on February 15. Cardozo’s proposal on how to get around congressional concern is to characterize his group as a study team which will work with the Salvador Government for an “extended” period of time to examine their needs. Cardozo says he is fully prepared to go before Congress and defend his mission on that basis.

4. Cardozo clearly was furious at the handwringing indecisiveness of his government and party. He said President Herrera however fully understands and supports Cardozo’s plan and also fully understands the US intentions to support with MTT’s. Cardozo plans to lunch tomorrow with the Acting President, Montes de Oca, and the Minister of the Presidency, Gonzalo Garcia Bustillos, who thus far know very little about the situation. I have been unable to get to them the last three days since they have been out of town or incommunicado. Cardozo hopes he can turn the Acting President around or convince him to seek instructions from President Herrera.

5. We are at a critical stage. In terms of US-Venezuela relations, the top level political structure of this government must appreciate what they are getting into by sending this group to Salvador. But Herrera and Cardozo clearly have a commitment to make this Christian Democratic junta work. They also have apparently made a commitment to try to help save the Salvador situation against heavy odds. Others in the COPEI Party who are less familiar with our policy and the problems of Salvador, are characteristically cautious and trying to scuttle this effort.

6. Action requested: Given this background I, therefore, request instructions immediately for me to talk with the Acting President tomorrow morning (he returns to Caracas on Sunday) prior to or immediately following his lunch with Cardozo, along the following lines:

—The situation in Salvador is at a critical stage and the Government needs immediate political and military advice on how to proceed (expand these talking points as desired).

—Venezuela’s plan as originally designed by President Herrera and Ambassador Cardozo is a major element in an assistance program to Salvador that would include support from Spain, Colombia, and other countries.

—Once such assistance is provided the US is prepared to provide technical support to the Salvador National Guard, particularly in the important area of communications and transportation.

—US Government at the highest level urges the President of Venezuela to proceed with his plan on an urgent basis.

7. Please provide me these instructions by flash cable. If I cannot use them with Montes de Oca, I will do so with Garcia Bustillos as soon as possible.

Luers

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/79-3/80. Secret; Flash; Nodis.
2. Dated February 8. Luers reported on the political divisions in Venezuela and within the COPEI party, and on the disagreement between Cardozo and Calvani, over how Venezuela should proceed with assistance to the junta in El Salvador. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/79-3/80)
3. February 10.