Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela¹

Washington, August 15, 1979, 2350Z

213816. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With President Herrera.

1. Entire Contents Confidential.

2. Summary: In Quito for the Roldos inauguration,² Secretary Vance, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Vaky and Robert Pastor, met with President Herrera and Foreign Minister Zambrano on August 11. Discussions primarily dealt with U.S. and Venezuelan views on Nicaragua, other Central American countries, and the Caribbean.

A. Nicaragua and Central America. Herrera expressed concern over the future of Nicaragua and Central America, but said that democracy can still be encouraged in Nicaragua and aid should be provided promptly. He recommended that GNR military aid requests be answered positively, and said the GOV will consider providing military assistance. Since U.S. legal requirements preclude aid to police, Herrera agreed to look for a formula to provide police assistance. Herrera was pessimistic about Nicaraguan moderates, commenting that potential moderate leaders have no independent power base and are fearful of the FSLN. Still, he hopes reinstitution of press freedom will help. The Secretary informed Herrera the GNR delegation had told him press freedom will be reestablished in a week.³ The Secretary and President Herrera agreed that all democratic nations and groups should be encouraged to work for change in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.

B. Caribbean. Herrera said the Caribbean is vital to Venezuelan interests, and aid should be provided to avoid totalitarian regimes coming to power in mini-states in that region. The Secretary said he will soon consult with Herrera and others on the Caribbean issues.

C. Cuba. Herrera thinks the Cubans will be “cautious” in Nicaragua. The Secretary informed Herrera that we have conveyed our views on Central America to the Cubans and the Soviets. FonMin Zambrano said he will attend the Havana non-aligned meeting only if he is granted observer status with the right to speak. End summary.

3. Memorandum of Conversation August 11, 1979

Participants

Secretary Vance

Assistant Secretary Vaky

Robert Pastor

Malcolm R. Barnebey (notetaker)

Venezuelan President Luis Herrera Campins

Foreign Minister Jose Alberto Zambrano

4. President Herrera said he welcomed seeing Secretary Vance at this inauguration, which marked the rare event of a de facto regime peacefully turning over power to an elected constitutional regime. He said he hopes Peru and Bolivia will reach a more stable, democratic status next year. He said Nicaragua also exemplifies an opening to democracy, and while the “Southern Cone” is “harder” than ever, Brazil represents a most important opening to an eventual return to a democratic system. Secretary Vance agreed that the Ecuadorean inauguration is important, and hoped it augurs well for similar evolution in other countries.

5. Herrera then discussed Venezuela’s view of recent Central American and Caribbean developments. He said he is concerned over the direction Nicaragua may go, and how events there will affect Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. He said he is concerned, too, over possible repercussions in Costa Rica and Panama. He said he has concluded that—in view of the announcement of permission for a non-government press, and the continuing prestige and influence of the Catholic Church—democracy in Nicaragua can still be encouraged, and aid should be provided promptly for that country’s reconstruction. The Secretary agreed that both humanitarian and reconstruction aid should be provided to help heal the wounds that country has suffered. He said the Nicaraguan delegation the previous day had questioned why the U.S. is only providing aid through the Red Cross and not directly,⁴ and added he would look at this question upon his return to Washington. He said he was inclined to use both channels for U.S. assistance, and asked Herrera to comment on this. Herrera replied that both channels seem indicated, and aid to the Red Cross also serves to build support for that agency’s prestigious moderate leader, Ismael Reyes. Herrera commented that the Red Cross still has some autonomy, but that the problem he sees is that all aid is being provided and distributed without priorities or planning. He said it would be an error merely to send money and goods; rather, technical missions should accompany this aid—not to set priorities for Nicaragua but to assure that aid is administered well and in a non-political manner.

6. Herrera said that the FSLN commanders are now engaged in filling key power positions in the Government rather than in pressing for ideological rigidity in Government policies. He said the moderate civilian opposition previously had only an anti-Somoza goal, but their other goals were and are diffused—with the civilians in the GNR making little or no consistent efforts to build a political base. Herrera said conservatives and others are in disarray, although reinstitution of press freedom may help. He also made the point that Nicaragua’s “pluralism” will depend for the most part on the will of the FSLN commanders. The Secretary said the GNR delegation had told him that press freedom will be reestablished “in eight days”. Herrera replied he hoped this would be the case.

7. Assistant Secretary Vaky said we have seen some signs of renewed activity by the conservatives, by the private sector through COSEP and by the AIFLD-affiliated cuts. He asked how moderates could be encouraged to act, and if fear of the FSLN inhibited such actions. Herrera commented that Nicaragua moderates, such as the Christian Democrats with whom Herrera’s Copei is related, have gone from fear of Somoza to fear of the Sandinistas. He observed that despite outside support the civilians have never developed leaders who could build an independent power base. He said he had tried to build up the moderates’ morale, but instead they only awaited the FSLN commanders’ decisions. Only a few, such as Nicaraguan human rights leader Jose Esteban Gonzales and dissident liberal Ramiro Sacasa, did not give up the struggle for leadership of the anti-Somoza opposition.

8. Herrera then chided the U.S. for slighting Latin America, focussing its attention more, say, on Asia and Africa. He also questioned what he termed the U.S. inclination to support dictatorial regimes, often seen by Latin Americans as merely a device to protect U.S. corporate interests. He acknowledged that the situation has changed, particularly due to U.S. emphasis on protection of human rights, and Latin American dictatorships have come to feel they have less support from the U.S.

9. He said other problems in defending democracy in the area result from frequent disagreement between the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic sectors, and the notion that only rich countries can afford democracy. As an example, he said Caribbean mini-republics often look to Marxist or Castro-type solutions because they consider that they lack the resources needed to pay for democratic solutions. Herrera said he had welcomed Mrs. Carter’s statement in Puerto Rico about U.S. interest in the Caribbean,⁵ but he had seen no follow-up by the U.S.—or by Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela—to promote economic and social development in the area. He said that Trinidad and the countries to the north are vital to Venezuela’s interests and should be aided so as to avoid becoming totalitarian states.

10. Returning to the subject of Central America, Herrera said the democratization of the Andean Group nations and of Nicaragua will have great impact in that region. He said he is particularly worried over Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, whose Governments all had close ties to Somoza. Efforts should be made, Herrera said, to encourage existing democratic organizations. He said that the leftist forces have no electoral strength and must rely on guerrilla warfare and terrorist acts. He said the hemisphere democracies must find a way—including through the OAS and regional groups like the Andean Pact—to press for a democratic opening in these countries. Otherwise, he said, they will go the same way as Nicaragua. El Salvador’s military regime could, for example, be pressed to respect the results of its municipal elections scheduled for early in 1980.

11. The Secretary said he is in general agreement with Herrera’s views on the relationship between the U.S. and Latin America, and on problems in Central America and the Caribbean. He said the U.S. has given more attention to problems in other parts of the world, but that the Carter administration—with the Panama Canal Treaty and human rights issues—has paid increased attention to Latin America.

12. Regarding Nicaragua, Secretary Vance said both countries should act to help that country get back on its feet. He said the observation that Nicaraguan moderates may fear the FSLN commanders is probably correct, but that the remedy for this is for people in the democracies with like interests to develop more ties to Nicaraguan moderates—in business, trade, and other areas—and the sooner the better.

13. The Secretary then asked for Herrera’s views on these points:

—How can we best coordinate our efforts to foster progress in Nicaragua?

—Should the U.S. respond positively to military aid requests?⁶ If we decline, the GNR may turn to other sources. If we agree, how should we provide military and police assistance? Could the Andean Group countries help meet such requests for assistance?

—Regarding Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, how can we best cooperate to seek the opening to democracy which Herrera described? In El Salvador, especially, time is short.

14. Regarding the Caribbean, the Secretary said the U.S. has also been concerned over mini-states with too little administrative ability and too few resources to enable them to survive. The Secretary said we have worked on this problem, and hope to complete our analysis by next month. He said he would want to consult with Herrera and with others as to how next to proceed. Fortunately, he said, it is not yet too late to undertake such tasks in the Caribbean and to coordinate our aid efforts there.

15. Answering the Secretary’s points, Herrera recommended:

—That military aid requests be answered positively and said that if the GNR follows up its earlier tentative request the Venezuelans will consider providing military assistance, personnel, etc. to help orient and advise the Nicaraguan armed forces.

—That to help bring about democratic change in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, both countries might begin in Honduras, and through internal pressures in all three—but not pressures from outside the area—to influence the military regimes to adopt reforms which will lessen present and future popular tensions.

16. Assistant Secretary Vaky asked if Venezuela could not help advise El Salvador with respect to its electoral process. Herrera replied that Foreign Minister Zambrano had looked into this possibility and Venezuela may send a group to visit El Salvador to explore possible assistance. Vaky added that perhaps this help might be provided in such a way that no single foreign country would be seen as intervening in El Salvador’s domestic electoral affairs. Herrera added that to obtain a democratic opening in these countries the Church, through its bishops and the Regional Ecclesiastical Conference, can work for moderating changes, as can the Venezuelan and other Christian Democratic and Social Democratic Parties of the region. Zambrano emphasized that the governments in the three countries must first be convinced to adopt reforms and then other moderating changes can be encouraged by outside governments. Vaky observed that the military regimes and economic oligarchies in the area will be difficult to persuade to take such steps. Vaky quoted El Salvadoran President Romero as saying his regime would move toward reforms, but should not be pushed into them by outside pressures. Herrera commented that many of these regimes’ generals were U.S.-trained, suggesting that change might be urged upon the military regimes through this route.

17. Vaky then returned to the question of how to mobilize other nations’ efforts. Herrera opined that even Mexico might be urged to help, on the basis that they want others, most notably the U.S., to stay out of Central American affairs. The Secretary asked how the U.S. can help without appearing to be interfering in those countries’ domestic affairs. Herrera replied that much depends on how the U.S. describes its intentions, which Latin Americans frequently see as solely the protection of U.S. economic interests. He said that Cuba’s influence, particularly in the Caribbean, is not so much due to its military strength as to what it says and does on assistance matters—training people, providing doctors, etc. He said Venezuela can make concessions on oil deliveries to Caribbean mini-states, but the Cubans offer to send “400 teachers.” He said that the U.S. in time could come to be seen as a friendly country, even though economic or other disputes remain. Herrera continued that when opportunities arise, such as this inauguration of a democratic regime in Ecuador, the U.S. President should be present, and this fact would far outweigh the effect of a few “Yanqui go home” signs. He said the presence of Mrs. Carter and the Secretary in Quito was helpful in encouraging democratizing trends in Latin America.

18. Assistant Secretary Vaky asked for views on Cuba’s strategy, and how we should react. He asked what Zambrano would seek to achieve at the Havana Non-Aligned Movement meeting. Zambrano said he would go only if he was granted “observer” status with the right to speak at the meeting. Of the Andean Group countries Peru and Bolivia would be active participants, Colombia is considering a more active role, and Ecuador is hurrying to open relations with Cuba. Thus, Zambrano said, the Andean Group is constructing closer links to Cuba. Herrera asked the Secretary about U.S. relations with Cuba. Secretary Vance responded that in view of Cuban activities in Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere little had been accomplished since the two countries had opened interest sections in each other’s capitals. He said that except for Cuba’s release of prisoners little if any improvement has taken place in U.S.-Cuban relations.

19. Herrera continued that his government had not completed their review of Venezuelan policy toward Cuba because other issues had taken precedence. Unlike the U.S., Venezuela has not designed any global strategy for dealing with Cuba. For us, he said, “frictions don’t exist” with Cuba over African issues, and, unlike the 1960s, at the present time Cuba poses no aggressive threat to Venezuela. What Venezuela has, as a consequence, is relations “at a distance” with Cuba.

20. Assistant Secretary Vaky asked whether Herrera believed Cuba would push hard to seize control of Nicaragua. Herrera answered that he thinks the Cubans will be “cautious,” citing as an example the July 26 speeches in Havana of Castro and the GNR delegation—“Castro’s speech was less radical than theirs.” He stressed that Venezuela would also object to having “enemy” government under Cuba’s tutelage close to his country’s borders.

21. The Secretary stated that—whatever the Cubans’ objectives—we have conveyed to them our views on Central America. He said we have also done this to the Soviets. We warned the Soviets of the consequences of any aggressive actions in the region. The Secretary added that while to date we have received no response to either demarche, we expect to receive them soon. He said that others with Cuban contacts, such as Mexico and Panama, should likewise express their views. These countries might have more impact on the Cubans than we do; for our part we would expect to exert greater influence on the Soviets.

22. Ambassador Vaky asked Herrera once again how to harness other countries in this effort. Pastor mentioned that the Andean Group countries, now that more of them are becoming democratic, could make a useful contribution. Herrera said efforts of many, including the Andean Group, should be joined in this effort, including the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Panama and Barbados. He added that in Panama itself a democratic opening is a possibility, and that others should seek to help President Royo gain stature in spite of Torrijos’ predominant influence. Herrera said the Andean Group would seek closer ties to influence Panamanian developments, for instance while he and others are attending the October 1 Canal Ceremonies. (He said the Andean Group is particularly interested in establishing marketing and storage arrangements in Panama.)

23. Assistant Secretary Vaky returned to the subject of military assistance to Nicaragua, which Tomas Borge suggested informally to Ambassador Pezullo. Vaky said our legal restrictions preclude any U.S. assistance to police. Nevertheless there is a need for such assistance (vehicles, police experts, etc.), and asked if Venezuela and other Andean Group countries could provide it. He said Panama has a modest program there, but more is required. Herrera said Venezuela’s aid would have to come from its own National Guard, which he said is an objectionable name for police to Nicaraguans, but agreed to look for a formula to provide police assistance. Asked further if other Andean Group countries might also contribute, Herrera said he would consult with his staff in this regard.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS Memcons 1979. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information immediate to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts. Drafted by Barnebey and Butcher; cleared by Pastor, Bremer and in S/S-O; approved by Vaky.
2. See Document 284 and footnote 2, Document 285.
3. A memorandum of conversation for the meeting with the GRN delegation was not found.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XV, Central America, Document 301.
5. Presumably a reference to Rosalynn Carter’s October 11, 1977, speech in Dorado, Puerto Rico. (“Carter in New Bid For Canal Backing, New York Times, October 12, 1977, p. 9; John M. Goshko, “U.S. is Pressing New Effort to Aid Caribbean Economy,” Washington Post, October 23, 1977, p. 134)
6. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XV, Central America, Document 302.