97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand1
243938. For the Ambassador. Subject: (S) US-SRV Dialogue. Ref: State 219884.2
1. (S–Entire text).
2. As discussed during your visit to Washington, Department wishes to respond in Bangkok to the Vietnamese on their presentation on Kampuchea in New York with Ambassador McHenry and John Negroponte.3 You should call on SRV Ambassador Hoang Bao Son, or in his absence, the Charge, and make points in paragraph below. You should leave behind an aide memoire to assure that the nuances of this message will be accurately delivered to Hanoi.
3. Talking Points:
—As you are undoubtedly aware, UN Ambassador Donald McHenry and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Negroponte have met in New York twice recently with Vietnam’s UN Ambassador Ha Van Lau to discuss the question of Kampuchea. In those meetings, which took place August 1 and 15, the U.S. side made a presentation of our views on how we might proceed to search for a solution which would reconcile the interests of all the parties involved and which would permit the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and self-determination for the Khmer people. We also discussed at some length the four point proposal publicized in Vientiane July 18. Ambassador Lau provided your government’s response August 15. My government would appreciate your conveying the following points to your government regarding your response made in New York.
—We have studied carefully your government’s response and regret to find that you are willing only to treat the Kampuchean problem narrowly as regularization of the Thai-Kampuchea border. We regard the border problems as symptoms of the central issues of foreign invasion and occupation of Kampuchea and the denial to the Khmer people of their right to self-determination.
—In reviewing your government’s response, we share your stated objective of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, but these principles [Page 346] cannot be realized if the Khmer people are not allowed to choose their own course. Peace and stability cannot be built on the sacrifice of Kampuchea’s sovereignty.
—Vietnam’s views on historical solidarity and the unity of the Indochinese nations cannot obscure the fact that Kampuchea is not being allowed to exercise self-determination. Self-determination is impossible as long as 200,000 foreign troops occupy Kampuchea.
—Moreover, the presence of your troops in Kampuchea, particularly along the Thai-Khmer border, continues to constitute a threat to Thai security and territory and to regional stability.
—We are willing to work with Vietnam and all other interested parties to seek a comprehensive political settlement, one feature of which would ensure that the Pol Pot regime could not reestablish control in Phnom Penh. However, we find nowhere in your government’s response any indication that Vietnam is willing to work with other concerned parties to deal with the entire range of related Kampuchean issues.
—We would also remind the Vietnamese Government that it is their actions within Kampuchea which are risking great power involvement in the region, and repelling those who could be your natural friends in Southeast Asia. Your unwillingness thus far to seek a negotiated solution in Kampuchea encourages the very trends over which you profess vehement concern. In fact, Vietnam’s actions are provoking increased Chinese interest in the region, and greater dependence on Vietnam’s part on the Soviet Union. In this connection, we recall the words of your late President Ho Chi Minh that “nothing is more precious than freedom and independence.” Vietnam’s actions are jeopardizing Vietnam’s own freedom and independence and preventing the peaceful construction of all the countries of Indochina.
—We do not oppose a Vietnam which is strong at home and progressing. We do oppose those activities elsewhere in Indochina and the region which foster instability. We are ready to work with you as well as all other concerned parties to reverse this cycle of confrontation, war, famine and the squandering of precious human and material resources. Your response thus far does not encourage us to believe that your government is prepared to deal seriously with all the issues so that we can construct a settlement which does not infringe on the interests of any nation or people in the region.4
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 74, Thailand, 7/80–1/81. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to USUN and the White House. Printed from the copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- See Document 95.↩
- See Documents 94 and 95.↩
- Telegram 41983 from Bangkok, September 16, reported that Abramowitz passed along the U.S. message to the Vietnamese Ambassador on September 16 and left him with the aide-mémoire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870143–0719)↩