96. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts1
226408. Subject: Meeting With Khmer Resistance Figure.
1. (S–Entire text).
2. Summary: Khmer resistance leader and KPNLF Vice President Chhean Vam called on DAS Negroponte this week to provide his views on the situation in Kampuchea and to discuss his concerns about Kampuchea in the forthcoming UNGA. He urged the US to vote to maintain DK credentials, despite the KPNLF’s adamant opposition to joining forces with the DK. Vam sought military and humanitarian support, but was assured only that US humanitarian assistance to the Khmer would continue. End Summary.
3. Son Sann’s Khmer People’s National Liberation Front, (KPNLF), Vice President Chhean Vam called August 19 on DAS John Negroponte and EA/VLK Director Desaix Anderson to discuss Kampuchea. Vam stressed concern about the Khmer credentials issue in the 35th UNGA. He worried that the empty seat formula might be adopted, partly because of political pressures which he thought might affect the positions of the US and UK, and thereby result in steady slide toward acceptance of Heng Samrin’s credentials. He contended that Hanoi’s known intention of having the Heng Samrin regime hold elections next year is designed to allow the Heng Samrin authorities and Vietnamese to claim that the regime having been elected by the Khmer people was entitled to the UN seat. Elections held under the supervision of PAVN would hardly represent the will of the Khmer. He urged the US to continue to vote for the DK credentials as an expression of opposition to the Vietnamese invasion and the regime the Vietnamese had installed. Secondly Vam urged US to help establish the principle concerning an evolution of Khmer UNGA credentials that not only must elections permit Khmer self-determination, but also that the elections must be held under the supervision of the UN or the great powers. During discussion, Vam noted that latter might be accomplished either through modification of the UN resolution on Kampuchea, or by other unspecified means.
4. Vam acknowledged the seeming contradiction of his advocacy of a vote to maintain the DK credentials despite the fact that the KPNLF [Page 343] has steadfastly refused to cooperate in a united front with the DK, but said that it was essential to protest the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and prevent legitimization of the Heng Samrin regime.
5. He said that the Chinese had put tremendous pressure on the KPNLF to form a united front with the DK, but this was impossible. Many KPNLF fighters have been fighting the Khmer Rouge for years, before and after April 1975, and they are unwilling to join forces with the DK, who killed members of almost every Khmer family. Moreover, the DK has no future because of the way they treated the people. They can never again establish a popular base of support.
6. Vam also asked if it would be possible for the KPNLF to open an information office in the US. They plan to open such offices in France, the UK, and Canada as well. The Quai had told them to go ahead and not seek any formal authorization. London also apparently has agreed. Vam also hopes to open an office in Canada. We promised to look into the matter and contact them later. Vam said that despite authorization given by the KPNLF Congress which met in Kampuchea in April, they had no intention of forming a government anytime in the near future.
7. In describing the conditions in Kampuchea now for the KPNLF, Vam said that following severe difficulties with the RTG in the spring, at Chinese behest, he said, the Thais were now treating them very helpfully. Adequate food supplies from the IO’s and VOLAGs are reaching Ban Sangae with about 30,000 people, north of Aranyaprathet, and in Sok San with 3,500 Khmer, south of Pailin. Smaller enclaves opposite Thailand’s Surin province have difficulties because Thais fear that supplies end up with the CPT which, Vam said, operates in the Dangrek range.
8. Vam thanked the US for humanitarian support. He recalled that we had told him in Bangkok last April that the US could provide only humanitarian assistance; provision of military equipment at that time was not possible. KPNLF needs for arms and ammunition were great and he hoped if not now at some future date the US would help with weaponry and ammunition or funds. There was no alternative to armed resistance to drive the Vietnamese out. China supports the DK and the Vietnamese support Heng Samrin. Nobody supports us, he said. He said that the KPNLF had 10,000 fighters, and could count on perhaps two thousand more from the other Khmer Serei groups. DK has between 25,000–30,000, despite their claims of 60,000 guerrillas and 50,000 militia. Several thousand DK soldiers came recently from the refugee holding center at Sakaeo. Heng Samrin has 15,000. DK has no base of popular support because of its previous policies and practices, and the Khmer people overwhelmingly favor the KPNLF’s Sereikar, he claimed. There were in effect no limits on the number of troops who would join, if the KPNLF had arms.
[Page 344]9. Vam would not verify Son Sann’s purported visits to Beijing. He said that Son Sann is currently in France, but will be going to Tokyo for talks with the Japanese. (Vam noted separately that private Japanese organizations have agreed to provide the KPNLF with a radio transmitter so that they can announce their own programs and successes, which heretofore, the DK with its good radio system has been able to claim.) Vam, who has been in France since early May, then London, is going to Canada then return to France and Western Germany and possibly other Western European capitals before returning to Kampuchea.
10. Vam said that the KPNLF had not recently been in touch with Prince Sihanouk or his entourage. Sihanouk has rejected their offers to become head of the KPNLF. Despite the Prince’s attitude, the door will remain open for joining forces, should he change his mind, Vam said.
11. DAS Negroponte thanked Vam for the visit. We welcomed the exchange. He told Vam that we would continue to provide humanitarian support. We are sympathetic with many of their ideals, but we cannot provide any military support. Many of us share personally the agony of Cambodia’s tragedy. We do not now see clearly a path for resolving the issues other than to provide humanitarian relief while awaiting a break in the political situation.
12. Comment: Vam was clearly pleased with the visit, even though we were able to respond to his requests only in a very limited way. Following the meeting Vam or his lieutenants talked with the press and told them of the meeting. We are prepared to confirm the fact that meeting took place on an if-asked basis. We intend, however, to down play any political significance which might be ascribed to the encounter, stressing the point that this was a meeting with representatives of group which shares our deep concern for the humanitarian situation in Cambodia.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Molander, Box 81, Refugees: (Khmer Rouge/Pol Pot). Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent to Bangkok, Beijing, Hong Kong, Paris, Tokyo, Ottawa, and London.↩