94. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts1
206686. Subject: US-SRV Meeting in New York. Ref: State 202297.2
1. (S–Entire text).
2. Summary: UN Ambassador Donald McHenry and DAS John Negroponte met Vietnamese Ambassador Ha Van Lau in New York August 1 for a review of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia and to make some comments on the Indochinese FonMins’ four point proposal concerning the Thai-Khmer border.3 U.S. side stressed search for peace, ASEAN and Thai security, political settlement on Kampuchea along lines of UNGA resolution, and concern about Soviet military presence in Indochina. We urged Vietnam to choose a constructive role in Southeast Asia and to address key issues of withdrawal of forces from Kampuchea and self-determination for the Khmer. Lau reiterated familiar Vietnamese positions charging U.S. collusion with China and Thailand in support of Democratic Kampuchea. Of interest in discussion of four point proposal, Lau described the proposals as conceptually a package, but said if progress was possible on elements of the package, it would still be possible to proceed. Action addressee posts may draw on this report to provide secret, close-hold background briefing for host governments on the talks. End Summary.
3. At our request, Ambassador McHenry and DAS Negroponte met with Vietnamese UN Ambassador Ha Van Lau in New York August 1 to review recent developments concerning Indochina, USG objectives and thoughts we have regarding the Indochinese four point proposal [Page 336] made in Vientiane July 18. Ambassador McHenry recalled Secretary Muskie’s message concerning Vietnam’s incursion into Thailand delivered to SRV FonMin Nguyen Co Thach June 26 through Ambassador Abramowitz in Bangkok,4 the ASEAN Kuala Lumpur meeting and the joint demarche to UN SG Waldheim urging that he play a more direct role in Khmer relief efforts.5
4. Ambassador McHenry outlined to Ambassador Lau U.S. objectives seeking peace and stability in Southeast Asia, support for ASEAN, development of mutually advantageous relations and communications between Vietnam and ASEAN states, and creation of a system of stable, independent states in the region. We made clear our concern about Thai security and our intention to stand by commitments to Thailand. We stressed support for survival of the Khmer people and nation. We seek an internationally accepted government in Kampuchea also acceptable to the Khmer people and regard both the Pol Pot and Heng Samrin regimes as unacceptable. We expressed concern about the access and buildup of Soviet forces in Indochina.
5. We expressed recognition of the legitimate interests of Vietnam for its security and in friendly relations with its neighbors. We stressed that Hanoi’s willingness to deal flexibly with these issues would be a major contribution and help permit Hanoi to play a constructive role in the region.
6. In this context, DAS Negroponte noted that we had studied the Indochinese FonMin proposals and sought elaboration of such issues as a DMZ, an international conference, etc. We commented that if by “irreversibility” Hanoi meant that Pol Pot could not return to power, we could agree emphatically, but if the Vietnamese mean that the key political and military issues of the Kampuchean question are not subject to discussion and negotiation, then it was difficult to see how the proposals represent a basis for discussion. In our view, we told Lau, the proposal attempts to promote recognition of the Heng Samrin regime and to address narrowly only Thai-Khmer border issues and not the questions of withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and the establishment of a government in Phnom Penh acceptable to the Khmer people. We also commented that we could not accept political preconditions for relief urgently needed by Kampuchea and stressed that progress on this point was essential regardless of our ability to move or not on some of the other issues.
7. Ambassador Lau promised to forward the U.S. presentation to his government for considered response, and he made extensive [Page 337] preliminary commentary. Most of his response represented familiar Vietnamese positions focusing on China’s “expansionist and hegemonist ambitions” as the source of tension in Southeast Asia. He accused the U.S. and Thailand of collusion with Beijing, aiding and abetting the survival of Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea (DK) forces. He asserted that China and Thailand have recently accelerated their efforts to feed, arm and infiltrate “remnant Pol Pot troops” into Kampuchea. Some refugee relief is actually funneled through Khmer Rouge military, he charged. Lau said that following the devastation of Kampuchea under Pol Pot, the Khmer needed time urgently to overcome basic food, housing, and medical needs. While “Vietnamese were tightening their belts to help the Khmer, Pol Pot forces were blowing up trains of relief supplies.”
8. Citing Hanoi’s leadership including FonMin Thach, Lau reiterated Vietnam’s commitment to respect Thailand’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In a separate context, he also recalled Vietnam’s commitment through treaties to aid Laos and Kampuchea, and stressed that Vietnam would honor those commitments.
9. Lau also referred to the closure of the Thai-Lao border, “arbitrarily,” he said, by the Thai.6 He described as “explosive” alleged Chinese attempts to foment disturbances on the Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Lao borders.
10. Lau spoke of discrepancy in the U.S. position declaring that we do not support the Pol Pot clique, but vote for their credentials in the General Assembly. He called on us to make our action in the UNGA consistent with our words. He also accused U.S. officials in Beijing of publicly calling for China to attack Vietnam, and noted that while we raise alarms often about the Thai-Khmer border, we say nothing of the massing of huge numbers of troops on the Sino-Vietnamese border.
11. Regarding the four points, Lau described the Indochinese FonMin proposals as serious. In his view, while the proposal was conceptually a package, if progress could be achieved on elements of the package, then we should proceed. Lau touched several times on the subject of “irreversibility” of the situation in Kampuchea in somewhat abstruse language. He declared that the Khmer people were entitled to the right of self-determination. With the toppling of Pol Pot “the Kampuchean people have taken their destiny in their own hands.” “They have stated that the situation is irreversible, and they are gradually consolidating their administration.” Any effort by the Thai, Chinese, or U.S. to change the situation in Kampuchea is in vain, he [Page 338] declared. A page of history has been turned. At one point, in discussing China’s and Vietnam’s difficulties, he noted that no nation, however sophisticated their weaponry, could long suppress another people. At another point, referring again to the Chinese threat to Vietnam, Lau asserted that the peace and security could not be obtained through the sacrifice of the peace and security of one party alone. He showed no evidence of appreciation of the irony of his statements.
12. In response, Ambassador McHenry noted that while both sides employed the same language in describing objectives, we disagreed on actions to achieve those objectives, and also on the sources of tensions in the region. Lau responded that if we disagree on the source of tension, it seems unlikely that we would be able to agree on objectives. If, however, we reach a consensus on the source of tension, he said, we should work to get rid of the source. DAS Negroponte objected to the characterization of U.S. policy as one of collusion with China. We form our policy on the basis of our own interests, Lau was told. He stressed to Lau that the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations was an historical fact and one which was in part a function of China’s emergence from its isolation. We are developing relations with China on their own merits. Negroponte also stressed to Lau that while Thai security and relief for the Khmer were the most urgent goals, other U.S. goals, such as a political settlement in Kampuchea were equally important.
13. Ambassador McHenry denied that we were deliberately feeding combatants on the border. Noting that relief supplies also leak to Heng Samrin combatants, he commented that we could not let the Khmer people starve in order to prevent a single grain of rice from getting to combatants, despite our policy of providing relief only to civilians. Mr. Negroponte also stressed that we had undertaken the cross border feeding only because thousands of starving Khmer had shown up at the border looking for food to survive. As soon as the administration in Phnom Penh could provide relief effectively, relief could be increased in that channel, and need would quite naturally decline on the border.
14. As a parting question, Mr. Negroponte asked Lau whether his comment that Vietnamese troops would leave Kampuchea the day the Chinese threat ended (and the Kampucheans so desired) referred to a Chinese threat in Kampuchea as Vietnam perceived it or also to the “threat” along the Sino-Vietnamese border. Both, Lau replied, “and in Laos too.”
15. Comment: Talks were cordial and comprehensive although Lau’s reaction was preliminary. No breakthrough was achieved, nor was one expected. We await a more considered response from Hanoi before reaching any definitive conclusions, although chances appear remote that Vietnamese will agree to discuss key issues affecting Kam [Page 339] puchea situation as we see them. Like the Indochinese FonMins’ statement, Lau attempted repeatedly to shift blame to China, the U.S. and Thailand for the region’s tensions and to focus on the narrow issue of the Thai-Khmer border as the only problem for negotiation. His statement that the proposal could be considered as a whole or as elements perhaps offers some grounds for further exploration, but overall there was no hint of genuine flexibility on the Vietnamese part.
6. DAS Negroponte briefed Australians and New Zealanders August 4 on the meeting, and will brief the ASEAN Washington Committee August 5. We also plan to brief the Japanese and Chinese.
- Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, POL–16 US-SRV Meeting NY, August 1, 1980. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by L. Desaix Anderson (EA/VLC); cleared by J. Willet and Seton Stapleton (S/S–O) and in substance by Melvyn Levitsky (IO/UNP); approved by Negroponte. Sent to Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Manila, Bangkok, Beijing, Tokyo, Canberra, Paris, and Wellington. Sent for information Immediate to Vientiane, Hong Kong, Moscow, and USUN.↩
- Telegram 202297 to several posts, July 30, instructed recipients to inform their host governments of the proposed Negroponte meeting with Ha Van Lau in New York that week. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870117–1996)↩
- The July 18 proposal by the Foreign Ministers of Laos, Vietnam, and Kampuchea, issued in Vientiane, called for the demilitarization of the Thai-Cambodian border, establishment of a Thai-Cambodian joint commission to agree on international control of the border, cooperation in resolving the refugee problem, and direct or indirect negotiations to solve outstanding problems. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, p. 326) Thailand rejected it as an attempt to weaken its sovereignty over its border. (Henry Kamm, “Cambodia Charges Thailand With Military Intrusions,” New York Times, July 27, 1980, p. 6)↩
- See Document 92.↩
- See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, p. 327.↩
- Thailand closed its border with Cambodia after the June 23 incursion of Vietnamese troops.↩