95. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts1
219884. Subject: Follow-Up Meeting With SRV Ambassador Ha Van Lau. Ref: State 206686.2
1. (S–Entire text).
2. Summary: In follow up meeting August 15 with UN Ambassador Donald McHenry and DAS John Negroponte, Vietnamese Ambassador Ha Van Lau responded to US presentation made August 1 (reftel) In repetitive, familiar fashion with no suggestion of substantive flexibility or willingness to negotiate the central issues concerning Kampuchea. Hanoi’s response continued to focus only on border issues, as embedded in the Indochinese FonMins’ four point proposal. Next opportunity to explore further Vietnamese positions will presumably be in New York in meeting during UNGA with SRV FonMin Thach by Thai FonMin Sitthi. US side also raised MIA/POW and Khmer relief issues. [Page 340] Action addressees may use this report to provide background briefing for host governments. End Summary.
3. Vietnamese Ambassador Lau August 15 provided response on Hanoi’s instructions to US presentation made in New York August 1. In his opening statement, Lau welcomed “any exchange of views aimed at promoting solutions for peace and stability in Southeast Asia on the basis of respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity for all the countries and political systems, based on non-interference in the internal affairs of each country and settlement of disputes by peaceful means.”
4. Lau then ran through a litany of well known positions concerning the situation in Kampuchea. He said that Hanoi’s position is well known. The Pol Pot clique has been abolished for all time. The Heng Samrin regime is the legal and legitimate representative of the Khmer people. “That is an irreversible fact, and no one is allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of Kampuchea.” PAVN troops would not remain in Kampuchea one day longer than the threat from China persisted and the Heng Samrin regime wished them to remain.
5. Lau confirmed that the four point proposal made by Indochinese FonMins in Vientiane could be discussed as a whole or in parts. Elaborating on the idea of an international conference, Lau made clear that the Vietnamese are proposing regional discussions by “concerned parties” i.e. Thailand, Heng Samrin regime reps, and the Vietnamese, either directly or through third parties, to reach agreement on only the points in the four point Vientiane proposal. Only subsequently, would the other non-regional powers, presumably including ourselves, convene an international conference to “confirm and guarantee” the agreements reached by the regional powers. Lau said that an international conference held before any resolution of problems by the involved parties of the region could not be successful.
6. Lau denied that the four point proposal was designed to obtain international, particularly Thai, recognition of the Heng Samrin regime. He said, nevertheless, “it is an undeniable fact that the People’s Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea is in control of the whole country and handling the domestic and foreign affairs of Kampuchea.”
7. Lau declined to define the scope of their DMZ proposal, but asserted that it must be on both the Thai and Khmer sides of the border. He contended that Thailand’s safehaven proposal provided only for the security of the Thai side of the border and not the Khmer side. He argued that a DMZ arrangement would not violate Thai sovereignty, since once the Thai authorities agree on a formula acceptable to them, there could be no question of violating their sovereignty. Negroponte commented that the concept of a DMZ in the four point proposal, as we understand it, would be unacceptable to Thailand since Thais would [Page 341] see any DMZ on Thai territory as a derogation of Thai sovereignty and since they do not consider Thailand to be at war with Kampuchea.
8. Lau said Vietnam “respected” US concern for the security of Thailand, and called for US concern and respect for the security of the Indochinese countries. He stated baldly, “the independence and sovereignty of none of the countries of the region should be sacrificed.” In this connection, he said that the US might make an important contribution to peace and stability in the region, if it is really motivated by goodwill.
9. In response, after agreeing to study his remarks further, the US side pointed out that Ambassador Lau’s exposition indicated that nothing in the interior of Kampuchea is subject to negotiation. Lau’s presentation, he was told, was understood as simply an elaboration of the four point proposal. We also noted that Thai and our opposition to dealing with the Heng Samrin regime was not narrowly a question of recognition, but because of the regime’s lack of any legitimacy, since it was installed and maintained in power by foreign military force.
10. We also raised two other issues, the relief effort and MIA’s/POW issues. On POW/MIA issues, we called for resumption and acceleration of efforts, which have been at a standstill since August 1978. Regarding relief, we noted that the Indochinese FonMins had called for discussions of ways to improve relief efforts, called attention to the Chairman’s statement concluding the May conference on Kampuchean relief,3 and urged discussions urgently with the IO’s. Discussions should address, among other things, use of domestic airports, direct relief flights to Phnom Penh, and increase of medical personnel allowed to serve in Kampuchea. Lau gave pro-forma responses on both these issues. He noted that senior UN officials have recently commented favorably on progress in relief through the Heng Samrin administration.
11. Comment: There was no hint of willingness to negotiate issues other than those contained in the four point proposal, although Lau indicated that Hanoi could be quite flexible on the procedural aspects of such discussions. By limiting the scope for a conference both substantively and to regional participation, Vietnamese are keeping the door closed on any meaningful settlement except on Vietnamese terms. This precludes progress for time being except perhaps on trying to reduce tensions on the border itself, such as through the prospective talks by the Vietnamese and Thai Foreign Ministers in New York, and the continuing dialogue with IO’s and UN on Kampuchean relief.
- Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, POL–16 US-SRV Meeting NY, August 1, 1980. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by L. Desaix Anderson (EA/VLC); cleared by Melvyn Levitsky (IO/UNP) and Jane E. Becker (S/S–O); approved by Negroponte. Sent to Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Manila, Singapore, Tokyo, Paris for Bigelow, Canberra, Wellington, Beijing, and Bangkok. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow, Hong Kong, USUN, Vientiane, the Mission in Geneva, and London.↩
- See Document 94.↩
- See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, p. 337–338.↩