89. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts1
149398. Subject: Negroponte-Ha Van Lau Meeting.
1. (S–Entire text).
2. Begin Summary: DAS Negroponte met with Vietnamese UN Ambassador Ha Van Lau 4 June in New York to discuss several issues in our bilateral relations: MIAs, orderly departure and Vietnamese charges of U.S. use of toxic chemicals, and to review Geneva Conference on Kampuchean relief.2 Ha Van Lau stonewalled all specific issues, but took initiative to restate Hanoi’s view of situation in Indochina, following essentially same line as Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach took in Bangkok.3 Addressees may share fact and content of meeting in context of what we envisage as regular general exchange of views on issues between us and Vietnamese. Department will be doing same here. End Summary.
3. In 4 June meeting at the Vietnamese UN Mission with Vietnamese UN Ambassador Ha Van Lau, DAS Negroponte reviewed status of MIA and ODP issues, discussed results of Geneva Conference on Kampuchean relief, and responded to Vietnamese memorandum on U.S. use of toxic chemicals.
4. After first informing Ha Van Lau of Secretary’s intention to attend ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur,4 Negroponte noted that in his March meeting with Ha Van Lau5 he had left several dossiers on particular MIA cases, had reiterated the suggestion that Lt. Col. Mather be permitted to go to Hanoi at an early opportunity to establish a channel of information on MIA questions, and had noted specifically that the report of 400 remains in Hanoi needed to be clarified. He stated that as of yet we have had no reaction from Hanoi.
5. Negroponte then turned to the Geneva Conference on Kampuchean relief, expressing regret that the Vietnamese had not participated. [Page 325] He drew Ha Van Lau’s attention to the summing-up statement of Australian Foreign Minister Peacock, noting that it summarized extremely well our point of view and the principal observations of the conference. He pointed out that the statement also listed some concrete ways in which the relief effort to the Khmer people could be improved, and left a copy of Peacock’s statement with Ha Van Lau.
6. On ODP Negroponte reviewed the past discussions between the U.S. and UNHCR, and Hanoi, discussed the status of the respective lists, and re-affirmed our willingness to interview people on the Vietnamese list with ties to the U.S. He stated that as far as we are concerned the next step is up to the Vietnamese, specifically to allow Mike Myers to proceed to Ho Chi Minh City at the earliest possible opportunity.
7. Negroponte concluded by referring to a Vietnamese memorandum on U.S. use of toxic chemicals in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia which SRV Embassy in Paris passed 22 January to Embassy Liaison Officer (Paris 02387 Notal).6 He reiterated our concern over reports that lethal gas has been used in Laos and Kampuchea. He rejected the Vietnamese contention in the memorandum that the U.S. used toxic chemicals and gases to kill civilians and to destroy the environment in Vietnam, and rejected Vietnamese claims for compensation for the use of chemical defoliants and herbicides. He stated that we recognize that some of the chemicals used in Vietnam for defoliation and as herbicides may have produced some adverse effects. He noted that a Vietnamese scientist recently visited the U.S. in a private capacity to discuss this issue. He said we were prepared to entertain a request for discussion between our respective scientific and technical experts and suggested that a contact for further exchanges be through respective liaison officials in Paris.
8. On the MIA issue Ha Van Lau responded that he had transmitted the U.S. information and requests to the Foreign Ministry and the interested offices in Hanoi but had not yet received any response.
9. On the Geneva Conference, he said that Vietnam had explained its position fully in the ECOSOC meeting and in its letter to the Secretary General.7 He said Vietnam opposed political conditions attached to humanitarian assistance and deplored the abuse of humanitarian assistance to interfere in the internal affairs of Kampuchea. He noted that the “initiator” of the idea of the humanitarian conference had made it [Page 326] clear that part of the motivation for the conference was political. He said that Hanoi would not participate in a political conference or one that did not include the PRK. In light of the results of the conference, he said, Hanoi believed that it had been correct in staying away. He observed that the conference did achieve a positive result in stimulating contributions, but stated that the convening of a pledging conference along the lines of the November conference last year in New York8 would have achieved the same result.
10. On the response to the Vietnamese memo on use of toxic chemicals, Ha Van Lau stated that he would relay our response to Hanoi. Speaking personally, he stated that he believed the specific concerns raised in Hanoi’s memo were well founded, commenting that he was speaking from personal experience from his investigations after the war.
11. On orderly departure, Ha Van Lau stated that he was not responsible for refugee affairs but that he would convey our views to Hanoi. On Mike Myers travel to Ho Chi Minh City, he stated that “I think he is in Hanoi, and I think he should proceed with the authorized authorities in Hanoi.”
12. Ha Van Lau then said he wanted to speak about U.S. policy and about the situation in Kampuchea. He spoke for roughly thirty-five minutes, making the following main points:
U.S. actions and policy
—Hanoi judged from the statements, activities, and actions of the U.S. toward Vietnam that the U.S. is continuing to “play the China card” and to support reactionary forces against the cause of the Kampuchea people.
—In addition, the U.S. in the international community has blocked international aid to Vietnam.
—Such actions and such an attitude on the part of the U.S. will only further complicate the relationship between our two countries and does not create a climate conducive to the resolution of the problems between us.
—On the contrary, such attitudes and actions work against the long-term U.S. interest.
Kampuchea
—Kampuchea is no longer an issue.
—After suffering the evils of the Pol Pot regime (which he reviewed at length) everything in Kampuchea has now returned to normal; people’s lives have been stabilized.
[Page 327]—It is clear that the source of instability in Kampuchea is the collusion between the U.S. and China; such actions are detrimental to U.S. interests in the region and to peace and stability in the region.
—The U.S. needs to acquire a really objective assessment of the factual situation in Indochina; i.e. that Kampuchea is irreversible, and the U.S. should have no illusions about changing the situation in Kampuchea to please China or in favor of the U.S.
—Relations between Vietnam and Kampuchea are simply a question of two sovereign and independent nations which have been united for a long time in defense of their sovereignty and independence.
—As soon as the threat of Chinese interference is withdrawn, Vietnamese troops will be immediately and totally withdrawn from Kampuchea.
13. In response Negroponte again expressed our regret that Vietnam did not attend the Geneva Conference and urged a positive Vietnamese response to the specific suggestions in Peacock’s statement.
14. He then stated that we obviously have serious disagreements about the source of instability in the region. He said he presumed Ha Van Lau was well aware of our recently stated views on these issues and would therefore not rebut each specific point. He did however stress that the U.S. pursues its own policy and interests in the region, and that these are focused on a strong and healthy relationship with ASEAN countries. It is for that reason, he said that the Secretary is going to Kuala Lumpur. He stressed we continue to support fully the ASEAN UNGA resolution9 as the basis for moving toward any political solution and for peace and stability in the region. He specifically rejected any implication of U.S. support to Pol Pot, noting that we have repeatedly made clear that we do not advocate the return of his regime, and that neither we, the international community nor the Khmer people could accept such an outcome. He stressed that our goal was the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and a political outcome in Kampuchea that would be decided by the Cambodian people.
14. Ha Van Lau concluded by discussing China, noting that China continues to threaten Vietnam with a second lesson. He observed that it would be no easy thing for the Chinese to attack Vietnam again because the Vietnamese are well prepared. He noted that China had invaded Vietnam twelve times in its history. He said that if China attacked again it will suffer an even more bitter defeat than last February and that any attack could result in unforeseeable consequences; the situations would be very serious. He said that the Chinese policy [Page 328] is one of adventurism and hegemonism and that the U.S. would be wise to understand it.
- Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, Box 17652, POL 16 US-SRV Meeting, NY, June 4, 1980. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Lyne; cleared by Holbrooke; approved by Negroponte. Sent to Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Manila, Jakarta, Beijing, Tokyo, Wellington, Canberra, and Paris. Sent for information to USUN and the Mission in Geneva.↩
- May 26–27. For a description of the meeting, see Yearbook of the Untied Nations, 1980, pp. 337–338.↩
- Presumably at the October 23 meeting with Holbrooke; see Document 64.↩
- June 25–26. See Document 146.↩
- See Document 87.↩
- Telegram 2378 from Paris, January 22, transmitted a Vietnamese memorandum alleging U.S. use of chemicals in Vietnam. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800038–0505)↩
- The April 26 letter objected to the convening of an international conference on Kampuchea without the agreement of Kampuchean officials. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, p. 336.↩
- November 5, 1979. See footnote 5, Document 67.↩
- Reference is to UN General Assembly Resolution 34/22. See footnote 3, Document 70.↩