146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia1
174009. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With ASEAN Foreign Ministers.
1. (S–Entire text).
2. Summary: Secretary’s June 28 public remarks2 during two hour session with ASEAN Foreign Ministers were well received and ASEAN praised U.S. for contributions to region as well as to individual ASEAN countries. All the Foreign Ministers stressed the importance with which their governments regard the issue of DK seating at the UN. Secretary said US had not made final decision on this issue. The high degree [Page 511] of attention to DK seating issue did not, however, affect the overall congeniality of the meeting. End Summary.
3. Opening of public portion of session by Philippines Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Tarentino focused largely on economic issues and desire of ASEAN to have greater support from U.S. in a wide variety of programs. While expressing gratitude for U.S. signing of agricultural planning center, Tarentino urged the U.S. to accelerate and expand the range of economic activities for development cooperation. Tarentino particularly called on U.S. to contribute to international dialogue on economic issues during upcoming UNGA.
4. On the political side, Tarentino urged the U.S. to continue focus on the problem of Vietnamese actions in Kampuchea, equating the situation in Afghanistan and Kampuchea3 as both the product of foreign occupation. The Philippines’ spokesman reiterated ASEAN’s decision to support the DK, urging that the U.S. support principles of international law and the UN Charter rather than concern itself with individuals. He concluded with a statement that failure to support the DK in the UN would severely weaken regional security.
5. Following the Secretary’s prepared statement (septel), Marshal Sitthi, on behalf of ASEAN, and the Secretary signed the agreement for the agricultural planning center. Sitthi afterwards commented that U.S. had established new principle of cooperation with ASEANs by not pushing its own ideas but rather listening to the interests of ASEAN.
6. With the closing of the public portion of the session, the ASEANs launched quickly and briskly into the question of DK seating at the UN. Malaysian Foreign Minister Rithauddeen stressed the importance of upholding principles in support of DK saying that we cannot stop recognizing DK rights in the UN without accepting the principles that superior powers can impose their will on inferior powers. He called on the U.S. to discuss the DK seating issue more openly with our non-Asian friends and allies, making the point that it was a world-wide problem of peace and stability and that it has the same import as the situation in Afghanistan. He argued it was clear that the policies of the Soviet Union were directly supportive of Vietnam and that Hanoi could not maintain its war without Soviet support.
7. In commenting briefly on other issues, Rithauddeen expressed appreciation for U.S. support for the movement of refugees from Malaysia and for the decision to support Kuala Lumpur as the site of the Rubber Council headquarters. He also urged that the U.S. assist in the [Page 512] conclusion of a tin agreement which would protect producers’ prices and consumers’ source of supply.
8. Singapore Foreign Minister Dhanabalan re-emphasized the Soviet’s role behind Hanoi’s attack on and occupation of Kampuchea. He requested verbal U.S. support for the Thai policy of repatriation of Khmer “refugees,” noting that this principle is as important as the principle of first asylum. He stated that additional support would give credibility to Thai efforts. Dhanabalan then requested U.S. support for ASEAN’s two joint statements.4 Indicating that he could understand that the U.S. was not able to openly pronounce its position on the DK seating issue, backing the ASEAN communiques would permit oblique support for the position. He also asked about the substance of U.S. demarches to the Soviets and the Vietnamese on the recent border incidents.
9. Secretary Muskie described the meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin Washington5 and asked Ambassador Abramowitz to detail the substance of his meeting with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach.6 The Secretary indicated that there was perhaps not enough public attention to the principle of voluntary repatriation but stressed that the U.S. considered from the beginning that it was an important principle and certainly part of our entire refugee program. He noted that the U.S. has spent millions of dollars supporting all aspects of the refugee program, including voluntary repatriation.
10. Returning to the question of DK seating, the Secretary stressed the real dilemmas for the U.S. in the issue. While ASEANs had resolved their dilemma about whom to support, the U.S. had not. He described the proposition put forward by the ASEANs as a “lawyer’s argument” which perhaps had merit with the courts but which did not prove very convincing with public opinion. He pointed out that last year the decision to support the DK seat was made two days before the vote and that public opinion had little time to react. The Secretary remarked that it would be premature to decide this issue without full consultations, and that consultations with ASEAN were an exceptionally important part of the dialogue. The Secretary emphasized he did not want to suggest this issue was an area of disagreement but that the U.S. needed more time to consider its position. He reiterated U.S. commitment to a free Kampuchea and one which did not have foreign forces [Page 513] present. Promising continued consultations before and at the UNGA in September, the Secretary concluded by stating he would reinforce ASEAN’s call for action by the Secretary General during his meeting with the SYG next week.7
11. Returning to the DK issue, Foreign Minister Mochtar argued that the alternative to Pol Pot was perhaps even worse on human rights grounds since it was possible to substantiate the fact that Vietnamese were selectively distributing food and were allowing certain elements to starve to death. Mr. Mochtar expressed reservations about the relief program inside Cambodia. The Secretary rejected the suggestion that diversions were a justification for reducing assistance inside Cambodia since the alternative would be to allow people to starve and that would mean still more refugees fleeing to Thailand. Philippines Representative Tarentino argued that it was important to point out to the public that it was the Soviet Union which was behind the Vietnamese and opposing the DK. Deputy Prime Minister Rajaratnam argued that it was important to continue to recognize the DK since it was the only fighting force against Hanoi and the Soviet Union and because it was the legitimate regime in Phnom Penh when the invasion took place.
12. Secretary Muskie asked the ASEANs to carry the discussion beyond the DK seating question and explain their concept of a political solution and how it could be achieved. Marshal Sitthi stated that while the ASEANs supported the DK that did not have to mean support for Pol Pot. He saw Pol Pot as a personality of the past, noting his replacement by Khieu Samphan and a recent letter from DK Foreign Minister Ieng Sary which asked for Thai support for the creation of a national patriotic front in Kampuchea. In the letter Ieng Sary purportedly promised to submit to internationally supervised elections to choose a new leader for Kampuchea. Sitthi noted that Ieng Sary wanted to put Sihanouk up in front and others like Son Sann and perhaps even Heng Samrin supporters under him. All were acceptable so long as they opposed Vietnamese occupation. He noted that the Vietnamese and the Soviets did not like this united front. Sitthi also referred to Thai and Singaporean intentions to invite Sihanouk to the region to help in playing a role with the refugees as part of their search for a political solution.
13. Foreign Minister Rithauddeen then stressed the legitimacy principle arguing that at the time of the invasion the DK was the legitimate ruler of Kampuchea and that as the “owner of the house” he should not be thrown out in favor of those who invaded the house forcibly. He stated that he had proposed to Nguyen Co Thach during his recent [Page 514] visit to Kuala Lumpur that a political solution be achieved by combining all of the elements in Kampuchea—Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and Heng Samrin—but Thach had not been responsive.
14. Mochtar stated he felt that many were falling into a Vietnamese trap by continually referring to Pol Pot when they really meant the DK. Pol Pot was an actor in the past and any continued reference to him brought out the images of genocide. He urged that we refer instead to the DK since that was the present and the future for Kampuchea. He stated that at the appropriate time Pol Pot would probably disappear from the picture but that working out a solution would take time.
15. Foreign Minister Rajaratnam supported this point arguing that ASEAN had a political solution and that was support of the DK. ASEAN hoped that the DK over time could be expanded into a representative government acceptable to the Khmer people. He specifically called on the Secretary to acknowledge ASEAN’s primary interest in the stability of its region and acceptance of the solution that ASEAN thought best fit its needs. He stressed that the decision to support the DK was not taken lightly and that if ASEAN made a mistake it would have to live with it. ASEAN’s vital interests are at stake. He asked Secretary to convey the strength of ASEAN’s feelings to those who would be involved in making the U.S. decision. Again looking beyond the present, he referred to a meeting in Geneva with the Secretary General of Son Sann’s Khmer movement and their discussion of a united front. Rajaratnam argued that as the situation developed, new leaders would emerge. He mentioned an earlier proposal on creating “safe-havens” for the Khmer refugees where people to lead Kampuchea could be trained since the DK and the military forces were incapable of running a nation.
16. As the session concluded, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke noted that ASEAN’s references to a long-term solution, perhaps taking 10 to 15 years, posed additional problems. The U.S. has been paying the preponderance of the bills for refugees/relief and for military security assistance to the ASEAN nations. He stressed there are limits to the U.S. budget and the willingness of the American people to continue to tolerate these costs. Secretary Muskie noted that we agree with the ASEANs in values and principles, and that we needed to share differing views and exchange ideas in order to reach consensus and agreement. He stated that we would approach the issue on DK seating with the desire to be as helpful as we can and with a better appreciation of the issue after the opportunities to review the issue with the ASEANs both collectively and in bilateral sessions.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Sullivan Subject File, Box 69, ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, 6–7/80. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.↩
- Muskie was in Kuala Lumpur June 27–29. His public remarks and press briefing are printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 1980, pp. 43–45.↩
- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began on December 24, 1979. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 244–246. Vietnamese incursions across the Cambodian border began on June 23. See Documents 90 and 91.↩
- Presumably the statements issued at the end of the June 28–30, 1979, ASEAN Ministerial meeting in Bali (telegram 16 from Bali, June 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790314–0350) and the December 14, ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting (see Document 144).↩
- No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.↩
- See Document 92.↩
- Not further identified.↩