Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

87. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, March 27, 1980, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Vietnamese Issues

PARTICIPANTS

• Vietnam

  • Amb. Ha Van Lau, Permanent Representative to the U.N.
  • Mr. Ha Huy Tam, First Secretary, Vietnamese Mission
  • Mr. Tran Si Luong, Third Secretary, Vietnamese Mission

• U.S.

  • John D. Negroponte, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
  • Gen. Thomas C. Pinckney, Regional Director, East Asia & Pacific Affairs, Department of Defense
  • John H. Willett, Political Officer, USUN (Notetaker)

1. Summary: DAS Negroponte opened discussion by fully reviewing the MIA question, underscoring its humanitarian aspect and urging SRV cooperation to resolve the issue, which was viewed as an obstacle to improved US/SRV relations. General Pinckney left material on four specific cases with Amb. Ha Van Lau. Negroponte expressed U.S. hope that Vietnam would prove more forthcoming on the orderly departure program. He stressed the need for the rapid importation of rice seed into Kampuchea. In conclusion, Negroponte underscored U.S. concerns on reports of poison gas use in Kampuchea and Laos.

Amb. Ha Van Lau did not accept that the MIA issue was a genuine obstacle to better relations. He expressed guarded optimism on the orderly departure program. He dismissed as slanderous reports of poison gas use. Finally, Ha Van Lau said SRV shares U.S. concerns on urgency of rice seeds for Kampuchea, and said that international community should act to halt “privateering” in the Thai camps. In conclusion, he urged that U.S. and Vietnam meet more often on matters of mutual concern. End Summary

2. After an exchange of pleasantries, Negroponte conveyed personal greetings from Secretary Vance, whom Ha Van Lau had last seen in November, 1979 in New York City.² He said Vance and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke had asked him to pay a courtesy call on Ha Van Lau in his (Negroponte’s) capacity as the replacement for Bob Oakley. He expressed appreciation for Ha Van Lau’s willingness to receive him on such short notice so soon after Ha Van Lau’s return from Hanoi.

3. Missing in Action: On behalf of Secretary Vance, Negroponte expressed thanks for Ha Van Lau’s prompt response to Vance’s letter of February 7 concerning MIA’s.³ To remove this impediment to better relations, the United States proposed that Hanoi and Washington work towards a solution of accounting problem. So long as the SRV delays moving forward on this point, this will be viewed as an obstacle to improved relations.

4. Negroponte said that the U.S. was disappointed that the SRV had not found it convenient to invite Lt. Col. Mather⁴ to Hanoi. To assist the SRV in developing the fullest possible accounting, Mather should visit Hanoi at the earliest possible date. The advantage to the SRV would be Mather’s help in reviewing case data assembled by the U.S., making available our experience, suggesting ways the SRV accounting efforts might be improved, and harmonizing SRV and U.S. methodology to improve understanding on this matter. Finally, the U.S. was available to assist the SRV in any other way possible on accounting.

5. Negroponte pointed out that the accounting issue is a humanitarian one. The mutual objective is to relieve the suffering and anxiety of the next-of-kin. Decency demands that attention be devoted to the accounting question, both to enable proper interment for recoverable remains, and so that the U.S. and Vietnamese peoples can remove a good portion of residual rancor.

6. Negroponte said that the U.S. has assembled known information on each MIA. Likewise, SRV media has released much information on a number of prisoners or casualties; obviously on these individuals, at least, the SRV can offer a full accounting. During the war, Hanoi released pictures and news releases on captives and corpses. Subsequent to the war, information was released on gravesites, etc. There was also the persistent case of the remains of 400 Americans. Suspicion could be easily reduced if Hanoi would permit a joint US-SRV party to visit the site, as was raised in Secretary Vance’s last letter to the Foreign Minister.⁵ This would be a positive gesture, and such a visit could take place during Mather’s first trip to Hanoi.

7. Negroponte said that the United States was prepared to take these small but concrete steps, which are the only way to begin a meaningful process of setting our relationship on a firm foundation. The U.S. has always been and remains ready to assist the SRV in arriving at a proper accounting. In this respect there is considerable opportunity for expanded cooperation between the U.S. and the SRV, and Negroponte repeated that the United States would welcome the opportunity to assist the Vietnamese on the MIA issue. Both the United States and Vietnam know that more can be done. The 73 remains previously returned are a positive step, but they cannot substitute for a full accounting which, should it take place, would improve the SRV image in the United States, regionally and worldwide.

8. In conclusion, Negroponte said that the United States wished to eliminate areas of suspicion and mistrust in this aspect of our relationship. When Representative Wolff visited Hanoi in the summer of 1979, SRV officials stated that they were working on some cases and that they hoped to have information “soon”.⁶ But there has been no further information provided. The expectations which were raised by the SRV statement create suspicions that the Vietnamese authorities are not cooperating, and these suspicions produce a climate in which people are willing to accept rumors or information that has not been fully verified.

9. General Pinckney then presented four specific cases to Amb. Ha Van Lau.⁷ He outlined the details of each case and left material with the Ambassador for further consideration by the SRV authorities. Pinckney pointed out that in view of such hard evidence, there must be some records on the Vietnamese side that would help us answer the concerns of the families involved.

10. Food Relief for Kampuchea: Negroponte pointed out the particularly urgent need for seed rice with which to begin planting in Kampuchea, a process that must be completed in the forthcoming weeks. While there is still hope that sufficient funds can be raised for this seed rice, and that sufficient seed rice can be found for purchase, there is deep concern because of slow off-loading capacity in the port of Kompong Som and because of the collapse of a portion of the port facilities in Phnom Penh. As a result, it may not be possible to import the needed 30,000 metric tons of planting seed. Negroponte noted the SRV’s reported decision to turn over 10,000 tons of seed for use in Cambodia, but he added U.S. belief that all avenues—barge transport, land routes, sea ports, and provincial airports—should be used to increase the intake of relief supplies, especially rice seed, during the coming crucial weeks. The U.S. assumes that the prospect of renewed starvation, and the flooding of Khmer to the Thai border in search of food and seed, concerns Hanoi to the same degree as Washington.

11. Orderly Departure Program: The U.S. has been trying in recent months to reach agreement with Hanoi on a common list of those eligible for emigration. While Hanoi had previously announced its reluctance to proceed before having 1,000 names on the list, the U.S. understands that there are now 1,300 names available. We also understand that the UNHCR Representative Myers⁸ has been in Hanoi awaiting an opportunity to visit Ho Chi Minh City in order to begin interviewing those on the joint working list, so that the departure process can begin as soon as possible. Negroponte expressed the U.S. hope that Hanoi will accept more from the list of 9,000 names already provided, and reiterated in the strongest terms the desire of the U.S. for the program to succeed. The U.S. is anxious to do what is necessary to make the program effective in meeting its humanitarian objectives.

12. Poison Gas: Negroponte noted the SRV rejection of charges of use of poison gas by Vietnamese forces in Indochina, as well as rejections of similar charges by the Laotian and Soviet Governments.⁹ Nonetheless the U.S. is impressed by the fact that the Vietnamese Government has taken no steps to dispel the deep international concern that arises from these reports. He urged that Hanoi accept a visit by impartial international observers for the purpose of evaluating the truth. If the charges are found to be untrue, that would put the matter to rest.

13. Amb. Ha Van Lau expressed appreciation for Negroponte’s and Pinckney’s visit. He said he had taken note of Negroponte’s statements “with all necessary reservations”, that his government would review them and that he would reply in more detail at a later date.

14. Ha Van Lau said he did not share the U.S. view that the MIA issue is an obstacle to improved relations between the U.S. and the SRV. He recalled telling Secretary Vance on November 5, 1979 and in his February 26 reply to the Secretary’s letter—as well as to Representative Lester Wolff—that Vietnam works on the basis of humanitarian spirit and friendship between America and Vietnam because Hanoi knows that the families concerned are in a state of uncertainty. He pointed out that Vietnam understands, even more than the United States, the depths of feeling involved, because there are tens of thousands of people on the Vietnamese side in the war who remain unaccounted for. Seven million tons of bombs were dropped and there was enormous destruction. So far Vietnam has no accounting for thousands of its citizens and soldiers. Ha Van Lau said that he himself has cousins of whose whereabouts he remains ignorant. His own relations have asked him for facts about them but he was unable to reply. He said he was telling Negroponte this to show him the strong sympathy that Vietnam had for the position of the American families.

15. Recalling that he had previously spoken to Secretary Vance on this subject, Ha Van Lau pointed out that Vietnam had returned all living Americans. He said it would be against Hanoi’s humanitarian goals to leave American families suffering. Likewise, it would bring no benefit to the SRV. He said that Hanoi acts upon information as it is given by the United States and that Washington should remove all suspicions of Vietnam’s motivations. He recalled that when U.S. pilots were captured, North Vietnamese soldiers had protected them from physical violence on the part of the civilians. He promised to take the cases that General Pinckney had left with him into consideration. He said Vietnam would try to make a full accounting, but he could not share the U.S. belief that the MIA issue was an obstacle to better relations. In conclusion, he said that obstacles do in fact exist to improved relations, but that these obstacles were created by the U.S. side.

16. Ha Van Lau said that the subject of a visit on Mather’s part to Hanoi was currently under review. He promised to remind his Foreign Minister of the issue. Personally speaking, he said he had no clear picture of exactly what was involved, but he promised to report faithfully what Negroponte had asked.

17. Ha Van Lau expressed his belief that the problem of the joint list of approximately one thousand (sic) names would be solved, but that good will was needed on both sides. He noted the complaint on his government’s side that the American officer involved “does not have the right attitude to solve the problem”, even though the UNHCR Rep does want the problem solved. (NOTE: There was not time during the meeting to clarify exactly which American or what problem Lau was referring to here.)

18. Ha Van Lau said that reports of use of toxic or poisonous gases on the part of the Vietnamese forces are slanderous and unacceptable, since Vietnam is incapable of producing toxic chemicals. He said if the U.S. side continues to raise one problem after another, this will simply create further suspicions. In this respect, he cited the case of those undergoing re-education programs. He said the SRV had stated its policy, but some do not believe in this honest profession of Hanoi’s intentions. Recently, representatives of Amnesty International had visited those places but had seen for themselves that there was no basis in such allegations. If the U.S. continues to raise “unreal” problems and then base relations on a resolution of these problems, U.S.-Vietnamese relations would get nowhere.

19. The Vietnamese Ambassador said that his government fully shares U.S. concerns as regards the necessity of seeds for Kampuchea. On March 26, he spoke with Sir Robert Jackson (UN Coordinator for the Khmer Relief Program), Grant and Egger¹⁰ of UNICEF and other UN officials concerned with Khmer relief. Ha Van Lau reportedly suggested to them that in order to solve the issue, they should talk directly with PRK officials on the capacity of the PRK to receive seeds and foodstuffs. On his just-completed trip to Hanoi, Ha Van Lau himself went to Kampuchea for two days and saw with own eyes the logistical difficulties involved. He said the Kampucheans are making a major effort because such is in their interest. The international agencies and organizations, Vietnam, and other socialist states are trying to help the Khmer. Ha Van Lau also reported that on March 26 the USSR told the UN that Moscow would help with providing port unloading equipment. He said the international agencies involved in the Khmer relief effort are prepared to accept assistance from any quarter.

20. Ha Van Lau said he would make one point that had not yet been covered. As regards Khmer relief, the major problem was how to provide assistance both inside Kampuchea and outside. Some people, he feels, should not be permitted to smuggle aid into Kampuchea as reported in the press.

In the camps along Thailand’s border with Kampuchea, he said that war lords are fighting and that Vietnam had brought this to the attention of the United Nations at the beginning of the Khmer relief program. He accused the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Serei of abusing the charity of the international community and engaging in black marketeering, profiteering and the killing of civilians. He called for an immediate cessation of such incidents. He accused the instigators of acting on political motives and working against the Khmer people and the “legal government” in Phnom Penh. He accused them of trying to sabotage the rehabilitation efforts of the Khmer.

21. Ha Van Lau said that he was not prepared to speak with Negroponte on general matters, “because our points of view on relations between us, as well as on security in Southeast Asia and friendship among peoples, have all been stated on many previous occasions.” He said that the U.S. Administration and the State Department understood the Vietnamese point of view and told Negroponte that when he had spoken with Representative Wolff and with Secretary Vance, he had urged them “not to play the China card”. He said it was “an established understanding” on the Vietnamese side that the U.S. was playing the Chinese card despite the fact that U.S. officials had denied it. In conclusion, Ha Van Lau said that if the U.S. is not playing the Chinese card, it should prove this with deeds. But since Ha Van Lau spoke with Vance, there has been nothing new.

22. Negroponte said that with respect to the concrete questions that had been posed, the U.S. hoped to have answers as soon as possible. Negroponte said he took note of Ha Van Lau’s promise to remind the Minister of our request on Mather’s trip to Hanoi. As for the orderly departure program Negroponte said that if obstacles exist, the U.S. stands ready to help resolve them. But it was our understanding that the next step rested with Hanoi. The U.S. sincerely believed that it had made every reasonable effort to get the program to succeed. He said that the U.S. was not playing the China card and that the three most important concerns of the United States in Southeast Asia were A) the security of Thailand, B) the humanitarian situation in Kampuchea, and C) the growing Soviet influence in the region. He said to Ha Van Lau that these matters had, it is true, been discussed at great length in the past, but since Lau had raised the matter, Negroponte felt compelled to set the record straight on this point.

23. Ha Van Lau said that he was ready to talk with Negroponte on general questions at any time, adding that it would be good to meet more frequently. He asked that his respects be conveyed to Secretary Vance, and Negroponte promised to do so. Before leaving, Pinckney said that the United States appreciates Hanoi’s concerns on the MIA issue, since they so closely parallel those of the United States. He said that by sitting down together with no recriminations, but just for the purpose of discussing specific cases, he was sure that many questions would be answered and that the air would be cleared on both sides. It would be a benefit to all concerned to familiarize themselves with the interests of the other side and to develop a habit of working together.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Sullivan Subject File, Box 71, Negroponte-Ha Van Lau Meeting, 3/80. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Willett (USUN). The meeting took place at the Vietnamese Mission to the United Nations.
2. See Document 68.
3. Neither Vance’s letter nor Ha Van Lau’s reply has been found.
4. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Mather, Commander of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center detachment in Bangkok.
5. Not found.
6. See foonote 12, Document 53.
7. Not further identified.
8. Michael Myers, a staffer with the UN Human Rights Commission.
9. The charges were made at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction held at Geneva March 3–21. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, p. 72.
10. James Grant, UNICEF Executive Director, and Charles Egger, UNICEF Deputy Executive Director.