Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

64. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, October 25, 1979, 0454Z

43652. Subj: (S) Holbrooke-Thach Meeting, October 23, 1979.

1. (Secret–Entire text)

2. Following is verbatim report of subject meeting.

Location: Vietnamese Mission

Participants:	Richard Holbrooke
	Morton Abramowitz
	Michael Armacost
	Dennis Harter
Vietnamese:	Nguyen Co Thach, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
	SRV Ambassador to Bangkok
	SRV Counselor Luu Doan Huynh

Holbrooke: I am pleased that you were able to see us and that I was personally able to see you again after one year.

Thach: One year and one month.

Holbrooke: One year and one month. Yes, I think it was September 29th.² As you know, I had useful talks with Vice Foreign Minister Phan Hien in New York last Tuesday.³ I am sure that he has reported to you on our discussion. I will not repeat those matters again to you today. Secretary Vance has asked me to join the Senators in order to show our concern for the grave problems facing the Khmer people. Of course, you understand I cannot go to Phnom Penh on this trip. Mr. Harter has been asked by Secretary Vance to do so. He will accompany the Senators as an escort.⁴ Let me also introduce Mr. Armacost who will replace Mr. Oakley as my Senior Deputy. Mr. Armacost is presently at the Pentagon, working on Asia. Before this he was in the White House and before that in the State Department. Mr. Oakley is going to Zaire as Ambassador.

Thach: And you will miss him.

Holbrooke: He will miss Vietnam, but he will be back some day. Let us go back to the trip and the fact that the Senators have requested to take several staff. This unfortunately became interpreted as two. It was apparently a miscommunication or something “mal-entendu.” Each of the Senators has one personal staff and there is also a representative of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired by Senator Church. Thus their minimal group is five staff, one State Department escort and four others. The press problem is a new problem and if it is unacceptable then I understand. But we would hope that two staff or three or four or five is no problem. I hope that Phnom Penh can accept the larger numbers. We should separate the staff and press problems.

Thach: We are embarrassed. We cannot say whether we agree or whether we do not agree. This does not depend on us. If we do anything against what is agreed to by the Phnom Penh authorities, we will have trouble with them.

Holbrooke: Two or three more staff would certainly not be a great problem.

Thach: The numbers are not important. Only one thing is important and that is their sovereignty. We will notify Phnom Penh again.

Holbrooke: I hope our two Ambassadors can work it out.

Abramowitz: When you hear from Phnom Penh, please notify me at anytime.

Thach: Yes. Yes, I will do as you wish. I doubt whether there is enough time to get any results. I must cable Hanoi and then Hanoi must cable to Phnom Penh.

Holbrooke: Mr. Minister, perhaps I could mention a few other points which came up in my discussions in New York. Phan Hien both in Geneva and in New York said we were playing the Chinese card. I want you to know and to understand the United States continues to have as its ultimate objective the normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam. After we saw each other a year ago certain events occurred in the region and it was no longer possible for us to move forward with normalization at that time. Nevertheless, normalization is still our objective. The factors that make it difficult now are well known, the Kampuchea situation and the refugee situation.

We have noted and have attached great importance to your statements on the refugee moratorium and on your actions since the Geneva Conference.⁵ These actions are significant and help to relieve the tremendous burdens and pressures on this area. The continuation of the moratorium is of great importance. We have also noted statements including those that you yourself have made here that Vietnam will not attack Thailand, and that Vietnamese troops will not fight on Thai soil. You understand that this is what causes most concern in this situation.

Thach: I do not like to dwell in the past. If you have anything new to say on the question of normalization, then give them to me. I don’t want to go over all this again. It all gives us bad impressions. You say you want to normalize. But then you tell us otherwise. Let me tell you frankly: You are becoming the victims of your own propaganda. We are not in a hurry on the question of normalization. When normalization is in the interests of both sides, we will have it. We existed for four thousand years without relations with America. We can exist for a few more without relations with you. We want to have relations because it is in the interest of both countries. But Vietnam will continue to exist with or without those interests and without relations. You have given me an explanation that you do not play the China card. But that does not change my impression or the impression of my government. We regret it. China plays the America card.

Abramowitz: Mr. Holbrooke does not know how to play cards. He plays tennis.

Holbrooke: The Chinese invented card playing. We don’t play cards; are not playing any Chinese card. We know the importance of each other’s sovereignty. We follow your government’s actions closely. We can distinguish between those which contribute to stability and others which do not. Congressional visits do contribute and we appreciate this. Your statements in Thailand are also appreciated. The visits of the Senators to Phnom Penh will also contribute. The question that concerns us the most is Thailand. I particularly noted your statement two days ago in the press conference.⁶ That statement we take as very important.

Thach: The politics are very clear. We will not invade Thailand. That has been an historic fact; it still maintains and will do so in the future. Even the far distant future. We will not invade Thailand.

Holbrooke: There is always a danger because your troops are near the border and there is fighting going on. Yesterday we were in an area near the border where artillery had been fired into Thailand and people had been killed. These were refugees and Thai people.

Thach: We are aware of the policies of the American Government during the recent war on the Cambodian sanctuaries. We do not intend to follow the American example.

Holbrooke: You are very clever. You know that at the time I did not support that policy. I wrote an article about it. (Holbrooke to Armacost): You now understand how smart the Minister is because he addresses me with positions that he knows that I did not agree with.

Thach: We try to understand Thailand, and I hope that they understand us. I had a visit for one hour with Prime Minister Kriangsak. (To Ambassador Abramowitz): It was after your meeting with Kriangsak.⁷ I was very firm.

Abramowitz: And Prime Minister Kriangsak?

Thach: He also was firm. Our policy is clear. Just don’t make a big noise about everything and become a victim of your noisy propaganda.

Holbrooke: We are not making noise. We only made noise when 40,000 and 50,000 refugees came to Hong Kong and the ASEAN countries. This was a terrible burden to those countries and ASEAN was coming apart. There we correctly made a big noise.

Thach: That is a different question. How many people in Hong Kong are Vietnamese and how many are Chinese who come directly from China and not Vietnam? You never make reference to Chinese who come from the Mainland.

Holbrooke: After I had talked with Phan Hien, I visited Hong Kong with the Vice President.⁸ I discussed this with the authorities there. They make a distinction between two different groups. Those who come from Vietnam and those who come from the Mainland. The Hong Kong authorities return people who come from the Mainland to China every day. This is a matter of British and Chinese concern. The biggest refugee problems have been in Thailand and Malaysia. (To Ambassador Abramowitz): The boat numbers are better now, correct?

Thach: I want to forget the past. There has been too much suffering for both countries. But the policies of the U.S. during recent months compel us to recall the past. It is no good to dwell on the ashes of the past. If you can stop, as early as possible it is in your own interest. We are ready in any eventuality if you wish to go on.

Holbrooke: We too wish to put the past behind us. Phan Hien and I discussed this; we tried to explain that we do not operate with the policies of the past.

Thach: You have sent your 7th Fleet to the area; that is an action of the past, it is no good.

Holbrooke: We have heard this before. I stress again: We only seek to save people who are dying at sea. We will withdraw the 7th Fleet when conditions exist that make their efforts unnecessary. I mentioned this now since Phan Hien also mentioned it in New York.

Thach: I also talked with congressional delegations. They also did not agree on sending the 7th Fleet. If you can stop it as early as possible it is in your interest. Otherwise, it becomes like a “boss.”

Holbrooke: Another question is the question of orderly departure. After I saw Phan Hien in Geneva and talked to him about this question, we sent a special team here to Bangkok to process these cases. This team was to proceed to Ho Chi Minh City as soon as the Vietnamese Government would agree to let them in to carry out the practical procedures for orderly departure. But it is now months later and they are still here. I do not understand. We are ready to make major steps to do this with you. I particularly want to ask you to help us on this. It will help us and it will help you.

Thach: We see no [garble—conditions?] on this matter. Your consular officials can travel on the plane to bring those who are allowed to go abroad, and then go back to their base. That is the arrangement we have agreed to. But you want to stay. You want your consular people to stay in Vietnam and that is not possible.

Abramowitz: Mr. Minister, please let me say a few words about this program. We are prepared to operate in Vietnam under the conditions you have stipulated. It is your country. But we also have our legislation to carry out. That is our responsibility. Our purpose is to take the maximum we are permitted to take as soon as possible. We will operate as you tell us to. But to the extent that you allow consular officers to stay for several days we could process many more applicants. Our request is purely functional: We want to move larger numbers of people quicker.

Holbrooke: These people are across the street, Mr. Minister. You can take them with you when you return to Hanoi. They have been put here to do this. We have put no conditions on them. But they are still here. It is in your interest and in our interest and it will reduce the pressure on the ASEAN to bring people directly to the United States. We understand that you feel that you could lose control inside your own country if our people were able to move about freely. But you have your ways to protect yourself from that.

Thach: No. That’s not the case.

Holbrooke: If we process the people in your country then it is easier. This was your proposal not ours.

Thach: We extended our goodwill and cooperation but we cannot say that the law of America can only be carried out only in that way. Vietnamese law is the sole law in Vietnam. It is not United States law. People go by mutual agreement when they are accepted by the United States. That is the time that the consular officers can come to Vietnam. And then the plane can come. Further, we have accepted in the team of HCR (UNHCR) that there would be one American, but that he would not have the status of an American official.

Holbrooke: We have accepted this.

Thach: Then that is something that is for working for now. While there is no normalization, we do not see how you can ask for more than this.

Abramowitz: We are not trying to avoid your law. The U.S. law requires that anyone who wishes to come to the United States must first be seen by a consular officer or by an official of our immigration service. It does not matter where, in Bangkok, Moscow, or anywhere. The more time they are allowed to spend in Vietnam, the more we can speed up the process. We will operate as has been so far agreed. But the numbers will grow if consular officers can come in for two or three days. Instead of 50 people who can be processed in a one-day period by a consular officer, the consular officers could process far more in a 2–3 day period. This is our sole purpose to increase the numbers. You may decide to do otherwise for other reasons, but the only issue for us is to try to expand the numbers.

Thach: The consular officers only can come after it has been decided that the people can be allowed to leave Vietnam.

Abramowitz: The person from the voluntary agency who comes in under the UNHCR will come in only to in a sense arrange all the documents. According to our law a consular official must look at the case to determine who the person is and that he is not really a cousin or a brother of who he says he is. In the past fifty years there have been many cases of immigration fraud and this has dictated why we have these features in our laws. Only a consular officer has the authority to say that an applicant can receive a visa.

Holbrooke: When anyone wishes to go to Vietnam he needs permission and he goes to the UN in New York or Paris and he needs to get permission from someone.

Thach: That is not always necessary. Your 7th Fleet can pick them up at sea without consular officers.

Abramowitz: I only wanted to be sure that you fully understand our policy and our legal requirements, and that our purpose is to maximize the numbers of people who can be moved. You may still decide you do not want to do it in such a way as to expedite the process, but that is your decision.

Holbrooke: I think it is important for it to begin. The refugee numbers have dropped. I wanted you to hear the Ambassador. As you said to me once before we need to find imaginative solutions.

Thach: That is our decision. Please abide by it.

Holbrooke: We will. When will you go back to Vietnam?

Thach: On the 26th.

Holbrooke: We have taken too much of your time.

Thach: I have reserved the whole morning for you.

Holbrooke: Then you must have something to say.

Thach: We always have lots to talk about but this time I have nothing to talk about. You requested the meeting. So I have nothing to say.

Holbrooke (to Armacost): You see he is one of the best diplomats in the world.

Thach: No. You are mistaken. I am the worst diplomat. I could not persuade him (Holbrooke) on the China card. I want to make this statement very clear. This is a very deep impression in our country. I must be frank with you.

Holbrooke: I was with the Vice President in Peking in August. He told Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping that we opposed any second Chinese attack on Vietnam and that we would oppose it publicly.⁹ Secretary Vance told Han Nianlong this in New York when he was there.¹⁰ The President told Deng Xiaoping that in Washington in January before the attack.¹¹ We did not support a Chinese attack. We will not support a Chinese attack. We had intelligence about the build up on the border just as we had intelligence about the Vietnamese military in Kampuchea and we also opposed the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. I wish to make it very clear, we opposed both invasions. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. You say you are concerned about the China card. I don’t question that or your sincerity. The U.S. does not wish to encourage China in this way. We have normalized relations with China because it is in our interests to do so. And we will continue to improve our relations with China. We will have credits and Hua Guofeng will come to the U.S. next year. Vice President Mondale went to China this year. But one thing we will stress very strongly. We will not support, we do not support Pol Pot. This is a matter that the U.S. and China do not agree on. We hope you can accept our statements on this as sincerely as we accept yours. You understand why we can’t move now, but we can remain frank in our talks with each other.

Thach: I take note of what you say. But that is something that is still difficult to understand. We still find it hard to understand that prior to and after the Chinese attack you significantly improved your relations with China showing that the attack on Vietnam had no influence on your policy. On the other hand, you say the Vietnamese attack on Kampuchea means you can take no action on relations with us. This is a double standard and we don’t understand. We will never understand. I cannot explain it.

Holbrooke: I would like to review for you the timing and the sequence. I know what you said but that was not the sequence. We saw each other on September 29th [27th]. At that time, we removed the question of aid from our considerations, and then we were considering the possibility of moving forward on the recognition of Vietnam. The refugees began to increase greatly in October. Vietnam’s invasion began in December. This created an enormous public outcry. The Chinese invasion came after. The refugee issue more than anything else caused the halt to progress. There was a cry of outrage in the U.S. Even people who before didn’t support the U.S. involvement in Indochina were critical of your policy on refugees. That is what happened in October, November and December before the Kampuchea affair.

Thach: After Bangkok where do you go?

Holbrooke: I will go to Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and then back to D.C. I will stop in Hawaii for one day.

Thach: We are interested in peace and stability and cooperation in this area. But the U.S., China and ASEAN don’t want this and that is clear to us. Both the U.S. and China want war in this area. That is clear.

Holbrooke: We do not want war.

Thach: A proxy through the hands of others.

Holbrooke: I am sorry; we don’t want war in this area.

Thach: ( )¹² They have peace, freedom and neutrality in the region.

Holbrooke: You mean the Malaysian proposal for a zone of peace?¹³ We have accepted all this. I have said this myself publicly.

Thach: We want the Southeast Asians to discuss this together. But your friends don’t want it.

Holbrooke: We agree with it and we support it. We support ASEAN. We want peace in Kampuchea too and a way to find a solution to the problems that we have there.

Thach: We have conflicting views. Please don’t have any illusions of imposing your views on us. We also will not impose our views on you. This is a matter of deep differences between us and we believe it should be set aside. We should find out areas of agreement to discuss.

Holbrooke: I agree with that. And we should build bridges one step at a time. We have taken steps for food relief to Kampuchea, and on orderly departure from Vietnam. In that regard we have encouraging reports and the Senators’ visit is encouraging. We hope that you can take into account the Ambassador’s points on the program of orderly departures working under UNHCR.

Abramowitz: Mr. Minister, personally I have been here only for the past 15 months; I have seen the tension and vast human tragedies generated by the Kampuchea problem. I must say that there must be an adjustment and a balancing of all country interests. Otherwise, Cambodia will only be a source of permanent tension. No one side can impose a solution. Over time all parties must adjust. How we get to that point, I do not know, but all must make some adjustments in their positions.

Thach: What is at stake is the interest of the Kampuchean people. We can’t decide that.

Holbrooke: The Kampuchean people are being destroyed.

Thach: You support the destroyer.

Holbrooke: No, we do not.

Thach: We have our conflicting views. We don’t need to discuss this.

Abramowitz: Vietnam cannot promote security by making its neighbors insecure.

Thach: May I make a reply?

Abramowitz: I did not want to keep you longer.

Thach: Then a reply is not necessary.

Abramowitz: In the short time I have been here, we have seen very terrible things. I am not trying to be polemical by my previous comment.

Thach: Of course. I have lived here for 58 years and I have seen worse crimes. I am a victim here not you. I am getting older and older with the crimes against the people in this area.

Holbrooke: I hope your Ambassador and Ambassador Abramowitz across the street can talk.

Thach: Yes, we don’t need cars.

Holbrooke: We walked across the street this morning. Ambassador Abramowitz has the full support and confidence of the President and the Secretary. He can speak for us. We have serious difficulties. But we wish to stress the desire to move forward. We recognize that you have problems with China. You must understand that our relations with China will continue. There will be other visits. Do not interpret these as anti-Vietnamese. We are willing to improve relations because it is in our interests.

Thach: We are very patient. We will watch deeds. We don’t need to rely so much on words.

Abramowitz: We will also watch your deeds.

Abramowitz

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Far East, Box 13, 9–11/79. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis.
2. They met on September 27. See Document 27.
3. October 16. Telegram 274516 to selected posts, October 20, summarized the discussion, during which Holbrooke told Phan Hien that the “situation in the region” made progress toward normalization of U.S.-Vietnamese relations impossible. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2407, N790008–0219)
4. Harter accompanied the congressional delegation led by Senator Sassor to Kampuchea. See Documents 67 and 140.
5. Presumably the UN conference on refugees held in Geneva July 20–21. See footnote 7, Document 53.
6. Thach stated that Vietnamese troops would not cross into Thailand. See “Vietnam Says Its Troops Will Not Enter Thailand,” New York Times, October 21, 1979, p. 17.
7. Abramowitz and Kriangsak met on September 28. Telegram 39760 from Bangkok, September 28, reported their meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790444–0482)
8. Holbrooke accompanied Mondale on his visit to China, Japan, and Hong Kong in late August and early September.
9. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 265.
10. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 278.
11. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 206 and 207.
12. As on the original; an omission in the transmission.
13. Presumably a reference to the 1971 ASEAN declaration of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in the region.