86. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Secretary’s Meeting with Sihanouk
PARTICIPANTS
United States
- The Secretary
- Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
- Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for EA
- John D. Negroponte, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EA
- Stephen R. Lyne, Director, EA/VLC
- Prince Norodom Sihanouk
PRINCE SIHANOUK: It is very nice of your Excellency to receive me. I know how busy you are. I appreciate very much your gracious hospitality.
THE SECRETARY: I am very pleased to have this chance to meet with you again.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: I thank you and your government for its so noble moral support through me to my people and country.
THE SECRETARY: I hope you are comfortable and that your trip has been fruitful.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: Yes. I have received much friendship, much sympathy, much support. I am enjoying your gracious hospitality. I am very satisfied. My wife also. We are very grateful to you.
THE SECRETARY: Please extend my very best wishes and respects to your wife.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: She sends her best regards and affection to you. She remembers very well when we met you when you visited us at the Lenox Hill Hospital in New York.2
THE SECRETARY: How is your health? Are you feeling well?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: Much better, yes. Thank you.
THE SECRETARY: Everyone in the United States shares the same concern that I and the President have for the suffering of your people.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: You have done very much for me and my compatriots.
THE SECRETARY: Have you had an opportunity to meet with many of your countrymen during your stay in the U.S.?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: Oh yes, Your Excellency. We have met with many of them. There are meetings day and night. A few days ago we had a big assembly of Cambodians at the Hilton Hotel, meeting me, welcoming me. We spent the evening together. They made very clear that they support me as their leader, and that they support my efforts to liberate my country.
THE SECRETARY: I read the memorandum of your meeting with Mr. Holbrooke.3 I am particularly interested in hearing from you an up-date of the situation and your views on your future. I would be very pleased if you would share your views with me.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: I am always very happy to share them with you, Your Excellency.
[Page 308]Since my liberation in January 1979, my country has faced two problems: a humanitarian/social problem and a political/military problem. There are many refugees in Thailand and inside Cambodia. I know that my compatriots, despite their dedication to their homeland and their love for their homeland, were anxious to leave Cambodia in order to find freedom and dignity because under the Khmer Rouge regime they did not enjoy any liberty or dignity. Now under Vietnamese colonialism they have lost their dignity and freedom once again. It is a terrible humiliation for our nation which is being colonized by Vietnam. I request that the rich countries of the west accept more and more of my people until the time comes when my compatriots can go back to a free and independent Cambodia. We are all anxious to go back to our homeland. It is simpler for me. I am wonderfully accommodated in Peking and Pyongyang. Nonetheless, I am desirous to go back to Cambodia. I am a Cambodian. I do not want to live and die on foreign soil. That is the psychological and moral problem of all my compatriots. They are like me. They want to go back to Cambodia, even if they can only go back as soldiers or guerrillas fighting against Vietnam. All they need is weapons.
I ask all justice-loving, peace-loving, freedom-loving, friendly countries in the world to demand the convening in Geneva, or in New York at the United Nations, an international conference to neutralize Cambodia. I think that the tragedy of Cambodia cannot be ended until Cambodia is completely neutralized and internationally guaranteed like the status given Austria after World War II. Austria got assurances from the Soviet Union on one hand, and from the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom on the other, as a neutral country, a neutralized state, so that Europe could enjoy stability and peace. If one does not definitively neutralize Cambodia, Southeast Asia can never enjoy peace and stability. The war in Cambodia may one day spread to other countries in the region. The ASEAN countries are quite conscious of this danger. For the time being the Chinese, ASEAN, and some in the west—in Europe—think that the seat of Cambodia at the UN should be reserved for the Khmer Rouge regime. They think they should support the Khmer Rouge regime in fighting against Vietnam in Cambodia. That is not enough. It is a temporary measure to stop temporarily the advance of Vietnamese expansionism and Soviet hegemonism. The real solution for the problem of Cambodia should be the neutralization of Cambodia. The idea of such neutralization is not realistic at this time because neither China nor the Soviet Union nor Vietnam would agree. But I think that if the great states, like the U.S., the western states in Europe, Japan and Asian countries, and China herself, would support the idea, heavy pressure would exist against Vietnam and the Soviet Union. They may one day go to the conference table in order to discuss these issues.
[Page 309]THE SECRETARY: Do you think that the People’s Republic of China would support a neutralized Cambodia?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: For the time being the People’s Republic of China is not ready to compromise on Cambodia. It insists on the continuation of the armed struggle against Vietnam in Cambodia. China lets me know clearly that it can accept only one solution, the continuation of the armed struggle under the Khmer Rouge.
THE SECRETARY: We applaud and support your refusal to cooperate with the Khmer Rouge. We agree that it is out of the question. We are pleased that we share the same perceptions.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: If I reject the idea of cooperation with the Khmer Rouge, China will not help me. You are aware that in the meetings here the nationalists want me to form an army to go with them to Cambodia to fight against the Vietnamese. They do not claim to be able to defeat Vietnam, but want to create new conditions to get Vietnamese approval of the neutralization of Cambodia. We should make things more difficult for the Vietnamese in Cambodia. But it seems that the United States and other countries disapprove of this idea. I am ready to give up this plan. I insist, however, on a political aspect of my plan. We cannot solve the humanitarian aspects of the problem unless we go to the root of the evil; we must go to the political problem.
THE SECRETARY: How do you see resolving the political situation?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: May I repeat? I wish for strong support from all peace-loving and justice-loving nations for the idea of an international conference and the neutralization of Cambodia. We should allow the Cambodian people to have general elections to elect a government which really represents them, which is genuinely Cambodian. I have suggested to the Vietnamese that they accept this idea of a general election. Heng Samrin’s group in Phnom Penh, which claims to be supported by the Cambodian people, should not fear them. They claim to have the support of the people. If they present themselves to the Cambodian people in a general election, they should win, they should triumph. I have suggested to the Chinese that they allow a general election since their proteges the Khmer Rouge, according to their propaganda, enjoy the support of the Cambodian people and so they might be able to win also. Neither the Chinese nor the Vietnamese should fear a general election. Other political parties should be allowed to participate as well, like me. I have many supporters in Thailand and inside Cambodia. I can organize a political party. It should be up to the Cambodian people to decide the political system, the leadership, and the government of Cambodia.
MR. HOLBROOKE: You spoke about China in response to the Secretary’s question about the international conference. As you know, [Page 310] the UNGA resolution calls for an international conference.4 We are ready for one. But the Chinese and Vietnamese do not appear ready to participate. Without the Chinese and Vietnamese there is no use in having the conference. You know the Chinese very well. You have known them since 1954. Do you think that there are any conditions under which China would agree to an international conference this year?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: For the time being the Khmer Rouge is still strong in fighting against Vietnam. Therefore, China is not yet ready to accept an international conference and the neutralization of Cambodia. If next year, for example, China sees that the Khmer Rouge cannot challenge the Vietnamese effectively, China which is intelligent, will certainly accept the neutralization of Cambodia. Otherwise it would have to accept a communist Cambodia, but one that belonged to the other side, the mortal enemies of China—Vietnam and the Soviet Union. As far as Vietnam is concerned, it will not accept the neutralization of Cambodia or an international conference on Cambodia unless it faces more difficulties in Cambodia. That is why I speak about the necessity of armed struggle against Vietnam in Cambodia. Without additional difficulties Vietnam will not accept the idea of an international conference or the neutralization of my country.
THE SECRETARY: Let me comment on two or three things which are on my mind. Then we can come back to how you assess the political situation. As Secretary Holbrooke has said, I want to repeat that there is an urgent need for new pledges of relief and support for your people. There is also a need to exert concerted pressure on all the authorities in Cambodia to permit relief to go forward to meet the needs of your people. Although the situation has improved in the last few months, our estimate is that the situation may worsen in the near future. By March or April. As the symbol of the Cambodian people yours would be an important voice raised in the search for international assistance. In the long run, it would enhance your political position. It would identify you as a nationalist above all political parties and as a political catalyst for a resolution of the problems. In this connection we believe it is important to you to improve your consultation with ASEAN. As I understand it, you plan to go to Singapore. When?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: In June.
THE SECRETARY: I had lunch today with Andrew Peacock,5 the Foreign Minister of Australia, he hopes that when you come to the area you will come and pay him a visit.
[Page 311]PRINCE SIHANOUK: Yes. I plan to go to Australia. His government already knows.
THE SECRETARY: I know you want to visit your people in the refugee camps in Thailand. I know that there are practical problems with that. We would be glad to do what we can to assist you in the region. Your role in the humanitarian aspects of this problem would lay useful groundwork for better relations with the Thai. I would also like to mention that we believe that the lack of unity among Cambodian nationalist groups is hampering movement toward a political solution. It seems to us that closer political relations between you and Son Sann would help further things.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: That is no problem. I am ready to welcome him very warmly if his group decides to join me. There is no problem. At the Hilton Hotel meeting I received much applause from hundreds of Cambodians for my appeal to Son Sann and his group to join me. We are very anxious to have him with us in a genuine national union of all Cambodian nationalists. There is no problem as far as I am concerned.
THE SECRETARY: That brings us back to your dilemma. On the one hand you have China, which wants you to support Pol Pot. On the other hand you have Vietnam which has intensified its activities. How can we move these forces to consider a second step, one we would support, a political conference out of which would hopefully emerge a resolution which would let the Cambodian people decide their future and government
PRINCE SIHANOUK: We must be patient. There are many obstacles. The problems are quite difficult.
THE SECRETARY: That’s an understatement.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: Yes, you understand well. I do not want France and other friendly countries in the west to move strongly now. It is not time.
THE SECRETARY: How do you see the situation developing? What are you doing? How are you proceeding to ensure that the process moves in a measured way to achieve the objectives that you want to see?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: I have no personal ambition. I am tired of politics. After my liberation in January 1979 I fulfilled my mission at the Security Council in New York. After that I went to Pyongyang where I was prepared to stay quietly. But my compatriots want me to be more active. I have to see them. I am not anxious to engage to further political activity. I am fed up with political activity. I am forced to engage in politics. It is very unpleasant for me. As far as Cambodia is concerned, its fate is almost sealed. I know the Vietnamese well. Vietnam will not give up. Vietnam will not withdraw its troops from [Page 312] Cambodia unless there is an extraordinary unforeseen event which would force Vietnam and the Soviet Union to soften their present stand. Cambodia, like Laos, is firmly in the hands of Vietnamese colonialism. Vietnam will not give up. I am not optimistic. I personally think we must accept a fait accompli. If my compatriots want me to go to the battlefield, I will do so. I will return to Cambodia. I will fulfill my duty to my homeland. The Czechs, the Bulgarians, and the Afghan people want to be free and liberated from the domination of the Soviet Union. But they have to accept the fait accompli. My people are like people of Dubcek,6 of Bulgaria. What can we do? Unless there is a new world war, an international war, we cannot wish for the liberation of Cambodia. We cannot hope for it. It is an impossibility.
THE SECRETARY: The tragedy is that your people are being crushed between two forces, the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese. In the process your people are being devastated.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: Yes. What can we do?
THE SECRETARY: That is what I am trying to get from you.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: I don’t know. The U.S. is very powerful.
THE SECRETARY: But you understand your people better than anyone. They are in a desperate situation.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: My people want liberty, territorial integrity, national sovereignty, etc. But we have no way to reach our goals. I apologize. I have nothing to say.
THE SECRETARY: What will you seek to do when you meet with ASEANs? What will you seek to do when you go to Thailand to meet with your people?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: I want to visit the refugees. There are 700,000 of them in Thailand and along the Thai-Cambodian border. I want to observe them as their lawyer and supporter. There are three categories of refugees. The majority want to settle in Europe and America. I can deal with the western embassies in Bangkok and Singapore to get permission for these refugees to leave Thailand. The second category are those refugees who may agree to stay temporarily in Thailand to be close to their homeland. Finally, a small minority may choose to go back to Cambodia. I want to make lists, to divide my people into the three categories. I can be their diplomat and lawyer in the international field. I could be helpful and useful to them directly. Now I just speak and travel. I am not useful.
THE SECRETARY: ASEAN shares the same humanitarian objectives. They are also concerned about stability in the region. They want [Page 313] a stable situation and an independent Cambodia. They have the same objectives that you do.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: There are problems there too.
THE SECRETARY: We have to deal with the reality of large powers, people with guns.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: ASEAN countries, like China, want me to cooperate with the Khmer Rouge to attract national support and international sympathy. If I become the head of State of Democratic Kampuchea, which is a full member of the UN, I weaken the position of the Russians and the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin. Heng Samrin will not succeed in getting the seat of Cambodia at the UN. The ASEAN countries fear that if Sihanouk does not join with the Khmer Rouge before next year’s UNGA, the UN may change its mind and give the seat to the pro-Vietnamese regime in Phnom Penh. For Thailand, China, and ASEAN, that would be terrible. They do not want a Cambodia definitely colonialized by Vietnam. If they have a common frontier with Vietnamese that would be terrible.
I am not allowed by Cambodian nationalists to go to the Khmer Rouge. If the U.S. should persuade my compatriots to let me become head of state of the Khmer Rouge (shrug). I depend on my people. Even if the nationalists in the U.S. agree that I should become head of state of Democratic Kampuchea—it is not possible. My compatriots in the rest of the world will condemn me.
THE SECRETARY: We cannot support the Khmer Rouge. We cannot support Heng Samrin. There must be another solution.
MR. HOLBROOKE: If that solution includes you, that requires a change of attitude by China, ASEAN, Thailand. This is what we have been talking about over the past week. You have a problem with Bangkok, it goes back to Prear Vihear. It must be reduced. Do you agree?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: Yes. I am a man of good will. I don’t want to make the situation more complicated. I am ready to accept all and any conditions to work with Son Sann and Thailand to save my country. I have no personal ambition. I have no demands. I did not come to become a national leader again. I am comfortable in Pyongyang. I would be happy to go back. Others have pressed me. The ASEAN countries have a problem. The U.S. has a problem with the Soviets in Vietnam. I have no problem.
THE SECRETARY: You yourself may have no problems, but your people have problems.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: Yes. My people have problems. But I am a man of the past, not the future. I have found a second homeland. I am happy.
MR. HOLBROOKE: What about the Vietnamese? Would they be willing to accept less than the full cake? Is there any way that the [Page 314] Vietnamese could accept you as a part of a new political situation in Phnom Penh?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: Unless they face more difficulties there, they have no use for me. I have tried. I have sent many letters. They reject me. They consider themselves strong enough to keep the Cambodian cake in their mouth without making any compromises with anyone. I cannot predict the future. If one day they see they cannot go on with a tough position because of difficulties in Cambodia they may invite me to talk. They may invite me to Hanoi. I have let them know through common friends that I am ready at any time to go to Hanoi to talk with them. In France I asked common friends to let them know that I am always available for talks. In the past I went there many times. They are not interested.
THE SECRETARY: What kind of a situation can you envisage in which they would be interested in you? I understand that the Chinese want you to come in as head of state. What do the Vietnamese have in mind for you?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: Nothing. They have nothing in mind for me. They want to swallow Cambodia and turn Cambodia into a Vietnamese province. If over the next few years they do not succeed in pacifying the country and the Khmer Rouge remain very strong, they may reexamine the possibilities of dealing with Sihanouk. No one can predict the future or the evolution of international events.
MR. HOLBROOKE: Do you see any chance of a change this year?
PRINCE SIHANOUK: This year there is no hope. We have to wait until next year. Even ASEAN is helping China to get my approval for a coalition with the Khmer Rouge. With Son Sann they have no problem because he has no power. Son Sann is not a zero but the real force in any coalition would be the Khmer Rouge. What ASEAN and China want is the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk; Son Sann is not important. But I repeat, I am at their disposal. Here in the U.S. the nationalists depend on you. If the U.S. government want me to cooperate with the Khmer Rouge, to become the head of state of Democratic Kampuchea, it should speak to the Cambodians here. They will agree with you. ASEAN would like to see me in Singapore because they want me to cooperate with Pol Pot and to join a coalition with the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge themselves have let me know that they are very anxious to have me back as head of state. They say they will allow me to reshuffle the government. But in fact the Khmer Rouge will keep power—they are the ones who control the communist party apparatus and army. They are the masters of everything. The government is just an honorary figurehead; it does not have any power in Cambodia. But I depend on the nationalists. If in France, in the west, if in the U.S., they gave me the green light, the feu vert, I have no prejudices. For the sake of my people, I am prepared to do whatever my people want.
[Page 315]MR. HOLBROOKE: There is one practical problem. When the Prince is in Pyongyang it is difficult to communicate with him. We value our contacts with him. We have to think of a way to communicate with him.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: It is very easy: through the French mission in Pyongyang. You can send a message to your embassy in Peking, who can give it to the French Embassy, who can then send it to their trade mission in Pyongyang. They can see me at any time.
THE SECRETARY: We will be in contact with you.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: Sweden also is very interested.
THE SECRETARY: I want to keep in touch.
PRINCE SIHANOUK: Sweden could be your intermediary very easily. And they are your good friends.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–82–0217, Box 4, C, 1980. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Lyne on February 28. The meeting took place in Vance’s office.↩
- Sihanouk was in the hospital in January 1979. His note of appreciation to the U.S. Government, January 15, 1979, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 42, Kampuchea, 1/77–10/79.↩
- See Document 83.↩
- Reference is to UN General Assembly Resolution 34/22 adopted on November 14, 1979. See footnote 3, Document 70.↩
- No record of the luncheon meeting has been found. Peacock was in Washington for a meeting of the ANZUS Council. See Document 271.↩
- Presumably Alexander Dubcek, former leader of Czechoslovakia.↩