Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

83. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 21, 1980, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Situation in Kampuchea

PARTICIPANTS

• Prince Norodom Sihanouk
• Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for EA
• John D. Negroponte, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EA
• Stephen R. Lyne, Director, EA/VLC

SIHANOUK: Thank you for your warm generous hospitality.

HOLBROOKE: I want to tell you that it is at the personal instructions of Secretary Vance.

SIHANOUK: Please convey to him my personal gratitude and salutations.

HOLBROOKE: The Secretary and I believe you are a great historic figure who has played an important role in the past and has an important role to play in the present. He wanted to demonstrate his regard for you.

SIHANOUK: I am deeply grateful and honored to be considered a friend of the U.S. Please also transmit my very affectionate salutations to Ambassador Mansfield.

HOLBROOKE: Last week I was in the refugee camps along the Thai-Kampuchean border. I asked the people about the future of Cambodia. I asked them: What about Pol Pot, Heng Samrin? Everyone talked about Prince Sihanouk. All of them loved you; all of them remembered you.² They wanted to know where you were. They did not know you were in Europe. You need to let your people know where you are.

SIHANOUK: I have many contacts with my supporters along the frontier. Delegates come to me from my sympathizers. I have sent them messages and tape recordings. In many of the Thai refugee camps and in parts of Cambodia they have received my messages. I do not know why the others don’t know where I am.

I have to explain that I have been unable to go to Cambodia despite my great desire. I cannot achieve my great dream. The government of Thailand will not let me go. I cannot reach them because of the government of Thailand. I am anxious to meet with my people. I want to go visit them.

HOLBROOKE: I am disappointed that you did not go to Singapore. I know your explanation. We agree with you that there can be no support for Pol Pot or Ieng Sary. I would have thought that it would have been to your advantage to go to Singapore to talk with Lee Kuan Yew and to discuss the issues directly. It would have been a way to improve relations between you and the Thai. Let us hope that you can go to Singapore.

SIHANOUK: Maybe I can go in June. I have to go to Kim Il Sung’s birthday and he wants me to stay for one to two months after that. I can’t travel until after that. I will go to Australia, and I can stop in Singapore.

HOLBROOKE: May I ask you some things about Kim Il Sung? You know him, and we do not. What does Kim Il Sung think about the Soviet-Chinese rivalry?

SIHANOUK: He is clearly hostile to the Soviet Union. He is very clearly sympathetic to China. He condemns Vietnam and he criticizes the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnam. Officially he does not dare let the world and the Soviet Union know his views. With me he made his position clear. He condemns Vietnam. He condemns the Soviet Union. He likes China. He is very independent vis-a-vis China but he likes the Chinese.

HOLBROOKE: What does he think about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?³

SIHANOUK: I left before the invasion. I am sure he must be very angry toward the Soviet Union. He used to criticize the Soviet Union and very violently condemn Vietnam.

HOLBROOKE: What do you think his objectives are regarding South Korea? You know he has just sent letters to individuals in the government in South Korea using their government titles. This is a first.

SIHANOUK: He may hide his ideas and his thinking from me. It seems to me, however, that he was sincere when he assured me that he didn’t want any war, that he wanted South Korea to remain non-communist if that is what the people of South Korea wanted. He wanted the South and the North united as equal states in a federation which he called Koryo.

He pointed out he does not want any war. I believe he is sincere. He has done a lot for the development of his country; he has built schools, hospitals, cultural centers, and other facilities for his people and youth. This shows he does not want war. For himself he has built beautiful palaces in the mountains and at sea resorts. He has many luxury houses. He likes expensive cars, Mercedes, Lincolns. I think that since he likes luxuries so much he will not wage war.

He is a lot like Tito. There are three “imperial communist” heads of state: Tito, Ceausescu, Kim Il Sung. They are very imperialistic; very luxurious; they do not want war. They would lose their imperial style of life.

On the question of reunification of Korea. I remember that it is true that North Vietnam said it would accept a non-communist South Vietnam if that is what the people wanted. In fact North Vietnam communized South Vietnam without delay. I cannot give you any guarantee about Kim Il Sung’s intentions toward South Korea. He is intelligent. He realizes he can’t fight a war. If he achieves his dream of a federation he may respect South Korea as a nationalist state for many years. He knows he cannot fight against you, the U.S. He knows he cannot rely on the Soviet Union. He does not want to rely on the Chinese.

That is Kim Il Sung. I know him very well. He is not in good health. He has a growth on his neck which increases in size. It is very visible. It may be cancerous. He is the guarantor of stability and peace in North Korea, and his people fear that he may not have much life left. I guarantee you that if he lives he will not fight a war.

HOLBROOKE: What is his attitude toward the DK and Pol Pot?

SIHANOUK: He condemns them but allows them to have an embassy in Pyongyang.

HOLBROOKE: Does he pressure you to form a united front with Pol Pot, as China does?

SIHANOUK: China pressures me all the time. Kim Il Sung never pressures me. That is one reason I went to Pyongyang. He tells me: I support you. He says I believe you should cooperate with the DK, but I follow and support you. That is all he says.

HOLBROOKE: Has this issue strained relations between China and North Korea?

SIHANOUK: Kim Il Sung said that North Korea and China will remain good friends even if they do not share the same opinions about Cambodia. He said they have decided not to speak about it. He said North Korean-Chinese relations are based on bilateral issues and they put the others aside.

In Pyongyang the DK has tried to contact me through the Romanians and the Swedes but not the North Koreans. The Romanians support the DK. The Khmer Rouge asked the Swedes to arrange a meeting for them with me. I rejected this appointment with the Swedish Chargé to meet the DK. He has since refrained from pushing this idea. I have made it clear to him that when I meet with him the condition is that we will not discuss the DK. Each time I saw the Romanians they tried to press me on behalf of President Ceausescu to accept the post of president of the DK.

HOLBROOKE: I want to assure you that we are totally opposed to the DK, to Pol Pot, to Khieu Samphan, to Ieng Sary. We see no differences among them. Do you agree?

SIHANOUK: Yes. Fully. Khieu Samphan is not less cruel. He is the thinker, le penseur, of the team. He said that to create a revolutionary society one must physically liquidate the people.

HOLBROOKE: I want to be sure that you understand our vote for the DK at the UN.⁴ We believed that it was the best tactical way to avoid legitimitizing the Vietnamese takeover. ASEAN, our European allies, and other non-aligned countries all agreed. When we voted we stressed that we opposed all that Pol Pot stood for and would not recognize or help him. Mr. Burchett says in a recent article in THE NATION⁵ that Ambassador Woodcock urged you to join the Khmer Rouge.

SIHANOUK: No. He did not ask me to join the Khmer Rouge. He did explain that the Khmer Rouge were the only armed force that could fight the Vietnamese in Kampuchea. He did not urge me to join the Khmer Rouge.

HOLBROOKE: This is a simple statement of fact. Ambassador Woodcock did not mean that we supported the Khmer Rouge or that we wanted you to support them. Burchett must have misrepresented what you said.

SIHANOUK: Mr. Burchett is not honest. He did not quote me accurately. He misquoted me for the benefit of the Vietnamese and the Soviets, he is one of their sympathizers.

HOLBROOKE: I hope you will clarify this in your interviews in the United States. I hope you will clarify that we have never pressured you to join the Khmer Rouge.

SIHANOUK: I never said it. Ambassador Woodcock never said anything like that. The thing he did say was that on the battlefield only the Khmer Rouge were capable of resisting the Vietnamese.

HOLBROOKE: That’s a fact at this time.

SIHANOUK: That’s a fact.

I want to let the world know I have a large army. I have officers in France and the United States who have been trained in French and American schools. They are ready to serve me. From Thailand and Kampuchea I have received many letters from young Cambodians who are ready to serve under me in a national army to fight for the liberation of Kampuchea. But China does not want me to fight unless I am with the Khmer Rouge. Thailand does not allow me to enter Cambodia through Thailand. I met with your Embassy officers in Paris. I presented to them an expose of my position and of my army.⁶ I beg your help to persuade Thailand to give me sympathy and cooperation and to help me struggle for the national liberation of Cambodia. Also I ask you to persuade China to help me. We have many men. We have no weapons and no arms. King Hassan of Morocco told me: You will not be successful in your political objectives to liberate your country, to call an international conference, and to give your people the right to determine their own future unless you have an army, unless you lead an army to fight the Vietnamese and to weaken the government of Heng Samrin. He said: You must return to let the world know clearly that you are a valid alternative to Heng Samrin and the Khmer Rouge. The world must have a reason to support you and to recognize you as the leader of Cambodia. You must fight on the battlefield.

HOLBROOKE: There are some things I don’t completely understand. The Chinese saved your life and brought you out of Phnom Penh in 1979. You came to New York. We thought you were going to stay here or in France. Then you had dinner with Deng Tsiao Ping. The next morning you had breakfast with Mr. Oakley and you told him that you were going back to China.⁷ Why?

SIHANOUK: Because China could not let me go to Paris to fight the DK in the political field. I had promised Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai that if I was ever not in Cambodia, I would stay in China. Deng reminded me of my promises. I made it clear that I would go to China only if Deng promised not to try to persuade me to join the Khmer Rouge.

HOLBROOKE: Is there any difference between Chou En Lai and Deng?

SIHANOUK: During the 1970–1975 war the situation in Cambodia was different than it is now. I cannot say whether if Chou En Lai were alive today he would behave differently than Deng because the situation is different.

HOLBROOKE: In regard to Thailand, what is the problem between you? Are the Thai feelings based on the difficulties between your two countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Your problems with Thailand seriously limit your future, and we should discuss them frankly to see what can be done.

SIHANOUK: The key issue is Preah Vihear.⁸

HOLBROOKE: You won. Dean Acheson was your lawyer. You had the best lawyer in the U.S.

SIHANOUK: We had the best lawyer in the world. And we did win. But the Thai have never pardoned us. Also now, Thailand, with China, protects the Khmer Rouge and Son Sann. I am totally against the Khmer Rouge. Son Sann is not with me. The Thai are well aware that I cannot accept that part of Cambodia become a protectorate of Thailand. Thailand, like Vietnam, wants to swallow Cambodia and wants to establish at least a part of Cambodia as a protectorate.

NEGROPONTE: You mentioned Son Sann in the same way as the Khmer Rouge. What are your feelings about Son Sann?

SIHANOUK: Son Sann and his group, Dien Del, are not sympathetic to me. They are very ambitious. They want to gain power. They want to be the leaders of the people. They tell the people that Sihanouk does not want to serve the people, that he wants to lead the good life in Korea and France. Son Sann does not like me. He tries to discredit me and work against me with my people.

I want my people to be united, not disunited. I am ready to be friends with all Khmer. Ninety per cent of the Cambodians here in the United States fought against me. Now we are friends. My duty is not to be a leader of my own group but to represent the nation. I want to unite not divide the nation. I am aware we are weak. Each day we are weaker and weaker. We cannot have disunity. As chairman of the Federation of all patriotic groups I cannot beg Son Sann to accept me as his servant. Son Sann and his group should join our Confederation. I should not join Son Sann; he should join me.

I am not here for your support for me. I have been invited by my compatriots. You said you wanted to see me. I have no personal ambitions. I am happy in Korea. I am unhappy when I see my people facing misery. I don’t seek help from foreign countries for myself. I don’t plan to be the leader of my nation. Once the Cambodian people are liberated, they can elect their leaders. Cambodia and the Cambodian people have the right to determine their own future.

HOLBROOKE: Yes, we agree, but how do we get there? How do we get the Vietnamese to agree to a neutral non-aligned Cambodia?

SIHANOUK: King Hassan said I cannot achieve this goal of liberation of Cambodia by peaceful means. He said: You must go to the battlefield. How can I go if no one helps?

HOLBROOKE: Do you want to go to fight in order to drive out the Vietnamese or to force the Vietnamese to negotiate?

SIHANOUK: We cannot defeat the invincible army of Vietnam. We want to give credibility to our efforts to liberate our country. If I oppose Heng Samrin, Vietnam will always be weak psychologically and politically in Cambodia.

HOLBROOKE: Do you believe the Vietnamese would accept a political solution involving your return to Cambodia?

SIHANOUK: Vietnam says it is in Cambodia to protect the Cambodian people from the genocidal policies of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. Therefore, to support Pol Pot and Ieng Sary is to strengthen the Vietnamese pretext for being in Cambodia as a protector of the Cambodian people against the Khmer Rouge. If I lead a movement of liberation without the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese will no longer have a pretext to remain.

HOLBROOKE: How do you propose to fight the Vietnamese who have 200,000 troops and twenty divisions in Cambodia who are destroying the country? When I was in the border camps I asked: Who was worse, Pol Pot or Heng Samrin? The Cambodians said they were equally bad; Pol Pot killed us and Heng Samrin is starving us.

SIHANOUK: According to Mao Tse Tung if one cannot get the support of the people, one can never win. The Vietnamese 200,000 troops do not have the support of the people. You see that the Khmer Rouge are still fighting and cannot be crushed. Son Sann is still alive. My own army would be much bigger than theirs.

NEGROPONTE: Back to an earlier question, with some armed resistance would you be willing to enter into negotiations?

SIHANOUK: Yes. Also we would continue to fight.

HOLBROOKE: Will the Vietnamese agree to a political settlement which will take their troops out and yours back in?

SIHANOUK: What would happen would be that Heng Samrin would collapse internally and internationally.

HOLBROOKE: Heng Samrin doesn’t exist as an important factor. He is the creation of 200,000 Vietnamese troops.

SIHANOUK: If my proposal is not interesting, how can you and the Chinese believe that the Khmer Rouge and Son Sann will be able to get back Kampuchea? You will simply be creating further Thai instability. We have to fight to weaken Heng Samrin and to harm the Vietnamese. If we do nothing, if we accept the Vietnamese, we will have no answer to recovering Cambodia. We will remain under Vietnamese colonialism. We will have to accept the fait accompli as in Afghanistan.

HOLBROOKE: I agree with your view that Vietnam is the cause of the problem and we must get them out of Cambodia. We see three problems: One is the refusal of many Khmer Serei elements to work with you.

SIHANOUK: Many of the Khmer Serei groups are pro-Sihanouk. That is why the Thai will not give them humanitarian relief.

HOLBROOKE: The second is the attitude of the Thai government toward you. You have explained this. The third is the attitude of the Chinese who want to create a united front between you and the Khmer Rouge.

SIHANOUK: This is impossible.

HOLBROOKE: We have to concern ourselves with your relations with Son Sann and others.

SIHANOUK: Son Sann only.

NEGROPONTE: You said if the Khmer Rouge came to join your federation you would not accept them. If Son Sann came to join your federation, would you accept him?

SIHANOUK: Yes. There is no reason to refuse. But my compatriots in France and the U.S. tell me they will abandon me if I accept the Khmer Rouge.

HOLBROOKE: We understand and share your view about the Khmer Rouge. The difficulties between you and Son Sann are crucial. It is important to resolve the differences. The public appearance of disagreement is very damaging. The Khmer Serei groups are fighting each other at the refugee camps.

SIHANOUK: But the Khmer Rouge have attacked some nationalist camps too.

HOLBROOKE: Yes.

SIHANOUK: They were not battles between nationalists. The Khmer Rouge attacked nationalist camps.

HOLBROOKE: What about the Vietnamese? You know Pham Van Dong and the other leaders very well. Do you think the Vietnamese leadership would ever accept you?

SIHANOUK: The Vietnamese are Vietnamese. We cannot change them. Henry Kissinger told me in Peking that no one should ever rely on the Vietnamese. They are immoral. I cannot speculate about the future. It all depends on their situation in the international arena, the situation inside Vietnam, Indochina events, and the changing attitudes of the U.S. and other great powers. Vietnam will make its policy in conformity with its interests and capabilities. They are not sentimental. They are without morality. They are intelligent and opportunistic. They can understand where their interests lie.

NEGROPONTE: You will meet with Secretary Vance in a few days. Could you and I meet informally during the next few days? Perhaps Saturday,⁹ in order to prepare the best possible meeting with the Secretary. You and I could meet on Saturday and try to prepare what you want to discuss with the Secretary.

HOLBROOKE: You should know clearly what we want. We want an independent Cambodia, neutral and non-aligned, free of foreign troops, able to choose its own leaders. If my experience on the border is any indication, the people want you.

SIHANOUK: It’s up to them.

HOLBROOKE: Yes, it’s up to them.

SIHANOUK: Yes, I will never propose myself. I simply wait for the chance to have my party compete with the Khmer Rouge and Heng Samrin. Please convey to Ambassador Woodcock my apologies. I apologize for any misunderstanding. I understood him very well. He said nothing like what Burchett has written. I mentioned only that he acknowledged that the Khmer Rouge possessed the only effective armed force against Vietnam. That is all he said.

HOLBROOKE: Burchett twisted what you said. The issue here is your relationship with the Thai government, your relationship with Son Sann, your relationship with China, and your relationship with the Vietnamese. We should talk more about it. I propose that when you meet with John you focus on what you want to discuss with the Secretary.

SIHANOUK: Son Sann is no problem. I am anxious to get his friendship, and that of his group. If he decides to join Sihanouk and the federation we will all welcome him.

HOLBROOKE: Are there any conditions under which Vietnam would accept you, and remove its troops?

SIHANOUK: We have to wait for Vietnam to determine its political, diplomatic, and military position. I can’t guess. Vietnam might shift its position vis-a-vis Son Sann, the Khmer Rouge, and Pol Pot.

HOLBROOKE: You were writing Pham Van Dong a series of letters. Have you received any response?

SIHANOUK: Yes, I wrote three letters. There was no reply to either the first or the second. The third letter was returned unopened. They are not very polite. When they have the Cambodian cake in their mouth, they want to swallow it.

HOLBROOKE: You are still thinking of going to Singapore in June?

SIHANOUK: I am going to Australia in June. I can combine the two trips as they are in the same area.

HOLBROOKE: The Foreign Ministers of Australia and New Zealand will be here next week.

SIHANOUK: I am going to Australia; I am invited by my countrymen.

HOLBROOKE: What about China? Are they keeping in contact with you?

SIHANOUK: Yes, I keep friendly contacts with them.

HOLBROOKE: Will you see Ambassador Chai while you are here?

SIHANOUK: Yes, I think he will ask to meet with me. In Paris I kept close contact with the Chinese Embassy.

I have a message to deliver to you on behalf of President Kim Il Sung. He wants to improve his relations with you. I hope that the day will come when the U.S. will be able to establish commercial relations with Pyongyang.

HOLBROOKE: I hope so too. But North Korea has proposed direct talks with us. We can’t do that unless South Korea comes too.

SIHANOUK: But France and other western countries have established commercial relations. You could do the same.

HOLBROOKE: We can’t do that without weakening our friends in South Korea.

SIHANOUK: I am not coming here to promote my personal ambitions.

HOLBROOKE: We understand that. I have always admired you. As I told Lacouture, I have always regarded you like DeGaulle, a man who personifies his country and is above party or faction.

SIHANOUK: I do not pretend to be a DeGaulle. I just want to fulfill my duty as a Cambodian citizen.

HOLBROOKE: I understand. We have to resolve the internal rivalries and your problems with Thailand.

SIHANOUK: I have told the Chinese I will not attack the Khmer Rouge on the battlefield. They don’t have to worry. I won’t cooperate with them but I won’t attack them. China should be satisfied with such behavior on my part.

HOLBROOKE: Is China still pressing you?

SIHANOUK: Yes. China still presses me. Some westerners also advise me to become the Chief of State of Democratic Kampuchea and to reshuffle the government in order to prove that it is a humane one. I say I am ready to do it if the Khmer people want me to, but they do not want me to.

HOLBROOKE: Whatever you do you mustn’t form a government in exile.

SIHANOUK: I will never form a government in exile.

HOLBROOKE: Good. You are above parties.

SIHANOUK: Some of my supporters have urged a government-in-exile but I will never do it.

NEGROPONTE: It will reduce the possibilities of any settlement.

SIHANOUK: Rest assured I will never do such a thing.

HOLBROOKE: We are devoted to peace in Cambodia. Tomorrow Ambassador Palmieri will explain what we are doing to save the Khmer people. We are spending hundreds of millions of dollars. We are working night and day. Mrs. Carter herself visited Thailand in an important gesture.

SIHANOUK: I express my profound gratitude to the U.S. Government, to the American people, to President Carter. I appreciate your efforts.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–82–0217, Box 4, C, 1980. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Lyne on February 22. The meeting took place in the Sheraton Carlton Hotel. “SECDEF has seen” is stamped at the top of the page. A notation in an unknown hand in the top right-hand corner of the page reads, “Harold Brown eyes only,” and Brown wrote, “2/27 HB.” An unknown hand wrote adjacent to Brown’s notation, “Show this to Nick Platt.”
2. Sihanouk lived in exile following the Lon Nol coup in 1970. After the Khmer Rouge takeover in 1975, Sihanouk returned to Kampuchea, where he lived under house arrest. Sihanouk was released in January 1979 and disassociated himself from the Khmer Rouge.
3. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began on December 24, 1979. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 244–246.
4. See footnote 4, Document 60.
5. Not further identified.
6. Oakley met with Sihanouk in Paris on December 13, 1979. Telegram 39040 from Paris, December 13, transmitted a memorandum of conversation of the discussion. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790573–0911)
7. Oakley met with Sihanouk on February 1, 1979. Telegram 30886 to Tokyo and Beijing, February 5, reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790055–1143)
8. See footnote 5, Document 60.
9. February 23. See Document 85 and footnote 2 thereto.