85. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Norodom Sihanouk’s Views
PARTICIPANTS
- Prince Norodom Sihanouk
- Michael Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EA
- John D. Negroponte, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EA
- Ambassador Mort Abramowitz
- Stephen R. Lyne, Director, EA/VLC
ABRAMOWITZ: I am very much interested in pursuing with you elements of our discussion on Saturday,2 particularly what can be done in regard to the growing crisis in Kampuchea, which has already had too much adversity. It looks like the last rice crop was very bad. In Battambang there was virtually nothing. The prospects are that unless there are sizable deliveries, much storage in Kampuchea, deliveries of seed, and increased distribution there will not be a rice crop next year either. Therefore, the people of Cambodia will be kept alive only through the international effort. I would be interested in your evaluation of this. Are my concerns merited or overdrawn? What role do you feel you can play to insure a wider distribution of food in Kampuchea? It seems to me that the problem is the indifference or the unwillingness of the Vietnamese to permit distribution. How do you feel about these aspects of the problem? We can talk about a political solution forever. But over the next few months these humanitarian problems will be the key ones.
SIHANOUK: I share fully your concern about the humanitarian and social problems. I came here because my compatriots invited me. I do not want to play a role in the political or military field but I could not avoid involving myself in these fields since my compatriots wanted me to play the role of the traditional leader of my nation. But I share the opinion of Ambassador Palmieri when he advised me to concentrate on humanitarian issues.3 If the U.S. could establish contact between me and a Thai representative I can discuss with Thailand about our common concern—the fate of the refugees and the necessity to help [Page 300] the Cambodian people who will have almost nothing from December on because it appears that neither Battambang nor the rest of Cambodia will be able to produce any amount of rice. My problem in brief is this: How can I serve my people in Thailand and in Cambodia in the humanitarian field? I should have permission from Thailand and the Heng Samrin regime to enter Cambodia. If neither Thailand nor Heng Samrin will give me permission, I can’t be useful. I should return to Pyongyang. Can Sihanouk go to Thailand or Cambodia? It seems it is easier for me to go to Thailand if I promise to play no political role. I am ready to give up political and naturally military activity. I am ready and eager to play a role only in the humanitarian field. It would please me very much. I am conscious that for the time being my efforts in the political, military, diplomatic areas would not give me a good result. Priority must go to saving Cambodian lives and people. I have to save my people from hunger and disease.
ABRAMOWITZ: Let me ask a number of things about the possibilities of a humanitarian role. In the first place, a humanitarian role is not just in Thailand. In the first instance it is in the West, in UN organs, to make clear that Cambodia is undergoing great suffering. If we are to cover the situation it is the West that must play the major role in providing adequate support and in doing its best to pressure the Vietnamese to allow food to be distributed throughout the country. Is there not a mission to be performed in the West? If that mission is performed in the West in that way, that lays the basis for a possible visit to Thailand as the Thai government sees the role you are playing, appreciates that role, and recognizes the necessity to facilitate the saving of the Kampuchean people. It seems to me that this humanitarian role is throughout the world. It starts in the West where money must be raised. It is the West which must pressure Vietnam, which obviously dominates most of Kampuchea. That is the logic of events. There is the possibility of a humanitarian conference to raise money. There is a lot of activity to do in the West, and in that activity there is a role as spokesman, recognized by most of the West as the principal voice of Kampuchea.
NEGROPONTE: I believe that the recollection of the Prince, reflected in his talk with Ambassador Palmieri, is that he is doing exactly what you propose by his travelling and playing the role of keeping the Kampuchean issue alive in the front of the eyes of the world. The Prince spoke of his relationship with Thailand. Our Ambassador to Thailand, since he deals personally with the Thai leaders, would be interested in what we both could do in order to improve your relationship with Thailand.
SIHANOUK: I would like very much to have the opportunity [Page 301] to meet with the Thai Ambassador. In Peking I often had the opportunity to meet with the Thai Ambassador; we had very good meetings. At any time I am ready to have a friendly meeting with the Ambassador of Thailand. I am not hostile to Thailand. I want to improve my relations with the Royal Thai government in order to help my people. Certainly I will follow a humanitarian relief role in the West, but I also must have contact with the refugees. I can have contact with the West in Bangkok through Ambassadors and the UNHCR. If I am allowed to go to Thailand I can speak out for Thailand, not in the political field but strictly on humanitarian relief. I will not embarrass Thailand. I can guarantee it. I share your opinion and, as Ambassador Palmieri suggested, it is necessary to concentrate on humanitarian affairs.
NEGROPONTE: There may be concern about the public attitude you might adopt toward Thailand. What can be done to reassure the Thai?
ABRAMOWITZ: If your concern is to go to Bangkok to go to the border to see your people it will be necessary to lay the appropriate background over the next couple of months for your profound humanitarian mission. I do not know if it will ever work out. If it does work out, it will be necessary to establish your humanitarian mission in the West, to establish your recognition that Thailand has played a tremendous role in saving the Cambodian people.
Obviously you view Thailand in relationship to various forces in Kampuchea. Whatever Thailand is doing or not doing, their position is one of neutrality and they should not be gainsayed publicly.
NEGROPONTE: The Thai deserve credit for providing refuge to the Khmer people and for helping to feed them.
ARMACOST: We are required to praise Thailand because they deserve it and to encourage them to continue to accept more refugees and to help in the feeding. If we acknowledge their role, it is easier for them to get public support. Your access to Thailand might be enhanced by paying tribute to its humanitarian role.
NEGROPONTE: Yes, you should do the same. There are no political ramifications. It is a question of a humanitarian role.
ABRAMOWITZ: Thailand faces political difficulty for its policy of allowing large numbers of Cambodians to enter Thailand. It is not popular. Some important men, some of whom you know well, have publicly attacked the Kriangsak government for letting the Cambodians in. So the refugee policy of Thailand, which has let in a lot of Khmer refugees whose numbers are not insignificant and which arouse the Thai, is very generous. The people and the legislature criticize, and the government must take the political heat, to use an American expression. From that point of view it is not costless, not cost-free. For Thailand the most important thing is to see Vietnamese forces withdraw; that [Page 302] is the most significant. They want a non-Vietnamese Cambodia. How to get there is everyone’s problem. You want it. We want it. How do we get there? It is a long difficult road. But the most immediate problem is how to manage the humanitarian problem. You as the voice in the West for the Cambodian people could have a major role in arousing the consciousness of the West.
ARMACOST: I understand that you have recently been meeting with the Chinese. Have you talked with the Chinese about playing a humanitarian role? How would they react to this?
SIHANOUK: They are interested in one thing: my cooperation with the Khmer Rouge. They want me to be Head of State of Democratic Kampuchea again. They think of nothing else other than resistance against Vietnam. They did not talk about humanitarian issues with me, not at all. I have very good relations with them. Yesterday I and my wife spent many hours with them; we had dinner with the Ambassador and his wife. This morning I had a haircut at the Embassy. I go to the Chinese Embassy to improve my relations with them. China is my second homeland. After the coup d’etat of Lon Nol China did much for me. I cannot forget them.
ARMACOST: They want you to improve your relations with Pol Pot?
SIHANOUK: No, they want me to be Head of State.
ARMACOST: You say you will not do it, it will not work?
SIHANOUK: Yes. I can never again be Head of State of Democratic Kampuchea. I prefer to go to Pyongyang. The Khmer Rouge killed my children and grandchildren. My people are my children also. I cannot fight for them because of their crimes. To be Head of State of Democratic Kampuchea would be terrible. I cannot do it.
NEGROPONTE: About an international conference. We all want a political solution at some time in the future. It is a goal we all share. When you talk about an international conference what exactly do you have in mind? What countries?
SIHANOUK: I have proposed the United States, Great Britain the Soviet Union and France. I have in mind it will be like 1954 when five great nations, China, United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union met in Geneva in order to end the war in Indochina and to neutralize Cambodia and Laos.4 That was the result of the 1954 International Conference. It was a very good result for Cambodia. It succeeded in safeguarding our territorial integrity and national unity. We held free elections under the ICC, with Poland, Canada and India. We got [Page 303] many, many advantages for peace and progress in Cambodia. I would like something like that again. It could be either in Geneva or New York at the UN. I think we should also ask India, Poland and Canada in order to have continuity from 1954 up to now. If we could have the 1954 Geneva Conference as the basis of the work we should keep alive the ICC with India, Poland and Canada. Those three countries should attend. Yugoslavia as dean of the non-aligned may attend also. Naturally the countries concerned, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, and also Japan, Australia and New Zealand. They are in the same region as Indochina. Stability in Indochina is a guarantee of stability for the region.
NEGROPONTE: And the subject would be a conference on all of Indochina or just Cambodia?
SIHANOUK: If possible, just Cambodia. Vietnam considers the fate of Laos sealed. So there remains only the Cambodian issue. So we should try to persuade China on the one hand and Vietnam and the Soviet Union on the other to accept the neutralization of Cambodia to serve the interests of both sides. China cannot accept a Soviet-sponsored Cambodia. Vietnam cannot accept a Chinese-sponsored Cambodia. We should have a neutral Cambodia friendly to all countries in the world, with the Soviet Union, with China, with Vietnam.
ABRAMOWITZ: How do you see this occurring in a practical sense? What do you see as the Chinese objectives in Cambodia?
SIHANOUK: The situation in Cambodia is this. In the framework of the Indochina dispute between the West, represented by the U.S., and the East, represented by China and the Soviet Union after World War II, after 1975 all that remained in Indochina was communist. America was out. There remained only the two red giants. Indochina must belong either to the Moscow church or the Peking church. I call these Communists “churches”. We are the victims of a dispute between two communist churches. China and Cambodia were together. China, with the Khmer Rouge, got Cambodia in her camp. There remained Vietnam, which had tried to be neutral.
Since the 1970’s the leadership in Hanoi, although officially neutral, leaned to Moscow. In Hanoi I had close relations with Giap and Le Duan; Pham Van Dong less. Even Giap did not like or approve of China. Since 1976–1977 it became clear that Vietnam was in the Soviet camp.
So China, Vietnam and the Soviet Union cannot imagine my Cambodia other than communist. They want the Prince to become a communist. They will never agree to decommunize Cambodia. They want to keep Cambodia communist. China cannot accept neutralization. If China would move to decommunize, it could be achieved by working with Sihanouk, Lon Nol, etc. Cambodia could be decommunized. But China wants Cambodia to remain fully communist. That is the reason [Page 304] why there is a deadlock. Neither can accept a decommunized Cambodia. Therefore, they must continue a proxy war in Cambodia in order to have either a pro-China Cambodia or a pro-Vietnam-Soviet Union Cambodia. It is a dispute between two communist states—between two communist churches. They reject any idea of interference by other people. They state it is a domestic affair, it is a domestic affair of two communist churches.
NEGROPONTE: Either one church wins or both churches agree on a solution along the ideas of the Prince.
ABRAMOWITZ: How do you get the two to agree?
SIHANOUK: I propose a neutral Cambodia under my leadership. China will accept it because everyone knows how I feel about the Chinese. The Soviet Union knows I am not hostile to it; up to the time of the Lon Nol coup I had good relations with them. As for Vietnam, I was helping Vietnam; that is why the coup happened. After that I allied with them. My friendship with Vietnam is very long. I am the solution for Cambodia. But I am not communist, not an authentic communist. Therefore they will not accept me. I have to become a communist head of state.
The Khmer Rouge are not acceptable in a neutralized Cambodia. The Soviet Union and Vietnam will never accept the Khmer Rouge. China will have to withdraw the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam and the Soviet Union will have to withdraw Heng Samrin. China should withdraw the Khmer Rouge leadership to Peking. Vietnam should withdraw Heng Samrin to Hanoi and Moscow. I told the Chinese they have built me a great palace; they can accommodate Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan.
ABRAMOWITZ: Under which conditions can the two churches agree?
SIHANOUK: The U.S. should study the situation.
ARMACOST: Our assessment of Chinese objectives is close to yours, though frankly we think power realities are more decisive than ideology. Our impression is that China’s objective is to counter Vietnam’s effort to treat the situation in Cambodia as irreversible. To this end they are obliged to emphasize support for the Khmer Rouge as the only viable fighting force in Cambodia at the moment. If the fighting produced a more conciliatory mood in Hanoi, then China might be more amenable to a compromise. It is not that they are dogmatically committed to a communist government in Cambodia. Do you think the Chinese will insist on Sihanouk becoming a communist?
SIHANOUK: Both sides want to keep Cambodia communist. In all of history there is no example of a country which is already communist becoming non-communist. My dream would never become a reality [Page 305] as far as de-communizing Cambodia. My problem is I can’t be a communist. It is not possible. Even if it were to become possible to become a communist I could never become a communist with Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Son Sann. I can’t be a communist with those killers.
NEGROPONTE: Time is needed until the churches resolve their differences. No matter what you decide, the two churches have to reach a modus vivendi.
SIHANOUK: China let me know very clearly that the situation in Cambodia is not irreversible despite what Pham Van Dong said. The Chinese say that Cambodians must unite and fight against Vietnam until the end. Deng Xiao Peng told me that if I don’t succeed in three to four years, after eight to ten years I will succeed in liberating my country; I will win. He did not take into account that our people will have disappeared by then. How can China continue to fight by proxy like that in Cambodia against Vietnam and the Soviet Union? The day will come when there are no more Cambodians to be their proxies. How will they continue the fight then? In order to continue the fight there they will have to introduce Chinese soldiers. Is China realistic or not? Chinese are not unrealistic.
[Page 306]ABRAMOWITZ: Did you tell Deng that?
SIHANOUK: I tell the Chinese Ambassadors. I prefer not to tell Deng. He is very tough. I prefer no disputes.
ABRAMOWITZ: Do you believe the Vietnamese will ever leave Cambodia?
SIHANOUK: No they will never leave.
ABRAMOWITZ: They have to be driven.
SIHANOUK: Yes. Otherwise they will never leave. I know them.
NEGROPONTE: They are having a difficult time at home, their economy is in bad shape.
SIHANOUK: Don’t expect much from that side. Even if their economy is in bad shape, if their people are starving, they will not change.
ABRAMOWITZ: Even if Le Duan dies do you think there will be any change?
SIHANOUK: No change.
NEGROPONTE: You studied in Saigon, did you not?
SIHANOUK: Yes. Since then I have had many Vietnamese as friends. Since then some of them have become communists, some have become non-communists. I have many Vietnamese friends on both sides. I know them. I know them well. Economic difficulties mean nothing to them. They can be imperialistic in Cambodia and Laos forever. They don’t mind troubles.
ABRAMOWITZ: Do you believe that Vietnam really believes in the Indochina Federation?5
SIHANOUK: Oh, Vietnam does not believe in the Indochina Federation; it is a Vietnamese Federation. You usually have a federation among equal members with equality for each other. An Indochina Federation means that Indochina belongs to the Vietnamese, and that the Lao and the Cambodian people are wiped out.
NEGROPONTE: Do you believe that is their intention?
SIHANOUK: Oh yes. They plan genocide, only they are subtle. They do not kill outright like the Khmer Rouge. They are more subtle. In Laos already many people flee to Thailand from Laos, not just the tribespeople but the lowland Lao too. The Vietnamese encourage marriages between the Vietnamese and Lao. They encourage mixed marriages. Like Kaysone. Kaysone is more Vietnamese than he is Lao. Souphanouvong is completely under the control of his Vietnamese wife.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Sullivan Subject File, Box 71, Sihanouk Visit, 2/80. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Lyne on February 27.↩
- February 23. No record of this meeting has been found.↩
- See Document 84.↩
- For documentation on the Geneva Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XVI, The Geneva Conference.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 23.↩