Office of the Historian

78. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, December 22, 1979, 9:45–11:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • Office of the Vice President

    • Denis Clift

  • State

    • Cyrus Vance
    • Richard Holbrooke

  • OSD

    • W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
    • Michael Armacost

  • CIA

    • Admiral Stansfield Turner
    • Ambassador John Holdridge
  • [name not declassified]

  • JCS

    • General John Pustay

  • OMB

    • John White, Assistant Director, OMB
    • Edward Sanders, Deputy Associate Director-International Affairs Division)

  • White House

    • Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • David Aaron

  • NSC

    • Don Gregg

SUBJECT

  • SCC Meeting on Thailand-Cambodia Border Crisis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The DCI gave an intelligence update citing the following points:

—The expected SRV push across the Thai border, designed to eliminate Cambodian resistance groups, has not yet started. SRV plans are set. (TS)

—Thai forces are no match for the SRV units near the border. Thai deployment seems designed to give them maximum flexibility in choosing to engage or disregard SRV incursions. (TS)

—Cambodian groups opposing the SRV are poorly organized, and lack cohesion. (TS)

—A large-scale defeat of Thai forces by SRV units would pose a danger to the Kriangsak government, which then might invoke the Manila Pact. (TS)

—The role of the PRC remains both crucial and unclear. Two to three weeks would be required for them to build up forces along the SRV border sufficient to administer a “second lesson” to the SRV. (TS)

Means to deter SRV incursions into Thailand were then discussed:

—Safehavens. The concept will be pushed, although the SRV remains opposed, and UN support is mixed. All efforts will be made to create de facto safehavens and to deter SRV attacks on the refugee centers by increasing the international presence along the border. (TS)

—Increasing food supplies to the refugees. Use of trucks in Thailand will be stressed. This will increase the flow of food. Additional publicity will also be given to this effort. The Thais appear to agree to this concept as long as the trucks do not enter Cambodia. (TS)

—Thai requests for aid. The aid package is with the President for decision. Some subsidiary OMB decisions also await Congressional Conference action. It was agreed that Kriangsak’s letter to the President [Page 270] need not be answered until the aid package is set up.2 DOD was asked to expedite delivery of 19 of the 30 M–48 tanks the Thais have asked for. Secretary Claytor and General Jones agreed that these could be shipped quickly. (TS)

—Approaches to Hanoi. Five meetings with SRV leaders have been held since August,3 all protesting obstructions to the flow of food aid to the refugees, and urging the SRV not to go into Thailand. No further steps seem indicated. (TS)

—Pressure on the USSR. No reply has been received to the President’s letter to Brezhnev.4 No further moves indicated now; at least until the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. returns to Washington. (TS)

—Approaches to the PRC. Nothing additional needed now. The PRC appears to understand our position. What if anything to say to them will be decided before Secretary Brown’s trip.5 The question left to be decided is what the U.S. says publicly if the PRC again attacks the SRV in response to an SRV attack on Thailand. (TS)

In discussing Soviet attitudes toward the Thailand-Cambodia crisis, it was agreed that:

—The Soviets understand the difference between Cambodia and Thailand in terms of U.S. interests. (TS)

—The Soviets are not interested in a confrontation with the PRC over this issue. (TS)

—The Secretary of State can tell Dobrynin that the substance of Secretary Brown’s trip to the PRC will be influenced by what happens along the Thai-Cambodian border. In passing this message, it will be made clear that the U.S. wants a neutral, non-aligned Cambodia, with no foreign troops on its soil, to emerge from the present situation. (TS)

At a restricted meeting, the implications arising from a newly-discovered Pol Pot base deep in Thailand were discussed. The base may be known to the SRV, and may be attacked by them. Such a deep incursion might cause the Thais to consider invoking the Manila Pact. The questions of telling the PRC and the Thais that we know of the base were discussed, as was the issue of notifying selected Congressional leaders. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski stressed that the basic issue involved is a strategic one—SRV efforts, with Soviet support, to establish a dominant position in Southeast Asia. Any tactical moves made with regard to the Pol Pot [Page 271] base should be in that larger context, so as not to discourage either Thai or PRC opposition to the SRV. There was general agreement on this point. (TS)

The conclusion of the restricted meeting was to take the following steps:

—Draft talking points to be used with the PRC.

—Consider separately what, if anything, should be said to the Thais.

—Consider briefing specific Congressional leaders on the extent to which the Thais and the PRC are giving covert support to the Cambodian elements opposing the SRV. The Secretary of State said he would like to brief Senators Church and Javits, and Congressman Zablocki. The DCI indicated that he would want to brief the Chairmen of the two intelligence committees. In this connection, no specific mention of the Pol Pot base will be made. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski asked that the talking points be prepared for the next VBB meeting. (U)

Those attending the restricted meeting were: Vance, Holbrooke, Brzezinski, Claytor, Armacost, Jones, Turner, Holdridge and Gregg. (C)

The meeting adjourned at 11:15 a.m. (U)

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–82–0270, 1, Cambodia 1979. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter signed his initial “C” at the top of the first page.↩
  2. See Document 178.↩
  3. See Documents 64, 67, and 68.↩
  4. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 238 and 242.↩
  5. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Documents 287–295.↩