79. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1
52664. Dept please pass to Paris and others as desired. Subj: (S) Demarche to Vietnamese on Offensive. Ref: A. State 330503, B. Bangkok 50320, C. Bangkok 51796.2
1. (Secret—Entire text)
[Page 272]2. In Ambassador’s absence from Bangkok (and SRV Ambassador’s absence in Hanoi), DCM made demarche Dec 24 as instructed Ref A to SRV Political Counselor Luu Doan Huynh. Huynh promised to convey the message faithfully to Hanoi, but asked the U.S. to send the message also directly to the PRK Embassy in Moscow or Havana. DCM held out no hope that this would be done.
3. In conversation which ensued, Huynh commented that Vietnam has acted with restraint on the border in view of many things, “including U.S. commitments”, but Thais also should restrain themselves. Huynh reiterated standard SRV charges that Thailand is facilitating supply of Pol Pot and violating the Khmer border.
4. In response DCM noted that any problems of this nature were a direct consequence of the presence of Vietnamese troops along the border. He stressed again the importance of Vietnam’s not violating the Thai border or engaging in military action against Thailand, and the particular importance we also attach to Vietnam’s forces not attacking the large concentrations of civilians along the border, particularly at Nong Samet and Non Mak Mun. Huynh commented that Heng Samrin authorities wish to protect its people, but if armed Khmer Serei continue to use the concentrations for their military activities, no one could be responsible for the consequences and action against them and “could not be construed as attacks on the people.”
Huynh made the point that so far, the Vietnamese have shown restraint toward these concentrations. DCM told Huynh that efforts have been made to remove armed elements from the concentrations and it is our understanding that some progress has been made.
5. Huynh also responded to our earlier demarches by the Ambassador Dec 7 concerning distribution of food in Kampuchea, (Ref B) and by ADCM Dec 18 concerning the reports of closure of the Kompong Som port to all but socialist shipping starting January 15 (Ref C). On former, Huynh said Hanoi categorically rejects all such reports and notes that the PRK Government (and Vietnam) were doing everything possible to expedite distribution of relief supplies. Huynh added that inadequate transportation facilities “in a country emerging from a period of genocide” were a major factor inhibiting distribution efforts. He charged that the U.S. was orchestrating an international campaign against Vietnam on the relief effort and advised that this could add to further misunderstandings and the perpetuation of tension in the area. DCM countered that international community had made clear its willingness to be of greatest possible assistance to needy Kampuchean people. It had been rebuffed by PRK. It was inexcusable, for example, that nation with such pressing medical needs and only fifty doctors for entire population, would not let foreign medical personnel in. Whatever the problems on the ground, it was clear that the Heng Samrin [Page 273] authorities were placing their own concerns, suspicions and sensitivities ahead of the need of their people. It was also clear that Vietnamese had considerable influence with PRK and unfortunately were not using it to further the relief effort.
6. Concerning the reports of closure of Kompong Som port, Huynh was instructed by Hanoi to respond that the U.S. should approach the PRK Embassies in Moscow or Havana about a matter which concerns the PRK and not Hanoi. In response to further probe, Huynh said that he had no information about the matter.
7. Comment: Most striking part of Huynh’s comments was reference to restraint by Hanoi, at least partly, because of U.S. commitments. Huynh also made clear that the Vietnamese were carefully watching the situation at Nong Samet and Non Mak Mun and that their future actions would be determined by the assessment of the degree to which these concentrations harbored Khmer Serei resistance elements. In his treatment of subject, Huynh conveyed the impression of some Vietnamese sensitivity toward international concern for the fate of these people.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Far East, Box 13, 12/79. Secret; Immediate; Sensitive; Nodis.↩
- Telegram 330503 to Bangkok and Paris, December 22, contained instructions for the démarche to the Vietnamese. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175–2007) Telegram 50320 from Bangkok, December 7, transmitted the text of an earlier démarche to the Vietnamese on Khmer relief. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790564–0722) Telegram 51796 from Bangkok, December 18, reported the closure of Kompong Som to relief shipments. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790582–0278)↩