Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

68. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, November 5, 1979, 3–3:45 P.M.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
  • Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary, EA

• Foreign

  • Ha Van Lau, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations

HOLBROOKE: I hope you will report to your government that our efforts here to get food to the people of Kampuchea is being done without any support for any faction in Kampuchea.

(At this point, Holbrooke read a statement made by the Phnom Penh authorities,² implying the U.S. is colluding with the PRC to support and supply Pol Pot forces.)

The statement made by the government in Phnom Penh misrepresents the American position. Would you please report this to Minister Thach. We oppose the Pol Pot government. We are not involved in any such arrangement.

HA VAN LAU (HVL): You already told Minister Thach the same thing.

HOLBROOKE: Yes, but since then your government has issued this additional statement.

HVL: I am sure that the U.S. representative understands the position of the USG on this. In saying so, I must add that the Phnom Penh authorities have their own outlook and their own opinions on this issue. If you have the chance to talk with them you can make your position clear.

HOLBROOKE: Three U.S. senators are right now making the same point to representatives of the Heng Samrin government.³ Secretary Vance and I have known you for 12 years. I want you to know that I am speaking from conviction now.

HVL: As Phan Hien told us, you have not yet convinced us adequately of your opinion.

HOLBROOKE: Mr. Ambassador, it is Vietnam that must convince the world that it doesn’t want Kampucheans to starve.

(At this point Secretary Vance arrived to join the meeting.)

VANCE: It is nice to have a chance to see you again. One thing that is terribly important is that we make sure that arrangements are such that there is cooperation from the Kampuchean authorities on the distribution of food and medicine once it arrives in that country. We have reports that 90% of the stuff delivered to Phnom Penh is still in warehouses and not distributed. It requires cooperation if it is to get to the people in the countryside. Vietnam should use its influence in making sure that the local authorities act in a cooperative way to get medicines and supplies out to people who need it.

HVL: I am glad to have a chance to meet with you and to have a frank talk just as we have many times in the past. Our people have suffered a lot. We hope to end the suspicion that Vietnam is hindering the delivery of humanitarian aid. We have our own difficulties. We have given a great amount of aid to the Kampuchean people already. I will announce that this afternoon. As a result, our own people have reduced their rice ration. Speaking frankly, reports that Vietnam is impeding assistance are false. They are put out to create misunderstanding and enmity between us. This morning I told the three American senators that the international community and the American people are very concerned over the food situation of the Kampuchean people. This concern is legitimate. But we also must look beyond this. The famine has its root cause in the enormous consequences left by the Pol Pot regime from its 4 years of devastation. It is the result of past developments. The Kampuchean people are a nation. They have their own history, their own civilization and their own self-respect. They can make their own sacrifices and efforts. I have the impression from reading the mass media and statements by delegates that people think the Kampucheans are children waiting for assistance from the international community. That they can’t save themselves. A nation which does not know how to save itself cannot expect help. Outside assistance can’t substitute for efforts by the local inhabitants. In present circumstances the Kampuchean people are in bad need of help from the international community because they are meeting difficulties due to the past. Providing help is a responsibility, an obligation of mankind toward these too long suffering people.

You also must understand the factual situation—what the people are doing and what they have need of. They are not requesting air drops! Representatives of international organizations now in Phnom Penh are discussing with the local authorities questions regarding the means of delivery.

At this point I want to say that we welcome your granting a visa to the Ambassador of the Phnom Penh government enabling him to come to the U.S. Here he can have useful contacts with the American people. There are a number of people who are trying to paint a false picture of the situation there. They do not see the efforts made by the Kampuchean people and thus are misleading public opinion.

In the past, together with many Socialist countries, we gave assistance to the Kampuchean people. Now we are continuing. Regarding American assistance, the Kampuchean people welcome assistance without political conditions. Questions are how to arrange for the reception, transportation and distribution of such aid. The local authorities are authorized to discuss and decide these questions. It is not of benefit to this humanitarian effort to paint a false picture of Kampuchea. This morning I read a statement given at a press conference by a Canadian (?) spokeswoman. I was very dissatisfied with it. She said the Geneva Conference was convened because of pressure on Vietnam to control the wave of boat people. She added that now we are in a position to pressure Vietnam to open a land route and called upon the international community to pressure Vietnam. You understand, Mr. Secretary, that the Vietnamese people will not give in to such pressure. The Canadian official also offended us here in this meeting and at their press conference. This is not in their own interest. It will reduce their prestige.

We are here in a spirit of cooperation, trying to contribute to the success of the conference. A number of people who lack goodwill are trying to act against us. This is not beneficial and it is not necessary for us to reply.

As far as relations between our two countries, we are looking to have good relations. I met with Representative Wolff this morning.⁴ He raised a number of problems and points and we shall take them into consideration. It is not necessary for me to repeat those at this time.

VANCE: Let me respond. As we see it, the central issue regarding Kampuchea is how all of us can make sure that necessary food and medicine get to the people in the countryside. There is no question that the people suffered terribly under Pol Pot. They also suffered as a result of the war when Vietnam brought its troops into Kampuchea. War always brings suffering. But now the Kampuchean people find themselves in a situation where they have lost their crops and where it is difficult to plant and feed their people because of the fighting. They don’t have enough medicine. And to avoid the fighting, people must flee. So it is not a question that the Kampuchean people don’t want to help themselves, but rather that it is impossible for them to do it under the present circumstances. Thus it is essential that the Phnom Penh authorities facilitate the process of the distribution of medicine and food and other supplies. Vietnam can be helpful in talking to the local authorities and in encouraging them to work with all people and representatives of all organizations, whatever their philosophies or ideologies, to get food to the people. I encourage you to do this.

On our bilateral relations, there are two principal points obstructing normalization of relations: 1) the refugee problem and 2) Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. These two obstacles have halted progress between us. We have to find a solution to get back on track again to continue the process we have started and to achieve the end that all people, and particularly me, want to see.

HVL: You are aware of the position of my government from reports from representatives of your government who have met with us. In my opinion, conditions at present are not yet right, although we are looking for improvement. But you have failed to mention one other relevant factor. Our country was subjected to a war by 600,000 troops. Now they are trying to threaten us again.

VANCE: I want you to know that we are not playing any “China card.” Regarding Pol Pot, we have said time and time again that we oppose him and everything he stands for. He is a tyrant.

HVL: Regrettably they are still sitting in international organizations. They have created a lot of obstacles to our work.

VANCE: I would add that we also don’t believe that Heng Samrin represents the will of the Kampuchean people. We believe these people want to have free choice to determine what their government should be.

HVL: We are talking with the same sense, the same meaning—that is how to get the Kampuchean people to exercise self-determination. Now you don’t believe they are exercising self-determination, but I believe soon you will. I tell you truly they are masters of their country. They are supported by their inhabitants, but outside forces are creating difficulties to this process. The Kampuchean people have regained independence and freedom. They know how to defend their rights. We believe the outside forces will finally fail.

VANCE: We believe there should be no outside force: no Chinese force; no Vietnamese force.

HVL: We don’t want to stay. Do you believe we want to stay?

VANCE: We hope you get out. That would remove one of our obstacles.

HVL: As long as the threat of aggression by the Peking authorities still exists, they will remain. As soon as it stops, Vietnamese troops will be withdrawn at the request of the Kampuchean people. They will not stay one day longer.

VANCE: We understand your concerns, the concerns you express about a possible second attack. To the extent we can do anything about it, we will oppose it and try to prevent it from happening.

HVL: I hope I can believe what you say is true.

VANCE: Believe me. This is true.

HVL: Yes, I do. But your intent and your statement should be proved by evidence, by action, so our people can believe it

VANCE: One other point. I am very worried about the situation along the Thai border. It is very dangerous. I note that Pham Van Dong has said you have no intention to attack Thailand, but I am frankly worried.

HVL: I will inform my government of your concern. As far as the tension along the border, in our view it is false and artificial. The leaders in Southeast Asian countries and the mass media say that Vietnam is not going to attack Thailand. At the same time, they say that there exists a danger of aggression by Vietnam. This is a contradiction. This proves it is artificial.

HOLBROOKE: But the situation there could erupt without anyone wanting it to.

VANCE: What Dick is saying is that incidents can occur that explode into larger things, not that you won’t keep your word.

HOLBROOKE: Last week I saw Nguyen Co Thach.⁵ He told me that you won’t attack Thailand. At the same time, I traveled along the border and I can tell you that the tension is real. The Thai government is prepared to defend its territories, as any country must. The Vietnamese are fighting the Pol Pot remnants on Kampuchean soil. While I was there artillery rounds from Kampuchea fell into Thailand and the Thais returned the fire. We are concerned that the forces fighting each other inside Kampuchea will spill over and fight each other inside Thailand. This could involve Thailand. As you know we have announced that we have stepped up our aid to Thailand. In doing this, we are not involved in support of any one side, but we are simply helping our own ally defend its own territory.

HVL: I have nothing to say about your concern over that situation. Only when we believe each other can we settle this. The Thais say they won’t attack Kampuchea. We want to believe that. To ease the difficulty on the border we are arranging for Thai and Vietnamese officials to meet with each other.

VANCE: This is a very good step.

HOLBROOKE: That would be very helpful.

At this point the meeting was concluded with pleasantries.

1. Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, Box 17652, New York Meetings, 1978–1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Kenneth M. Quinn (EA) on November 6. The meeting took place in the Chinese Lounge at UN Headquarters.
2. Presumably the statement issued on November 1 by the Kampuchean Government; see Henry Kamm, “Cambodia Impasse: Political and Human Needs in Conflict,” New York Times, November 2, 1979, p. A8.
3. Senators Sasser, Danforth, and Baucus. See foonote 4, Document 67.
4. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. A brief summary of the meeting is in telegram 293558 to Bangkok, November 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790519–0224)
5. Presumably the meeting on October 23; see Document 64.