Office of the Historian

51. Memorandum From Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, May 16, 1979

SUBJECT

  • Vietnam (U)

Cy Vance has sent the President a poorly reasoned memorandum on Vietnam.2 I have annotated my reaction on the next page.3 (C)

The idea is Holbrooke’s, who raised it at our Monday East Asia group meeting.4 I am opposed, not so much on China grounds as on grounds of constancy and credibility. We told the Vietnamese in September that if they invaded Cambodia or drew closer to the Soviets, normalization was not in the cards.5 They made their choice; now let them live with the consequences for awhile. Can we not learn patience? (S)

Holbrooke wishes Oakley to meet the Vietnamese solely to condemn their behavior in Cambodia and to decry the Soviet presence. But would others believe us? (S)

Would the Vietnamese not sense that the very willingness to talk represents a change in position? And Cy affirms that this would be a change. If we are to change, then should we not consult our allies and China first? And if to enter a dialogue is a change, then should it occur before or after the Brezhnev Summit?6 Will our complaints to the Soviets about Cam Ranh Bay, etc., be more or less plausible if we just began talks with Vietnam? Less, I should think. (S)

I have drafted an appropriate cover memorandum from you to the President at Tab I.7 (U)

Nick Platt disagrees. He feels that we lose nothing by maintaining communication with Hanoi. By doing so we are being responsive to the requests of other allies in the region, including the Japanese and [Page 184] our ASEAN partners. Platt would hate to see us work ourselves into a position where we had to be sure of a positive response before opening a dialogue. Such a practice could produce a situation of a long hiatus.8 (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

That when the subject comes up on Friday (May 18), you recommend that: (a) State develop a strategy paper with options on dealing with Vietnam (Holbrooke consistently has refused to develop a PRM-type policy memorandum, knowing—I believe—how weak his argumentation would be on paper.); (b) we talk first with ASEAN, Japan, and China; and (c) we postpone any initiative with Hanoi until after the Brezhnev Summit.9 (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 33, Chron, 5/1–16/79. Secret. Sent for action.↩
  2. See Document 50.↩
  3. Attached but not printed is a copy of Vance’s May 16 memorandum, on which Oksenberg wrote extensive comments.↩
  4. May 14. No minutes of this meeting have been found.↩
  5. See Documents 26 and 27.↩
  6. The Summit was held in Vienna June 16–18. Documentation is in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union.↩
  7. Attached but not printed is an unsigned version of Document 52.↩
  8. Oksenberg added “denying us flexibility a la US-China relations in the past” by hand.↩
  9. Neither the approve nor the disapprove option was selected.↩