Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

268. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 31, 1980, 10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with Malcolm Fraser, Prime Minister of Australia

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • Mr. Claytor
  • VAdm Hanson, Dir, Joint Staff
  • DASD/ISA Mr. Murray
  • Ambassador Philip Alston
  • Deputy Asst Secretary State, Evelyn Colbert
  • DASD/ISA Mr. Platt
  • LTC Eirich, Assistant for Australia/ISA (note taker)

• Australian

  • Malcolm Fraser
  • Michael McKellar, Minister attending the Prime Minister
  • Sir Geoffrey Yeend, Head, Prime Minister’s Department
  • Sir Nicholas Parkinson, Australian Amb.
  • Adm Sir Anthony Synnot, Chief Defense Forces Staff
  • William Pritchett, Secretary of Defense
  • Peter Henderson, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. R.W. Furlonger, Director General, Office of National Assessments

Mr. Claytor: We appreciate the strong support you’ve given us in Iran² and Afghanistan.³ And the decisive measures you’ve taken. We need that kind of worldwide support.

Mr. Fraser: We believe the U.S. is right in these situations and that it’s not just the task of the U.S. We think the current situation is a long term problem, one that might last for the decade.

Mr. Claytor: We agree, but it’s not easy to convince everyone of the Soviets’ intentions.

Mr. Fraser: We would be interested to hear your plans. For our part we are willing to do more in our part of the world. We could make facilities available in Australia.

Mr. Claytor: They would be appreciated; it would be great to have an increased presence in your area. We are, of course, taking our own measures to strengthen our position.

We have new programs across the board, a 5½% increase in the FY 81 defense budget—the biggest increase in 15 years. It’s needed. Our five year defense program will increase 4½% each year so that at the end of the 5th year we will be spending 25% more than we are now.

Our immediate concentration will be on the MX missile to maintain equivalence with the Soviets.

We will also increase the Navy, 17 new ships, and an additional nuclear carrier. We need them because of the Indian Ocean deployment.

We will arm an additional division in Europe.

We will establish a Rapid deployment force. We are doing this on two fronts. We have been doing it in Europe to backup two divisions on the central front. We preposition heavy equipment there and then fly in the troops. It’s easy to fly in the troops.

For the Indian Ocean we’ll contract for some RO-RO ships that will carry enough supplies and equipment for a half a division. We plan to send the ships to Diego Garcia. This means we will be able to deploy this force into the area within 5 to 7 days instead of 30 days with enough equipment or supplies for 10–15 days. We will have this capability by the spring.

In the longer term we will have a new special class of support ships by budget year 83.

Mr. Fraser: Will you be needing facilities in Australia?

Mr. Claytor: Yes, we plan to look at the problem.

Mr. Fraser: What kind of operations would you conduct?

Mr. Claytor: We will look for a homeport for carriers. Our problem is the six month turn around period. Longer periods with men away from their families cause personnel problems. Homeports near the operating areas are a great advantage. A homeport on the Indian Ocean would be attractive, if feasible.

Adm Synnot: Maintenance requirements would pose a problem at Perth.

Mr. Claytor: We would use dry dock facilities at Singapore or Subic Bay when required but could return to Perth between deployments.

Homeporting in Japan has worked well. In addition to the ship, there is also the problem of maintenance for the Air Wing.

ADM Synnot: You would almost need an air station to maintain the aircraft.

Mr. Claytor: That’s right and then there is the problem of family housing. There would be about 6000 men on the carrier; 4000 of these would have families. We are looking into the requirements for dependent housing.

Mr. Fraser: Well I certainly think we should explore it. I know there are practical problems to overcome, but I don’t see why we couldn’t support a homeport in Australia. Let our people look at it. What are the other options?

Mr. Claytor: Combined operations.

ADM Synnot: Including Marines?

Mr. Claytor: That’s right, we’ll have Marine amphibious groups deployed to the Indian Ocean, and Marine exercises in Australia would be very good.

In addition to the Indian Ocean, I’m also concerned about the South Pacific. That’s an important area.

Mr. Fraser: We’re particularly aware of the importance of the area. We have allocated greater aid. The sums are small, but large relative to their small economies.

I urged Ohira to consider greater civilian aid to the islands. He said he would take a look at it. Our objective should be to keep the Soviets from playing around in the area. Later today I’ll tell the President we are prepared to increase aid to the Southeast Asian nations, and that Australia is willing to do more.⁴ The sooner we examine the establishment of joint bases, the better.

Mr. Claytor: We have been doing some internal studies—it involves a great deal of study. The Navy has to get its requirements together and then talk to you.

Mr. Fraser: I remember we talked about this ten years ago. We said then that they would be available.

Mr. Claytor: Ten years is about what it seems to take to get things like this done.

—We are also looking at other bases in Oman—Bob would you like to say something on that?

Mr. Murray: They received us well in the countries we toured in December, Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. All of them said we were welcome to use the available facilities but that we should keep our presence low key, integrate into the area, and use local workers. They are worried about the Soviets. They understand America’s responsibility and want to help.

We think we’ll soon be able to use Mombasa for carriers. With the triangle of Mombasa, Oman and Diego, we’ll have a reasonably good support arrangement for our operations in that area. We would like to use air facilities in Somalia and Oman for air search operations and we’ve been talking to Egypt about its air fields. We need as many airfields as we can get.

This would allow us greater flexibility if some become unavailable.

Mr. Fraser: Are you doing more in Diego? Are the facilities there being expanded?

Mr. Claytor: Yes, our five year plan show improvements in runways and P.O.L. facilities.

Adm Synnot: Will it be able to handle B–52s.

Mr. Claytor: Yes, when we’ve extended the runways and expanded the aprons.

I spent a day out there when I was Secretary of the Navy. I was very impressed. We could put the whole Seventh Fleet in the lagoon if we dredged it. Best of all there are no people there. Only the environmentalists complain about our presence. There are some wild donkeys there that they are worried about.

Adm Hanson: The liberty is not good.

Adm Synnot: Morale won’t be very high on those depot ships.

Mr. Claytor: Those will be civilian crews, highly paid and rotated periodically. I’d be worried if Marines were on those ships.

Mr. Fraser: Would the Marine groups be located at Diego.

Mr. Claytor: The Marines would rotate in and out of the area and would use the materiel on the depot ships during unopposed landings. In the new budget we do have money for a new class of amphibious ships, the LSD–41, which we would use for opposed landings. We believe the most likely case will be an unopposed landing where we’ll be able to move our heavy equipment in with administrative landings. These prepositioned ships will give us that capability.

Mr. Fraser: What about Australian airfields as transit facilities?

Mr. Murray: We might need them, but plan is now to move our flights through Europe and the Mid East.

Mr. Fraser: What are some of the things we could do?

Adm Synnot: We have limited capabilities compared to the U.S. We have one P–3c squadron with an ASW capability, and we would not be able to accelerate our current operations very much.

—We could make port calls in areas that are inaccessible to the U.S. Navy—in India for instance.

—We would take over some of the patrolling of the Malacca straits and parts of the Southern Indian Ocean. We have access to the air facilities at Tengah and Butterworth.

Mr. Claytor: Great Idea.

Mr. Fraser: We had been thinking of removing our presence at Butterworth, but that would have to be reassessed.

I’m thinking of exploring a revival of the Five Power Agreement⁵ in London. That arrangement is in being, but has been rather dead from the start.

Mr. Claytor: We’d like to see more of the Royal Navy with the French in the Indian Ocean.

Adm Synnot: They make about one deployment a year.

Mr. Claytor: The French have a very big presence in Djibouti. We are seeking to encourage the UK to establish a permanent token force in the Indian Ocean.

Adm. Synnot: I recall that the UK sent a task force to the Med that released U.S. ships. They’ve also sent an Army unit to Oman.

Mr. Claytor: We appreciate the opportunity to exercise with the Melbourne in the RIMPAC exercise.

Would the Melbourne be able to participate in an Indian Ocean exercise?

Adm. Synnot: It couldn’t go for a while. I doubt if it could have anything there until after the middle of the year.

Mr. Claytor: We could coordinate the carrier deployments. We have 26 ships in the Indian Ocean now with carrier groups scheduled to be rotated.

Mr. Fraser: Our actions are important to the perception of the Southeast Asian nations. A number of factors have caused doubts within these countries. I believe the Soviet challenge will be outside Europe in the Third World.

Mr. Claytor: I agree, it will not be in Europe provided our presence there is not an easy mark.

Mr. Fraser: I believe the Soviets will conclude a war in Europe would be too costly—what kind of Europe would they have left after a big war?

—Because the threat will be in the Third World I never believed in the idea of an Indian Ocean balance. Suharto and I both supported increased forces in the Indian Ocean.

—I think the President’s speech⁶ gives us a good base to build on, at least it exhibited a change of course.

Mr. Claytor: Our course is now set and we intend to increase speed.

Mr. Fraser: ASEAN will have greater self confidence if it sees a renewed interest on the part of the U.S. There has been some doubt about U.S. interest in this part of the world. The Nixon doctrine⁷ said you’re on your own. ASEAN felt lonely. You don’t need to be the world’s policeman or offer blank checks, but it’s important to show interest in the independence and sovereignty of these countries.

Mr. Claytor: I agree, but we really couldn’t do that because of internal factors. Now the Vietnam syndrome is just about over. People in the U.S. were anti-military. They didn’t like people in uniform. Now we’ve had requests for our reservists to wear their uniforms. The President’s speech couldn’t have been made when he took office. They would have hounded him out of Washington.

Mr. Fraser: In my view our efforts must be for the long haul; we must pay attention to the Third World, particularly ASEAN. We must give them the confidence to say in public what they say in private.

Mr. Claytor: The Soviets have helped us in this. They scared the Third World. These countries can see that a treaty of friendship with the Russians is an invitation to an invasion and the killing of their presidents.

Mr. Fraser: Yes it has certainly strengthened the conviction of some of the leaders like Moi in Kenya.

What are we doing to implement these ideas.

Adm Synnot: We will work out the details—most likely with CINCPAC.

Mr. Claytor: Our study on the homeport requirement is not really finished. It’s probably a month away.

Mr. Fraser: I think we could sort out the homeporting problems, but it’s an issue we will have to think about some more.

Adm Synnot: A large aircraft carrier would create some big problems.

Mr. Fraser: Perth is a good city.

Amb Alston: Would they welcome the idea of a homeport?

Mr. Fraser: The Premier of Western Australia guarantees it. They’re more reactionary out there than in the East.

Mr. Pritchett: What about Pakistan?

Mr. Claytor: Brzezinski and McGiffert are going there today to look at the problems from a military and economic perspective. The problem is to presuade the Indians that Pakistan is not a threat. Almost all of Pakistan’s Army is on the eastern border. They wouldn’t move it to the west unless political conditions change. Is there anything that can be done to improve relations with India?

Mr. Fraser: Peacock’s recent discussions with Indira⁸ indicate she is still sympathetic to the Russians.

Mr. Murray: The Carrington mission was helpful.

Mr. Fraser: She insists on bringing up unhelpful things like why we didn’t condemn China as strongly when it invaded Vietnam.

Mr. Murray: We intend to send Clark Clifford to see her in the near future.

Mr. Claytor: What about Japan? Harold Brown had some discussions with Ohira on increasing their defense forces and taking some of the pressure off us. What do you see for the Japanese role?

Mr. Fraser: There’s a great deal of political sensitivity in ASEAN. They fear China, also the Russians. Japanese ships would not be acceptable yet within ASEAN. We are close to the Japanese, but we might feel uncomfortable about a Japanese fleet in Sydney harbor. Perhaps they could do more work in the north Pacific.

Mr. Claytor: They could do more around their home islands—ASW work—they would not be a threat to anyone else there. We’d like to see them do more, but it’s a sensitive issue.

Mr. Platt: The climate has changed in Japan. When Harold Brown asked Ohira for increased defense expenditures the request was publicized and the reaction was not negative. This would have been unthinkable two or three years ago.

Mr. Pritchett: Will Clifford mention the plans for Kenya to Indira?

Mr. Murray: It’s not a part of the formal briefing, but it could come up. Part of his objective is to explain our actions in the Indian Ocean. We plan to indicate that our interest in Pakistan is not a threat to India.

Mr. Fraser: One person who could approach Indira might be Harry Lee. He respects Indira, he liked her strong government and had little use for Desai. Do we have an assessment of the relationship? Lee is on our side on most of these issues.

Synnot: How do we publicize our discussions? No specifics, additional discussions are required, common and independent actions for regional security.

Mr. Fraser: We’ve said we would be willing to increase patrols in the Indian Ocean. We could say we discussed that without being specific. We could say we were laying the ground work for staging facilities. We wouldn’t be specific on homeporting. Greater numbers of exercises, land, air, and sea.

Adm Synnot: Contributions to air patrols.

Mr. Fraser: We’ll note our offer for greater assistance to ASEAN. On the question of increased Australian defense forces, we’ll say more than what we’ve been doing.

Mr. Pritchett: Cultivate defense contacts in the region. We will have on-going discussions, I suppose mainly with CINCPAC, but you will probably want to have a policy input from back here.

Mr. Claytor: That’s right, we’ll look at that. We appreciate all of your proposals.

Mr. Murray: Australia has gone to war with us the last four times. I hope we don’t have to do it again.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–83–0218, 1, Fraser Visit, 1980. Secret. The meeting took place at Blair House.
2. Iranian students took 52 Americans hostage on November 4, 1979. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vols. X and XI, Part 1 and Part 2.
3. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began on December 24, 1979. Documentation on the invasion and the U.S. response is in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union.
4. See Document 269.
5. Reference is to the 1971 Five Power Defense Arrangement among the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore, in which member countries would consult if there were an armed attack on Malaysia or Singapore.
6. Reference is to Carter’s January 23 State of the Union speech. For the text of the speech, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 138.
7. See <ref target="frus1977-1980v01#d29"><hi rend="italic">Foreign Relations</hi>, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 29</ref>.
8. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.