Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

267. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 25, 1979

SUBJECT

• ANZUS Breakfast

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador McHenry
  • Mr. Holbrooke
  • Ambassador Alston
  • Mrs. Colbert

• New Zealand

  • Secretary of MFA Frank Corner
  • Ambassador to the UN H.H. Francis

• Australia

  • Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock
  • Ambassador to the UN H.D. Anderson
  • Private Secretary Robert Gordon

The Secretary suggested that the group take up Indochina as its first order of business. There was general agreement that Kampuchean relief was the most urgent immediate problem and that it was necessary to put heavy and concerted pressure on the Vietnamese to break the deadlock in Phnom Penh and to accept arrangements that would make it possible for the relief effort to go forward. Mr. Corner reported that he had raised this issue with Phan Hien the previous day. Phan Hien, while dismissing accounts of famine as exaggerated had, nevertheless said that UNICEF could come. Mr. Holbrooke suggested that when Mr. Peacock saw Phan Hien later in the day he should stress the urgency of the problem and make it clear to him that the ANZUS countries, ASEAN, the Japanese and others all feel very strongly about it.

Turning to the military situation, Holbrooke noted that the dry season offensive was already under way. The military outcome is unpredictable but there can be no doubt of certain consequences: the Vietnamese will advance; there will be a vast increase in Kampuchean refugees and in starvation; pressures on the Thai border will increase; and, in the end, Kampuchea will be destroyed. Political tensions in Thailand could also increase. [2½ lines not declassified] Corner remarked that Phan Hien in talking of Thai cooperation with Pol Pot and the Chinese, had urged that if Heng Samrin forces tangled with the Thai it would be important to keep cool. Vietnam does not intend to molest Thailand. Nevertheless, Ambassador Francis observed, it was obvious that Vietnam intended to cross the border. All agreed with the Secretary’s comment that the situation was ominous.

Meanwhile, Holbrooke continued, no one can predict what the Chinese will do. They have said they are not planning another massive offensive. But it was clear from the difference between their comments to him in July and those to the Vice President six weeks later that their position has hardened considerably.² They are backing Pol Pot all out. They charge that the Vietnamese are now wholly Soviet puppets and will take years to learn that they must change their policies. Pol Pot must be supported as the only effective resistance to the Vietnamese. The United States and Japan are naive in talking about a political solution.

Peacock observed that this same line had been reflected in the Chinese demarches in Canberra and Wellington where, as we all knew, they had completely misrepresented the U.S. position.

Corner, observing that Phan Hien had also stressed to him the total Vietnamese subservience to the Russians, wondered about the extent to which this was really true. Past experience had suggested that the Vietnamese were fiercely independent. The Secretary agreed that this was the case; despite their present heavy dependence on the Russians, which they will find increasingly galling, the Vietnamese retain their independence. Even so, however, the Soviets have strengthened their position in the region, gradually building up installations which they can deny are bases. As the struggle goes on they will be able to strengthen their position; accordingly the longer it continues the happier they will be.

Corner observed that their unwillingness to subordinate themselves to any other country and their economic problems offered the main hope of detaching the Vietnamese from the Russians. Lee Kuan Yew at Lusaka, he observed, had pointed out, with some effect on the Africans, that while the Russians were effective in supplying military equipment to countries that want to go to war, countries that want to promote economic development must turn to the west. The same point applies to Vietnam.

The Secretary agreed that this is our principal lever; the real question is how to use it. The Vietnamese continue to press us on normalization and we continue to tell them that they must first clear away the obstacles. Meanwhile, Holbrooke observed, nothing can be done about a political settlement until the dry season fighting is over; the Vietnamese and the Chinese both want another test on the Khmer battlefield. Agreeing with this analysis, Peacock observed that over the next four months nothing more could be done beyond keeping up the pressure on troop withdrawal, refugees and famine. He asked whether the Secretary would be raising the Vietnam issue with the Russians. Responding affirmatively, the Secretary observed that it would probably be only for the record.

The Secretary then raised the problem of orchestrating tactics in the UN; what would be the best way to proceed. Holbrooke responded that the Thai would take the lead and would play the PRC game—perhaps too much so. Ambassador McHenry noted that while the ASEAN-sponsored item is on the agenda, the ASEANs don’t seem to know as yet exactly what they have in mind. Clearly, however, they would like a GA resolution that would do what the Security Council failed to do and they are concerned lest the humanitarian issues overshadow the political one. They seem to have a withdrawal resolution in mind, but they have not yet decided on what the best procedures would be.

Winding up the discussion of Indochina, Holbrooke observed that the Japanese had also seen Phan Hien on Monday³ and took the same line with him that the ANZUS countries were taking. We were asking the Japanese to link their actual aid deliveries to progress on refugees. Peacock speculated that pressure to resume aid will rise in Australia but that the cabinet would stand firm on this. Corner reported that the only remaining New Zealand aid program—training for Vietnamese students in New Zealand—had now been suspended by Hanoi, reflecting the much harder line the Vietnamese were now taking toward his country.

The Secretary then provided an account of developments in the Middle East. The West Bank-Gaza talks, he said, were going forward slowly and he expects that by the end of 1979 agreement will have been reached on modalities and major issues. With respect to powers and responsibilities, there is already 60–70% agreement. The key issues on which agreement has not yet been reached are essentually political: how to deal with common lands and how to deal with water. Sadat is satisfied with the progress that has been made to date. He will continue carefully building up his personal relations with Begin. The situation in Lebanon, however, is extremely worrisome. Without a real truce, we can have a catastrophe; the Syrians keep challenging the Israelis and getting clobbered. We will all have to work together to put the pieces together. Stabilization in Lebanon is particularly important since it also buys time for the West Bank/Gaza settlement.

The Secretary continued by describing the arrangements under which US monitoring will proceed in the Sinai until the end of the three year withdrawal period in 1982. We hope that one year before—in April 1981,—it will be possible to put in UNEF or some sort of multilateral force. We have insisted very strongly to both parties that in addition to the US there should also be some form of UN presence in the interests of all concerned. Egypt is strongly positive; Israel is strongly negative.

Peacock then raised the issue of the helicopter unit Australia had contributed to UNEF. The Defense Department he said was very anxious to get the unit back and these pressures were intensified in Canberra by uncertainty over whether the UN would provide the necessary logistic support if the helicopters remained and over financial support. However he is prepared to have them remain if this would be helpful and Prime Minister Fraser also takes this position. The Secretary responded that it would be extremely helpful if the Australians could delay their decision for a couple of weeks. Peacock said that this could be done and that he would cable Canberra to this effect immediately.

Peacock, referring to the Secretary’s reference in his GA speech to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, observed that it would be very important to have it in place before the NPT conference. The key problem the Secretary said was the difference between Britain and the USSR on the permissible number of acoustic stations. Peacock agreed to join the US in urging the British to be more flexible. New Zealand, Corner said, will once again be a sponsor of the GA resolution on nuclear testing. It has usually been able to exert a moderating influence. This year, however, because so little progress has been made on the CTB, the pressure for demanding a moratorium will probably be much stronger and, if this is the concensus, New Zealand will have to go along. Australia, however, is less convinced that the consensus will develop along these lines.

In anticipation of the Secretary’s meeting later in the day with Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Minister Olewale,⁴ Peacock suggested that the Secretary bear in mind that Olewale is paranoid about decolonization in the Pacific. The Australians, who had succeeded in redrafting the Forum decolonization resolution, had told Olewale that the more you go after the French publicly, the nastier they get. The French don’t mind references to self-determination, but they don’t want to be held to a set schedule. If there is a call for independence by the people of the territory they will respond, but this is unlikely in the case of New Caledonia. Corner, agreeing with Peacock’s analysis, said that Olewale seems to be becoming more aware of French sensitivities. He had reminded Olewale, citing New Zealand’s experience, that the French, much more than other Western countries, are likely to retaliate in the trade and aid fields.

The discussion closed with a brief mention of Indian Ocean affairs. Peacock expressed his gratification with the Secretary’s statement that negotiations with the Russians on this subject were unlikely to resume any time soon and reiterated Australian interest in being kept informed.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241,Vance Exdis Memcons, 1979. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Evelyn Colbert (EA) on October 1; distribution approved in S/S on October 9. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s suite at the UN Plaza.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Documents 252 and 265.
3. September 24.
4. See footnote 3, Document 143.