Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

17. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 30, 1977

PARTICIPANTS

• SRV side

  • Nguyen Co Thach, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
  • Cu Dinh Ba, Counsellor, SRV UN Mission
  • Ha Huy Tam, 2nd Secretary and Interpreter

• US side

  • Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
  • Kenneth M. Quinn, Special Assistant to Mr. Holbrooke
  • Timothy Carney, Acting Country Director
  • Judith Johnson, Notetaker

THACH: I speak English very badly. Mr. Tam will translate. (The meeting continued in Vietnamese and English with Tam interpreting.)

Today we are very glad to receive you here. Mr. Phan Hien has talked to me very much about you. Phan Hien has good memories about you. Of course, the issue has not yet been fully settled but relations between the two persons are good. Yesterday Mr. Ngo Dien let me know you had the desire to meet me. That is why today I arranged time to meet you. I am ready to hear anything you have to say to me. Of course, I want to hear pleasant words.

HOLBROOKE: I am very glad we could find time to meet today. In my view it is not important who asked for the meeting, but what is said in the meeting. Yesterday I had a very friendly and useful exchange² of views with Mr. Ngo Dien during which I outlined some views which concerned our immediate relations and some longer-range concerns of our policy in Asia.

T: I have been informed of this by Mr. Ngo Dien.

H: In addition, in May and June I had 14 hours of extremely useful exchanges with Mr. Phan Hien.³ And I appreciate your words concerning our personal relationship. I share those views entirely. Since I spoke yesterday at length, perhaps you would like to comment on those views, since Ngo Dien said that I would receive a reply at a later date.

T: I must say that it is quite strange, a surprise, what I heard from Mr. Ngo Dien from the talks yesterday. I do not want in our first meeting that we talk unsatisfactory words.

It surprises me because you wanted to meet us, and not us you. In Paris you put up to us the question of this meeting. You said you had three alternatives of meetings: 1) a meeting between the two Ministers; 2) a meeting between Ministers accompanied by Mr. Habib and on our side Mr. Nguyen Co Thach; and 3) the third possibility, a meeting between Mr. Habib and myself. We put the question as to why we did not choose to meet Mr. Habib? And why we did not choose the meeting of the two Ministers accompanied by their two assistants? The reason is that if now a meeting is held between Habib and me it is just like a meeting between Mr. Holbrooke and Mr. Phan Hien. The questions cannot be settled because the persons of Holbrooke and Phan Hien cannot settle it. It means we cannot settle the question. I think that this is not the case. On the contrary, Mr. Phan Hien told me that Mr. Holbrooke is a person we can speak to. So we think that if the meeting is held on the one hand between Holbrooke and Phan Hien or on the other hand between Habib and Nguyen Co Thach, then it is really at the same level. There is no difference between the two alternatives. Why should we replace a meeting between Phan Hien and Holbrooke with a meeting between Habib and Nguyen Co Thach? Could it be because Phan Hien and Holbrooke couldn’t settle the problem? No, we don’t think so. We think that now a meeting between the two Ministers at high level to settle the deadlock is the right thing. And if you have anything new, that would be a good thing. Otherwise the two sides may just meet and clarify their positions. That too would be a good thing. But it is not our request. You requested this meeting. (I ask) whether or not there is anything new for our side.

I am a man who is very straightforward and Americans who negotiated with me know this. I think Kissinger and Sullivan have that impression. That is why I want to say straight-forwardly . . . I want to clarify this thing. I regret that the first things we say to each other are very unpleasant, but I hope you understand. If it helps us to understand one another our meeting will be very useful. I want to add our Minister is very unsatisfied.

H: Mr. Minister, you have the reputation among Americans you have dealt with of being very frank, very direct. Today you have proved it to me.

T: I thought we demonstrated that to you.

H: The next time I see Ambassador Sullivan or Mr. Kissinger I will tell them you are the same—just as direct as ever.

I am a little unclear on what you have said. I would like to ask my associate to help me clarify it.

(Holbrooke and Quinn then conferred.)

Is his (Mr. Quinn’s) Vietnamese very good?

QUINN: (In Vietnamese) It’s not so much.

T: It is very good.

H: I think that we have two questions we should be discussing. One is whether or not our two Ministers will meet each other in New York during the General Assembly. That is a question which I think should be settled by the two Ministers. I understand your position as you have explained it to me.

The other question is that of a much broader relationship between our two countries. Here I am fully authorized by the President and the Secretary of State to discuss our position with you and explain and clarify the position we have taken in the past. If you will permit me I would like to add a few comments to what I have said in the past to Mr. Phan Hien and Mr. Ngo Dien.

T: Now about the first question. I have a question. I have already referred to the three possibilities which you mentioned in Paris. Before raising three possibilities that you raised in Paris, we put this question and you yourself answered the question. That is why you met with us in Paris: to have this meeting in New York, to have a meeting between our two Ministers in New York. So now, if you put the question of whether to have a meeting here, you put the cart before the horse. Because you thought it useful then, you raised it in Paris. Also we replied to you that we will have that meeting. We also thought the meeting would be useful and said we were ready. If we had had in mind that it would not be useful, we would not have been ready to agree to a meeting.

As for the second question, we are ready to hear you. We can spare the whole afternoon to receive you.

H: On the first question, I believe I understand your view more clearly now and I want to repeat it to be sure I understand exactly what you said.

You were saying that during our meetings in Paris I indicated to Phan Hien that there might be a continuation of our meetings in New York at one of three levels. You further understood that I proposed either the level of the Foreign Ministers, the level of Habib and yourself, or finally a continuation of meetings between Phan Hien and myself.

T: I think there is some confusion here.

H: That is why I asked to repeat your statements to you.

T: Mr. Pratt, your first secretary in Paris, met Mr. Do Thanh.

H: Now I understand. This is what Mr. Pratt said to your Mr. Do Thanh.

T: Yes, at the beginning of September. (Thach then said in English: “In the first half of September.”)

H: I understand, and I want to confirm what I understand your position is. I understand that you feel that the mid-level is not a useful level. If problems arise that Phan Hien and I cannot resolve then the Foreign Ministers would be the appropriate level for discussion. I understand your position quite well. If that is your position, I have nothing more I can say this afternoon on this position. If you will allow me to go on to the second position.

T: I have some more to say. We do not want to have the misunderstanding that Mr. Holbrooke and Mr. Phan Hien cannot settle the problem at their levels, and that Mr. Phan Hien and Mr. Holbrooke must be replaced by the Habib and Nguyen Co Thach level. This is a misunderstanding. We want to respect the talks between Phan Hien and Holbrooke.

H: I am glad we took all this time to go into it because now I will be able to explain your position more precisely.

Mr. Minister, this is the first time we have met. Since your reputation for frankness, clarity of thought and decisiveness is well known, allow me to make a few remarks to you about US-SRV relations.

First, I want to repeat to you our government’s warm welcome to the United Nations and to welcome your permanent delegation to US soil.

T: Thank you.

H: It is a source of gratification to the most senior members of the US Government that this long and bitter issue is finally and completely resolved. I know that you noted Ambassador Young’s welcoming speech. He is a member of the Cabinet of the United States Government. You also noted the presence of senior American officials at Secretary Waldheim’s reception for the Vietnamese delegation.

T: We understand your goodwill.

H: I mentioned yesterday to Mr. Ngo Dien that the President would be in New York next week and would be hosting a luncheon for Asian heads of delegations and permanent representatives to the UN and that Mrs. Johnson had issued an invitation to the Vietnamese Mission in the President’s name through Mr. Kiet.⁴ Did you receive that invitation?

T: (Thach and Ha Huy Tam conferred) Yes, Mr. Kiet. This morning Mr. Thach was in a meeting of the non-aligned countries but our associates may know that.

H: The US Government hopes that we will have a sound working relationship with the Vietnamese delegation to the UN. We will approach that relationship in the spirit of goodwill and mutual benefit and respect.

I know that you have a very busy schedule at the UN. I believe that in making time for this meeting today both sides are demonstrating their desire for an improvement in the atmosphere and the substance of our relations. For our part, that is certainly the case.

As I explained to Mr. Ngo Dien yesterday, we very much want to continue fruitful productive contacts with Vietnam. In this respect the US Government believes that my talks with Mr. Phan Hien were successful in making progress on some issues and in coming to better understanding of the positions of both sides on other issues. At the same time, we want to try to make future meetings beneficial so that we can continue to improve our relations. We wish to avoid sterile exchanges or meetings which might in fact harm our developing relationship. It was for this reason, Mr. Minister, that I wrote to Vice Minister Phan Hien during the summer.⁵ It was my feeling that another negotiating session at that time would have actually hurt our relations. This judgment was made on the basis of my assessment of the mood and situation that existed in the United States at that time—among American public opinion and in the Congress.

(The meeting was interrupted by a telephone call from Mr. Oakley for Mr. Holbrooke. Mr. Carney took the call in the next room and the meeting continued.)

T: How long can we continue?

H: As long as we have things to say. If we run out of time today I can find time to continue our discussions tomorrow.

T: I think your assessment this summer not to have further meetings at that time was correct because at that time you were making trips through Southeast Asia and to the ASEAN nations which were against Vietnam, and that is not conducive to our relations. You also helped those countries against us.

H: Let me be very frank, Mr. Minister. The reason I wrote my letter to Phan Hien had absolutely nothing to do with ASEAN. It was based on the domestic political mood, and the mood in this country. There is simply no possibility that it was related to ASEAN. As I told Mr. Ngo Dien yesterday, our policy in Southeast Asia is directed against no country.

T: Your arms and ammunition are used now against Laos and Cambodia.

H: We are not at all involved in military activities now taking place along the Lao-Thai or the Thai-Cambodian borders. ASEAN is not a military alliance. SEATO, which was a military alliance, officially went out of business on June 30 of this year. There is no longer a SEATO headquarters in Bangkok. The United States Government was in favor of the end of SEATO. ASEAN is not a replacement for SEATO. ASEAN is an economic block of diverse countries of Southeast Asia. You have different relations with each of the countries of ASEAN. The United States has different relations with each of the countries of ASEAN. But we want friendly relations with all the countries of ASEAN and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. We pose no threat to Vietnam. President Carter has stated that and I can reaffirm that here.

Phan Hien raised in Paris the question of American involvement in activities along the Lao-Thai border. I told him then that we were not involved there but, when I returned to Washington, I called all the US Government agencies which operate in the area and verified that fact. I repeat again today that the United States is not involved in such activities nor does it encourage these activities. I would hope both the United States and Vietnam could encourage our respective friends—that is, for us the Thai, and for you the Lao Government—to exercise the same restraint which your government and mine are exercising.

We have recently completed the first US-ASEAN discussions ever held.⁶ These discussions were conducted by Under Secretary Cooper and other associates of mine. These talks centered on economic assistance, trade, commodity controls and other economic issues. I can absolutely assure you that there was no discussion of any issues of a security nature. No American in our delegation had the authority or competence to discuss these issues. If you have any doubts on this matter, I would invite you to ask the Foreign Ministers or Finance Ministers of any of the five members of ASEAN.

Last week I was in Manila on a very different issue. The purpose of my meeting in Manila was to explore with the Government of the Philippines on what basis the U.S. military bases in the Philippines will remain.⁷ We did not reach final decisions but we did agree to a process which both sides believe will result in a mutually satisfactory outcome. The United States has a long-standing treaty commitment to the Philippines and we have two important military installations there. These installations and this treaty commitment are for the defense of the Philippines. But they are not a threat to any other nation. I am aware of the fact that your nation may have some doubts about what I have just stated. But history and common sense should demonstrate that these bases will never be used in a way that would threaten Vietnam.

What we seek in Southeast Asia, in the aftermath of a long and bloody war, is a peaceful and stable region in which the nations of the area, having resolved their differences, can live in peace and harmony on the basis of respect for their independence, sovereignty and integrity. Mr. Minister, I want to stress, as I did yesterday to Mr. Ngo Dien, that we are ready to do what can be done to demonstrate that this is our policy in this region.

Yesterday, Mr. Minister, I mentioned to Mr. Ngo Dien the atmosphere that existed in the U.S. Congress, and I want to mention this point to you. Since I first met with Mr. Phan Hien in Paris on May 4, a large number of amendments and laws have been proposed in the Congress which are, frankly, designed not only to prevent any form of American assistance to Vietnam, but also to demonstrate the strong feelings of many congressmen and members of the American public. In my letter to Phan Hien and again yesterday in my conversation with Ngo Dien, I drew your Government’s attention to the fact that the Administration has opposed as many of these amendments as it could. But we have not been entirely successful because of the strong mood that exists. In Paris in June I said to Vice Minister Phan Hien that I hoped that if we moved forward to establish diplomatic relations, the mutual act, which benefits both nations, would result in an improvement of the atmosphere and mood. Even now, as we are meeting here in New York, our Congress is considering additional amendments.

In summary, Mr. Minister, I want to reaffirm our Administration’s goodwill and its willingness and desire to continue to improve our relations. We have demonstrated this goodwill by action and we hope that both sides can find ways to move forward together.

May I add one more thing? Mr. Quinn reminded me, and he is absolutely right, that at this very moment your Government is turning over to our representatives in Hanoi the remains of 22 Americans.⁸ We appreciate this action and recognize it as a move to improve relations.

T: Thank you very much for your clarification. But it makes it harder to understand—I take note of what you said that you want to demonstrate goodwill to us. But the words expressed by you and the words expressed by the Foreign Minister of Thailand are different. Our Foreign Minister, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, asked the Thai Foreign Minister why he always caused those activities against Laos and Kampuchea. He replied candidly that they are still imposed on by much pressure from outside. I don’t know what this comes from. Just yesterday he said this.

H: Did the Thai Foreign Minister say to you that the U.S. is pushing them into border incidents?

T: No, but we don’t know where the pressure comes from if not the U.S. because you still give military aid to Thailand. If you want to put an end to border incidents with Laos, end your military aid to Thailand. We don’t want to have a military threat from your bases . . .⁹

H: (Interrupting) There are no American bases in Thailand.

T: I recall a story when I had negotiations with the Philippines. I asked the Philippines, “When are you asking the U.S. to dismantle American military bases in your land?” They said those bases do not threaten you, and I replied that 50 million tons of bombs and shells we are not afraid of so the bases in the Philippines we are not afraid of. My question was just to know whether the Philippines’ “change their position” (said in English); whether they want friendship with us or whether they want to rely on foreign military aid to threaten us.

So I want to say that we do not fear the threat from you. But I want to know whether you have changed your position toward us.

I find that in your way of speaking, you think only on what you are interested in, but do not think about issues we are interested in. I think you understand the feelings of the Vietnamese people on the destruction caused by you. We understand the mood of the U.S. Congress, but you must understand the mood of the Vietnamese people. If both sides want to develop good-will, we will need to solve these problems.

You want to settle the question of MIA in a very good way. So, if the feelings of our people are on such a level and we cannot alleviate them, how can we settle it?

When Mr. Pratt raised with Mr. Do Thanh three alternatives of meetings, we also raised three possibilities of the meetings:

1. The two Foreign Ministers meet; they are able to settle the three problems that both sides are interested in;

2. A second possibility is that nothing could be settled;

3. If the three issues could not be settled, one small step, a small issue could be settled.

H: May I ask you a very frank question? If a meeting were held, do you see anything positive resulting from it?

T: Even the contact between the two ministers will be a good thing. Even if nothing is settled the two sides would understand better the positions.

H: I am just speaking hypothetically, but suppose the meetings gave the American Congress the idea that we were discussing something that the Congress is against. That would hurt our mutual objective because Congress would be angry.

T: As for that, we thought that you had it already in mind when you put forth the three levels of meetings. Because when you put forth three levels you must have thought of something favorable. We already thought you said that if the meetings were held in July or August, they would not be fruitful. So that is why I thought that some kind of favorable thing came up so you set forth the three levels. Maybe the Americans already had a careful thought and examination, so that is why they put forth those three levels.

And I think now that if . . . while the two ministers may meet . . . if all the three issues are not totally settled, your side may make some proposal to settle a small step that you have proposed in June in Paris. You proposed diplomatic relations and the settlement of the MIA issue. As for the assistance, it would be discussed later. That was already rejected. Now it is also rejected. Tomorrow and the day after, in the future, we will also reject it. If you have any other proposal, because you have a lot of imagination, so we would consider it, because the Americans have a good sense of imagination. But if the two sides meet and cannot settle anything, so that is still a good thing. But if you think that now is an unfavorable time, even though it is something you suggested, you can withdraw that suggestion. But if you think it is better that we meet, our Foreign Minister may postpone for some days his return to his country.

H: I must say frankly that this is a very difficult time. But I appreciate the spirit of frankness you have shown in your discussions with us today and I will report what you have said to the Secretary of State. I think this has been a very useful exchange today. I had heard about you Mr. Minister for some years and am happy to have met you at last.

I do believe it will take imagination, on both sides, for us to resolve the issues between us. Let me say with great frankness that it was an act of political courage of the President of the United States to send a mission to Hanoi; to send me to Paris; to remove certain restrictions on the movement of Vietnamese officials in New York; and, above all, to welcome your admission into the United Nations.

I would just like to close with one personal comment, and I would like you to think about my comment and to convey it to your Foreign Minister. That is, I have known President Carter almost three years and I have heard him talk about the US involvement in Vietnam many times. He is the first President since before Harry Truman who has not been involved in an American involvement in Indochina. Furthermore, his past background shows clearly that he was not involved in the tragic events of the past. He approaches relations with Vietnam in a spirit of goodwill. He does not believe that the American people can accept an obligation based on an interpretation of the past, but he does remain ready to seek an improvement in relations between our countries based on mutual respect and mutual benefit. You or your representative will have a chance to see him personally in New York on Wednesday,¹⁰ so you will be able to judge for yourself.

T: Concerning the matter that President Carter was not involved in Vietnam, that is a favorable thing. Secondly, concerning his personal character, he should have done more than he has done so far in regard to Vietnam.

H: Mr. Minister, we have done as much as we feel is possible.

T: As you know, no other nation is in a situation like ours. No other nation has had as heavy devastation. In history, no other nation had that kind of destruction. And then we organized the search for the remains of your MIA’s. That also took great courage. That also takes great confidence from our people. There are places where the people ask why people are living in those circumstances; and why the government does not settle this; and why they have to look for the remains of the men who bombed our country? They raise the question of why the United States did not compensate us and why we are now looking for American remains? Millions of Vietnamese were killed in the war and we have not found their remains. This is hard for us to explain. We have goodwill, and we have great difficulties. You have goodwill and difficulties. Under those circumstances, do you think we may move somewhat forward? That is the question before us in a realistic way.

H: I will have to leave in a moment, Mr. Minister, but I would just like to say we believe we have put forward a way of making progress: to begin the process of normalizing relations; to begin building bridges that must exist between two countries.

T: So now I would like to repeat that our Foreign Minister will be here until October 4th. He will be here until October 4th in case you want to meet with him. I myself will be here for some time longer.

1. Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, Box 17652, Transcript: 1977–1978 Nguyen C. Thach—Richard Holbrooke. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the SRV Mission to the United Nations.
2. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
3. See Documents 11–15.
4. Not further identified.
5. Telegram 148802 to Paris, June 26, contains the text of Holbrooke’s letter to Hien. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071–1814)
6. The first U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue took place in Manila September 8–10.
7. See Document 300.
8. See “Vietnam Returns the Remains of 22 Americans to U.S.”, New York Times, October 1, 1977, p. 3.
9. In the margin adjacent to this paragraph, a notation in an unknown hand reads, “Grant MAP in 1978.”
10. October 5.