300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, the White House, Department of Defense, and Commander in Chief, Pacific1
227946. Military addee handle as Specat Exclusive, Fol tel sent action SecState from Manila dtd 22 Sep 1977 DTG Z221239Z.
Qte White House for Brzezinski and Armacost, Jakarta for Ambassador Newsom, DOD/ISA for Abramowitz Eyes Only and CINCPAC for Admiral Weisner Eyes Only. Secret Manila 15019. Nodis. For the Secretary from Holbrooke. Please pass to Jakarta for Newsom only. Please pass to Armacost/NSC; Abramowitz/ISA; CINCPAC for Weisner. Subject: Holbrooke/Marcos Meeting.
1. In six hours of discussions today with Marcos we covered wide range of issues, reached few conclusions. Marcos indicated considerable flexibility on the timing of the conclusion of any agreements on the bases, although he seemed to prefer the idea of a resumption of the negotiations this year. He says he needs to finish the base issue before “normalization”. That is, before he holds elections. This would be sometime next year. Other hand, he questioned whether we should begin negotiations this year if congressional calendar precludes consideration until 1978. I explained our intention to consult closely with Congress and pointed out that content of agreement would affect timing.
2. He has not yet committed himself in any way on the question of size and composition of compensation package. Although we stated clearly that last year’s offer would be hard to match, I identified compensation package as most important item from US point of view. Marcos focused on the twin issues of sovereignty and legal jurisdiction over American servicemen under certain circumstances. I stressed that we had already accepted concept of Philippine sovereignty but that we had to retain for ourselves the right to determine whether or not an American serviceman alleged to have committed a crime was on official status or not—a key factor in Philippine eyes.
3. Marcos and Defense Minister Enrile stressed theme that under the War Powers Act,2 the value of American treaty commitment was either sharply reduced or eliminated. I said that this was simply not [Page 991] the case, and that the War Powers Act did not affect the validity of the treaty.
4. Marcos reacted with predictable anger at my raising of human rights issue, saying that he was fully committed to human rights and that, as a result of my raising the issue again, he was wondering if there was not a serious misunderstanding even in the State Department of all that he had done to promote human rights in the Philippines. I said that I did not come to Manila to tell him how to run his country, but that he must understand that the human rights situation would be an important ingredient in the American reaction to any package for the bases when submitted to Congress. In Marcos’ eyes, the only possible victims of any torture or unfair confinement have been Communists, and he professes not to know what all the shouting is about. Suggested GOP is being “blackmailed” by subversive elements appealing for external sympathy. Enrile said that it was clear that the Americans believed anything negative that opponents of the regime told us, while we did not believe them. Marcos at one point termed questioning GOP compliance “offensive,” and questioned the very value of trying to find a basis for new agreements at this time if there was such misunderstanding in the U.S. but later backed off this posture. Marcos concluded that GOP still has major human rights PR requirement in U.S.
5. We will conclude tomorrow. We did not expect any specific agreements to come out of today’s session, and none did. But with the notable and deliberate exception of compensation, we did hear their preliminary views on the entire range of issues that might come up between us during a negotiation, and we got a better sense of what Marcos wants. A recurrent theme was the lack of satisfaction with the existing consultative arrangements regarding our defense relationship. This was included in Marcos’ concerns about: the perceived vulnerability of the Philippines to attack due to our presence [less than 1 line not declassified], the need for a self-reliant defense posture, and characterization of the MDT as “useless” in resolving operational issues.
6. Marcos clearly expressed preference for informal discussions at a “political level” to resolve policy issues first, rather than a resumption of the unwieldy and unproductive formal talks. I agree with this preference, and believe that Dave Newsom will be the appropriate person to handle these. Marcos also showed a pronounced interest in moving in GOP-Embassy channel to settle several secondary issues immediately. This I believe would be helpful in order to remove some highly visible irritants from the situation, as long as it can be done in full cooperation with our military. It was interesting to note that his own Cabinet members were clearly more resistant than he was to this approach.
7. The mood and tone of the meetings was extremely friendly, except during the human rights discussion. Marcos has clearly lowered [Page 992] his sights from what they were a year ago, and wants to make a deal more than he did in the past. In this sense our strategy over last eight months has had some beneficial effects.
8. In reference to the idea of inviting Romulo to meet with the President during UNGA, I think that to make such an invitation tomorrow would be premature.
9. I advised Marcos of U.S. decision to make available to GOP an additional $30 million FMS for FY 77 program as one-time exception and made all the points agreed to in our discussions prior to departure. Stull Unqte
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Far East, Box 11, 9–11/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from the copy received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 296.↩