18. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
Washington, December 1, 1977
SUBJECT
- Holbrooke’s Negotiating
Instructions for His December 7, 1977 Meeting with the
Vietnamese
Attached at Tab A is Secretary Vance’s recommendations with regard to Vietnam.
Holbrooke meets December 7
with the Vietnamese in Paris. The session grows out of his October 3
UNGA session with Hanoi Vice
Foreign Minister Nguyen Co
Thach.2 At that time, Thach stated, “(A)bout relations between our country and
your country, before reaching diplomatic relations there might be a step
of another kind.”
Please note that State recommends a shift from our previous position.
State now proposes that in addition to our current offer (dropping of
the embargo upon establishment of embassies) we provide a second
alternative: opening of interest sections with no modification in the
embargo.
My concern about State’s recommendation is a very simple one: this
initiative gains us nothing internationally, while conceivably costing
us domestically. Accordingly, I would recommend no change in our
position for the time being.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you instruct the State Department to maintain our current
negotiating position with respect to the Vietnamese (dropping of the
embargo upon establishment of embassies).3
If, however, you decide to accept State’s recommendation to provide the
second alternative (opening of interest sections with no modification in
the embargo), I have these recommendations for you to make to Vance concerning the Paris meeting:
1. That Holbrooke be encouraged
not to be overly appreciative of any positive Vietnamese responses
concerning the three American
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yachtmen they now hold. We need not praise them for civilized
behavior.4
2. That Holbrooke be encouraged
not to table the interest section proposal if the Vietnamese abuse the
United States in their initial presentation—something Hanoi is unlikely
to do. It would be demeaning for us to be forthcoming a second time if
the Vietnamese scorn us.5
3. That Holbrooke be encouraged
clearly to leave the ball in Vietnam’s court at the end of the meeting,
by telling them we have now made two offers and we will meet with them
when they are ready to accept one of our alternatives or have a concrete
reasonable proposal to make of their own. I see no reason why the burden
should always be ours to make the proposals.6
Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter7
Washington, November 29, 1977
SUBJECT
- US-Vietnamese Talks in
Paris
Dick Holbrooke will be
leaving for Paris Monday to begin the third round of normalization
talks with the Vietnamese on December 7.8 I do not
expect this round of talks to reach agreement, but it is important
to proceed with the discussions while protecting ourselves from any
domestic repercussions.
Since the last meeting (June),9 the Vietnamese have become more interested
in improving relations with the U.S. In Holbrooke’s secret meetings in New York, they
suggested that we explore forms of representation short of full
normalization (exchange of embassies), and asked us to use
“imagination” in resolving our respective “political” difficulties.
Without abandoning their position on aid, the Vietnamese now seem to
recognize three things: that they will not get it; that they need
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a relationship far more
than we do; and that we are under no domestic pressure to
normalize.
There are, of course, serious problems with Congressional reaction to
anything involving Vietnam and we do not wish to offer the
Vietnamese concessions or modify substantially our basic position.
However, it is important to keep open the possibility for progress
in future meetings. Vietnam, the 16th most populous country in the
world, is already a major factor in Southeast Asia, and it is not in
our interest to slip back into the pattern of animosity which
existed prior to January 20, and which our actions have somewhat
reduced despite Congressional constraints. In preparing this memo, we took in-depth soundings with
carefully selected members of Congress to determine possible
reactions to various negotiating scenarios.
Subject to your confirmation, I believe Dick should negotiate along
the following lines:
—Basic Position: We would repeat our earlier
(and publicly-known) position: that we are ready to exchange
Ambassadors and lift the trade embargo. We would continue to reject
flatly the notion of an aid “obligation.” We would explain our
problems with indirect aid and how we have chosen to deal with
them.
—Brillig: If the case of the three young
American yachtsmen held by Vietnam since October 12 is not on the
way to resolution by the time talks begin, Dick would raise this
matter in his initial statement. We are informing the Vietnamese in
advance that this will be the first order of business, and that it
seriously affects our relations. (We have had a number of
Congressional queries on this.)
—Levels of Representation: While not accepting
our position, the Vietnamese may respond with an offer to exchange
trade offices or some non-diplomatic form of representation,
presumably on condition that we lift the trade embargo. We would
reject any such offer, but, subject to the qualification in the next
paragraph, say we would consider establishment of (1) interests
section or (2) consulates (both of which are important steps but
short of full diplomatic relations) without
lifting the embargo. It would be valuable to have a lesser form of
representation in Hanoi as long as we maintain the embargo intact as
a bargaining chip in moving up to embassy level later. It is likely
that the Vietnamese will not accept this proposal, but if they
reject it, we will have made a constructive proposal which leaves
the door open to future discussion. Even if they were unexpectedly
to indicate acceptance, we would make no announcement in Paris, but
ask Dick to return to Washington for additional consultation with us
and with Congress before deciding how best to make an
announcement.
I prefer interests sections. Congress is accustomed to the idea of
interests sections for countries where we consider the political
relation
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ship not good
enough to warrant an embassy. After the United States and several
Arab countries broke diplomatic relations in 1967 (and Congress
passed a resolution endorsing this break), the United States had an
autonomous, fully operational interests section in Cairo until
diplomatic relations were finally restored in 1974. We opened an
autonomous interests section in Syria in 1974, followed by
diplomatic relations. We have or have had interests sections in a
number of other countries (including Cuba). There have been no
negative Congressional reactions to any of these, including the
Cuban arrangement.
Our consultations with the Hill indicate wide-spread support for this
approach—in fact, it was preferred to our original offer by everyone
we talked to because it did not yet lift the trade embargo and did
not mean full recognition.
—MIAs: We
will continue to press for more information. However, I do not
expect the Vietnamese to give us much additional information at the
next round.
Recommendation:
That you approve the negotiating strategy set forth above.10
