A State paper which served as the basis for the discussion is
attached.
Attachment
Memorandum From the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee
Affairs (Clark) to Vice
President Mondale3
Washington, June 18, 1979
SUBJECT
1. Current Situation
The refugee population in Southeast Asian countries of first asylum
now exceeds 330,000 (170,000 in Thailand; 78,000 in Malaysia; 52,000
in Hong Kong; 34,000 in Indonesia; 6,000 in the Philippines). In May
alone, about 65,000 new refugees arrived, including 59,000 “boat
people” from Vietnam and 6,000 “land refugees” from Laos. In
addition, about 90,000 “new Khmer” fled Cambodia, but one-half of
them have already been forcibly repatriated by the Thai, and the
remainder face a similar threat.
The character of the refugee flow has changed since April 1978 as a
result of Hanoi’s decision to register and deport large groups of
its population to barren “new economic zones” in Vietnam.4 Many Vietnamese chose to flee by boat
rather than face what Le Monde has called “Gulag Vietnam.” Hanoi is
now offering its entire ethnic Chinese population the choice of
domestic deportation or departure by boat (with exit fees ranging up
to $3,000 per adult). Two-thirds or more of the refugees now fleeing
from Vietnam, and many Cambodian refugees, are ethnic Chinese.
Refugee arrivals are now exceeding departures by six to one.
First-asylum countries thus see themselves threatened with large,
indigestible, permanent additions of Vietnamese/Chinese. In
response, they have strengthened their defenses against this influx.
Indonesia and Malaysia have announced they will not take any new
boat arrivals. Thailand is forcibly repatriating 80–90,000
Kampuchean refugees and refusing sanctuary to new boat arrivals.
These actions will probably
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moderate, but only a strong positive response by the
international community both in pressuring Vietnam and providing
stepped-up resettlement can prevent massive loss of life. Hong Kong
remains open but is under severe pressure as it receives 2,000 new
refugees a day (many from north Vietnam).
2. The Proposed International Conference
British Prime Minister Thatcher asked UN
Secretary General Waldheim
to convene an international conference to draw public attention to
the reprehensible nature of Vietnam’s policies, highlight the
magnitude of the refugee problem, and encourage other countries to
increase their acceptance of refugees. We have strongly endorsed
this initiative, and the initial response by most governments has
been positive.
There is no consensus yet on the forum or site for the conference,
but there is agreement by Waldheim and UN High
Commissioner for Refugees Hartling to a two stage approach separating
political from humanitarian issues. We believe the first step should
be an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to
consider the tensions in the Southeast Asian region and the
Vietnamese policies that cause them, despite the risks of a Soviet
veto or addition of other refugee questions to the agenda. Having
highlighted the political issues in the Security Council, we would
seek authorization for the Secretary General to convene a special
follow-on international conference (or, much less desirably, a
special session of the United Nations General Assembly) to address
the practical issues of greater resettlement opportunities, vastly
increased financial support for the care and maintenance of the
burgeoning camp population, creation of more refugee processing
centers (RPC) in Southeast Asia to
relieve the burdens on the countries of first asylum, and
reaffirmation of the principle of first asylum. Waldheim seems inclined to a July
19 meeting in Geneva.5
The President’s talks with Japanese leaders and other participants at
the Tokyo Economic Summit,6 followed by Secretary
Vance’s meetings with
ASEAN and ANZUS,7 offer an excellent opportunity
to enlist and coordinate broad support for a series of urgent
actions (Canada and Japan have already indicated their intention to
raise the refugee issue at the Tokyo Summit). We want to achieve a
strong consensus
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not only
on the idea of a Security Council meeting followed by an
international conference, but also greatly increased participation
by the Tokyo participants in resettlement and financial
contributions. With ASEAN, we
will want to stress their renewed commitment to first asylum.
3. Pressure on Vietnam
Specifically, we want Vietnam to: cooperate with resettlement
countries and the UNHCR in
processing people for orderly direct departure from Vietnam at a
rate at which they can be absorbed by the international community;
treat all its citizens in accordance with the UN Charter so that they do not feel
compelled to risk their lives by fleeing in small boats; cease
abusing those who have expressed a wish to leave so that they can
live under bearable conditions while awaiting departure.
Vietnamese tactics and statements have sought to convey flexibility,
but their actions in promoting the outflow from their country have
remained unchanged over the past eight months.
Two types of international pressure may hold some promise, even
though the Vietnamese have proven extremely resistant to pressure of
all types in the past.
The Vietnamese might respond if the international community can be
mobilized to apply economic pressure. Aid donors might be induced to
shift resources from development projects to support for refugees,
whether inside Vietnam, in temporary asylum, or in resettlement
countries. In 1978, multilateral assistance to Vietnam amounted to
$150 million; in addition bilateral aid was $130 million
(principally from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Japan).
The impact of such economic sanctions would be enhanced if combined
with an outcry of international public opinion, including
denunciations by key Asian governments and the Nordics against the
inhumanity of the Vietnamese. But, psychological factors aside,
neither foreign aid nor trade is essential to Vietnam’s current
military activity in Kampuchea or build-up against China. The Soviet
Union can easily offset any financial loss to Hanoi. International
pressure would be of greatest effect if it stresses that the Soviets
must share responsibility and opprobrium with Vietnam.
4. Increased International Efforts
At present, about 10,500 refugees are being resettled each month
(7,000 to the U.S., 3,500 to other countries), but monthly arrivals
now exceed 60,000. Though most resettlement countries plan to
continue programs, commitments are made ad
hoc or annually. UN High
Commissioner Hartling has a
proposal, with specific targets for countries,
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to double the total number of
resettlements. This should be a centerpiece of the international
conference. In addition to increasing resettlement opportunities in
Western Europe and other traditional resettlement countries, the
proposed conference might, therefore, consider creating an
international fund to promote resettlement of refugees in developing
countries, and to underwrite economic development projects based on
refugee labor. Some Latin American countries have expressed interest
in this idea. Capitalization of the fund would probably have to be
about $500 million. Such an approach would, however, yield only
limited results in the short term.
Inevitably we are being drawn towards efforts to persuade the PRC to take more refugees, either
permanently or temporarily. Some Southeast Asian countries have
begun to discuss this with the PRC.
The PRC has already taken about
230,000 Chinese and claims it continues to take about 10,000 per
month. If we wish to see a substantial increase, we must consider
financial aid, probably through the UNHCR, for resettlement in the PRC. We would have to agree to take some refugees with
past associations with the U.S. from among those going to the PRC. A collateral PRC contribution could be
establishment of a very large temporary asylum camp in the PRC for refugees awaiting onward
resettlement.
Should refugee flows continue anywhere near current levels, and first
asylum continue to be granted by the ASEAN nations and Hong Kong, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’
costs for feeding, clothing and sheltering refugees in Southeast
Asia will rise sharply. The conference would, therefore, have to
address the question of how to raise an additional $300 to $400
million for these purposes.
Finally, in order to bridge the gap between the rate of permanent
resettlement and the numbers in the camps, there is an urgent need
to follow up on the ASEAN/UNHCR-sponsored Jakarta conference
agreement of May 158 to establish one or more island
Refugee Processing Centers (RPC).
An RPC is an area in which the
international community can hold refugees until they can be
resettled, while relieving the pressure on first asylum. Thus,
resettlement countries must be able to make at least generalized
long-term commitments on resettlement rates. Indonesia has agreed to
establish one RPC to accommodate an
initial population of 10,000 refugees, against U.S. and Australian
assurances that they will accept the inhabitants of the center in a
reasonable time (three years). The ASEAN nations must be encouraged to offer additional
and larger island center sites.
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5. U.S. Resources
The U.S. refugee program for Indochinese is currently processing an
average of 7,000 Indochinese per month through FY 1979 to be resettled in the U.S. The
President has authorized a budget request for FY–1980 which would continue this rate
through FY–1980, but he has
indicated his desire to review this rate before the start of the
fiscal year. The direct costs of this U.S. resettlement program in
FY–1980 will be $244.3 million
($95.3 million to the Department of State for screening,
transportation, and resettlement and placement grants to voluntary
agencies; and $149 million to the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare for public assistance, medicaid and other social
services). It is clear that our projected resettlement rate of 7,000
per month will not be enough to persuade other countries to do more.
We must therefore seriously consider responding positively to High
Commissioner Poul Hartling’s
suggestion that we increase our rate to 10,000 per month, while
supporting him in his efforts to seek significantly larger increases
from others. Such an increase would add $41 million in State
Department costs and $45 million to HEW costs each year.
UNHCR care and maintenance costs
for expanding refugee population may quadruple in the coming year.
We have had a policy of contributing 50 percent of these costs.
There is no alternative to continuing this policy if we wish others
to commit themselves to quadruple their own contributions. We
estimate that this could involve an FY–1980 budget amendment of as much as $175 million, in
addition to substantial amounts (perhaps $50 million from the U.S.)
required to expand the system of Refugee Processing Centers. We will
have to move quickly to define and submit a budget amendment. Costs
are rising so rapidly that the UNHCR effort would be in danger of bankruptcy if we
waited for a supplemental in 1980.
Finally, the agreement between the UNHCR and Hanoi on direct departures from Vietnam for
family reunification9 (the only present alternative to the
unregulated human flood in Southeast Asia) raises serious policy and
financial issues. We initially saw this family reunification program
as an immigration rather than a refugee program, which would leave
the costs of transportation and resettlement in the U.S. to the
families concerned, rather than the U.S. Government. However, this
would be contrary to policies followed on refugees received directly
from the Soviet Union. In any case, most Vietnamese in this country
will be eligible for citizenship next summer. In the interim, they
will not be able to qualify their relatives for admission
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under the Immigration and
Nationality Act. When they do acquire citizenship, quota
restrictions will quickly be exceeded and the flow of immigrants
from Vietnam will be shut off. In addition, any significant direct
flow from Vietnam could generate welfare costs for which the states
would insist on reimbursement. Thus, we must give serious
consideration to changes in policy and law if we are not to be
vulnerable to charges from Hanoi that we have failed to facilitate
the humane emigration we claim to seek.
